In OCCA case No. RE-2011-249, the appellant appealed his conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree and causing an accident resulting in great bodily injury while driving under the influence. In a published decision, the court decided that the order revoking the appellant's suspended sentence was an abuse of discretion and modified the sentence to time served. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. M-2009-1146, Ronald Dean Gallaway appealed his conviction for Driving while Impaired (Count 1). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but reversed the sentence and ordered a remand for resentencing. One judge dissented. Gallaway was tried in Texas County for two offenses: Driving while Impaired and Speeding. The jury found him guilty of the lesser offense of Driving while Impaired and decided on a sentence of six months in jail and a $500 fine for that charge, plus a $200 fine for speeding. Gallaway's appeal focused on two main issues. First, he argued that the breath test results should not have been allowed in the trial because the proper procedures for administering the tests were not followed. However, the court found that even if this was an error, it was harmless because the evidence from the trial was still strong enough to support the conviction for Driving while Impaired. The jury chose not to convict Gallaway for the more serious charge of Driving under the Influence, which would have required reliance on the breath test results. Second, Gallaway claimed that his sentence was incorrect because the court did not follow the rules regarding alcohol assessments. The law requires that an alcohol and drug assessment be done before sentencing and that the recommendations from this assessment be included as part of the sentence. The court found that while an assessment was done, the judge did not include all of the recommended conditions in the sentence. As a result, the court decided to reverse the sentence and send the case back for resentencing in accordance with the law. Gallaway was given the opportunity to request an order to suspend part of his sentence during this new hearing.
In OCCA case No. F-2009-959, the appellant appealed his conviction for driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm most of the lower court's decisions while modifying one of the fines imposed. One member dissented. Napoleon Eugene Manous was tried by jury in the District Court of Okmulgee County, where he was found guilty of two counts: one for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and another for driving with his license suspended. The jury sentenced him to seven years in prison with treatment and a fine for the first count, and to six months in jail with a fine for the second count. Mr. Manous raised several points in his appeal. He claimed his rights were violated in a few ways. For instance, he argued that statements he made while in custody should not have been used against him because he did not receive a warning that he had the right to remain silent (known as a Miranda warning). The court found that the statements were not obtained from police questioning, so they could be used in his trial. He also argued that hearsay evidence was wrongly allowed in his trial. However, the court found that this evidence was not used to prove something true but was only to explain why the police officer acted as he did. Therefore, it did not violate his right to a fair trial. Manous believed he did not get a fair punishment because of incorrect jury instructions about fines for his second count. The court agreed that the jury got bad information about how much they could fine him and decided to change the fine amount to $300 instead of $500. He argued that the trial court misapplied his sentence and didn’t accurately reflect the jury’s decision. The court acknowledged this mistake and agreed to correct the written judgment to match the jury’s decisions. Moreover, Manous claimed that mentioning his past legal troubles during sentencing was unfair. The court, however, found that his lawyer did not object to this at the trial, which weakened his argument on appeal. He also stated his lawyer did not properly fight against the errors during the trial that affected his sentencing. Again, the court found that many issues had already been addressed and it was not enough to have his conviction overturned. Lastly, he combined all his complaints, arguing that they collectively warranted a new trial, but the court ruled that there was no significant accumulation of errors. In summary, the court affirmed much of the initial decisions made by the lower court but did make changes to the fine in one count. One judge disagreed with part of the decision but largely supported the overall outcome.
