In OCCA case No. F-2017-1186, Shannon James Kepler appealed his conviction for First Degree Manslaughter. In a published decision, the court decided that the State of Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to prosecute Kepler. The court found that he is an Indian and that the crime happened within the boundaries of the Muscogee Creek Nation Reservation. Therefore, the court granted his appeal and vacated the conviction. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. PC 2017-755, the petitioner appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In a published decision, the court decided to vacate the previous sentence and allow for resentencing with a jury. The dissenting opinions argued against the majority decision, indicating that the judge had the discretion to deny jury resentencing based on prior waivers. The case started when the petitioner was just seventeen years old and pleaded guilty to First Degree Murder in 2006. Originally, he was sentenced to life in prison without the chance for parole. After some time, he claimed that this sentence was unfair because he was a minor when he was sentenced. The court agreed and decided to let him be resentenced but had to deal with the issue of whether his resentencing should involve a jury. The petitioner argued that since he was seeking resentencing, he should be allowed a jury trial. However, the state disagreed, pointing out that he had waived his right to a jury trial when he originally pleaded guilty. The judge decided that because of this waiver, he didn’t have to give the petitioner a jury for resentencing. In this case, the court looked at previous decisions that said when a juvenile is sentenced to life without parole, they should have a jury trial unless they give up that right. The majority of the court found that the petitioner did not truly waive his right to a jury for the resentencing, as he was relying on new rules from recent important cases. Ultimately, the court decided that it was wrong for the judge to deny the jury resentencing. They chose to vacate that decision and said the case should go back to the lower court to figure out the right way to do the resentencing, with the ability to include a jury if the petitioner asked. The dissenting opinions argued that the judge had actually acted correctly by denying the request for a jury because the petitioner had already waived that right back when he pleaded guilty. They believed that the rules shouldn’t allow a person to change their mind long after the original decision. The court ordered that the petitioner’s guilty plea and conviction were still valid, but they needed to follow the correct process under the law for the new sentencing.
In OCCA case No. CF-2004-4488, the petitioner appealed his conviction for murder and shooting with intent to kill. In an unpublished decision, the court affirmed the conviction, stating that his consecutive sentences do not violate constitutional protections against cruel punishment. One judge dissented on the reasoning. [occa_caption]
In OCCA case No. F-2015-155, Sauter appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm and burglary in the first degree. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction due to insufficient evidence. One judge dissented. Sauter was found guilty by a jury in the District Court of Nowata County and was sentenced to a total of forty-seven years in prison along with fines. The evidence presented during the trial primarily came from two accomplices, Welsh and Fulcher. Sauter argued that since these accomplices’ testimonies were not supported by independent evidence, his convictions should not stand. The court explained that under Oklahoma law, the testimony of an accomplice cannot solely support a conviction unless there is other evidence that connects the defendant to the crime. The court found that while there was evidence linking Sauter’s vehicle to the crimes, there was no evidence that directly implicated Sauter himself. Since the only evidence against Sauter came from the testimonies of Welsh and Fulcher, which lacked corroboration, the court had to reverse the convictions. The dissenting judge felt there was enough independent evidence connecting Sauter to the crimes, particularly the fact that Sauter's car was used and that he had been seen driving it shortly before the home invasion. This judge believed that the jury could conclude Sauter was complicit in the robbery and burglary based on the evidence presented.
In OCCA case No. S-2014-759, #x appealed his conviction for #y. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court’s dismissal of the case. #n dissented. In this case, the State of Oklahoma charged Chad Allan Lunsford with serious drug crimes. The police found a large amount of methamphetamine and other drug-related items in a car after they stopped the driver for a traffic violation. The driver, Gloria Caffey, was arrested, and Lunsford was also taken into custody after the police found the drugs. Lunsford said the case should be thrown out because the State didn’t prove that he owned or knew about the drugs. He argued that just being in the car wasn’t enough to show that he controlled the drugs. The judge in the district court agreed with Lunsford and dismissed the case, saying there wasn’t enough evidence to show that he had control over the drugs. The court explained that just being near drugs doesn’t mean someone is guilty. There has to be more proof, showing that the person really knew the drugs were there and had control over them. For example, in this case, the drugs were found in a bottle with Caffey's name on it, and she admitted they were hers. Also, there was no clear evidence that Lunsford was trying to hide anything, and he didn’t try to run away when he could. When the State appealed the judge’s decision, the higher court looked at the facts carefully. They reviewed whether the lower court made a mistake in its decision. The higher court found that the lower court was correct in dismissing the case because they didn’t have the right evidence to show Lunsford was guilty. Thus, they agreed to keep the lower court's dismissal. However, one judge did not agree with the decision. This dissenting judge thought that the trial court made a mistake by not considering some evidence that could connect Lunsford to the drugs. They felt that there were enough signs showing Lunsford might have had knowledge and control over the drugs, and the matters should have been decided by a jury. Ultimately, the court upheld the lower court's decision to dismiss the case against Lunsford, agreeing that the evidence wasn’t strong enough to prove he was guilty of the drug charges.
