Deferred Judgment Archives

RE-2019-155

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 13, 2020
Post category:RE

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **MICHELLE MARIE MESPLAY,** Appellant, v. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **No. RE-2019-155** **FILED** IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA FEB 13 2020 **JOHN D. HADDEN** CLERK --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **HUDSON, JUDGE:** Appellant Michelle Marie Mesplay appeals from the revocation of her suspended sentences in Ottawa County District Court Case No. CF-2015-134. On October 2, 2015, Appellant entered a plea of no contest to Child Neglect under 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(C). The trial court accepted her plea, withheld a finding of guilt, and delayed proceedings for ten years. On December 23, 2016, the State filed an Application to Accelerate Deferred Judgment, to which Appellant stipulated. The court then accelerated her deferred sentence to a conviction, sentencing her to ten years imprisonment with all ten years suspended. On May 3, 2018, the State moved to revoke the suspended sentence, citing failures to pay supervision fees and court costs, continued methamphetamine use, repeated failures to report, and unknown whereabouts. Appellant stipulated to the motion, and the Honorable Robert Haney revoked seven and a half years of her remaining ten-year suspended sentence. Appellant contends this revocation was excessive and claims an abuse of discretion regarding the length of the revocation. The court's decision to revoke is grounded in the understanding that a suspended sentence is a matter of grace (Demry v. State, 1999 OK CR 31, I 12, 986 P.2d 1145, 1147). The State must demonstrate only one violation of probation to revoke a suspended sentence in full (Tilden v. State, 2013 OK CR 10, I 10, 306 P.3d 554, 557). In this case, Appellant’s stipulation to violating the terms of her suspended sentence validates the trial court’s revocation decision. The trial court’s discretion in revocations remains crucial, and disturbances to this discretion are reserved for clear abuse (Jones v. State, 1988 OK CR 20, I 8, 749 P.2d 563, 565). Evidence presented to justify the revocation aligned with statutory requirements (22 O.S.Supp.2018, § 991b(A)), and Appellant has not substantiated any claim of abuse of discretion. **DECISION** The revocation of Appellant's suspended sentences in Ottawa County District Court Case No. CF-2015-134 is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2020), MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon filing of this decision. **APPEARANCES:** **ANDREW MELOY** – Counsel for Defendant **MARK HOOVER** – Counsel for Appellant **ROGER HUGHES**, **MIKE HUNTER** – Counsel for Appellee **OPINION BY:** HUDSON, J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** CONCUR **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** CONCUR **LUMPKIN, J.:** CONCUR **ROWLAND, J.:** CONCUR --- For the complete opinion in PDF format, [click here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2019-155_1734334834-1.pdf).

F-2018-901

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 13, 2020
Post category:F

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **Case No. F-2018-901** **NAJEE JAMALL COX, Appellant,** **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** **SUMMARY OPINION** **LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Najee Jamall Cox, appeals from the acceleration of his deferred judgment and sentencing in Case No. CF-2014-5486 in Oklahoma County, presided over by Judge Ray C. Elliott. On January 30, 2017, Cox entered a guilty plea to Burglary in the First Degree, and his judgment and sentencing were deferred for seven years, with probation conditions effective until January 29, 2024. On March 20, 2018, the State filed an application to accelerate the deferred sentence, citing multiple violations, including new criminal charges and failure to pay court costs. At the hearing on August 14, 2018, Judge Elliott denied Cox's request for a continuance to allow his co-defendant to testify, after which the hearing proceeded with the State's presentation of evidence from probation officers and law enforcement. **FINDINGS:** 1. **Evidence of Possession**: The court found sufficient evidence supporting that Cox had constructive possession of marijuana and related paraphernalia based on the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop and subsequent findings in his vehicle. 2. **Right to Present Testimony**: Cox was given the opportunity to present a defense but failed to secure the presence of his co-defendant through proper procedural channels. His claim of due process violation was denied due to lack of shown prejudice. 3. **Notice of Reimbursement Fee**: Sufficient evidence demonstrated that Cox was aware of his obligation to pay the District Attorney's fees. 4. **Judicial Notice**: The court's reference to Cox's counsel's reputation did not negatively impact his rights, as the violation found was supported by sufficient evidence regardless. 5. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: Cox did not demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient enough to have affected the outcome. Based on the analysis of these propositions, the order of acceleration issued by the District Court is **AFFIRMED**. **CONCLUSION**: The mandate will be issued upon the filing of this decision. --- **Representatives:** - **Counsel for Appellant**: Matthew Tate Wise - **Counsel for State**: Kirk Martin, Mike Hunter **Decision by**: LEWIS, Presiding Judge **Concurrences**: KUEHN, V.P.J.; LUMPKIN, J.; HUDSON, J.; ROWLAND, J. [Click here to download the full PDF of the opinion.](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-901_1735118825.pdf)

