C-2014-854

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In OCCA case No. C-2014-854, Cory James Leon Whiteside appealed his conviction for Domestic Assault and Battery and Domestic Abuse - Assault and Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant his petition, allowing him to withdraw his pleas. One member of the court dissented. Whiteside pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor charges involving domestic violence. The court sentenced him to one year in jail for each charge, with the sentences to run one after the other. Shortly after pleading guilty, Whiteside asked to change his plea from guilty to not guilty, stating he had not understood the consequences of his plea. His request to withdraw his plea was denied by the court. Whiteside then appealed this decision, arguing two main points. First, he claimed he did not knowingly and voluntarily give up his right to have an attorney represent him during the case. Second, he argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because he didn't fully understand what he was agreeing to. The court reviewed the entire record of the case. It found that Whiteside's waiver of his right to counsel was not made in a knowing and voluntary way, meaning there was no clear record showing that he understood what self-representation involved or that he had been advised of the risks of not having a lawyer. The state even agreed with this point. Because this error was significant, the court decided to let Whiteside withdraw his guilty pleas. Following this decision, the other issue Whiteside raised became unnecessary to address. Therefore, the court ordered that Whiteside be allowed to withdraw his pleas.

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S-2012-166

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-166, Moises Gonzales-Tello appealed his conviction for Aggravated Trafficking in Heroin. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling to suppress evidence gathered during a traffic stop. One judge dissented. The State of Oklahoma appealed a decision made by the district court. This decision was based on a traffic stop where law enforcement officers discovered evidence of a crime, but the evidence was later deemed inadmissible. The district court ruled that the stop had taken too long and that the officer did not have a proper reason to keep the suspect detained after the initial reason for the stop was completed. During the traffic stop, the officer noticed several unusual things that made him suspicious. He called for a drug-sniffing dog to come to the scene. Even though the officer asked for permission to search the car, he did not actually let the suspect leave and did not return his driver's license or paperwork. The dog arrived about 30 minutes after the stop began, but did not find anything. After the dog didn't indicate any signs of drugs, the officer conducted his own search and found a significant amount of heroin. The court looked closely at whether the officer had enough reason to continue holding the suspect after the initial reason for the traffic stop was accomplished. While the State argued that the officer's actions were justified, the court explained that to search a car without a warrant, an officer must have either permission from the owner or a strong reason to believe the car contains evidence of a crime. In this case, the dog did not find anything and the officer did not get enough proof that would justify a search. If there had been clear consent from the suspect for the search, the situation might have been different. However, the way the officer asked for consent made it seem as if the suspect did not truly have a choice. When the court reviewed the case, they found that the district court made a reasonable decision in ruling that the initial detention was too long and that the search was not justified. The State also argued against using the Exclusionary Rule, which prevents illegally obtained evidence from being used in court. The court did not agree with the State on this argument, as they did not provide enough support for their claim. In summary, the court decided to maintain the district court's order to suppress the evidence found during the traffic stop, agreeing that the officers did not follow the correct procedures.

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C-2006-1154

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In OCCA case No. C-2006-1154, Rayshun Carlie Mullins appealed his conviction for multiple serious crimes, including rape and robbery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that Mullins could withdraw his guilty pleas to many of the charges because he was not informed that he would have to serve 85% of his sentences before being eligible for parole. One judge dissented, arguing that the court should not vacate the pleas since Mullins knew he faced a long prison term when he entered his guilty pleas.

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S-2004-1009

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In OCCA case No. S-2004-1009, the State of Oklahoma appealed the conviction of Donald Isaiah Phares for negligent homicide. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the prosecution. One judge dissented. To summarize, this case started from a car accident on September 15, 2003, where Phares was involved in a collision that resulted in another driver's death. Phares was first charged with a traffic offense for failing to stop at a stop sign and paid a fine for that. Later, in January 2004, the State filed a charge of negligent homicide against him, claiming his action of not stopping at the stop sign was reckless. Phares argued that being prosecuted for negligent homicide after already being punished for the traffic violation was unfair and violated his rights to not be punished twice for the same act. The court agreed with him, stating that both charges came from the same action, and therefore, he could not be punished for both. They found that the traffic offense was part of the negligent homicide claim and ruling that prosecuting Phares again for negligent homicide would lead to double punishment. The court decided the district court's dismissal was correct as the two charges stemmed from the same event, adhering to the law that prevents someone from facing multiple punishments for the same act. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of the negligent homicide case against Phares.

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