In OCCA case No. F-2011-693, Michael Wayne Dorsey appealed his conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree and Shooting with Intent to Kill. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Dorsey's conviction and his sentences but vacated the $5,000 victim compensation assessment set by the trial court. One member of the court dissented. Dorsey was found guilty by a jury of manslaughter and shooting with intent to kill. The jury decided on a punishment of thirty years for manslaughter and five years for the shooting charge, which would be served one after the other. Dorsey argued that he should have been allowed to use self-defense as a reason for both charges, but the court found that the instructions given to the jury were correct. Dorsey also claimed that the trial judge made an error with jury instructions regarding self-defense and intoxication, but the court disagreed. He further asserted that his lawyer was not effective because there was no objection raised to those jury instructions, but the court ruled that there was nothing wrong with the instructions in the first place. Lastly, Dorsey objected to the judge imposing the victim compensation amount without considering several important factors. The court agreed that the judge did not properly assess the situation and sent the case back to the trial court for a new decision on the compensation amount. Thus, the main outcome was that while Dorsey's conviction was upheld, the court required a reconsideration of the victim compensation assessment based on certain statutory factors outlined in the law.
In OCCA case No. C-2009-542, Gatewood appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs and Using a Telephone to Cause the Commission of the Crime of Trafficking in Illegal Drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant Gatewood's petition for writ of certiorari, allowing him to withdraw his pleas. One judge dissented. Roscoe Curtis Gatewood, Jr. was in trouble because he was accused of selling drugs and using a phone to help with that crime. He decided to plead guilty to these charges with the advice of his lawyer. The judge gave him a long sentence. Gatewood later wanted to change his plea because he felt his lawyer had a conflict of interest. The conflict happened because both Gatewood and his girlfriend, who was also accused, were represented by lawyers from the same law firm. Gatewood's girlfriend decided to testify against him in exchange for a lighter sentence. This meant Gatewood's lawyer could not defend him as well because he was also looking out for the girlfriend's best interests. The court agreed that this was a serious problem, which unfairly affected Gatewood's case. As a result, the court allowed Gatewood to take back his guilty pleas, meaning he could go to trial instead. The decision to reverse the previous ruling was made so Gatewood could have a fair chance to defend himself. In summary, the court found that Gatewood's rights were harmed because of his lawyer's conflicting duties, and they reversed his conviction so he could have another chance in court.
In OCCA case No. F-2008-1043, William D. Hibdon appealed his conviction for endeavoring to manufacture methamphetamine, possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse and remand his convictions. One judge dissented. Hibdon was found guilty by a jury and was sentenced to a total of 31 years in prison. The convictions were based on evidence found after police officers searched his home without a search warrant. The police had gone to Hibdon’s house after receiving a tip that he was making methamphetamine. When they arrived, they smelled ether, a chemical often used in meth production. After arresting Hibdon, one officer entered the house without a warrant and found more evidence. Hibdon argued that this search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, but this was denied by the trial court. The appeals court found that the officers had enough time to get a search warrant but did not do so. They decided that there was no immediate danger to the public that would justify the warrantless search. Since the officers did not meet the requirements for an emergency situation, the court believed Hibdon’s rights were violated. Therefore, the evidence obtained during the search could not be used against him. The court reversed Hibdon's convictions and sent the case back for further proceedings. One judge disagreed with the majority's decision, believing that the police acted correctly in their search based on the circumstances they faced at the time. This dissenting opinion asserted that the smell of ether justified a limited check of the house for safety reasons. Overall, the majority decision emphasized the importance of obtaining a proper search warrant to protect individuals' rights, while the dissent highlighted the potential dangers law enforcement officers may face in similar situations.