F-2018-900

Post author:Staff
Post published:January 9, 2020
Post category:F

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ANGEL MUNOZ,** **Appellant,** **-VS-** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. F-2018-900** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JAN - 9 2020** **SUMMARY OPINION** **LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Angel Munoz, appeals from the acceleration of his deferred judgment and sentencing in Case No. CF-2016-701 in the District Court of Oklahoma County, by the Honorable Glenn M. Jones, District Judge. On March 7, 2018, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to Count 1: Assault and Battery With a Dangerous Weapon, with sentencing deferred for a period of five years under probation conditions until March 6, 2023. On June 26, 2018, the State filed an application to accelerate Appellant's deferred judgment and sentencing, alleging he violated probation by committing the new crime of Possession of a Firearm after a prior felony conviction, as charged in Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-2018-2625. An amended application was filed on August 21, 2018. At the hearing on this application, the State called Appellant's probation officer, Tammera Saavedra. During a home visit on April 13, 2018, Officer Saavedra found a nine-millimeter semiautomatic pistol and ammunition in plain view in a garage where Appellant claimed to be staying. Additionally, personal items belonging to Appellant were found near the firearm, leading to his arrest for possessing the firearm. Appellant's brother-in-law, Arturo Plascencia, testified that Appellant did not live in the garage, stating that he had never stayed there. Appellant corroborated this, but both testimonies were contradicted by evidence showing Appellant's possession and control of the area where the gun was found. After hearing the evidence, Judge Jones found that Appellant violated his probation. Consequently, he accepted the State's recommendation and sentenced Appellant to a term of ten years. Appellant raises two propositions of error on appeal: 1. **Proposition I**: The trial court abused its discretion by accelerating Appellant's sentence when the State failed to provide sufficient competent evidence of the alleged new offense. 2. **Proposition II**: The acceleration judgment should reflect Appellant's conviction for Assault and Battery With a Dangerous Weapon, rather than Assault and Battery With a Deadly Weapon. **ANALYSIS** In **Proposition I**, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his knowledge of the firearm's presence. The standard for reviewing such claims requires that the court finds whether a rational trier of fact could have concluded the essential elements of the probation violation were met by a preponderance of the evidence. Evidence presented indicated Appellant's admission to living in the garage at the time the firearm was discovered. Testimony from Officer Saavedra and physical evidence reinforced the conclusion that Appellant had dominion and control over the area where the firearm was located. Conflicting testimonies regarding Appellant's residence and possession were matters for the court to evaluate. Thus, Appellant failed to substantiate that Judge Jones acted irrationally in his ruling. In **Proposition II**, Appellant argues for a correction of the accelerating judgment to accurately reflect his offense. The State agrees that this matter warrants attention. Therefore, it should be remanded to the District Court for the necessary correction. **DECISION** The order of the District Court of Oklahoma County accelerating Appellant's deferred judgment and sentencing in Case No. CF-2016-701 is AFFIRMED. However, the case is REMANDED to the District Court for a correction in accordance with Appellant's request. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2020), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the filing of this decision. **APPEARANCES** **For the Appellant:** Kenneth C. Watson, Nancy Walker-Johnson Attorney at Law 119 N. Robinson, Suite 640 Oklahoma City, OK 73102 **For the State:** Tiffany Noble, Mike Hunter, Diane L. Slayton Assistant District Attorneys 505 County Office Building Oklahoma City, OK 73102 **OPINION BY:** LEWIS, P.J. KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur LUMPKIN, J.: Concur HUDSON, J.: Concur ROWLAND, J.: Concur [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-900_1735119586.pdf)

