In OCCA case No. RE 2010-0600, Beau Ashley Kifer appealed his conviction for lewd molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentences for two of the counts but reversed the revocation for the other two counts because the court did not have the authority to act on those counts since the sentences had already expired. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2009-385, Jeffrey Eugene Rowan appealed his conviction for Child Sexual Abuse by a Person Responsible for a Child's Health, Safety, or Welfare. In a published decision, the court decided to grant Rowan's motion for a new trial and dismissed the appeal because the case would be retried. One judge dissented. Rowan was convicted in the District Court of Pittsburg County and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison. His conviction was based on various testimonies, including his own admission to investigators about inappropriate behavior with his stepdaughter and medical testimony suggesting signs of abuse. However, after the conviction, new evidence came to light regarding the medical witness that may have affected the credibility of the case against Rowan. The new evidence showed that the physician assistant who examined the child had her medical license suspended due to drug abuse and misconduct. This detail raised concerns about the reliability of her testimony, which was crucial to the prosecution's case. The court found that this new evidence could change the outcome of the original trial and therefore ordered a new trial. Rowan's original appeal was deemed moot because the case would be retried, and there was no need to evaluate the specific claims raised in that appeal. As a result, the motion for a new trial was granted, and the case was sent back to the lower court for another trial.
In OCCA case No. F-2009-525, Sparks appealed his conviction for Second Degree Murder, Unlawful Delivery of a Controlled Drug, and Unlawful Removal of a Dead Body. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions for Counts 2 and 3 but reversed and remanded Count 1, with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented regarding Count 1. The case involved Nathan David Sparks, who was tried and found guilty in Osage County. The jury decided that he should spend ten years in prison for Second Degree Murder, along with a fine for delivering a controlled substance and a year in county jail for improperly handling a dead body. The trial judge followed the jury's recommendations. The appeal focused on several issues, including whether there was enough evidence to support a conviction for Second Degree Murder. During the trial, the prosecution argued that Sparks gave methamphetamine to a woman who later died from it, claiming they had a close relationship and that he knew about her health issues. Sparks argued that the evidence did not strongly support the idea that his actions were extremely dangerous. The court reviewed prior cases and determined that not every case of delivering drugs resulting in death is automatically Second Degree Murder. They explained that for a murder charge to stick, the actions must show a clear disregard for life. They found that in Sparks' case, while he knew the victim had health problems, there wasn't enough evidence to prove his actions were dangerously reckless enough to warrant a murder conviction. Each of Sparks' other issues was also reviewed. They found some testimony was not directly related to the case, but since the evidence for Counts 2 and 3 was strong, it did not change the outcome. They determined that there was no misconduct during the trial and that Sparks had adequate legal representation. In summary, the court upheld Sparks' convictions for the drug delivery and body removal but did not find strong enough evidence for the murder charge, leading to its dismissal. One judge disagreed, believing the evidence was sufficient to uphold the murder charge due to Sparks' knowledge of the victim's health issues.
In OCCA case No. F-2009-794, Allen Eugene Bratcher appealed his conviction for Lewd Molestation. In a published decision, the court decided to modify his sentence to thirty years, although they affirmed his conviction. One judge dissented from the decision to reduce the sentence, stating that there was no error in how the prosecutor conducted the trial. Bratcher was found guilty in Garfield County and originally sentenced to seventy years in prison. He raised several issues on appeal, including concerns about his sentence being too harsh and the conduct of the prosecutor. The court found that while some of the prosecutor's statements were improper, the conviction did not need to be reversed. The judges determined that the long sentence shocked their sense of justice, especially given the circumstances of the case and Bratcher's lack of prior accusations. They reviewed the prosecutor's comments, especially those appealing to the jury's sympathy, and decided that these remarks contributed to the excessive original sentence. The court also considered Bratcher's claims regarding his lawyer's performance, but they ruled that the trial lawyer's decisions were part of their strategy. Ultimately, while the court affirmed Bratcher's conviction, they thought the sentence should be reduced to thirty years instead of seventy. The decision allowed the judges to agree on many points but showed differences regarding what the final sentence should be.