In OCCA case No. F-2007-909, Val Wilkerson appealed his conviction for Rape by Instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment but modified his sentence from thirty years to fifteen years imprisonment. One judge dissented. Val Wilkerson was found guilty by a jury in Haskell County for a serious crime. The jury decided on a punishment of thirty years in prison. After the trial, Wilkerson felt that things went wrong and he raised several points to appeal. First, he argued that the State used too much unfair evidence from other incidents that made him look bad. He thought this made the trial unfair. Second, he believed it was wrong for the prosecutors and police to mention that he had stayed quiet when asked questions. Third, he said the court did not give the jury the correct instructions. Lastly, he claimed that all these mistakes together made his trial unfair. The Court looked over everything carefully and agreed that the way other crimes were presented was a problem. They found that even though some earlier actions of Wilkerson were similar to what he was accused of, the older incidents happened a long time ago and should not have been brought up so much in his trial. The Court determined that while some bad evidence was allowed, the main evidence against Wilkerson was enough for the jury to find him guilty. However, the additional bad evidence likely influenced the length of the sentence because the prosecutor asked the jury to consider these past actions when deciding on punishment. Since the Court believed that the jury was distracted by this unfair evidence while deciding on the punishment, they changed the sentence to fifteen years instead of thirty. They also concluded that other issues raised by Wilkerson either did not affect the trial’s fairness or were fixed by the trial court’s instructions. In summary, the court upheld the conviction but agreed that the punishment was too harsh and lowered it. One judge disagreed and believed the case should be tried again.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-859, Percy Dewayne Cato appealed his conviction for driving under the influence, driving with a suspended license, and speeding. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions, but modified one of the fines. One judge dissented. Percy Cato was found guilty by a jury for three different offenses. The first was driving under the influence, which was more serious because he had two previous DUI convictions. The jury gave him a punishment that included time in prison and other conditions like treatment and community service. He was sentenced to a total of four and a half years, with some of that time suspended, meaning he would only serve three years in prison and spend time on probation afterwards. Cato claimed the instructions given to the jury about his previous DUI convictions were wrong, saying they should have been told that one of those convictions couldn't be used to give him a harsher punishment. The court found that this mistake did not harm Cato; he still received a fair punishment based on his actions. He also argued that the way his punishment was split between prison time and treatment violated the law. However, the court ruled that this was okay because the law allows for a mix of punishment and rehabilitation for DUI cases. Cato requested that the jury be told how to consider evidence showing he refused to take a breath or blood test. Although the court said this type of instruction is important, they did not find it necessary in Cato's case because he couldn't prove that it affected the outcome of his trial. In summary, the court upheld the main parts of Cato's punishment while making a small change to one of the fines. The decision was mostly in favor of maintaining his convictions, showing the court believed that the jury's decision was fair and just.
In OCCA case No. F-2001-1028, Terry Wayne Jennings appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse his conviction and dismissed the case. One judge dissented. Terry Wayne Jennings was found guilty by a jury in Kiowa County. The jury recommended he be sentenced to eighteen years in prison, and the judge also added a fine of $25,000, even though the jury did not suggest it. Jennings appealed his sentence, raising several issues. One of the main points in his appeal was about the search warrant used to collect evidence against him. Jennings argued that the warrant was based on a weak affidavit, which is a written statement used to get permission from a judge to search a place. He claimed that his rights were violated because this affidavit did not provide enough information to believe there was a good reason to search his property. The court reviewed the details of how the warrant was issued and the information given to the judge who approved it. They said that in deciding whether there was probable cause for a search, the judge needed to believe there was a fair chance that the information was true. Important details like whether the informing person was credible or if their information offered any independent confirmation were necessary. In this case, the specific informant's information was not well-supported. The court noted that there was no past history of the informant giving reliable information to the police. They compared this case to a previous case where a similar situation led to the suppression of evidence. After looking carefully at the affidavit, the court felt there was not enough solid information for the judge who issued the warrant to conclude that there were true grounds for the search. As a result, the court decided that Jennings’ conviction was based on evidence that should not have been allowed, reversing his conviction and ordering that the case be dismissed. In conclusion, the decision from the court meant that Jennings was no longer considered guilty based on how the evidence was collected. The court stressed that following proper legal procedures is important to protect everyone's rights, especially in criminal cases.
In OCCA case No. F 2000-740, the appellant appealed his conviction for Attempted Escape. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modified the sentence from three and a half years to two years imprisonment. Two judges dissented regarding the sentence modification. The case involved the appellant trying to escape from a private prison that was not officially recognized as a penitentiary. The court determined that the appellant should have been charged under a specific law concerning attempted escapes from non-penitentiary facilities. After reviewing the case, the judges concluded that while the conviction was valid, the original sentence was excessive since the appropriate law related to his actions was different than what was originally applied.