Criminal Intent

F-2019-417

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In OCCA case No. F-2019-417, Henry Warren Kwe Kwe appealed his conviction for Conjoint Robbery, Shooting with Intent to Kill, Possession of a Sawed-Off Shotgun, and Leaving Scene of a Collision Involving Injury. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Kwe Kwe's convictions on all counts except for the Victim Compensation Assessment for Count 4, which was vacated. Kwe Kwe dissented. Kwe Kwe was found guilty of several serious crimes stemming from an incident involving a robbery and a shooting. The trial revealed that he, along with accomplices, confronted the victim, demanding her money while one of them displayed a weapon. When the victim attempted to call for help, she was shot in the back with a shotgun. Following this, the robbers took her purse and fled. On appeal, Kwe Kwe raised numerous issues regarding his convictions. He argued that being convicted for both robbery and shooting violated laws against multiple punishments for a single act. However, the court found that the robbery and the shooting were distinct actions. The shooting was meant to prevent the victim from escaping and to eliminate her as a witness, rather than to take possession of her belongings. Kwe Kwe also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him, claiming he wasn't the shooter. However, the jury had enough circumstantial evidence to conclude he aided in the crime, as he orchestrated the robbery and knew one accomplice was armed. Also, he was found in possession of a sawed-off shotgun shortly after the incident. The court held that the evidence supported the conclusion he was culpable for aiding and abetting the shooter. Another argument from Kwe Kwe revolved around the legality of the sawed-off shotgun itself. He claimed the prosecution didn't prove the shotgun's barrel was less than 18 inches, which would classify it as sawn-off under the law. Nevertheless, the officer testified that the weapon was a modified sawed-off shotgun and that the jury could determine this after examining it. Moreover, Kwe Kwe claimed that the court’s language when discussing the victim's injuries went against the norms of a fair trial. However, the court found this testimony relevant, as it demonstrated the severity of the attack and the intent behind the actions taken by Kwe Kwe and his accomplices. Lastly, he argued that his legal counsel did not perform adequately by failing to raise certain legal defenses and objections during the trial. Yet, the court determined that any such failures did not adversely affect his rights or the outcome of the case. In summary, Kwe Kwe's convictions remained intact, and while some procedural missteps were noted, none were sufficient to reverse the verdict aside from the correction regarding the Victim Compensation Assessment linked to his charge. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision overall, while rectifying the single financial aspect.

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S-2018-1227

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellant, **v.** **DAVID FLORES VILLANUEVA,** Appellee. **No. S-2018-1227** **NOT FOR PUBLICATION** **FILED** **IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **SEP 26 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN** **CLERK** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE: On March 6, 2018, Defendant Villanueva was charged with one count of Burglary in the First Degree in Comanche County Case No. CF-2018-135. On November 7, 2018, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Ken Harris, Special Judge. At that hearing, the State amended the information to include a charge of Conspiracy to Commit Burglary. Villanueva demurred to both charges; the demurrer to the burglary charge was overruled, while the conspiracy charge was granted. The State appealed this ruling under Rule 6.1 and 22 O.S.2011, § 1089.1. Judge Meaders, after reviewing the preliminary hearing transcript and hearing arguments from both sides, upheld the magistrate's decision. From this ruling, the State continued its appeal. The State's primary argument was that it was erroneous for the trial court to grant Villanueva's demurrer concerning the conspiracy charge. According to Rule 11.2(A)(4), this appeal was automatically assigned to the Accelerated Docket. The analysis considers whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed favorably towards the State, to find that a felony crime occurred and that Villanueva likely committed it. The Court must uphold the magistrate's ruling unless there was an abuse of discretion. The Court determined that no such abuse of discretion occurred in this instance. The decision to grant the demurrer concerning the conspiracy charge was not clearly erroneous or illogical based on the evidence presented. **DECISION** The order dismissing the conspiracy charge against Villanueva in Comanche County District Court Case No. CF-2018-135 is AFFIRMED. A MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision, in accordance with Rule 3.15. --- **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** **COUNSEL FOR STATE/APPELLANT** Kyle Cabelka, Assistant District Attorney Comanche County **COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE** Clay Hillis Lawton, OK --- **OPINION BY:** LEWIS, P.J. **CONCUR:** KUEHN, V.P.J.; LUMPKIN, J. **DISSENT:** HUDSON, J.; ROWLAND, J. --- **DISSENTING OPINION OF HUDSON, J.:** I align with Judge Rowland's dissent and wish to emphasize that the magistrate's decision did not adhere to the proper legal standard, which mandates that at a preliminary hearing, the State is not obliged to present evidence that would suffice for a conviction; rather, the standard is to establish probable cause. The preliminaries focus on whether there is enough evidence for a reasonable person to conclude that an agreement to commit a crime existed among the suspects. Based on the testimony, when two armed men and a female accomplice invade a home, demanding money while brandishing weapons, the magistrate should have inferred an agreement had taken place, viewing the facts favorably for the State. The evidential threshold should reflect that significant circumstantial evidence can imply conspiracy. My view is that the magistrate abused discretion by ruling there was insufficient evidence for conspiracy at the hearing's conclusion. The facts supporting the charge should have warranted a finding of probable cause as a reasonable inference could be drawn affirming an agreement among the accused parties. The ruling lacks justification against existing legal precedents. The magistrate's interpretation of the circumstances failed to consider the appropriate evidential standard and should be revised. I am authorized to state that Judge Hudson concurs with this dissent. --- For the official full text, [click here to download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/S-2018-1227_1734274980.pdf).