In OCCA case No. RE-2010-431, Edwards appealed her conviction for QUERKing a Forged Instrument. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that while Edwards' five-year suspended sentences were properly revoked, the District Court mistakenly ordered the sentences to run consecutively instead of concurrently. The court agreed with the State's request to remand the matter for re-sentencing to align with the original judgment. No dissenting opinion was filed.
In OCCA case No. F-2010-288, Gary Don Thompson II appealed his conviction for Possession of Marijuana, After Conviction of Two or More Felonies. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the judgment and sentence, meaning Thompson's conviction was thrown out. One judge dissented. Thompson was found guilty by a jury. The trial took place in Okmulgee County. The jury recommended that Thompson get ten years in prison and pay a $5,000 fine. Thompson's lawyers argued that the evidence used to convict him was obtained in a way that was not allowed by law. Before the trial, they asked the court to suppress, or not allow, the evidence. The court denied this request based on what the police officer said at an earlier hearing. However, during the trial, the officer explained what happened in detail, and his story was different from what he said before. The officer admitted that he did not have any reason to think Thompson was doing anything wrong. He only saw Thompson walking at night in an area he thought had a lot of crime. At trial, the officer said that Thompson threw away a bag of marijuana after the officer told him to stop. The court looked at this new information and believed that Thompson was stopped by the police without enough reason to do so. Because of this, the court said that Thompson's actions of throwing away the marijuana were the result of being detained improperly, and they found that the previous court had made a mistake in not allowing the evidence to be suppressed. The final decision was to reverse Thompson's conviction and send the case back with instructions to dismiss it.
In OCCA case No. RE-2010-10, a person appealed his conviction for lewd molestation. In a published decision, the court decided that the length of the revoked suspended sentence should be shortened. One member of the court disagreed with this decision. The case began when the person was charged and sentenced as a Youthful Offender for lewd molestation. He was given eight years, but on December 22, 2008, he had part of that sentence suspended after spending some time in juvenile custody. Later, he was accused of breaking the rules of his probation, which included failing to register as a sex offender and not completing required treatment. During a hearing, the judge decided that the individual had violated his probation and revoked five years of his suspended sentence. However, upon appeal, the court found that he should actually receive credit for the time he was under juvenile supervision. Given this credit from December 1, 2005, to December 22, 2008, the court modified the revocation to just over four years instead of five. The district court was instructed to update the sentence accordingly.
In OCCA case No. RE-2009-655, Paul Renodo Epperson appealed his conviction for violating a protective order. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of part of his suspended sentence but vacated the assessment of jail fees that had not yet been incurred. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2009-149, Kenneth Clark Knox appealed his conviction for Sexual Battery. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but vacate the three years of post-imprisonment supervision. One judge dissented. The case began when Kenneth Knox was tried by a jury and found guilty of Sexual Battery after having previously been convicted of more than two felonies. The jury recommended a punishment of four years in prison, which the trial court imposed, along with three years of supervision after prison. Knox appealed for several reasons. First, he argued that the evidence presented by the State was not strong enough to prove that he committed sexual battery. He believed that the conviction should be overturned and the charges dismissed. However, the court found that, when looking at the evidence favorably for the State, there was enough proof for a reasonable jury to conclude that Knox touched the victim inappropriately. Second, Knox claimed that the law regarding post-imprisonment supervision was not in effect when he committed the crime, so the three years of supervision imposed by the court should be canceled. The court agreed, explaining that the law was only effective after the crime took place, meaning Knox should not have been sentenced to post-prison supervision under that law. Lastly, Knox suggested that if the court did not agree with his other points, they should fix the written judgment to match what the judge said during sentencing. The court decided that they would vacate the supervision requirement and instructed the lower court to correct the judgment to show that Knox's sentence was only four years in prison. In conclusion, while Knox's conviction remained, the court removed the extra three years of supervision from his sentence. The case has been sent back to the lower court to make the necessary changes to the judgment.
