In OCCA case No. F-2019-37, Suggs appealed his conviction for first-degree burglary. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse and remand for a new trial on that count due to an instructional error, while affirming the convictions on the other counts. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2017-357, Shawn Lee McDaniel appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate the judgment and sentence, remanding the matter with instructions to dismiss. The main issue in this case was whether the victim was considered an Indian under federal law and whether the crime took place in Indian country, which is defined as land within the boundaries of Indian reservations. Both questions were answered affirmatively. The court looked to a previous case, McGirt v. Oklahoma, which established that certain lands in Oklahoma were still recognized as Indian reservations under federal law. McDaniel’s appeal was based on the fact that the murder occurred within the historic boundaries of the Cherokee Nation and that the victim was a recognized member of the Cherokee Nation at the time of his death. The court remanded the case to a lower court, which found that both of these conditions were true, meaning federal, not state, authorities had jurisdiction over the case. The court’s decision concluded that since the crime fell under the federal jurisdiction, the state of Oklahoma did not have the authority to prosecute McDaniel. Consequently, the judgement was vacated, and the matter was directed to be dismissed. While most judges agreed with the results, there were dissenting opinions which expressed concern and highlighted issues within the majority opinion, particularly regarding its adherence to historical precedents and the implications of McGirt's ruling.
In OCCA case No. F-2019-115, Beck appealed his conviction for multiple serious crimes, including First Degree Burglary and Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided that the State of Oklahoma did not have the authority to prosecute him because he is recognized as an Indian and the crimes occurred in what is considered Indian Country. The result was that Beck's convictions were overturned, and the case was sent back with instructions to dismiss the charges. There was a dissenting opinion regarding the application of the law.
In OCCA case No. F-2019-417, Henry Warren Kwe Kwe appealed his conviction for Conjoint Robbery, Shooting with Intent to Kill, Possession of a Sawed-Off Shotgun, and Leaving Scene of a Collision Involving Injury. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Kwe Kwe's convictions on all counts except for the Victim Compensation Assessment for Count 4, which was vacated. Kwe Kwe dissented. Kwe Kwe was found guilty of several serious crimes stemming from an incident involving a robbery and a shooting. The trial revealed that he, along with accomplices, confronted the victim, demanding her money while one of them displayed a weapon. When the victim attempted to call for help, she was shot in the back with a shotgun. Following this, the robbers took her purse and fled. On appeal, Kwe Kwe raised numerous issues regarding his convictions. He argued that being convicted for both robbery and shooting violated laws against multiple punishments for a single act. However, the court found that the robbery and the shooting were distinct actions. The shooting was meant to prevent the victim from escaping and to eliminate her as a witness, rather than to take possession of her belongings. Kwe Kwe also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him, claiming he wasn't the shooter. However, the jury had enough circumstantial evidence to conclude he aided in the crime, as he orchestrated the robbery and knew one accomplice was armed. Also, he was found in possession of a sawed-off shotgun shortly after the incident. The court held that the evidence supported the conclusion he was culpable for aiding and abetting the shooter. Another argument from Kwe Kwe revolved around the legality of the sawed-off shotgun itself. He claimed the prosecution didn't prove the shotgun's barrel was less than 18 inches, which would classify it as sawn-off under the law. Nevertheless, the officer testified that the weapon was a modified sawed-off shotgun and that the jury could determine this after examining it. Moreover, Kwe Kwe claimed that the court’s language when discussing the victim's injuries went against the norms of a fair trial. However, the court found this testimony relevant, as it demonstrated the severity of the attack and the intent behind the actions taken by Kwe Kwe and his accomplices. Lastly, he argued that his legal counsel did not perform adequately by failing to raise certain legal defenses and objections during the trial. Yet, the court determined that any such failures did not adversely affect his rights or the outcome of the case. In summary, Kwe Kwe's convictions remained intact, and while some procedural missteps were noted, none were sufficient to reverse the verdict aside from the correction regarding the Victim Compensation Assessment linked to his charge. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision overall, while rectifying the single financial aspect.
