F-2021-211

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In OCCA case No. F-2021-211, Michael Ray Dawkins appealed his conviction for assault and battery with a deadly weapon, felon in possession of a firearm, and maiming. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for assault and battery with a deadly weapon and felon in possession of a firearm but reversed the conviction for maiming and instructed to dismiss it. A dissenting opinion was not noted. The case involved a jury trial where Dawkins was found guilty on all counts after shooting a woman named Krystal Traylor. He received a sentence of 45 years for the assault and battery, 25 years for the firearm possession, and another 45 years for the maiming, with some sentences running concurrently and others consecutively. Dawkins raised several claims on appeal, including that his constitutional right to an attorney of his choice was violated, that he faced double punishment for the same act, and that there were errors in admitting certain evidence during his trial. Upon review, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Dawkins's request for a new attorney, as he did not provide valid reasons for wanting to change lawyers. It was also determined that Dawkins’s convictions for assault and battery and maiming stemmed from a single act, which should not result in multiple punishments. Therefore, the court reversed the maiming conviction. Further, the court found that the identification of Dawkins by the victim was correctly admitted as evidence, dismissing the hearsay claim. Dawkins's assertions about prior bad acts being admitted were also rejected, as they were deemed relevant and essential for establishing motive and intent. The court noted that a limiting instruction had been provided to jurors, mitigating concerns over the impact of these past acts. Finally, regarding Dawkins's claim for a speedy trial violation, the court found that the delays were mainly attributable to him or his defense strategies, concluding that he was not prejudiced by the delay. Overall, most of Dawkins's claims were denied, leading to the affirmation of his main convictions and the reversal of the maiming charge.

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C-2020-691

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In OCCA case No. C-2020-691, Raheem Travon Walker appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery on an Employee of a Juvenile Detention Facility. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant Walker's request to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial. One judge dissented. To explain further, Walker was 17 years old when he pleaded guilty to the crime. He entered into a deal, thinking he would be part of a special program for young adults where his sentence would be delayed. However, later it was discovered that he was not eligible for this program due to a past juvenile record for robbery. Because of this ineligibility, the judge gave him a different sentence, which he believed was not what he had agreed to. After realizing that he did not get what he had bargained for, Walker asked if he could change his mind about the plea. A hearing took place, but his request was denied. He then appealed the decision, arguing that he was not helped properly by his lawyer during the process. The court found that he had a valid point since he entered the agreement expecting specific benefits, which were not provided. Because of this, the court decided he should have another chance and allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea. The dissenting opinion argued that Walker had not raised the issue of not having a proper plea form and thus had waived that right. They believed there was no mistake about the plea agreement and questioned whether Walker's claim had enough basis to warrant this new decision. Regardless, the majority found that Walker’s concerns about his plea and the sentence should be addressed by allowing him to go to trial.