In OCCA case No. RE-2009-1019 and RE-2009-1020, the appellant appealed his conviction for the revocation of his suspended sentences. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the full revocation of his seven-year suspended sentences to a three-year revocation with four years remaining suspended. One judge dissented. The case involved the appellant, who had previously pleaded guilty to multiple drug charges and received a suspended sentence. Later, the State accused him of violating his probation by committing new crimes. The judge found enough evidence to revoke his entire suspended sentence, which the appellant contested. The appellant argued that a small amount of marijuana found in a car he was driving was not enough to prove he controlled it because it was not his car. He also claimed that revoking his entire sentence was too harsh and should be changed. However, the court upheld the judge's finding that the appellant indeed had control over the marijuana since he was driving the car alone and had acknowledged ownership of the drug paraphernalia in the car. The court found merit in the appellant's argument about the harshness of the punishment because the reasons for revoking the full sentence were incorrect. The judge had based his decision on prior allegations that didn't hold up to factual scrutiny during the revocation hearing. The violations were also deemed minor and were not even prosecuted. In the end, the court decided to cut the original seven-year full revocation down to three years while keeping four years suspended, demonstrating that the punishment still reflected the violations but was fairer given the circumstances.
In OCCA case No. C-2011-651, the appellant appealed his conviction for domestic assault and battery by strangulation and threatening to perform an act of violence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the sentence for the second count but affirmed the conviction and sentence for the first count. One judge dissented. James Duane Dorsey, Jr. entered a guilty plea for domestic assault and battery and no contest for threatening to perform an act of violence. He was sentenced to three years in prison, which was suspended, and 90 days in county jail for the first count. For the second count, he received a suspended one-year jail sentence, to run at the same time as the first count. Dorsey later tried to withdraw his pleas, but the trial court did not allow it. In his appeal, Dorsey argued two main points. First, he claimed his plea for the first charge was not valid because the court did not show enough facts to justify the plea. Second, he said the sentence for the second count was too long and needed to be changed. The court looked carefully at the entire case record before making a decision. They found that for the first point, Dorsey did not mention the lack of facts during his earlier motions, which means it was not properly brought up in his appeal. The court determined that, under their rules, they could only check for serious mistakes, not just any errors. They confirmed that Dorsey's pleas were made knowingly and that the court had the right to accept them. Dorsey had admitted to the crime of strangulation during his hearing, and the state had evidence to support the charge of threatening violence. For the second point, the court agreed with Dorsey that his sentence for the second count was too long. They noted that the maximum sentence for that misdemeanor should be six months. Therefore, they adjusted the sentence down to six months, but still suspended it. Overall, the court accepted Dorsey’s pleas and affirmed his conviction for the first count. However, they changed his sentence for the second count to fit within legal limits. One judge disagreed with how the court reviewed the first point but agreed with the rest of the decision.
In OCCA case No. J-2010-839, M.D.M. appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's denial of M.D.M.'s request for juvenile certification, but reversed the order allowing the State to sentence him as an adult. M.D.M. dissented. M.D.M. was charged as a Youthful Offender and requested to be treated as a juvenile instead. The trial court denied his motion, stating that he could be rehabilitated and that the public would be safe if he was treated as a Youthful Offender. The court's decision was based on facts and evidence presented during the hearing. On appeal, M.D.M. argued that the trial court made several mistakes in denying his request. He believed the written order did not match what was discussed in court and that he was not given a fair chance for rehabilitation while being treated as a Youthful Offender. The court ruled that the trial court's initial decision was reasonable and did not abuse its discretion in treating M.D.M. as a Youthful Offender. However, the court also found that the written order mistakenly stated that M.D.M. should be sentenced as an adult. The court clarified that M.D.M. should be treated as a Youthful Offender if convicted. The decision included guidance for the trial court to ensure that M.D.M.'s case is handled appropriately moving forward.