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F-2018-664

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **KEYUNA CRYSTAL MOSLEY,** Appellant, vs. **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** Appellee. **No. F-2018-664** **FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA SEP 19 2019** **SUMMARY OPINION** JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Keyuna Crystal Mosley was tried by jury and convicted of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 801, after being previously convicted of two or more felonies, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2017-1853. Following the jury's recommendation, the Honorable Ray C. Elliott sentenced Appellant to twenty (20) years imprisonment, requiring her to serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole consideration per 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1. Appellant appeals this conviction and sentence. **Proposition of Error:** Appellant raises one proposition of error: that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove her guilt of conjointly committing robbery with a dangerous weapon beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus due process mandates her case be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss. **Decision:** After thorough consideration of the complete record, including original records, transcripts, exhibits, and briefs, we find the law and evidence do not necessitate relief. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed robbery with a dangerous weapon (Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, ¶ 15, 90 P.3d 556, 559). To establish robbery with a dangerous weapon, the State must demonstrate that the wrongful taking and carrying away of personal property from another's person or immediate presence occurred by force or fear, specifically involving a knife (21 O.S.2011, § 801; OUJI-CR 2d 4-144). The term “principal” in a crime includes anyone who either directly and actively commits the acts constituting the offense or knowingly and with intent aids and abets in its commission (Hackney v. State, 1994 OK CR 29, ¶ 9, 874 P.2d 810, 814; OUJI-CR 2d 2-5, 2-6). Appellant contends the State failed to prove that she acted conjointly with her boyfriend in committing the robbery. She argues that the victim Seale's testimony was incredible and contradicted by her own statement, and that the State should have corroborated Seale's testimony with additional evidence such as forensic evidence, text records, or records of their online communications. This assertion is incorrect. While the State could have provided such corroborative evidence, it was not required to do so. Seale was both an eyewitness and the victim, and the jury determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony (Mason v. State, 2018 OK CR 37, ¶ 13, 433 P.3d 1264, 1269). The jury is entitled to make reasonable inferences supporting their verdict. Even in cases of sharply conflicting evidence, we will not disturb a properly supported verdict (Robinson v. State, 2011 OK CR 15, ¶ 17, 255 P.3d 425, 432). The evidence established that Appellant lured victim Seale to the crime scene, called her accomplice, and directly took and carried away Seale’s property while her accomplice threatened the victim with a knife. We will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the jury (White v. State, 2019 OK CR 2, ¶ 9, 437 P.3d 1061, 1065). Thus, this proposition is denied. **Conclusion:** The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY** THE HONORABLE RAY C. ELLIOTT, DISTRICT JUDGE **ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL** TIMOTHY M. WILSON ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 611 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL** ANDREA DIGILIO MILLER PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE 611 COUNTY OFFICE BLDG. 320 ROBERT S. KERR AVE. OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** DAN POND KATHERINE BRANDON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLA. ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS TESSA L. HENRY 320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 505 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **OPINION BY KUEHN, V.P.J.** LEWIS, P.J.: CONCUR LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR HUDSON, J.: CONCUR ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR **[Download PDF Version Here](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/F-2018-664_1735223763.pdf)**