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C-2018-1174

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### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA **Case No. C-2018-1174** **OCT 31, 2019** **STEVEN JOSEPH BEATY, Petitioner, v. THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondent.** **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Petitioner Steven Joseph Beaty entered guilty pleas to the following charges in the District Court of Grady County, Case No. CF-2018-115: **Count I** - Felony Domestic Assault and Battery, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies (21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 644 (C)); **Count II** - Misdemeanor Violation of Protective Order (22 O.S.Supp.2012, § 60.6); **Count III** - Obstructing An Officer (21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 540). The Honorable Kory Kirkland accepted the pleas on October 16, 2018. The sentences imposed included the following: **Count I** - ten (10) years imprisonment with the last seven (7) years suspended and a $500.00 fine; **Count II** - one year imprisonment and a $200.00 fine; **Count III** - one year imprisonment and a $100.00 fine, with all sentences served concurrently and additional requirements such as costs, victim compensation assessments, and referral to the Batterer's Intervention Program. On October 25, 2018, Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. After a hearing on November 13, 2018, Judge Kirkland denied the motion. Petitioner now appeals this denial and raises the following propositions of error: 1. The lack of a factual basis for the plea renders it involuntary due to not being served with the Protective Order. 2. The trial judge failed to consider Petitioner’s ability to pay the victim compensation fee. 3. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel during both the plea hearing and at the plea withdrawal hearing. **Analysis:** After thorough review of the petitions, records, and transcripts, the court finds no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. A plea is evaluated based on whether it was voluntary and intelligent, requiring the Petitioner to show it was entered inadvertently or without consideration. In his first two propositions, Petitioner alleges he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea due to inadequate factual basis and failure to inquire about ability to pay the compensation fee. However, these claims were not raised in the motion to withdraw nor in the certiorari petition, waiving their consideration on appeal. In Proposition III, relating to ineffective assistance of counsel at the withdrawal hearing, Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that such deficiencies would have altered the outcome. The court affirms that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and not coerced. The claim about the court’s failure to record considerations for the victim compensation assessment is acknowledged; thus, that part of the assessment is vacated, and the case is remanded for a hearing to address this requirement properly. **Conclusion:** The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari is **DENIED**. The Judgment of the District Court is **AFFIRMED**. The current victim compensation assessments are **VACATED**, and the case is **REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT** to consider all necessary factors for assessment under 22 O.S.2011, § 142.18(A). **OPINION BY**: LUMPKIN, J. **CONCUR**: LEWIS, P.J.; KUEHN, V.P.J.; HUDSON, J.; ROWLAND, J. **COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE AT THE PLEA HEARING**: Bill Smith, P.O. Box 926, Norman, OK 73070 **COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER ON APPEAL**: Danny Joseph, Oklahoma City, OK **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE**: Jason M. Hicks, District Attorney, Kara Bacon, Assistant District Attorney, Chickasha, OK. [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2018-1174_1734227971.pdf)

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F-2017-67

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The document provided is an appellate court opinion regarding the case of Cedric Dwayne Poore, who was convicted in the District Court of Tulsa County for multiple counts of Murder in the First Degree and Robbery with a Firearm. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma ultimately affirmed the convictions and sentences. ### Key Points from the Opinion: 1. **Charges and Convictions**: - Cedric Dwayne Poore was convicted of four counts of Murder in the First Degree through felony murder and two counts of Robbery with a Firearm. - The underlying felony for the murder counts was robbery committed in the course of the murders of four victims. 2. **Evidence Against Appellant**: - Witnesses testified that Poore and his brother shot and killed four victims in a robbery at an apartment. - Testimony from Jamila Jones, who was in contact with both brothers before the murders, suggested that they were planning to rob the victims. - Forensic evidence included DNA found on a cigarette near the victims and .40 caliber shell casings linking both Poore and the weapon used in other crimes. 3. **Proposition of Errors Raised on Appeal**: - **Hearsay**: The trial court’s denial of an affidavit from a witness who invoked the Fifth Amendment was challenged, but the court found no plain error. - **Sufficiency of Evidence**: Poore challenged the sufficiency of evidence, claiming that he was not directly involved in the murders, but the court held that circumstantial evidence sufficiently supported the convictions. - **Other Crimes Evidence**: The admissibility of evidence from a separate robbery was upheld as relevant and probative to establish motive and identity. - **Identification Testimony**: The court found no error in the admission of identification testimony from witnesses. - **Accomplice Corroboration**: The testimony of accomplices was found to be sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. - **Cell Phone Records**: Although the use of cellphone records without a warrant raised Fourth Amendment concerns, the evidence was deemed admissible under the good faith exception. - **Search Warrant**: Poore's arguments regarding the invalidity of the search warrant and execution of the search were rejected by the court. - **Cumulative Error**: The cumulative effect of any errors did not warrant relief, as the court found no substantial errors during the trial. 4. **Final Ruling**: - The Court affirmed the District Court's judgments and sentences without finding any significant legal errors that would warrant reversal. ### Conclusion: The case demonstrates the complex interplay of various legal standards, evidentiary challenges, and the appeals process for criminal convictions. The appellate court's decision reflects a thorough examination of both the procedural and substantive issues raised by the appellant, ultimately leading to the affirmation of the convictions based on the evidence presented at trial.