In OCCA case No. S-2010-540, Cavner appealed his conviction for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to uphold the district court's decision to suppress the evidence. One judge dissented. The case began when the State of Oklahoma charged Cavner with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. He argued that the traffic stop was not justified because there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The district court agreed to suppress the evidence but did not dismiss the case entirely. On appeal, the State argued that the district court made an error by suppressing the evidence. When reviewing these kinds of cases, the court looks at the facts presented and defers to the trial court's findings unless something is clearly wrong. It was nighttime when Deputy Yarber observed a vehicle in the parking lot of an abandoned grocery store. He noted that the car left the parking lot in a lawful manner as he and another officer approached. The deputy did not mention any specific criminal activity and had no reason to believe something illegal was happening. Another officer had previously looked into possible drug activity in the area, but that had not been reported recently. In such situations, officers are allowed to check on people they find in unusual circumstances. However, since the vehicle drove away from the parking lot before Yarber could approach, he needed to stop it on a highway, which changes the situation from a simple question into a detention, known as a traffic stop. The law requires that a traffic stop must be supported by something more than just a hunch or general suspicion. The court explained that deputies must have reasonable suspicion to make a legal traffic stop. They look for specific facts suggesting that a crime may be occurring, which was not the case here. The deputy did not have enough evidence or reasons to suspect that Cavner was committing a crime simply because he was in the parking lot of an abandoned store late at night. The court referenced a prior case to support its decision, comparing the circumstances to those in a previous ruling where a stop was also deemed unlawful due to lack of reasonable suspicion. In Cavner's case, the court ruled that the officers did not have enough evidence to justify the traffic stop. Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's order to suppress the evidence gathered during the stop, meaning the evidence could not be used against Cavner. The decision highlighted the importance of having proper legal grounds for police actions, ensuring that citizens' rights are protected under the law.
In OCCA case No. J-2010-0788, the appellant appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery With A Deadly Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the order that imposed an adult sentence and remand the case for sentencing as a Youthful Offender if the appellant is convicted. One judge dissented. The appellant, who was born on March 12, 1994, faced charges in the District Court of Muskogee County where he was labeled a Youthful Offender. A motion was filed by the State for an adult sentence, while the appellant sought to be treated as a juvenile. The court held a hearing, and the judge denied the appellant's request to be treated as a juvenile. The same judge also granted the State's request for an adult sentence. The appellant raised three main arguments on appeal. First, he claimed the written order for the adult sentence did not match what the judge said during the hearing. Second, he argued that the trial court did not show clear and convincing evidence to justify an adult sentence. Third, he said it was wrong for the court to deny his request to be treated as a juvenile. According to the law, to punish someone as an adult, the court must find strong evidence that the individual could not adequately be rehabilitated or that the public would be at risk. The court found that the trial judge did not make the necessary findings to support an adult sentence and actually believed the appellant could complete rehabilitation and that public safety would not be compromised. Therefore, the court agreed with the appellant that the decision to treat him as an adult was wrong, thus reversing that part of the judgment. However, regarding the second argument about treating him as a juvenile, the court disagreed. The judges felt the trial judge had enough reasons to treat the appellant as a Youthful Offender instead of a juvenile. In conclusion, while the order for an adult sentence was reversed, the court confirmed that the decision to treat the appellant as a Youthful Offender was appropriate. The case was sent back to the lower court to proceed with sentencing as a Youthful Offender if he is found guilty.
In OCCA case No. RE-2009-239, the appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a forged instrument. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the order of revocation to allow for concurrent sentences instead of consecutive sentences. One judge dissented regarding the finding of excessiveness in the revocation order. In the case, the appellant, who was originally given the benefit of a deferred sentence and then suspended sentences, was accused of violating his probation by not reporting to his probation officer. The sentencing judge ultimately revoked his suspended sentences and imposed a total of eight years in prison, which he argued was excessive. The court reviewed the record and statements made by the judge during the revocation hearing. They determined that although the judge had the power to revoke less than the full suspension, the circumstances of the case warranted a modification to allow the sentences to be served concurrently, rather than consecutively as originally ordered. Additionally, the appellant contended that a second assessment for victim compensation was unlawful, as it exceeded the statutory limit. However, the court noted that the compensation assessments were appropriate and not void, concluding that this issue did not affect the validity of the revocation order itself. The final decision directed the district court to change the revocation order to reflect concurrent serving of sentences while affirming the other aspects of the revocation.