F-2018-973

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 3, 2019
Post category:F

In the case of Brian Scott Willess v. The State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals addressed an appeal concerning the acceleration of Willess' deferred sentence for the crime of Stalking. The appeal was brought forth after the District Court of Cleveland County, under Judge Thad Balkman, found that Willess had violated the terms of his probation by not taking mandated mental health medication and committing a new stalking offense. **Background:** - On May 23, 2018, Willess entered a no contest plea to stalking, with sentencing deferred for five years, under probation terms. - The State later filed an Application to Accelerate Judgment, alleging violations of probation terms. A hearing was held on September 5, 2018, leading to the acceleration of Willess' sentence to five years imprisonment. **Propositions of Error:** Willess raised multiple arguments in his appeal: 1. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: Claimed his counsel failed to argue for credit for time served prior to his plea. 2. **Jurisdiction Issues**: Argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because there was no preliminary hearing held. 3. **Insufficient Evidence**: Contended that the State did not provide adequate evidence to prove a violation of probation terms. 4. **Due Process Concerns**: Suggested that he was not given adequate notice of the allegations against him and that hearsay evidence was improperly considered. 5. **Premature Acceleration**: Argued that the court should have considered intermediate sanctions instead of incarceration. **Court Opinion:** - The court affirmed the acceleration of Willess' deferred sentence, stating that the issues raised about ineffective counsel and jurisdiction were not valid in an acceleration appeal context. Proper processes for addressing these claims require filing a writ of certiorari. - On the sufficiency of evidence claim, the court found that the State had met its burden of proving violations by a preponderance of evidence, and the hearsay evidence presented had sufficient reliability. - Regarding due process, the court held that Willess had been duly notified of the allegations against him, and his hearsay concerns were addressed previously. - Finally, the court reiterated that even a single violation of probation conditions could warrant acceleration of the sentence, which was upheld in this case. The court's decision highlighted that procedural safeguards were followed and determined there was no abuse of discretion by the district court in accelerating Willess' sentence. In conclusion, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ruled in favor of the State, affirming Willess' five-year sentence for the violations of probation.

F-2017-1301

Post author:Staff
Post published:May 23, 2019
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2017-1301, William Curtis Box appealed his conviction for Aggravated Domestic Assault and Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the acceleration of his deferred judgment, which meant that his earlier decision to defer judgment was changed to a conviction. One judge dissented. The case started when Box was found guilty of a crime related to domestic violence and was given a deferred judgment, meaning he wouldn’t have a criminal record if he followed certain conditions for ten years. However, he did not follow those conditions and committed another crime called Obstructing an Officer. When the State of Oklahoma found out, they asked the court to change his deferred judgment to a conviction. Box argued that his probation should not be accelerated because the court did not have a written list of rules for his probation. He referred to previous cases from 1969 and 1970 which ruled in favor of defendants when there were no signed probation rules. However, the court explained that in later cases, they decided that a person on probation should understand they cannot commit any further crimes, even without a written agreement. Box also asked to withdraw his agreement to the State's application to change his probation status but could not find any laws that allowed him to do so. The court noted that a stipulation, or agreement, to accelerate a deferred judgment is different from things like guilty pleas, and there is no established way to take back such an agreement. Moreover, Box claimed that his sentence was too harsh. However, the court stated that during an acceleration appeal, they can only examine whether the acceleration was lawful, not whether the sentence was too long. Ultimately, the court upheld the decision to accelerate Box's judgment to a conviction based on his probation violation. They found no evidence of an abuse of discretion by the lower court in making this decision.

F-2018-167

Post author:Staff
Post published:May 16, 2019
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2018-167, Roland G. Torgerson, Jr. appealed his conviction for Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the acceleration of his deferred judgment and sentencing. One member of the court dissented. The case began when Torgerson entered a plea of nolo contendere (no contest) in 2015 for concealing stolen property. His sentencing was delayed for three years, during which time he was required to make payments for restitution and district attorney fees. However, he failed to make these payments, leading the State to request that his deferred judgment be accelerated. Torgerson admitted he had not made the payments and asked for more time to do so several times. His illness and difficulty finding work made it hard for him to pay. At the hearing, he stated that he was trying to get Social Security to help his financial situation. Despite his claims, the judge decided he had not done enough to show he was unable to make the payments, and therefore, he was sentenced to a five-year suspended sentence. Torgerson raised two main arguments in his appeal. First, he claimed the court was wrong to accelerate his sentence based on his failure to pay, stating that doing so violated his constitutional rights. Second, he argued that the five-year suspended sentence was too harsh. However, the court found that Torgerson had not proven he could not pay and ruled that the judge exercised proper discretion in his decision. Ultimately, the court affirmed the decision to accelerate Torgerson's sentencing, while one judge dissented and expressed concern that the failure to pay was more about his financial situation than a willful disregard of the court's orders.