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F-2018-167

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-167, Roland G. Torgerson, Jr. appealed his conviction for Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the acceleration of his deferred judgment and sentencing. One member of the court dissented. The case began when Torgerson entered a plea of nolo contendere (no contest) in 2015 for concealing stolen property. His sentencing was delayed for three years, during which time he was required to make payments for restitution and district attorney fees. However, he failed to make these payments, leading the State to request that his deferred judgment be accelerated. Torgerson admitted he had not made the payments and asked for more time to do so several times. His illness and difficulty finding work made it hard for him to pay. At the hearing, he stated that he was trying to get Social Security to help his financial situation. Despite his claims, the judge decided he had not done enough to show he was unable to make the payments, and therefore, he was sentenced to a five-year suspended sentence. Torgerson raised two main arguments in his appeal. First, he claimed the court was wrong to accelerate his sentence based on his failure to pay, stating that doing so violated his constitutional rights. Second, he argued that the five-year suspended sentence was too harsh. However, the court found that Torgerson had not proven he could not pay and ruled that the judge exercised proper discretion in his decision. Ultimately, the court affirmed the decision to accelerate Torgerson's sentencing, while one judge dissented and expressed concern that the failure to pay was more about his financial situation than a willful disregard of the court's orders.

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C-2016-813

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In OCCA case No. C-2016-813, Derlin Lara appealed his conviction for multiple charges, including Manslaughter in the First Degree and Driving Under the Influence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny in part and grant in part the appeal. One judge dissented. Derlin Lara was involved in a serious legal situation where he entered an Alford plea. This type of plea means that he did not admit guilt but agreed that there was enough evidence to convict him. His charges included killing someone while driving under the influence, injuring another person while DUI, driving without a license, and transporting alcohol in the car. After he pleaded guilty, he was sentenced by a judge. The judge gave him a long sentence that meant he’d serve a lot of time in prison. Lara later wanted to take back his plea because he felt it wasn’t fair and that he didn't fully understand what he was doing. He argued that he was confused during the process, and that he had received poor advice from his lawyer. The court looked carefully at Lara's case and found several key points: 1. The judges believed that Lara's plea was actually made with understanding, even though he insisted that he did not understand everything. They noted that he had an interpreter during his hearings. 2. The court decided that Lara was not unfairly punished multiple times for the same actions. They explained that each charge had different parts and involved different victims, so they did not violate any laws regarding multiple punishments. 3. Lara’s claims about his lawyer not helping him were also rejected. The court found that Lara did not show that having a different lawyer would have changed his decision to plead guilty. 4. The sentence he received for one of the charges was too harsh according to the law. He was given a year in jail for driving without a license, but that punishment was higher than allowed. The court changed that sentence to a shorter one of just thirty days. Lastly, the court found that the amounts assessed for victim compensation and restitution were not properly explained during sentencing. Therefore, they canceled those amounts and decided that a hearing should be held to determine fair compensation. In summary, while the court denied most of Lara's requests, they did change one of his sentences and agreed that some financial penalties needed to be rethought.

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F-2014-830

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In OCCA case No. F-2014-830, Cody Wayne Mayfield appealed his conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance and failure to stop at a red light. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse Count 2 and remand with instructions to dismiss it, while affirming the other counts. One judge dissented. The case involved Mayfield being found guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance and one count of failure to stop at a red light. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the drug charges and ten days in jail for the traffic violation. Mayfield raised several points in his appeal. He claimed that being convicted for two types of possession from the same incident violated double jeopardy rules, which protect against being punished twice for the same crime. He also argued that certain evidence presented in court, including information about his past crimes and a photograph of a piece of cellophane, was not relevant and unfairly biased the jury. The court found that the first count of possession was improperly charged alongside the second due to double jeopardy, so they reversed the second charge. However, in relation to the other arguments, the court decided that the admission of the pen packet evidence and the photograph did not greatly affect the trial's outcome. The court also ruled that there wasn’t enough evidence for Mayfield to claim that he wasn't connected to the drugs found in the area. Additionally, Mayfield's complaints about his lawyer's performance did not lead to a different outcome, as the court found the defense wasn't significantly lacking. Finally, the court noted that Mayfield’s life sentence was appropriate and consistent with the law because of his past criminal record. Most of Mayfield's arguments were rejected, leading to the final decision.