In OCCA case No. C-2010-337, Derrick Ewayne Bickham appealed his conviction for felonious pointing of a firearm and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny his appeal. One member dissented. Bickham entered no contest pleas for several charges in a District Court, resulting in a 20-year sentence for robbery and other related offenses. He argued that his pleas were made under coercion and did not reflect a clear understanding of the situation due to his mental health issues. However, the court found that Bickham entered his pleas knowingly and voluntarily, dismissing his claims of coercion. Additionally, Bickham contested that he should not have to pay for the costs related to his incarceration. The court ruled that he could challenge the cost calculation in a different court proceeding. The decision denied Bickham's petition but sent the case back to the District Court to assess if he was considered mentally ill, which could exempt him from incarceration costs.
In OCCA case No. J-2010-653, the appellant appealed his conviction for multiple charges, including arson and assault on a police officer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the juvenile court's order certifying the appellant as an adult. Two justices dissented. The appellant, who was around seventeen-and-a-half years old at the time of the incidents, faced serious charges, including arson and endangering human life. The state wanted to treat him as an adult, and a judge agreed to this on June 25, 2010. However, the appellant's defense argued that the state did not provide clear and convincing evidence to support this decision. During the appeal, the court examined whether the evidence justified treating the appellant as an adult. The judges noted that the law allows for such decisions only in exceptional cases, where a child is deemed not able to benefit from rehabilitation provided in juvenile programs. The appellant's side argued that he was receptive to treatment, as shown by his actions post-incident. He was receiving proper medical treatment after struggling with prescription medication and alcohol use, and he was advancing in his rehabilitation efforts. The justices found that the evidence presented showed the appellant was amenable to treatment and could be rehabilitated if kept within the juvenile system. The court emphasized that just because the acts committed were serious does not mean the child should be treated as an adult without proper evidence. Ultimately, the appeal resulted in the reversal of the certification order, meaning the appellant should not be treated as an adult and should be retained in the juvenile system. The dissenting opinions raised concerns about the risks of letting the appellant remain a juvenile, suggesting that not treating him as an adult could endanger the community given the serious nature of his actions. They believed that the judge's original decision should have been upheld. In conclusion, the majority opinion favored rehabilitation over punishment as an adult, highlighting the importance of the juvenile justice system's focus on the potential for reform and supervision.
In OCCA case No. C-2009-1192, Valentine Palos-Tellos appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill and Attempted Kidnapping. In a published decision, the court decided to grant his petition for a writ of certiorari and remanded the case for a new hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. S-2009-944, the defendant appealed his conviction for Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to uphold the lower court's ruling that the amendments to the Sex Offender Registration Act did not apply to the defendant. A dissenting opinion was not stated. The case involved the defendant, who was previously charged under the Sex Offender Registration Act. The key question was whether later amendments to the law should apply to him or not, given that he had entered a plea in 1999 and had complied with the previous legal conditions. The magistrate in the lower court determined that the law changes would be unfair to apply retroactively in the defendant's case. The court explained that new laws usually apply to future actions unless they are explicitly stated to have retroactive effects. They found no clear indication in the legislature's changes to imply that the new requirements should apply to those who had already been sentenced under the old rules. The court confirmed that since the amendments would change the defendant's obligations significantly, these substantive changes should not apply to him. As a result, the decision maintained that the lower court's refusal to move forward on the charge against the defendant could stand, with the matter being sent back to the District Court for any further actions needed, while affirming that the defendant was correct in his assertion that the recent amendments did not apply to him.