F-2017-970

Post author:Staff
Post published:April 4, 2019
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2017-970, Angelica C. Coats appealed her conviction for several crimes including drug possession and obstruction of an officer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court’s decision to accelerate her deferred judgment and sentence because she had violated probation by failing to pay required fees. One judge dissented, arguing that she was not willfully failing to pay because she had been declared indigent in court and there was no inquiry into her ability to pay.

F-2017-559

Post author:Staff
Post published:April 4, 2019
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2017-559, Jonas Jorge Conroy-Perez appealed his conviction for Harboring a Fugitive From Justice. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the acceleration of his deferred judgment and sentencing. One judge dissented. The case started when Conroy-Perez entered a guilty plea in 2015, which allowed him to avoid immediate penalties but required him to follow certain rules for two years. One of these rules involved paying fees. Later, the state claimed he violated these rules by not only missing payments but also due to new felony charges. In 2017, after a hearing, the judge decided that Conroy-Perez had violated his probation and increased his sentence to a 10-year term, with time suspended except for the first 90 days in jail. Conroy-Perez argued that he couldn’t pay the fees because he was unable to work after a vehicle accident and was receiving worker's compensation. The court looked into his arguments. On one hand, the court agreed that while the state proved he owed money, they should also have checked whether he was willfully not paying. The state did not show he could afford to pay the fees, thus the court ruled it was not right to increase his sentence based solely on that. Therefore, they sent the case back for further examination. On other points of appeal, the court found that there was no evidence his legal representation was inadequate and did not rule on the length of the new sentence since they had already reversed it. The dissenting judge noted concern about the implications of the ruling, emphasizing the importance of understanding a person’s ability to pay before increasing sentences for not paying fees.

M-2017-739

Post author:Staff
Post published:May 1, 2018
Post category:M

In OCCA case No. M-2017-739, Jeremy L. Garza appealed his conviction for Driving under the Influence of Intoxicating Substances. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Garza to represent himself during the acceleration proceedings without him properly waiving his right to counsel. One judge dissented. Garza had initially entered a guilty plea to a DUI charge and was given eighteen months of probation. However, the State later accused him of not following the rules of his probation, such as failing to report and not paying fines. When Garza addressed the court without a lawyer during these acceleration proceedings, the court did not properly document that he understood his right to have a lawyer or that he chose to give up that right. The court's opinion stressed that anyone facing charges has the right to a lawyer and can only waive this right if they do so knowingly and intelligently. This means they need to understand the consequences of representing themselves. Since the court did not show that Garza waived his right to counsel properly, the decision to sentence him was reversed. The matter was sent back to the lower court, instructing them to vacate the judgment and hold further proceedings that follow this ruling.

S-2013-315

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 21, 2014
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2013-315, David Johns appealed his conviction for larceny. In a published decision, the court decided that a trial court cannot modify the terms and conditions of a negotiated deferred judgment without the consent of the State. The case involved Johns, who had entered a guilty plea and was placed on deferred judgment for five years. He filed a motion to change the terms of his deferred judgment, and the trial court agreed to shorten it and dismiss the case, which the State appealed. The court explained that under current laws, the trial court does not have the authority to shorten the deferment period once a plea agreement is in place. This ruling was made to prevent issues that could discourage prosecutors from agreeing to deferred judgments in the future. The court emphasized that any changes to the terms of a deferred judgment must follow statutory guidelines, and the trial court may only act when the conditions are met at the end of the deferment period. It upheld the idea that modifying an agreement without proper authority is not allowed. Therefore, the original decision to cut Johns' probation short was not supported by the law. The court's answer to the reserved question of law confirmed that the trial court was not authorized to cut short the period of deferment after the terms of the plea agreement had been established. #n dissented.

C-2012-699

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 21, 2013
Post category:C

In OCCA case No. C-2012-699, Holstine appealed his conviction for Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance. In a published decision, the court decided to grant his request and remanded the case for a proper hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. One judge dissented.

F 2010-0888

Post author:Staff
Post published:December 9, 2011
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F 2010-0888, Eugene Turner appealed his conviction for assault and battery on a police officer, escape from detention/arrest, and domestic assault. In a published decision, the court decided that the District Court did not have the authority to accelerate Turner's deferred sentence for the assault on the police officer because the time limit for filing had already passed. The ruling was based on a prior case, which stated that a deferred sentence starts on the day it is given. Since the State didn’t file their application until after the deadline, Turner's case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings. One judge dissented.