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RE-2013-635

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In OCCA case No. RE-2013-635, Bradberry appealed his conviction for the revocation of his suspended life sentences. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the full revocation and modify it to a ten-year revocation instead. One judge dissented. Bradberry was given suspended life sentences for failing to register as a sex offender and living near a school. He was on probation for less than two weeks when the state accused him of not reporting to his probation officer and not providing proof of employment or treatment. The trial judge decided to revoke his sentences completely due to these violations. Bradberry argued that the judge made a mistake by revoking his sentences in full, claiming it was excessive. The appeals court agreed that the judge abused his discretion, especially since many of Bradberry’s previous issues happened before his new sentencing. They found that the most significant reason for the revocation was his failure to report, which they believed did not warrant a full revocation. In the end, the appeal court decided that Bradberry’s suspended sentences should be modified. Instead of serving a life sentence, he would have to serve ten years of his suspended time. One judge disagreed with this decision and believed the full revocation was justified because Bradberry had not met his probation requirements.

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F-2011-693

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In OCCA case No. F-2011-693, Michael Wayne Dorsey appealed his conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree and Shooting with Intent to Kill. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Dorsey's conviction and his sentences but vacated the $5,000 victim compensation assessment set by the trial court. One member of the court dissented. Dorsey was found guilty by a jury of manslaughter and shooting with intent to kill. The jury decided on a punishment of thirty years for manslaughter and five years for the shooting charge, which would be served one after the other. Dorsey argued that he should have been allowed to use self-defense as a reason for both charges, but the court found that the instructions given to the jury were correct. Dorsey also claimed that the trial judge made an error with jury instructions regarding self-defense and intoxication, but the court disagreed. He further asserted that his lawyer was not effective because there was no objection raised to those jury instructions, but the court ruled that there was nothing wrong with the instructions in the first place. Lastly, Dorsey objected to the judge imposing the victim compensation amount without considering several important factors. The court agreed that the judge did not properly assess the situation and sent the case back to the trial court for a new decision on the compensation amount. Thus, the main outcome was that while Dorsey's conviction was upheld, the court required a reconsideration of the victim compensation assessment based on certain statutory factors outlined in the law.

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F-2009-749

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In OCCA case No. F-2009-749, Waymond George Morrison appealed his conviction for multiple offenses, including Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substances (CDS) with Intent to Distribute, Driving a Motor Vehicle Without a License, Distribution of CDS, and Possession of Proceeds from drug-related activities. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction for three counts while reversing one count related to possession of proceeds, ordering that it be dismissed. One justice dissented. Morrison faced several serious charges related to drugs and was sentenced to a total of 100 years in prison for the most severe charges, along with some fines. During his trial, he argued that his rights to due process were violated, that there was an improper handling of testimony, and that he faced double punishment for his actions. The court evaluated his claims: 1. The first issue was whether Morrison’s rights were violated when the court didn’t allow certain testimony. The court decided that the excluded testimony wasn't relevant to the case, so his rights were not infringed upon. 2. The second concern was about the trial being split into two parts (bifurcated). The court ruled that this was a correct decision and that it did not abuse its discretion. 3. Morrison also contended that testimony from a rebuttal witness should not have been permitted. The court found that this was appropriate because the rebuttal witness provided necessary clarifications to previous testimonies. 4. Regarding the issue of double punishment, the court explained that Morrison’s possession and distribution charges were based on separate actions—one for having cocaine and one for selling it. However, his conviction for possession of proceeds was tied to the same act of selling cocaine, so that particular conviction was reversed. 5. The sufficiency of the evidence against him was also questioned. The court found that there was enough evidence for the jury to reasonably convict Morrison of intent to distribute due to the drugs found in his car shortly after a sale. 6. Lastly, Morrison felt his sentence was excessively harsh. The court did not agree, noting that due to his previous criminal record, the sentence was justifiable. In conclusion, the court upheld the majority of Morrison's convictions and sentences, significantly addressing various legal arguments made by him during the appeal process.