In OCCA case No. C-2010-287, Juan Carlos Hernandez-Montanez appealed his conviction for multiple crimes including Second Degree Burglary, Kidnapping, and Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to modify his ten-year sentence for Second Degree Burglary to seven years but upheld the rest of the convictions and sentencing. One judge dissented regarding the review process. Hernandez-Montanez was initially charged with many serious crimes but agreed to a plea deal that changed the charges. He pleaded guilty to the amended counts and was sentenced to serve a total of time in prison and jail. After a short period, he wanted to take back his guilty plea, claiming it wasn't done correctly. The case was reviewed, and the court looked closely at the reasons Hernandez-Montanez gave for wanting to withdraw his plea. He said his ten-year sentence was too long and that the court did not fully check if he understood his guilty plea. He also claimed he did not get proper help from his attorney during the process. After reviewing everything, the court found that Hernandez-Montanez's arguments did not hold up. They decided that there was a good reason to accept his guilty plea and that he understood what he was doing. The court modified one part of his sentence but left the rest as it was. The judges agreed on most points, but one judge had a different opinion about some legal processes.
In OCCA case No. J-2010-653, the appellant appealed his conviction for multiple charges, including arson and assault on a police officer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the juvenile court's order certifying the appellant as an adult. Two justices dissented. The appellant, who was around seventeen-and-a-half years old at the time of the incidents, faced serious charges, including arson and endangering human life. The state wanted to treat him as an adult, and a judge agreed to this on June 25, 2010. However, the appellant's defense argued that the state did not provide clear and convincing evidence to support this decision. During the appeal, the court examined whether the evidence justified treating the appellant as an adult. The judges noted that the law allows for such decisions only in exceptional cases, where a child is deemed not able to benefit from rehabilitation provided in juvenile programs. The appellant's side argued that he was receptive to treatment, as shown by his actions post-incident. He was receiving proper medical treatment after struggling with prescription medication and alcohol use, and he was advancing in his rehabilitation efforts. The justices found that the evidence presented showed the appellant was amenable to treatment and could be rehabilitated if kept within the juvenile system. The court emphasized that just because the acts committed were serious does not mean the child should be treated as an adult without proper evidence. Ultimately, the appeal resulted in the reversal of the certification order, meaning the appellant should not be treated as an adult and should be retained in the juvenile system. The dissenting opinions raised concerns about the risks of letting the appellant remain a juvenile, suggesting that not treating him as an adult could endanger the community given the serious nature of his actions. They believed that the judge's original decision should have been upheld. In conclusion, the majority opinion favored rehabilitation over punishment as an adult, highlighting the importance of the juvenile justice system's focus on the potential for reform and supervision.
In OCCA case No. F-2007-1133, Jona Ann Montgomery appealed her conviction for Second Degree Murder and Leaving the Scene of a Fatality Accident. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for Second Degree Murder and affirmed the conviction for Leaving the Scene of a Fatality Accident. One judge dissented. Jona Ann Montgomery was tried in Pittsburg County for her involvement in a tragic incident where she hit two children with her car while speeding near a crowded football game. The younger child, a ten-year-old girl, unfortunately died, while her brother survived. After the accident, Montgomery left the scene but left behind her belongings in the car. The main issue in Montgomery's appeal was the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the possibility of a lesser charge known as Misdemeanor Manslaughter. Initially, the law at the time of Montgomery's trial did not permit this instruction, and her attorney argued against it. However, shortly after the trial, a higher court changed its stance on this law, ruling that driving while impaired could indeed be used for a Misdemeanor Manslaughter charge. Montgomery argued that she should receive a new trial based on this new rule. The court reviewed the situation and agreed that the trial court had made a mistake by not allowing the jury to consider this lesser charge. They believed that a fair jury could have potentially found Montgomery guilty of Misdemeanor Manslaughter instead of Second Degree Murder, given the circumstances of the case. Montgomery also raised concerns about other evidence that was presented during her trial. This included items found in her vehicle that were linked to drug use and remarks made during the trial suggesting she showed no remorse for her actions. The court found that much of this evidence was not necessary and could unfairly bias the jury against Montgomery. The decision ultimately led to the reversal of her conviction for Second Degree Murder because of the instructional error on Misdemeanor Manslaughter, while they upheld the conviction for Leaving the Scene of a Fatality Accident. The judges aimed to ensure that future trials would avoid the errors found in Montgomery's case.