In OCCA case No. C-2009-542, Gatewood appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs and Using a Telephone to Cause the Commission of the Crime of Trafficking in Illegal Drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant Gatewood's petition for writ of certiorari, allowing him to withdraw his pleas. One judge dissented. Roscoe Curtis Gatewood, Jr. was in trouble because he was accused of selling drugs and using a phone to help with that crime. He decided to plead guilty to these charges with the advice of his lawyer. The judge gave him a long sentence. Gatewood later wanted to change his plea because he felt his lawyer had a conflict of interest. The conflict happened because both Gatewood and his girlfriend, who was also accused, were represented by lawyers from the same law firm. Gatewood's girlfriend decided to testify against him in exchange for a lighter sentence. This meant Gatewood's lawyer could not defend him as well because he was also looking out for the girlfriend's best interests. The court agreed that this was a serious problem, which unfairly affected Gatewood's case. As a result, the court allowed Gatewood to take back his guilty pleas, meaning he could go to trial instead. The decision to reverse the previous ruling was made so Gatewood could have a fair chance to defend himself. In summary, the court found that Gatewood's rights were harmed because of his lawyer's conflicting duties, and they reversed his conviction so he could have another chance in court.
In OCCA case No. F-2009-563, Hall appealed his conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction and sentence but modified the amount of his fine. One judge dissented. Hall was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to thirty years in prison and a $25,000 fine. He raised three main points in his appeal. First, he argued that the trial court made a mistake when trying to explain reasonable doubt to the jury. The court found no error here since the trial did not misdefine the term. Second, Hall felt that the jury was given the wrong information about the possible punishment range. However, the court confirmed the instructions were correct but agreed that the fine was set improperly. They ended up reducing Hall's fine to $10,000 because the jury had been given the wrong information about the fine amounts. Lastly, Hall's appeal included a claim that he should have been allowed to argue for a lesser charge related to drug possession, but the court ruled there wasn't enough evidence for this. In summary, the court upheld Hall's conviction and prison sentence, but they lowered the fine he had to pay.
In OCCA case No. S-2009-858, Jeffrey Dale Brumfield appealed his conviction for Possession of Methamphetamine. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's order suppressing evidence. Margaret Ann Brumfield was also charged with the same crime in a companion case numbered S-2009-862, and the same ruling applied. The case began when Trooper Johnson stopped the vehicle driven by Mr. Brumfield for speeding and discovered he did not have a valid driver's license. Mrs. Brumfield was a passenger in the vehicle. During the stop, the officer suspected Mr. Brumfield was under the influence of a drug, so he had both Brumfields sit in the patrol car while he searched the vehicle. Initially, he found nothing, and he allowed them to leave. However, after listening to a conversation the couple had in the patrol car, he suspected there might be drugs under the passenger seat. When he searched again, he found methamphetamine. The State appealed the district court’s decision, arguing that the officer did have the right to search the vehicle due to Mr. Brumfield’s behavior and suspected drug use. However, the court upheld the lower court's decision, stating that reasonable suspicion (which the trooper had) is not enough for probable cause. The initial search was not justified, leading to the suppression of the evidence found later. Thus, the court's final decision affirmed the district court’s ruling that the search was unreasonable, and therefore, the evidence obtained could not be used in court against the Brumfields.
In OCCA case No. S-2009-858, Jeffrey Dale Brumfield appealed his conviction for Possession of Methamphetamine. In a published decision, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that evidence discovered during a search of his vehicle should be suppressed. The ruling was based on the fact that the officer did not have enough probable cause to conduct the search after initially letting the Brumfields go. In this case, one judge dissented. In OCCA case No. S-2009-862, Margaret Ann Brumfield also appealed her conviction for Possession of Methamphetamine. The decision in her case followed the same reasoning as her husband's case, reaffirming the district court's decision to suppress evidence. The judge's ruling was similarly supported by the reasoning that the officer lacked the necessary probable cause for the searches conducted. Again, one judge dissented on the conclusion reached by the majority. The essential facts involved a traffic stop initiated because of speeding and a lack of a valid driver's license. The officer suspected drug use and searched the vehicle, which initially produced no evidence. The second search resulted in the discovery of methamphetamine after a recording revealed incriminating conversation. Ultimately, the court concluded that the officer's actions were not justified legally, leading to the suppression of the evidence collected.