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RE-2009-239

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In OCCA case No. RE-2009-239, the appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a forged instrument. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the order of revocation to allow for concurrent sentences instead of consecutive sentences. One judge dissented regarding the finding of excessiveness in the revocation order. In the case, the appellant, who was originally given the benefit of a deferred sentence and then suspended sentences, was accused of violating his probation by not reporting to his probation officer. The sentencing judge ultimately revoked his suspended sentences and imposed a total of eight years in prison, which he argued was excessive. The court reviewed the record and statements made by the judge during the revocation hearing. They determined that although the judge had the power to revoke less than the full suspension, the circumstances of the case warranted a modification to allow the sentences to be served concurrently, rather than consecutively as originally ordered. Additionally, the appellant contended that a second assessment for victim compensation was unlawful, as it exceeded the statutory limit. However, the court noted that the compensation assessments were appropriate and not void, concluding that this issue did not affect the validity of the revocation order itself. The final decision directed the district court to change the revocation order to reflect concurrent serving of sentences while affirming the other aspects of the revocation.

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F-2006-63

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In OCCA case No. F-2006-63, Beverly Michelle Moore appealed her conviction for First Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify Moore's sentence to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Two judges dissented. To explain, Beverly Moore was found guilty of killing two-year-old Avery Snyder. Avery had severe head injuries that doctors said were caused by violent shaking, known as shaken baby syndrome. The trial focused on whether Moore or Todd Snyder, Avery's father, caused the injuries. Moore admitted to giving a confession to the police but later recanted, claiming she did not harm the child. During the trial, the jury determined that Moore was responsible for Avery's injuries, leading to her conviction. The jury decided on life imprisonment without parole. However, the decision included a mistake regarding jury instructions about the 85% Rule, which means that for certain crimes, a person must serve 85% of their sentence before being eligible for parole. The court found it was necessary for the jury to understand this rule to make an informed sentencing decision. Moore's trial did not provide the jury with clear information about the 85% Rule, which was important after the jury inquired about it during their discussions. This omission was deemed a significant error that likely influenced the jury's decision to impose a harsher sentence. The court ultimately affirmed Moore's conviction for First Degree Murder but ordered that her sentence be modified to allow for the possibility of parole, reflecting the guidelines that should have been communicated to the jury during the sentencing phase. The dissenting judges believed the original sentence should not have been modified, arguing that the trial followed the laws that were in place at that time and no objections had been made during the trial.

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RE-2004-584

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In OCCA case No. RE-2004-584, Sarah Mae Jones appealed her conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance (cocaine). In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of her suspended sentence but modified it to reflect two years and ten months instead of the full sentence. One dissenting opinion was noted. Sarah Mae Jones had initially entered a guilty plea on October 18, 2001, for possession of cocaine and was sentenced to three years in prison, which was suspended. This meant she wouldn't have to serve time in jail if she followed certain rules. However, after violating her probation, she had parts of her suspended sentence revoked on two different occasions. The first revocation happened because she did not meet some requirements like reporting in person, maintaining a job, and avoiding illegal drugs. This led to a 60-day revocation. The second time, in March 2004, the state argued that she had again broken the rules of her probation. The court held another hearing where the judge decided to revoke her entire suspended sentence. On appeal, Jones claimed there wasn't enough evidence to support the complete revocation of her sentence. However, the court found that her own admissions during the hearing showed she had indeed violated her probation terms, which justified the judge’s decision. They explained that proving a violation only needs to show that it was likely she broke the rules, not to have a witness directly see it happen. In her second argument, Jones said the decision to revoke her entire suspended sentence without giving her credit for time already served was too harsh. The state agreed with her on this point, and upon reviewing her case, the court modified the revocation to two years and ten months, accounting for the time she had already spent under the suspended sentence. In conclusion, the court upheld the decision to revoke her suspended sentence but adjusted the length of that sentence to better reflect the circumstances.

