Credibility of Evidence

RE-2019-57

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In the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma, Toni Lynn Cook appeals the revocation of her suspended sentence from the McIntosh County District Court. Cook had originally pled guilty to the charge of Obstructing an Officer. Following her guilty plea, the State filed a Motion to Revoke her suspended sentence, claiming she committed new crimes while on probation, which included multiple counts of Assault and Battery on a Police Officer and Indecent Exposure. The revocation hearing saw evidence presented, including testimonies from jailers detailing that Cook had exposed herself and physically resisted their attempts to move her to a solitary cell, leading to injuries to the officers involved. The trial court found that the State met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Cook had violated her probation. Cook raised several propositions on appeal: 1. **Insufficient Evidence**: Cook argued that the evidence presented was insufficient to prove the alleged probation violations. However, the court found that the evidence sufficient and credible, affirming that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. 2. **Waiver of Hearing Within Twenty Days**: Cook contended that her waiver of the right to a hearing within twenty days was not valid. The court ruled that Cook had waived this right knowingly, as she had not requested an early hearing and did not provide evidence that she was unaware of this right. 3. **Excessiveness of Revocation**: Cook argued the revocation was excessive. The court noted that revocation is a matter of grace, and since Cook committed multiple new offenses while on probation, the trial judge's decision to revoke her sentence in full was not an abuse of discretion. In conclusion, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to revoke Cook's suspended sentence, finding no merit in her claims. The mandate was ordered to be issued upon filing the decision.

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S-2012-1012

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-1012, Barry Lee Brown appealed his conviction for a traffic offense. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's ruling to suppress evidence and dismiss the prosecution. One judge dissented. The case began when a police officer claimed to have seen a traffic violation, which led to a stop of Barry Lee Brown's vehicle. After stopping him, the officer suspected that Brown might be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. A second officer was called to the scene to perform sobriety tests. Before the trial, Barry Lee Brown argued that the stop was not legal and asked the court to throw out any evidence from the stop. During the hearing, the officer who stopped Brown had trouble remembering exactly what happened. He referred to a report written by the second officer, but that officer had not witnessed the stop himself. Initially, the trial court thought there was enough evidence to say the stop was legal, but later changed its mind. The court reviewed different points raised by the state about why the trial court’s decision should be changed. The state argued that the trial court made mistakes in its decision to suppress the evidence. However, the Appeals Court looked carefully at the facts and decided that the trial court had a good reason to change its decision. They noted that the officer who stopped Brown did not have a clear memory and his testimony was mainly based on what was written in another officer's report. The Appeals Court stated it respects the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly wrong or not supported by the evidence. After reviewing everything, they agreed with the trial court's ruling because it was based on the officer's inability to reliably remember the details of the stop. The Appeals Court also addressed the state’s claim that the trial court should not have been allowed to change its previous ruling. They found that the state did not provide enough legal backing for this claim, so they didn't consider it further. Finally, the court looked at whether the first officer could accurately use the report to refresh his memory about the stop. They concluded that just because he accepted the report as true did not mean it helped him remember the stop accurately. In the end, the court affirmed the decision to suppress the evidence that led to the conviction and agreed to dismiss the case.

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F-2007-336

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In OCCA case No. F-2007-336, Michelle Ann Barry appealed her conviction for First-Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse her conviction and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Michelle Ann Barry was found guilty of murdering her infant daughter, Andrea Heath. The jury decided on a life sentence for Barry. Barry argued that the evidence against her was not strong enough to prove she was guilty. Her main point was that the evidence only suggested she might be guilty but did not rule out other possibilities of who could have harmed her child. The court explained that it had to look at the evidence in a way that favored the state. They concluded that the jury could have believed Barry was the one who harmed her daughter. This was largely because the only other person awake during the incident was Barry's five-year-old son, who was too small to cause the injuries. Barry also claimed her lawyer did not do a good job defending her in court. To win this point, she had to show that her lawyer made serious mistakes and that those mistakes changed the outcome of her case. She pointed out that her lawyer failed to object to certain evidence that could have hurt her chances in the trial, like bad character evidence about her lifestyle and drug use. The court agreed with Barry that her lawyer's performance was lacking. They noted that her lawyer didn’t challenge negative testimony that could mislead the jury, and importantly, did not find experts to counter the claims made about her son’s physical inability to cause the injuries. Due to the many mistakes made by her lawyer during the trial, the court felt that Barry's conviction couldn’t stand. They reversed her conviction which means she would have a chance at a new trial to present her case again. One judge dissented, believing that the conviction should be upheld.

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F-2005-1193

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In OCCA case No. F-2005-1193, Tamara Marine Davis appealed her conviction for Accessory to Felony Murder in the First Degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modified the sentence to twenty-five years of imprisonment. One judge dissented regarding the sentence modification. Davis was found guilty of helping her husband after a murder had occurred. She assisted him in hiding evidence and lying to the police. At her trial, Davis presented several arguments for why her conviction and sentence should be overturned. First, she claimed that there was not enough evidence to prove she was guilty of being an accessory after the fact. The court disagreed, ruling that her actions showed she knew the victim was dead when she assisted her husband in getting rid of the victim's belongings and fleeing the state. Second, she argued that the jury heard improper information concerning her probation and parole history, which made them biased against her. However, the court noted that this information was raised by Davis herself to show the witness's bias, so it did not warrant reversal of the conviction. Third, she contended that misconduct by the prosecutor deprived her of a fair trial. The court found that while there were some issues with the prosecutor's questions, they did not significantly affect the outcome of the trial. Davis also claimed she received ineffective assistance from her attorney. The court found that the lawyer's performance was acceptable and that Davis could not show any harm resulting from their actions. Furthermore, she believed the introduction of some irrelevant evidence was unfair. However, the court determined that the evidence did not unduly sway the jury's decision. Davis argued the length of her sentence was too harsh compared to her involvement in the crime, and the court agreed, reducing her sentence from forty years to twenty-five. Lastly, the court found no cumulative errors that would necessitate a different result in the trial. Thus, while the court affirmed the conviction, it took action to lessen the punishment given to Davis.

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F-2004-729

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In OCCA case No. F-2004-729, Candy Mae Easton appealed her conviction for Manufacturing Methamphetamine and Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse her conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine but affirmed her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug. One judge dissented concerning the reversal of the manufacturing charge. Candy Mae Easton was on trial after neighbors reported a strong smell related to methamphetamine coming from the home of her co-defendant. Officers investigating found evidence that suggested meth was being made in the house, including white powder and other materials commonly used to manufacture meth. Easton admitted to using meth, but she said she did not help make it. The court examined whether there was enough proof to show that Easton helped her co-defendant in making the drug. The majority opinion stated that just knowing about the manufacturing and using the drug doesn’t mean she encouraged or assisted in making it. The appellate court mentioned that encouragement must be shown by some action or words, which were not present in Easton’s case. As a result, Easton’s conviction for manufacturing meth was reversed, meaning she was found not guilty of that charge. However, the conviction for unlawful possession was upheld because her sentence and fine were within the legal limits and were not seen as too harsh. The dissenting opinion believed there was enough evidence to support that Easton aided in the manufacturing, and thus would have kept her conviction for that charge. The judges' roles were discussed in terms of assessing evidence and the credibility of decisions made by the trial judge, emphasizing that it isn’t their place to change those factual decisions based on their opinions. Ultimately, the case was sent back to be corrected only in terms of the record regarding the possession conviction, while the manufacturing conviction was dismissed.

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