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F-2017-008

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In OCCA case No. F-2017-08, John Kyle Crandall appealed his conviction for first degree murder, concealing stolen property, and possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for first degree murder and possession of a firearm but reversed the conviction for concealing stolen property. One judge dissented.

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F-2015-1007

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In OCCA case No. F-2015-1007, Johnny Lee Ingram appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. The case began when Ingram was tried for two crimes: one for Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon and the other for Possession of a Firearm after prior convictions. The jury found him guilty of the first charge and not guilty of the second. He was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison based on the jury's recommendation. Ingram raised several points during his appeal. He claimed that the trial court made mistakes, such as not properly answering the jury's questions about the law, which led to confusion. The court agreed that the trial court's responses to the jury were not clear and this could have impacted the jury's decision. During the jury's deliberation, they asked about the meaning of certain instructions related to the case. The trial judge referred them to another instruction without clearly addressing their concerns. This left the jury confused about what constituted criminal intent and whether Ingram could be guilty based on his presence at the scene but not guilty of the other charge. The court emphasized that when jurors express confusion, it is crucial for judges to clearly resolve that confusion. Since the jury found Ingram guilty despite being confused, and considering that the instructions did not help clarify the legal standards, the appellate court concluded that Ingram was not given a fair trial. Thus, they overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial to ensure that the jury could properly consider the evidence laid out, without the confusion created by the previous instructions.

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F-2011-693

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In OCCA case No. F-2011-693, Michael Wayne Dorsey appealed his conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree and Shooting with Intent to Kill. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Dorsey's conviction and his sentences but vacated the $5,000 victim compensation assessment set by the trial court. One member of the court dissented. Dorsey was found guilty by a jury of manslaughter and shooting with intent to kill. The jury decided on a punishment of thirty years for manslaughter and five years for the shooting charge, which would be served one after the other. Dorsey argued that he should have been allowed to use self-defense as a reason for both charges, but the court found that the instructions given to the jury were correct. Dorsey also claimed that the trial judge made an error with jury instructions regarding self-defense and intoxication, but the court disagreed. He further asserted that his lawyer was not effective because there was no objection raised to those jury instructions, but the court ruled that there was nothing wrong with the instructions in the first place. Lastly, Dorsey objected to the judge imposing the victim compensation amount without considering several important factors. The court agreed that the judge did not properly assess the situation and sent the case back to the trial court for a new decision on the compensation amount. Thus, the main outcome was that while Dorsey's conviction was upheld, the court required a reconsideration of the victim compensation assessment based on certain statutory factors outlined in the law.

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F-2007-856

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In OCCA case No. F-2007-856, Ricky Louis Hunter appealed his conviction for Lewd or Indecent Proposals or Acts to a Child Under 16 and Unlawful Use of a Computer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for the first count while dismissing the second count due to double punishment concerns. One judge dissented.