In OCCA case No. F-2008-963, Richard Lloyd VanMeter appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor-Second Offense and multiple new charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the termination of his participation in the DUI/Drug Court Program and vacate his convictions, instructing to reinstate him in the program based on the conditions of his plea agreement. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2008-329, the appellant appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, Possession of Controlled Substance, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and Driving a Motor Vehicle while Under the Influence of Alcohol and Drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that because there was no record showing that the appellant waived his right to a jury trial, his conviction must be overturned and he is entitled to a new trial. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2006-1168, Steven Allen Flynn, Jr. appealed his conviction for Second-Degree Felony Murder, Concealing Stolen Property, Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine), Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Marijuana), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions for Concealing Stolen Property, Possession of Methamphetamine, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. However, they modified his conviction for Second-Degree Felony Murder to First Degree Manslaughter While Driving Under the Influence and reduced his sentence to twenty years. The court also reversed the conviction for Possession of Marijuana with instructions to dismiss the case. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-785, Charles Milton Smith, Sr., and in case No. F-2005-786, Bonnie Smith appealed their convictions for multiple crimes. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse their convictions and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Charles Milton Smith, Sr. was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance (methamphetamine), child endangerment, and possession of a controlled substance. Bonnie Smith faced similar charges for manufacturing a controlled substance and child endangerment. During the trial, both were found guilty of the charges against them. The jury recommended sentences that included lengthy prison time and substantial fines. However, they claimed that their rights were violated because they did not have court-appointed lawyers. Initially, they were considered unable to afford an attorney, but after someone paid their bond, the trial court ruled that they were no longer indigent and had to represent themselves, which they argued was not fair. The court looked closely at whether the trial court properly assessed their financial situation before denying them their right to legal representation. They pointed out that just because bond was posted, it does not automatically mean someone can afford a lawyer. The court found that there was no record showing that the trial court had properly checked their financial status or informed them that they might still qualify for a lawyer. Since having a lawyer is essential for a fair trial, the court reversed the Smiths' convictions and ordered a new trial where they would have a chance to properly have legal representation.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-427, Emily Michelle Dowdy appealed her conviction for First-Degree Manslaughter. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm her conviction but modified her sentence to twenty-five years imprisonment. One judge dissented from the decision to modify the sentence. Emily was charged after a fatal car accident that resulted in the death of another driver, Ryan Brewer. Emily's blood test later showed a high blood alcohol concentration, indicating she was driving under the influence. In her defense, she claimed she was involuntarily intoxicated, suggesting that she may have been given a drug without her knowledge, such as GHB or rohypnol, often associated with date-rape cases. Emily argued that she could not remember what happened after she took a friend to her car at a bar. The trial included a significant amount of expert testimony regarding the effects of GHB, but the state argued that Emily was likely just drunk from alcohol. Various witnesses testified about her drinking at the bar that night and her generally good driving record. On appeal, Emily raised several arguments regarding the fairness of her trial, alleging ineffective assistance of her counsel, improper admission of certain evidence regarding her character, and comments made by the prosecutor. The court reviewed testimony regarding whether Emily had been properly advised about her rights during police questioning and whether any misconduct had affected the jurors' views. After thorough review, the court concluded that the trial was fair overall, although it noted that one witness's hearsay testimony, which was not properly admissible, could have potentially influenced the jury's view of Emily. Ultimately, this led to a modification of her sentence, although the conviction itself remained intact. The dissenting judge felt that the original forty-year sentence was appropriate and did not believe that the limited hearsay testimony had a significant impact on the final outcome.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-859, Percy Dewayne Cato appealed his conviction for driving under the influence, driving with a suspended license, and speeding. