Culpable Negligence Archives

F-2009-1181

Post author:Staff
Post published:September 2, 2011
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2009-1181, Joe Reaner Strong appealed his conviction for Second Degree Felony Murder. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction due to the district court's failure to give the jury an instruction requested by Strong on the lesser offense of second degree manslaughter. One member dissented. Joe Reaner Strong was convicted of Second Degree Felony Murder after his two-year-old grandson died in a fire that started when the child found matches at home. At the time, Strong had left his grandson asleep alone for about two hours while he went to pick up his wife. The child was later found unresponsive and died from smoke inhalation. During the trial, the prosecution argued that Strong was responsible for child neglect because he left the child unsupervised. Strong's defense claimed that he was negligent but did not intend for his actions to harm the child. Strong believed that he should have been allowed to present his defense, which included the possibility that he was guilty of a lesser crime - second degree manslaughter instead of murder. The court noted it is important for the jury to hear all aspects of a case, including possible lesser offenses if there is evidence to support them. In this situation, the court stated that there was enough evidence suggesting that Strong's negligence might not rise to the level of murder. Instead, it could have been just an unfortunate accident due to lack of care under the circumstances. The decision determined that the jury should have been instructed on second degree manslaughter because Strong's actions might not have been willful neglect, which is necessary for a murder charge. Because the jury could have reasonably believed that Strong did not intend to leave the child alone and that his actions were the result of carelessness, the court ruled that not allowing this instruction was a mistake that impacted the fairness of the trial. In summary, the appellate court reversed Strong's conviction and ordered a new trial due to the district court's error in handling the jury instructions related to the lesser charge.

F-2004-1188

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 19, 2006
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2004-1188, Daniel Allen Moore appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but remanded the case for resentencing due to a jury instruction error. One judge dissented. On June 9, 2003, Daniel Allen Moore shot 24-year-old Garade Jean Girsback in front of a mobile home where she was babysitting. Girsback was related to Moore's wife and had often lived with their family. That evening, Moore hosted a barbecue and was drinking. Witnesses heard him express anger towards Girsback and make threats about killing her. After becoming upset during their conversation, Moore accidentally fired his gun, hitting Girsback. Moore and his wife left without trying to help, and he disposed of the gun. Later, he told a neighbor it was an accident and claimed he only meant to scare Girsback. The main question during the trial was whether Moore had intended to kill Girsback or whether her death was due to recklessness or negligence. The court found that there was an error because the jury was not properly informed about the punishment options for first-degree murder, specifically failing to instruct that life with the possibility of parole was an option. The state agreed this instruction was missed, but they argued it did not affect the outcome because the defense had mentioned the options during closing arguments. The court decided that the jury's confusion could have influenced their decision, especially since they only deliberated briefly before returning a verdict and sentencing Moore to life without parole. Because of this, the case was sent back for a new sentencing hearing with the correct instructions provided to the jury. Additionally, the court addressed other claims by Moore, like the admission of his statements to police. It concluded these statements were allowed for impeachment purposes and did not violate his rights, as they were spontaneous comments. The defendant also argued there was insufficient evidence and that various errors during trial warranted a different outcome, but the court found that while there were errors, they did not combine to affect the fairness of the trial significantly. In summary, the court upheld the conviction but required that the sentencing be done again with proper jury instructions about the punishments available to them.

M 2005-0332

Post author:Staff
Post published:March 24, 2006
Post category:M

In OCCA case No. M 2005-0332, the appellant appealed his conviction for reckless driving. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate the conviction and modify it to a lesser charge of speeding. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant received a speeding ticket on September 17, 2003, for going 90 mph in a 65 mph zone. During the trial, the judge found the appellant guilty of reckless driving and sentenced him to 90 days in jail, with 30 days to serve and the rest suspended, along with a $300 fine. The appellant did not appeal in time but was allowed to do so later. During the appeal, the appellant claimed two main points. First, he argued that his speeding did not meet the level of culpable negligence needed for reckless driving. The law requires more than just speeding to prove reckless driving. The state argued that speeding around other cars during the day showed enough negligence to support the conviction. Second, the appellant contended that he was not allowed to cross-examine a witness after the judge asked a question about intersecting roads. The judge’s questioning provided new information that had not been discussed before. The court pointed out that the appellant had the right to confront witnesses and cross-examine them, which was denied in this case. Ultimately, the court found that there was not enough evidence to support the reckless driving charge and modified the conviction to speeding instead. The court agreed to vacate the reckless driving sentence and sent the case back to the district court for proper sentencing on the speeding charge.

M 2005-0332

Post author:Staff
Post published:March 24, 2006
Post category:M

In OCCA case No. M 2005-0332, the appellant appealed his conviction for reckless driving. In a published decision, the court decided to modify the conviction from reckless driving to speeding due to insufficient evidence of reckless behavior. One judge dissented. The case started when the appellant received a traffic ticket for speeding, going 90 mph in a 65 mph zone. The traffic stop occurred on a dry day with moderate traffic. The officer who stopped the appellant said he did not see anything dangerous other than the speeding. The appellant was guilty of speeding, but the state argued that speeding was enough to prove reckless driving. For reckless driving, the law requires showing that someone acted with culpable negligence, which means the behavior must be more than just speeding. The court cited past cases that supported this idea, indicating that simply going over the speed limit is not automatically reckless driving. The state claimed that because there were other cars on the road and the appellant passed an intersection, that made the speeding reckless. However, the appellant pointed out that while he was speeding, he did not engage in reckless behavior that would endanger others. Another issue in the case was that the trial judge asked a witness about intersections but did not allow the appellant to ask the witness questions afterward. The court found that this was a mistake because everyone has the right to question witnesses against them. In the end, the court decided that while the appellant was guilty of speeding, there wasn't enough evidence for the reckless driving charge. They changed the conviction to speeding, removed the reckless driving sentence, and sent the case back to the lower court to decide the proper punishment for speeding.