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **CAMERON LEE SCHEMMER,** Appellant, v. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **Case No. F-2018-1023** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JAN 23 2020** **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN** **CLERK** **LUMPKIN, JUDGE:** Appellant, Cameron Lee Schemmer, was tried by the court and convicted of Count 1, Forcible Sodomy, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 888, and Counts 2-4, Lewd Molestation, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1123, in Kingfisher County District Court, Case No. CF-2017-96. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years imprisonment with all but the last five years suspended for Count 1. For Counts 2-4, the court sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently to one another but consecutively to the sentence for Count 1. As a result, Appellant will be required to serve 85% of his sentences before becoming eligible for parole, as per 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. From this judgment and sentence, Appellant appeals, raising the following propositions of error: **I.** The record in this case does not sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. **II.** Mr. Schemmer received an excessive sentence when the trial court followed the wrong sentencing statute. Upon thorough consideration of these propositions and the entire record, including the original record, transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we find no relief is warranted under the law and evidence presented. **Proposition I:** Appellant argues that the record is insufficient to support a finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Since he did not object before the non-jury trial, we review this claim for plain error, as established in *Simpson v. State*, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690. Plain error requires that Appellant demonstrate an actual error that is plain or obvious and affects substantial rights. A defendant may waive their right to a jury trial, but the waiver must be knowingly, competently, and intelligently made. The record shows that prior to trial, the court engaged in a colloquy with Appellant regarding his jury trial waiver. Appellant confirmed his satisfaction with his attorney and expressly indicated his desire to waive the jury trial right. This established a knowing and intelligent waiver by Appellant. Therefore, we deny this proposition as the trial court's assessment was in compliance with the law. **Proposition II:** Appellant contends his sentence is illegal because the Information alleged that R.N. was a child under sixteen, not under twelve. Thus, Appellant argues that the sentencing range should have been from one or three years to twenty years instead of a minimum of twenty-five years, as required when the child is under the age of twelve. Since Appellant failed to object at sentencing, we again look for plain error. The Information indicated that R.N. was under the age of sixteen at the time of the offenses, and the evidence revealed she was ten years old when the abuse began and eleven when it ceased. Appellant was charged under 21 O.S.2011, § 1123(A), which necessitates a minimum of twenty-five years imprisonment when the child is under twelve years of age. A court in a non-jury trial retains the presumption of knowing the law correctly. The facts show that R.N. was indeed under twelve when the offenses occurred, and the court found this circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the claim of an illegal sentence based on an erroneous application of the statute is without merit. **DECISION:** The **JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED**. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, the **MANDATE is ORDERED issued** upon this ruling. **APPEARANCES:** **Trial Counsel:** Blayne Allsup **Appellate Counsel for Appellant:** Cindy Brown Danner **Counsel for State:** John Salmon, Assistant District Attorney, and Theodore M. Peepers, Assistant Attorney General. **OPINION BY:** LUMPKIN, J. **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE:** CONCURS **LEWIS, P.J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J.:** Concur in Result **HUDSON, J.:** Concur **ROWLAND, J.:** Concur **KUEHN, V.P.J., CONCURRING IN RESULT:** While I concur with the outcomes reached, I note a discrepancy in the standard of review applied to Proposition I. The burden rests with the State to prove any constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as highlighted in *Chadwell v. State* and *Chapman v. California*. The majority's application of the plain error standard does not recognize this shifting burden adequately. **[Document ends here]**
The decision from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirms the conviction of Kenneth Oliver Ross for multiple offenses, including lewd molestation and human trafficking of a minor. The court meticulously addressed each of the twelve propositions of error raised by the appellant in their appeal. 1. **Double Punishment**: The court found no double jeopardy in the separate counts of lewd molestation, as they described distinct acts of abuse. 2. **Charge Appropriateness**: The court ruled that human trafficking was properly charged, as the prosecutor had discretion in choosing the relevant statutes. 3. **Sufficiency of Evidence**: Both propositions regarding the sufficiency of evidence for human trafficking were denied, with the court stating that isolated incidents could constitute the crime. 4. **Jury Instructions**: The court upheld the jury instructions given, finding no error in how the law was communicated to the jury. 5. **Ex Post Facto Claims**: The court found no ex post facto violation, indicating that ignorance of the victim's age was not a defense to the charges. 6. **Lesser Included Offenses**: The court ruled that the lack of request for certain lesser-included offense instructions meant review would be under plain error, which the court did not find. 7. **Statutory Clarity**: Propositions regarding the constitutionality and vagueness of the human trafficking statute were denied, with the court upholding the statute's clarity and application. 8. **Sentence Severity**: The court concluded that the 50-year sentence for human trafficking was not shockingly excessive based on the evidence presented. 9. **Cumulative Error**: The final proposition regarding cumulative error was also denied as no individual errors were found. Overall, the appellate court found no merit in any of the propositions and affirmed the original sentence handed down by the district court. The case illustrates the court's rigorous examination of statutory interpretation, jury instructions, evidentiary sufficiency, and statutory vagueness concerns in criminal appeals.