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions, but modified one of the fines. One judge dissented. Percy Cato was found guilty by a jury for three different offenses. The first was driving under the influence, which was more serious because he had two previous DUI convictions. The jury gave him a punishment that included time in prison and other conditions like treatment and community service. He was sentenced to a total of four and a half years, with some of that time suspended, meaning he would only serve three years in prison and spend time on probation afterwards. Cato claimed the instructions given to the jury about his previous DUI convictions were wrong, saying they should have been told that one of those convictions couldn't be used to give him a harsher punishment. The court found that this mistake did not harm Cato; he still received a fair punishment based on his actions. He also argued that the way his punishment was split between prison time and treatment violated the law. However, the court ruled that this was okay because the law allows for a mix of punishment and rehabilitation for DUI cases. Cato requested that the jury be told how to consider evidence showing he refused to take a breath or blood test. Although the court said this type of instruction is important, they did not find it necessary in Cato's case because he couldn't prove that it affected the outcome of his trial. In summary, the court upheld the main parts of Cato's punishment while making a small change to one of the fines. The decision was mostly in favor of maintaining his convictions, showing the court believed that the jury's decision was fair and just.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-1176, Rollie Mack Francis appealed his conviction for multiple crimes, including eluding a police officer and assault with a dangerous weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify one of his sentences but affirmed the other convictions. The court agreed with the state that there was an error in how a fine was considered in one of the counts, changing it to a $500 fine. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-700, Harry Oliver West appealed his conviction for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and Driving While License is Canceled/Suspended/Revoked. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and send the case back for a new trial. One judge dissented. West was found guilty by a jury, which decided that he should serve a total of 45 years in prison for the first offense and 1 year for the second offense, with some fines included as well. However, during the trial, the jury was not given proper instructions about what driving under the influence and driving while impaired mean. Even though West did not ask for these instructions, the court agreed that this was a significant mistake that affected the case. Due to this error, the court found that West deserved another chance to have his case heard, which means a new trial will take place. As a result, the decisions made in the trial are reversed, and the case gets remanded, which means it goes back to the lower court for a fresh start.
In OCCA case No. S-2005-840, #Ranney appealed his conviction for #driving under the influence and driving with a revoked license. In an (unpublished) decision, the court decided to deny Ranney's motion to dismiss the State's appeal. The court remanded the case back to the District Court with instructions to vacate its order that had previously granted Ranney's motions to suppress evidence and quash the charging information. #One judge dissented. The case began when Ranney was accused of hitting a sign in a convenience store parking lot while possibly being drunk. The police officer noticed things like the smell of alcohol and Ranney's slurred speech. Ranney admitted to drinking beer when the officer questioned him. At a preliminary hearing, Ranney tried to get his statements thrown out, but that motion was denied. Later, at a different hearing, Ranney asked again to have his statements and the charges dismissed. He argued he wasn't free to go when the officer spoke to him and that his statements were made because he felt pressured. He also claimed the officer didn’t have a good reason to come up and question him. The judge, after considering the situation, decided to grant Ranney’s request without explaining why. This left everyone confused about the reasons behind the decision. The State then asked the judge for a written explanation, but she didn’t respond. The State decided to appeal her decision, but Ranney argued that the appeal should be dismissed because there were no clear reasons from the judge about her ruling. While the court agreed there was a problem with the record, they didn’t think the State should be punished because it was mainly the judge’s fault for not providing explanations. So, the court ordered the case to go back to the lower court. They said the District Court should take away its previous decision and then handle Ranney's motions again, this time making sure to provide clear reasons for any new decisions.
In OCCA case No. C-2005-78, Allen Eugene McCarthy appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence and other related charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant McCarthy's request to withdraw his guilty plea for the DUI charge only, while affirming the rest of his sentence. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. M-2004-802, the appellant appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Marijuana). In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant was stopped by a police officer early in the morning because his car was parked in a lot with its lights on, near a closed restaurant. The officer got suspicious due to a series of burglaries happening in the area recently. When the officer approached the car, it began to move. The officer then decided to stop the vehicle to ask what the appellant was doing there. During the trial, the appellant argued that the stop was illegal. He believed that the officer did not have enough reason to suspect that he was doing something wrong. The officer admitted during the hearing that he did not know for sure if the appellant was involved in criminal activity when he made the stop. The court reviewed the situation and concluded that the officer did not have a good reason to think the appellant was doing anything suspicious. They pointed out that the appellant's actions could easily be seen as innocent. The conclusion was that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion, which is necessary to make a legal stop, and therefore the evidence collected after the stop should not have been used against the appellant. Ultimately, the court reversed the conviction, meaning that the case would not proceed further and the appellant's charges would be dismissed. One judge disagreed with the decision, arguing that the officer had good reasons to make the stop based on the circumstances around the time and location.