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F-2003-717

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In OCCA case No. F-2003-717, Paul Delmer Morgan appealed his conviction for Distribution of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Cocaine). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Morgan's conviction but modified his sentence. One judge dissented. Morgan was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison and a $100,000 fine. He challenged his conviction by claiming there were six main problems with the trial. First, he argued that there was evidence shown to the jury about other crimes he committed, which he felt was unfair. Second, he said the judge should have told the jury how to use statements from a witness who had changed his story. Third, he thought the judge did not properly warn the jury about trusting the informant’s testimony. Fourth, he believed the fine he received was too high because of how the judge gave instructions to the jury. Fifth, Morgan thought that his sentence was too harsh. Lastly, he claimed that taken together, these errors made it impossible for him to have a fair trial. After reviewing everything, the court found that the evidence about the other crimes was closely connected to his current case, so it could be allowed. They also noted that Morgan did not object to it during the trial, which meant he could not easily argue against it now. Regarding the witness’s inconsistent statements, the court agreed that the judge should have explained this to the jury, but they ruled that it did not hurt Morgan's case. The informant's testimony was supported by other evidence, so the lack of instruction on that wasn't a problem. They also decided that the fine imposed on Morgan was too high. Instead of $100,000, they lowered it to the maximum allowed by law, which was $10,000. Finally, the court felt that a life sentence for selling a small amount of cocaine was too extreme, even with Morgan’s prior criminal record. They changed his sentence to 20 years in prison instead. In conclusion, while the court confirmed Morgan's conviction, they modified his sentence to 20 years and a $10,000 fine. However, one judge disagreed with modifying the sentence, believing that the jury had made the right decision based on the evidence they had.

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RE 2002-0387

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In OCCA case No. RE 2002-0387, a person appealed his conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the revocation of his suspended sentence. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant pled guilty to robbery with a dangerous weapon on October 5, 2000, and received a six-year suspended sentence along with a $1,500 fine. He was also given rules to follow while on probation. A little over a year later, on January 1, 2002, the state filed a petition to revoke the appellant's suspended sentence. This meant they wanted to take away his suspended sentence because they believed he broke the rules. The hearing took place on February 27, 2002. The judge found that the appellant had violated some conditions of his probation, which led to three years being taken away from his suspended sentence. The appellant was only fifteen when he committed the crime and was still just seventeen at the time of the hearing. During the appeal, the appellant argued that the evidence the state provided was not good enough to prove he violated his probation. He also said that taking away three years of his suspended sentence was too harsh, especially since there were reasons that might lessen his punishment. The case included the fact that the appellant had not finished high school, and he had a lot of rules to follow without any support or treatment. One specific rule was that he could not hang out with people who had criminal records. The state claimed that he broke this rule by being around a certain person who had a felony conviction. However, during a trial, the appellant explained that being in a large group did not mean he was talking to or hanging out with that person. The state argued that they had enough evidence since the transcripts from another trial included the appellant's testimony. However, these transcripts were not available for the court to review in this case. In the end, the court agreed with the appellant that the evidence was not strong enough to prove he had violated the probation rules. Because of this lack of evidence, the court reversed the decision made to revoke the suspended sentence and ordered it to be dismissed.

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F-2001-230

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In OCCA case No. F-2001-230, Shihee Hason Daughrity appealed his conviction for two counts of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon and one count of False Personation. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions on the robbery counts but reversed the conviction for False Personation. One judge dissented. Daughrity was tried along with another person and was found guilty of robbing someone while using a dangerous weapon and falsely claiming to be someone else. The judge sentenced him to a long time in prison and also made him pay fines. Daughrity thought the trial was unfair and wanted to appeal. The court looked at the reasons Daughrity gave for why he thought he should win his appeal. He questioned whether there was enough proof for the False Personation charge because there wasn't clear evidence that he impersonated an actual person. The court reviewed previous cases to understand what counts as False Personation. They found that in this case, there wasn’t enough proof to show he impersonated someone who could be harmed by his actions. While the evidence seemed to show he used a fake name to escape responsibility for his actions, the instructions given to the jury were incomplete. Because of this, Daughrity's conviction for False Personation was reversed, which means he shouldn’t have been found guilty of that charge based on how the jury was instructed. However, they kept his convictions for robbery since they were clear and backed by enough evidence. In conclusion, while Daughrity's robbery convictions stayed, he won on the False Personation count. The judges made sure that the right procedures were followed, highlighting how important it is for juries to have complete and clear instructions when they are deciding on guilt.

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