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **RICHARD PATRICK SPAULDING,** **Appellant,** **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **Case No. F-2018-668** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **OCT 31 2019** **SUMMARY OPINION** **JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK** **LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:** Richard Patrick Spaulding, Appellant, was tried by a jury and found guilty of first degree murder, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2012, § 701.7(A), in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2017-682. The jury set punishment at life imprisonment. The Honorable William J. Musseman, Jr., District Judge, pronounced judgment and sentence accordingly. Mr. Spaulding appeals on the following proposition of error: 1. The evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the crime of murder in the first degree. Appellant must serve 85% of his sentence before being eligible for consideration for parole, pursuant to 22 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1(1). In Proposition One, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We review the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. *Spuehler v. State,* 1985 OK CR 132, ¶ 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04. In this inquiry, we will not second guess the jury's finding of facts, but will accept the reasonable inferences and credibility choices that support the jury's verdict. *Mason v. State,* 2018 OK CR 37, ¶ 13, 433 P.3d 1264, 1269. We conclude that the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for murder. Proposition One is denied. **DECISION** The judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY** **THE HON. WILLIAM J. MUSSEMAN, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE** **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** RICHARD KOLLER 423 S. BOULDER AVE., STE. 300 TULSA, OK 74103 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL** RICHARD COUCH REBECCA NEWMAN 423 S. BOULDER AVE., STE. 300 TULSA, OK 74103 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT KENNETH ELMORE MIKE HUNTER KATY HAMSTRA ATTORNEY GENERAL ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS KEELEY L. MILLER 500 S. DENVER AVE., STE. 900 TULSA, OK 742103 ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE **OPINION BY: LEWIS, P.J.** KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur LUMPKIN, P.J.: Concur HUDSON, J.: Concur ROWLAND, J.: Concur [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-668_1735223088.pdf)
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **HEATHER SUZANNE BARBEE, Appellant,** **vs.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.** **No. F-2018-616** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 26, 2019** SUMMARY OPINION **JOHN D. HADDEN, CLERK** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant, Heather Suzanne Barbee, was convicted by a jury in Muskogee County District Court, Case No. F-2017-190, of Sexual Exploitation of a Child. On June 14, 2018, the Honorable Michael Norman, District Judge, sentenced her to thirty-three years imprisonment, in accordance with the jury's recommendation. She must serve 85% of her sentence before parole consideration. Appellant raises six propositions of error in support of her appeal: **PROPOSITION I:** THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY HOLDING A TWO-STAGE TRIAL INSTEAD OF A ONE-STAGE TRIAL. **PROPOSITION II:** THE STATE'S DECISION TO PROCEED WITH A TWO-STAGE TRIAL WITHOUT ANY PROOF OF FORMER FELONIES CAUSED HARM TO Ms. BARBEE. **PROPOSITION III:** PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A FAIR TRIAL. **PROPOSITION IV:** INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A FAIR TRIAL. **PROPOSITION V:** THE SENTENCE WAS EXCESSIVE. **PROPOSITION VI:** CUMULATIVE ERROR DEPRIVED Ms. BARBEE OF A FAIR TRIAL. After thorough consideration of these propositions, the briefs of the parties, and the record on appeal, we affirm. Appellant was charged with sexually exploiting her minor sister for financial gain. The State charged two counts, but the jury found her guilty of only one. As to Propositions I and II, the record indicates that (1) Appellant had prior convictions used to enhance the sentence on one of the two charges she faced; (2) the trial was bifurcated as to both charges; but (3) the jury acquitted Appellant of the enhanced count. Thus, the jury sentenced Appellant as a first offender on the remaining charge, and never heard about the prior convictions. The procedure used was entirely proper, and Appellant fails to show any prejudice from it. *Wisdom v. State*, 1996 OK CR 22, 99 17-20, 918 P.2d 384, 390; *Marshall v. State*, 2010 OK CR 8, I 58, 232 P.3d 467, 481. Propositions I and II are denied. In Proposition III, Appellant alleges six instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Because she did not object to these comments below, we review them only for plain error - an actual error, that is plain or obvious, and that affects a defendant's substantial rights and the outcome of the trial. *Bosse v. State*, 2017 OK CR 10, 9 82, 400 P.3d 834, 863. We find no error. First, the prosecutor did not impermissibly comment on Appellant's failure to testify simply by arguing that the jury had received absolutely nothing to contradict the testimony of the State's primary witnesses. Such general comments about the totality of the evidence (and lack of controverting evidence) differ from directly suggesting that the defendant must be guilty because she did not take the stand. *Id.