In OCCA case No. M 2004-0742, the appellant appealed his conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicants and failure to wear a seat belt. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the decision and dismiss the case. One judge dissented. The case involved an appellant who was stopped by a police officer for not wearing a seat belt. The officer did not see the appellant driving erratically. However, the officer noticed that the appellant smelled like beer and had bloodshot eyes. The appellant told the officer he had consumed three or more beers, but the officer did not ask how long ago he had been drinking. During the trial, it became clear that the judge did not properly define what under the influence meant according to the law. The judge misunderstood that for someone to be considered under the influence, their ability to drive must be affected. This misunderstanding is very important because it means the trial didn't follow legal rules which are necessary for a fair judgment. Because of the mistake in understanding the law, the court decided that the evidence wasn't enough to support the appellant's conviction for driving under the influence. As a result, they overturned the conviction and directed the lower court to dismiss the case. This means that the appellant's conviction is no longer valid, and there will be no punishment against him for the charges.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-198, Clonnie A. Layman appealed his conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs (methamphetamine) and driving under the influence of alcohol. In a published decision, the court decided that Layman was entitled to a new trial because the trial court made a mistake by allowing the exclusion of a minority juror without a valid reason. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. RE-2003-918, the appellant appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence (DUI). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the order that terminated him from the Drug Court program. One judge dissented. The case began on April 10, 2002, when the appellant pleaded no contest to a DUI charge. He was given a suspended sentence, meaning he would not serve time in prison if he followed the rules. He also had to pay a fine and do community service. Later, he faced another DUI charge. He pleaded guilty again with a promise that if he successfully completed the Drug Court program, he wouldn’t have to face further charges for the first DUI. However, on May 1, 2003, the State accused him of violating the terms of the Drug Court program. The State claimed he had been sanctioned multiple times for not following the rules. On August 5, 2003, the court decided to revoke his suspended sentence and ended his participation in the Drug Court program. The appellant believed the court made a mistake by terminating him from Drug Court based on violations he had already been punished for. He felt this was unfair and argued it amounted to double jeopardy, which means being punished twice for the same offense. The State argued that they were not punishing him again for those violations but believed that the sanctions had not helped him change his behavior. The court examined the situation and found that the appellant had already faced consequences for his earlier violations. It agreed with him that the reasons for his termination were flawed. The judges noted that if prior violations were allowed to be counted again for the same termination, it would be unfair and might discourage other participants in Drug Court. The court decided to remand the case back to the lower court, allowing the appellant to return to the Drug Court program with the original rules he had agreed upon. The judges highlighted that a new violation must occur in order for more severe actions, like termination, to be taken. In summary, the court ruled in favor of the appellant, indicating that the reasons for his termination from Drug Court were not valid, thus restoring his opportunity to complete the program.