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C-2003-1247

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In OCCA case No. C-2003-1247, Robert Hershal Perkis appealed his conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, and burglary in the first degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon, reverse the kidnapping conviction, and modify the burglary conviction to second-degree burglary. One judge dissented on the kidnapping aspect. Robert Hershal Perkis was charged with three serious crimes: robbery using a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, and first-degree burglary. He pleaded nolo contendere, which means he did not contest the charges. The court sentenced him to a total of 60 years in prison for these crimes, with the sentences running one after the other, and ordered him to pay fines and restitution. Later, Perkis filed an application to withdraw his guilty pleas, stating that his pleas were not supported by enough evidence, that the sentences were too harsh, and that he did not receive good help from his lawyer. The court looked into these claims and first examined if the pleas were based on sufficient evidence. For the robbery charge, the court found that the victim was threatened with a dangerous weapon and had property taken from him, which satisfied the elements of robbery. Thus, the court upheld Perkis' conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon. In looking at the kidnapping charge, the court considered the facts surrounding the incident. The victim was taken to a field and held there by Perkis and others. The central issue was whether the confinement of the victim could be considered “secret.” The court decided that because the victim was in a public area, it did not meet the legal definition of secret confinement, which led to the reversal of the kidnapping conviction. Regarding the burglary charge, the court found that while there were issues concerning the evidence for first-degree burglary, it chose to modify the conviction to second-degree burglary instead, giving Perkis a shorter sentence for that conviction. Overall, the court's opinion granted some relief to Perkis by reversing one conviction and modifying another, but kept the robbery conviction intact. The dissenting judge felt that the kidnapping conviction should stand, arguing that the facts should be considered as a case of secret confinement.

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F-2001-651

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In OCCA case No. F-2001-651, Vadell Lamont Wright appealed his conviction for Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and Using a Vehicle to Facilitate the Intentional Discharge of a Firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the convictions. One judge dissented. Wright was found guilty by a jury and received a sentence of twenty years for the unauthorized use of a vehicle and twenty-five years for using a vehicle in connection with the discharge of a firearm, with both sentences to be served one after the other. He decided to appeal his convictions. The court reviewed several claims raised by Wright regarding his trial. The main issues included: 1. Seeing the defendant in handcuffs could have influenced the jury. 2. There was not enough evidence to say that Wright used the vehicle to make the shooting easier. 3. The court did not allow the defendant to explain his belief that he was allowed to use the car, known as a defense of mistake. 4. Evidence about other crimes affected Wright's right to a fair trial. 5. Communication between the jury and the trial judge was improper. 6. The trial court made mistakes regarding immunity for a co-defendant. 7. The jury was not given the option of lesser charges. 8. Overall, multiple errors deprived Wright of a fair trial. Focusing on the second issue, the court noted that Wright used a stolen vehicle to flee from police. He was in the vehicle with another person who fired a gun at an officer during the chase. However, the court found that simply using the car did not meet the legal requirement that it had to help make the shooting occur. There wasn’t enough evidence to show that the act of using the car was linked to the shooting directly. Additionally, in regards to possible mistakes about using the vehicle, the trial court's instructions did not help the jury understand what was being asked about having permission to use the car. Wright believed he had permission from the person who was with him and thought he could use the vehicle, but the trial court did not clearly explain this possibility to the jury. As a result, the court decided to reverse Wright's conviction for shooting from a vehicle and dismissed that charge. They also decided to send the Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle charge back for a new trial, stating that the earlier jury did not get all the right information to make a fair decision. In conclusion, the court found that Wright should not have been convicted based on the evidence presented and that he deserved a chance to argue his case again in a new trial.

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F 2001-434

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In OCCA case No. F 2001-434, the appellant appealed his conviction for multiple drug-related charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and dismiss some of the charges while affirming others. One judge dissented regarding the dismissal of a particular charge. William Forrest Mondier was found guilty of attempting to make drugs, possessing drugs, and allowing a place for drug users. The court looked at his case and found mistakes in how the jury was instructed regarding one of the charges. Because the jury didn't have the right information, they couldn't properly decide if Mondier had acted knowingly or intentionally when maintaining a place used for drugs. Therefore, that conviction was reversed. The court also found that Mondier's possession of marijuana and methamphetamine was too similar to keep both convictions, so they reversed one of them. However, his other convictions, including drug manufacturing and possession of drug paraphernalia, remained in place, as there was enough evidence against him for those charges. There were also several arguments raised by the appellant about the fairness of his trial and the enforcement of laws regarding the charges, but the court denied those claims. The final decision was to reverse and dismiss the charge of maintaining a place for drug users and the marijuana charge. The convictions for attempting to manufacture drugs and possessing paraphernalia were affirmed. One judge disagreed with the dismissal and wanted a new trial instead.

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