*, 2017 OK CR 10, I 85, 400 P.3d at 863. The prosecutor never shirked her burden to prove all elements of the crime. Second, the prosecutor did not vouch for the credibility of complaining witnesses by pointing to their demeanor and the consistency in their accounts; these comments were properly based on evidence presented to the jury. *Taylor v. State*, 2011 OK CR 8, I 57, 248 P.3d 362, 379; *Bland v. State*, 2000 OK CR 11, I 97, 4 P.3d 702, 728. Third, the prosecutor's assessment of the defense strategy as smoke and mirrors and intellectually disingenuous, and her statement, Ladies and gentlemen, she is guilty, were also fair inferences from the evidence presented. *Harris v. State*, 2000 OK CR 20, I 35, 13 P.3d 489, 498. Fourth, assertions of the defendant's guilt are not improper if they are made with reference to the evidence presented. *Williams v. State*, 2008 OK CR 19, I 107, 188 P.3d 208, 228. Fifth, asking the jury to consider the long-term effects of the defendant's conduct on the victim when assessing the sentence was not plainly erroneous. *Carol v. State*, 1988 OK CR 114, I 10, 756 P.2d 614, 617. We note that the jury recommended a sentence less than the 40-year sentence requested by the prosecutor. Finally, the prosecutor's reference in the punishment stage to acquitted conduct (Count 2, the charge on which the jury found Appellant not guilty in the first stage of the trial) was not improper. The jury was still free to consider that conduct, because it was not an element the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to sentencing on Count 1. *See Dowling v. United States*, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990). We find no error in the prosecutor's comments such as would warrant any relief. Proposition III is denied. In Proposition IV, Appellant faults trial counsel for not making objections to the issues raised in Propositions I, II, and III. To show trial counsel was ineffective, she must show both deficient performance and prejudice. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); *White v. State*, 2019 OK CR 2, I 23, 437 P.3d 1061, 1070. Because we found no merit to these substantive complaints, trial counsel was not ineffective. *Jackson v. State*, 2016 OK CR 5, I 13, 371 P.3d 1120, 1123. Proposition IV is denied. As to Proposition V, given Appellant's conduct in this case, the sentence recommended by the jury (less than what the prosecutor requested) was not shocking to the conscience, and the trial court's order that the sentence be served consecutively to Appellant's sentence in an unrelated case was not an abuse of discretion. *White*, 2019 OK CR 2, I 29, 437 P.3d at 1072. As to Proposition VI, because no error has been identified above, there can be no relief for cumulative error. *Engles v. State*, 2015 OK CR 17, I 13, 366 P.3d 311, 315. Proposition VI is denied. **DECISION** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Muskogee County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY THE HONORABLE MICHAEL NORMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** DAN MEDLOCK MEDLOCK LAW 620 WEST BROADWAY MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 **COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT** **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** LISBETH L. MCCARTY INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** NALANI CHING ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE KEELEY L. MILLER ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 220 STATE STREET MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** **LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR** **LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR** **HUDSON, J.: CONCUR** **ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR** [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-616_1735230080.pdf)