In OCCA case No. M-2002-1195, Anita Shank appealed her conviction for Driving Under the Influence, Transporting an Open Container of Beer, and Obstructing an Officer. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm her convictions for Transporting an Open Container and Obstructing an Officer, but modified her Driving Under the Influence conviction to Driving While Impaired and remanded the case for sentence modification. One judge dissented. Anita Shank was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol, transporting open containers of beer, and obstructing an officer during her trial. She received a 90-day sentence for driving under the influence and fines for the other two charges. Shank contested her convictions on several grounds, claiming the evidence was insufficient and arguing errors regarding jury instructions and sentencing. During the trial, it was noted that Shank was stopped by a sheriff's deputy while she was driving and had an open container of beer in her car. The deputy observed signs of intoxication, like bloodshot eyes. Shank admitted to drinking two beers but refused to take a breathalyzer test. When questioned about the whereabouts of her child, she lied and was uncooperative. The court found that there was enough evidence to support her conviction for driving under the influence but acknowledged that the jury should have been instructed on the possibility of a lesser offense—Driving While Impaired. The state agreed that not instructing on this was an error, although they deemed it harmless. Additionally, Shank argued the trial court should have considered a suspended sentence for her. The record did not show that the court completely ignored this request, but the judge did express a need for proof of her willingness to enter treatment for alcohol issues. After the appeal, it was revealed that Shank completed the treatment program, prompting the court to order the lower court to consider this when evaluating her suspended sentence request. The court upheld the obstruction conviction, stating that her deliberate lies and refusal to cooperate with the deputy interfered with the execution of his duties, which constitutes sufficient grounds for the charge. In conclusion, while Shank's obstruction of an officer and open container convictions were affirmed, her DUI was modified to a lesser charge of DWI, and the court directed the district court to revisit her request for a suspended sentence.
In OCCA case No. C-2003-31, Nemol Joe Fox appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor, Second or Subsequent Offense, and misdemeanor Driving Under Revocation. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari. One judge dissented. Mr. Fox entered a plea of nolo contendere, which means he did not admit guilt but accepted the punishment. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, with five years suspended, plus fines for both charges. He later asked to withdraw his plea, saying he didn’t fully understand what he was agreeing to. The court found that Mr. Fox was not properly advised about the option of treatment for his drinking problem, which is allowed under the law for such cases. Because of this, the court decided that his plea should be allowed to be withdrawn. The original sentence was reversed, and Mr. Fox was granted another chance to address these issues. One judge disagreed, stating that the trial court likely considered all options, including treatment, when deciding on the sentence. The dissenting judge felt that Mr. Fox should not get to change his plea because he and his lawyer had not raised this issue earlier in court. Overall, the main decision was that Mr. Fox did not get the fair chance he should have had to understand his options, specifically regarding treatment for his alcohol issues.
In OCCA case No. M-2002-263, #1 appealed his conviction for #2. In a published decision, the court decided #3. #4 dissented. In this case, the appellant, who we will call #1, had several legal issues. He was found guilty of different crimes related to driving, like drinking and driving and having an open container of alcohol in his car. Because of these convictions, he received various punishments, including jail time and fines. #1 claimed that he should not have been punished multiple times for what he did, saying it violated his rights. He also believed that the punishment he received was too harsh and did not follow the law. The court looked at everything and decided that #1's convictions were valid and should stay. However, they also believed that the sentences should be changed. Instead of the original punishments, they modified them to be a total of 60 days, and all fines and costs were put on hold. This was a fair decision considering the circumstances, and it meant that #1 would not have to serve as much time as originally decided. The decision seemed mostly agreed upon by the judges, but one judge thought differently and did not agree with the majority's opinion.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-1444, the appellant appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (2nd offense) and Driving While Privilege Suspended. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for Driving Under the Influence and ordered a new trial with proper instructions. The judgment for Driving While Privilege Suspended was affirmed. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-1061, Gibbs appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor, Second or Subsequent Offense. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentence to eight years in prison. One judge dissented. Gibbs was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to ten years, along with a fine and recommended counseling. Gibbs argued that the evidence against him wasn't enough to convict him. However, the court found the evidence sufficient to support the conviction. Gibbs' defense claimed he wasn’t driving under the influence; he said his car’s accelerator stuck and that someone gave him a ride home. He also stated that his sister saw him drinking at home. The prosecutor, during the trial, made errors when questioning Gibbs about the burden of proof and his rights. Even though there were issues with the prosecutor's comments, the court believed these mistakes did not greatly affect the overall outcome of the case. While the conviction remained, the court decided to lessen Gibbs' sentence due to the errors noted during the trial.