In OCCA case No. F-2009-129, David Deontae McCoy appealed his conviction for burglary, robbery, and assault. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm some of the convictions, reversed one, and ordered a new trial for that count. One judge dissented. David Deontae McCoy was found guilty by a jury for several serious crimes, including first-degree burglary, robbery by two or more persons, and assaults with dangerous weapons. He received long prison sentences for each count, but they would all be served at the same time. McCoy argued that his convictions were based on unreliable eyewitness accounts, especially regarding a witness named Megan Kinter. He claimed that because the eyewitnesses were mistaken, his convictions should be thrown out. He also pointed out that the trial court made a mistake by not giving a specific warning to the jury about believing eyewitness identification. Another important point McCoy raised was about getting punished multiple times for the same incidents. He said that the law protects him from being punished more than once for the same crime and argued that some of his charges violated that protection. McCoy thought he did not get a fair trial because the jury was not given all the necessary details about what his assault charges entailed. He also claimed that certain photographs shown during the trial should not have been allowed because they could be unfairly upsetting and hurt his case. Additionally, McCoy accused the prosecutors of bad behavior during the trial, which he said prevented him from having a fair trial. He claimed that his lawyer did not help him enough during the trial, which is also a right he has. After reviewing McCoy's arguments, the court found that the evidence against him was strong enough that he was likely involved in the crimes. They said that even if there were issues about the eyewitness identification, it did not weaken the case enough to change the outcome of the trial. The court mentioned that the trial judge did not correctly instruct the jury about the important parts needed to prove one of the assaults. Because of this, they decided that it was necessary to reverse that conviction and order a new trial. For another assault charge, although there was also a mistake in instructions, the court believed that it wouldn't have changed the result of the trial. So, they did not reverse that conviction. Finally, the court corrected a mistake about how McCoy's convictions were recorded, making sure the written records reflected what he was actually charged with. So, while two of McCoy’s convictions were kept, one was sent back for a new trial due to issues with how the jury was instructed.
In OCCA case No. F-2009-407, Thomas Ray Young appealed his conviction for four counts of Sexual Abuse of a Child. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions but modify the sentences to be served concurrently. One judge dissented. Young was found guilty of sexually abusing his daughter and was sentenced to four life terms in prison, which the jury recommended to be served one after the other. Young raised several issues in his appeal, including claims that the trial court made errors by allowing certain evidence, giving confusing jury instructions, allowing expert testimony that supported the complainant's credibility, and examples of prosecutorial misconduct. Additionally, Young argued that the accumulated errors denied him a fair trial. The court carefully assessed the evidence admitted during the trial. Young contested evidence about past physical abuse towards his daughter and son, as well as a 1979 sexual assault against a teenager. The court found that references to the past abuse of the daughter were relevant to understand why she may have been hesitant to report the sexual abuse. The mention of his son was seen as proper because it challenged the credibility of a defense witness. However, evidence regarding the 1979 sexual assault had minimal relevance and could have been too prejudicial. Regarding jury instructions, the court found the trial judge's instructions were tailored to the evidence, even though they were not standard. The court decided that these instructions did not create errors. The expert witnesses presented by the state were seen as helpful rather than harmful to the case; they did not improperly support the credibility of the complainant. The court ruled that most of the prosecutor's comments during trial did not warrant a problem, except for some details about Young's criminal past, which could have unfairly influenced the jury. The court believed that the modification of Young's sentences to run concurrently addressed any potential unfairness. In summary, the court affirmed Young's conviction but changed his sentences to be served at the same time instead of one after another.