In OCCA case No. S-2015-771, the defendant appealed his conviction for Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower courts' rulings. One judge dissented. Carl Edward Prince, also known as Carl Edward Harper, was arrested for having marijuana and other related charges. He was charged with three main offenses regarding drug possession and use of a police radio. During the early stages of the trial, a magistrate judge decided there wasn't enough evidence for one of the charges, which was about maintaining a place used for selling drugs. The prosecution believed that this decision was wrong and appealed it. The appeal against the magistrate's decision went to another judge who agreed with the first judge, stating that the evidence given by the prosecution was not strong enough to prove that Prince had maintained a location where marijuana was kept with the intent to distribute it. Because of this, they could not prove that there was a pattern or habit of drug use or sales at the location. The case was taken to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. The main issues raised by the prosecution were about whether the requirement for a pattern of activity (habitualness) should be considered a fact that needed to be proven and whether there was enough evidence to bring the case to a jury. The Appeals Court decided that the past decisions regarding drug cases required proof of more than just a single event of drug possession. They reasoned that a location must show a pattern of illegal drug activity or use before a person can be convicted under this law. The court looked carefully at what evidence was presented while considering the arguments from both sides. They concluded that there were no clear mistakes made by the lower courts. The evidence didn’t meet the standard needed to prove that Prince’s home was used primarily for drug activity. They upheld the decisions of the lower courts, which means that Prince was not found guilty of that charge. One judge disagreed with this final decision, feeling that the lower courts made a mistake in throwing out the charge about maintaining a place for drugs. This dissenting opinion argued that the law should allow for flexibility and not just rely on showing repeated actions or habits to prove the case. The dissenting judge expressed that the current interpretation of the law was too strict and made it difficult to prosecute based on the evidence presented. In summary, the Appeal Court confirmed that there wasn’t enough evidence to charge Prince with maintaining a place for drug distribution, leading to the upholding of his preliminary ruling.
In OCCA case No. M 2015-1099, Phantirath appealed her conviction for engaging in prostitution and operating a place of prostitution. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse her convictions because she was not allowed to enter a guilty plea, which is a right for defendants. One judge dissented, stating that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the plea.
In OCCA case No. C-2016-813, Derlin Lara appealed his conviction for multiple charges, including Manslaughter in the First Degree and Driving Under the Influence. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny in part and grant in part the appeal. One judge dissented. Derlin Lara was involved in a serious legal situation where he entered an Alford plea. This type of plea means that he did not admit guilt but agreed that there was enough evidence to convict him. His charges included killing someone while driving under the influence, injuring another person while DUI, driving without a license, and transporting alcohol in the car. After he pleaded guilty, he was sentenced by a judge. The judge gave him a long sentence that meant he’d serve a lot of time in prison. Lara later wanted to take back his plea because he felt it wasn’t fair and that he didn't fully understand what he was doing. He argued that he was confused during the process, and that he had received poor advice from his lawyer. The court looked carefully at Lara's case and found several key points: 1. The judges believed that Lara's plea was actually made with understanding, even though he insisted that he did not understand everything. They noted that he had an interpreter during his hearings. 2. The court decided that Lara was not unfairly punished multiple times for the same actions. They explained that each charge had different parts and involved different victims, so they did not violate any laws regarding multiple punishments. 3. Lara’s claims about his lawyer not helping him were also rejected. The court found that Lara did not show that having a different lawyer would have changed his decision to plead guilty. 4. The sentence he received for one of the charges was too harsh according to the law. He was given a year in jail for driving without a license, but that punishment was higher than allowed. The court changed that sentence to a shorter one of just thirty days. Lastly, the court found that the amounts assessed for victim compensation and restitution were not properly explained during sentencing. Therefore, they canceled those amounts and decided that a hearing should be held to determine fair compensation. In summary, while the court denied most of Lara's requests, they did change one of his sentences and agreed that some financial penalties needed to be rethought.
In OCCA case No. JS 2015-1076, R.Z.M. appealed his conviction for Forcible Oral Sodomy. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's order that dismissed the charge. One judge dissented. R.Z.M. was born on November 21, 1997, and was charged with serious crimes in Tulsa County. The charges included Rape-First Degree and Forcible Oral Sodomy. However, the first charge was dismissed before the trial. When it came to the second charge, R.Z.M.'s defense team asked to have it dismissed too. The judge agreed and granted the motion to dismiss on November 30, 2015. The State of Oklahoma was not happy with this decision, so they decided to appeal it. They argued that the trial court made a mistake by ruling that someone cannot be charged with Forcible Sodomy if the victim is too intoxicated to be aware during the act. However, the court decided that there was no error in the trial court’s ruling. The opinion explained that the law about Forcible Sodomy does not mention anything about intoxication. In this case, the law is very specific and does not allow for broad interpretations. Since the law does not include intoxication as a reason for the crime of Forcible Sodomy, the dismissal was upheld. In summary, the court sided with R.Z.M. and kept the trial court's decision to dismiss the charge.
In OCCA case No. C-2014-854, Cory James Leon Whiteside appealed his conviction for Domestic Assault and Battery and Domestic Abuse - Assault and Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant his petition, allowing him to withdraw his pleas. One member of the court dissented. Whiteside pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor charges involving domestic violence. The court sentenced him to one year in jail for each charge, with the sentences to run one after the other. Shortly after pleading guilty, Whiteside asked to change his plea from guilty to not guilty, stating he had not understood the consequences of his plea. His request to withdraw his plea was denied by the court. Whiteside then appealed this decision, arguing two main points. First, he claimed he did not knowingly and voluntarily give up his right to have an attorney represent him during the case. Second, he argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because he didn't fully understand what he was agreeing to. The court reviewed the entire record of the case. It found that Whiteside's waiver of his right to counsel was not made in a knowing and voluntary way, meaning there was no clear record showing that he understood what self-representation involved or that he had been advised of the risks of not having a lawyer. The state even agreed with this point. Because this error was significant, the court decided to let Whiteside withdraw his guilty pleas. Following this decision, the other issue Whiteside raised became unnecessary to address. Therefore, the court ordered that Whiteside be allowed to withdraw his pleas.
In OCCA case No. F-2014-396, Jenkins appealed his conviction for Burglary in the Second Degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify Jenkins' 30-year sentence to 20 years. The decision was reached after the court found some errors occurred during the sentencing stage. Jenkins was convicted of breaking into a house with the intent to steal. He argued that the evidence did not prove he broke into the home. However, the court found that the doors being open and a window being broken were enough to show that he did break in. The court also determined that his behavior, like giving a false name and running away, suggested he intended to steal. Although the court found the conviction valid, they acknowledged that the prosecution made mistakes when discussing Jenkins' past criminal record, which prompted them to lower his sentence. The original sentence of 30 years was too harsh given the errors, leading the court to adjust it to 20 years. Ultimately, the court upheld the conviction but modified the length of the sentence.
In OCCA case No. RE-2014-238, the appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a controlled substance within the presence of a minor child, driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, and failure to carry an insurance verification form. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentence but vacated the one year of post-imprisonment supervision. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. RE-2013-887, Collins appealed his conviction for Possession of Child Pornography. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentence but vacated the additional one year of post-imprisonment supervision. One judge dissented. Here's a brief summary of the case: Mark Stephen Collins was charged with having child pornography in 2010. He pleaded no contest and was given a five-year sentence, with a part of it suspended, meaning he wouldn’t have to serve it in prison if he followed certain rules. However, in 2013, he broke those rules in several ways, like failing drug tests, not attending counseling, and refusing to meet with his supervising officer. Because of this, the state asked to make him serve his whole sentence. During a hearing about the violations, the judge decided it was fair to revoke his suspended sentence because Collins had admitted to breaking the rules. Collins argued that the judge was too harsh in revoking his sentence and that his actions were due to his drug addiction. The court explained that it doesn’t have to be proven that all rules were broken, just that at least one was. Collins also believed that the judge should not have added a year of post-imprisonment supervision after revoking his sentence since it would be a longer punishment than what was originally given. The law allows a judge to require supervision after imprisonment, but the court found that the judge was not allowed to impose it in this situation because it was not part of Collins’ original sentence. In the end, the court agreed with most of the judge's decision to revoke the sentence due to the violations but took away the additional year of supervision because it was not permitted. The case was sent back to the lower court to issue a new order that matched the court's ruling.
In OCCA case No. F-2011-877, Dennis Lynn Miller appealed his conviction for multiple offenses, including child sexual abuse, first-degree rape, forcible oral sodomy, attempted first-degree rape, kidnapping, assault with a dangerous weapon, and intimidation of a witness. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions for counts one through six and eight, while reversing and remanding count seven for dismissal. One judge dissented. Miller was convicted after a jury trial in Muskogee County, where he faced serious accusations of abusing his adoptive daughter, L.M. The abuse began when L.M. was around thirteen years old, involving both physical violence and sexual acts that lasted for several years. Miller's conduct included threats of violence to control L.M. during these acts, which left her frightened and unwilling to report the abuse. L.M. eventually confided in a friend, and authorities were contacted, leading to a police investigation that confirmed multiple instances of abuse. Although Miller challenged the admissibility of certain evidence related to his past behavior and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the court determined that the substantial evidence supported the jury's decisions. The court acknowledged that some evidence may not have been properly objected to during trial, but found that the lack of objections by defense counsel did not significantly harm Miller's case, as the victim's testimony was clear and credible. The court ultimately ruled that Miller's conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon should be reversed as the evidence did not support that a dresser was used in a manner that constituted a dangerous weapon. In summary, the court upheld most of Miller's convictions while dismissing one, citing the overwhelming evidence against him and the credibility of the victim's testimony.
In OCCA case No. C-2010-695, Marcus Jermaine Christon appealed his conviction for multiple charges including burglary and possession of drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant his petition for certiorari and remanded the case for a new hearing. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2010-555, Keighton Jon Budder appealed his conviction for First Degree Rape (Counts I and III), Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon (Count II), and Forcible Oral Sodomy (Count IV). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify his sentences for Counts I and III to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. S 2011-0023, David Franco appealed his conviction for several charges related to using a vehicle in the discharge of a weapon, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, feloniously pointing a firearm, and other related charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the ruling that dismissed some of the charges against him. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. RE-2010-293, Downs appealed his conviction for a probation violation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentences. One judge dissented. Downs had entered guilty pleas for several crimes in 2004, which included assault and possessing controlled substances. After completing part of his sentence in 2006, some of his time was suspended, meaning he would not have to serve it if he followed the rules of probation. However, in 2008, the State accused him of violating his probation because he was arrested for a new crime. A hearing took place in 2010 where evidence was presented, and the judge found that the State proved Downs had violated his probation. As a result, all of his suspended sentence was revoked. Downs raised several arguments in his appeal, saying the trial judge made mistakes that affected his case. He claimed he was not given enough time to prepare his defense, that the evidence against him was not strong enough, and that he was not allowed to confront witnesses. He also argued that the revocation was for too long and that the judge didn't have the right to revoke his sentence. The court examined each of Downs' claims. They found that it was reasonable for the judge to deny a continuance for more time to prepare, and that the evidence at the hearing was enough to support the revocation of his probation. They also stated that Downs had waived his right to a quick hearing, meaning the 20-day rule that he mentioned did not apply. In the end, the court did agree that there was a small mistake in the length of time noted for the revoked sentence, which needed to be corrected. However, they affirmed the decision to revoke all of Downs' suspended sentences. Thus, the court ordered that a corrected record be made to show the right amount of time for his sentences. The judges all generally agreed on the decision, but one judge had a different opinion.
In OCCA case No. S-2009-1176, Don Wayne Townsend Jr. appealed his conviction for Omission to Provide for Minor Child. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's dismissal of the case. No one dissented. In this case, Townsend was initially charged with not providing for his child, which was a violation of the law. However, after the state presented its evidence, the trial judge decided that the evidence was not strong enough to continue the trial. The state then sought to appeal this decision, asking if the judge made a mistake in dismissing the case. The court looked carefully at the situation and found that the state's question was not really about the law, but rather about whether the evidence was enough to prove Townsend's guilt. The court explained that proving someone is guilty requires showing they willfully did not support their child for a long time. They also stated that it must be shown that the person had a legal obligation to pay child support. Ultimately, the court agreed with the trial judge's decision and found no error in dismissing the case against Townsend. This means that the matter was closed and he could not be tried again for this charge. The court's decision was recorded, and they indicated that the dismissal order would stand.
In OCCA case No. S-2008-53, the State of Oklahoma appealed the conviction for Child Abuse. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the earlier decisions, meaning they upheld the conclusion that there was not enough evidence to proceed with the trial against the defendant. One judge dissented in this case. The case was about a parent who was accused of child abuse after leaving her two children in a vehicle while she became unconscious. The court looked at whether the parent’s actions met the legal definition of child abuse. A special judge had already decided there wasn’t enough evidence to charge her, and when the State appealed that decision, the district judge agreed. When the case reached the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the justices reviewed the earlier decisions. They listened to arguments from both sides and looked closely at the facts. They saw that the earlier judges had acted reasonably and hadn’t made any mistakes that would change the outcome. Therefore, they decided to keep the original ruling, which meant that the parent wouldn’t have to face trial for the charges brought against her.
In OCCA case No. F-2006-17, McFarland appealed his conviction for sexual battery and second-degree rape by instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for sexual battery but modified the sentence for the second-degree rape by instrumentation by vacating the $10,000 fine. One judge dissented. McFarland was found guilty of two serious crimes and was sentenced to a total of eight years in prison and fines. He argued that charging him with both crimes was unfair because they were part of the same event, meaning he faced double punishment. The court examined the evidence and determined that the acts were separate enough that charging him with both was allowed and did not violate his rights. He also claimed that the prosecutor made inappropriate comments during the trial that affected his chances for a fair trial. Some of these comments were found to be improper, but the court decided they did not seriously harm McFarland’s case. Additionally, McFarland argued that the instructions given to the jury about the fines were wrong, which led to the $10,000 fine for the second-degree rape charge being improper. The court agreed with him on this point, finding that jurors were wrongly instructed that they had to impose a fine. In summary, while the court upheld the conviction and the sentence for sexual battery, it modified the sentence for the second-degree rape charge by removing the fine.
In OCCA case No. F-2006-598, Timmy Eugene Owen appealed his conviction for escaping from Grady County Jail and assaulting a police officer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Owen's convictions but reverse his sentences, leading to a remand for resentencing. One judge dissented from the opinion. Timmy Eugene Owen was convicted for two crimes: escaping from jail and assaulting a police officer. The jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison for the escape and ten years for the assault. Owen appealed this decision, claiming that he did not get a fair trial because of several reasons. First, he argued that the trial judge should have given him a mistrial due to improper questions from the prosecutor during the trial. However, the court said the judge did not make a mistake because the questions asked did not unfairly influence the jury's decision. Owen also claimed that the prosecutor acted unethically during the trial, which made it hard for him to get a fair trial. The court agreed that some of the prosecutor's comments were inappropriate but believed they did not change the outcome of the trial. They said that despite these comments, the evidence against Owen was very strong. Additionally, Owen believed that his sentences were too harsh. He felt it was unfair to receive a life sentence for escaping from jail and ten years for the assault. The court did not change the life sentence for the escape but suggested that all sentences might need reconsideration because they found that the prosecutor's words affected the sentencing. Owen also raised an issue about being punished twice for the two different crimes. However, the court stated that the two crimes were separate and required different evidence, so they did not violate any laws about double punishment. In the end, while the court affirmed Owen's guilty verdicts, saying he was rightly found guilty for both charges, they reversed the sentences and sent the case back to lower court for a new sentencing. A judge disagreed, believing the trial was fair despite the errors.