Constitutional interpretation Archives

C-2019-25

Post author:Staff
Post published:December 12, 2019
Post category:C

This decision from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals pertains to Conner E. Dover's petition for writ of certiorari, which was denied. Dover had pled guilty to unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and aggravated attempting to elude a police officer. His sentencing followed the completion of a regimented inmate discipline program, resulting in five years of imprisonment for each count, to be served consecutively. Dover sought to withdraw his plea based on an argument that the court did not sentence him according to his plea agreement. However, the court found that his plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently, and dissatisfaction with the sentence is not a valid reason for withdrawal. The court confirmed that the plea met the necessary legal standards and was not abusive, hence no relief was granted. The denial of the writ indicates the court's decision to affirm the original judgment and sentence. The legal principles applied include reviewing whether a plea was voluntarily and intelligently made, whether the sentence is excessive, the effectiveness of counsel, and the state's power to prosecute. Overall, the court held that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Dover's motion to withdraw the plea, supporting the conclusion that his plea agreement was validly applied.

C-2018-685

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 6, 2019
Post category:C

**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ORIE DANIEL HILL,** **Petitioner,** **V.** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Respondent.** **Case No. C-2018-685** **SUMMARY OPINION DENYING CERTIORARI** LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE: **Background:** Orie Daniel Hill, Petitioner, entered a blind plea of nolo contendere to multiple charges including: first-degree rape (victim under age fourteen), rape by instrumentation, lewd or indecent acts to a child under sixteen, and child sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently and mandated three years of post-imprisonment supervision. Hill later filed a motion to withdraw his plea, claiming it was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. **Issues Raised:** 1. The trial court abused its discretion in denying Hill's motion to withdraw his plea; 2. Hill was denied effective assistance of counsel. **Facts:** The case involved allegations against Hill related to inappropriate sexual behavior towards an 8-year-old girl, A.H. The investigation included statements from the victim and forensic evidence, including DNA linking Hill to the offenses. **Analysis:** The court's review is limited to whether the plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently, whether the sentence was excessive, and whether counsel was effective. The burden is on Hill to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective or that he did not fully understand the plea agreement. 1. **Proposition One:** The court concluded that Hill knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea. He was informed of his rights and the potential consequences. Despite Hill's claim of feeling pressure and receiving poor legal advice, the court found no evidence supporting these assertions. 2. **Proposition Two:** Hill’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, which requires showing both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The court ruled that counsel’s advice was sound and appropriately reflected the realities of the situation, including the potential for harsher sentences if the case went to trial. **Conclusion:** The petition for a writ of certiorari is DENIED, and the judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED. **MANDATE:** Ordered issued upon delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES:** - **For Appellant:** David R. Slane; Nicollette Brandt - **For the State:** Chris Anderson, Assistant District Attorney **OPINION BY:** Lewis, P.J. **Concur:** Kuehn, V.P.J.; Lumpkin, J.; Hudson, J.; Rowland, J. [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2018-685_1734175737.pdf)

S-2011-0467

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 1, 2012
Post category:S

In OCCA case No. S-2011-0467, a person appealed his conviction for possessing a firearm after a previous conviction. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling which found that the application of a new law to this case was unconstitutional. One judge dissented. To explain further, the person involved, known as the appellee, was charged after a new law was enacted that changed the rules about possessing firearms for people with past convictions. Originally, under the law at the time the appellee completed his past sentence, he was allowed to possess a firearm. However, the law changed in 2010 to make it more difficult for people with certain convictions to have firearms, requiring them to wait ten years instead of just having their rights restored after finishing their sentence. The appeal began after a magistrate found that using the new law against the appellee was unfair because it changed the rules after he had already completed his legal obligations. The court needed to determine if this application of the law was considered an ex post facto law, which is illegal under the Constitution because it punishes someone for actions that were not against the law when they were done. The appellee had completed his deferred sentence successfully and had regained the right to possess a firearm. The court recognized that the law should not punish people for actions that were legal at the time they were done, and applying the new law to the appellee would violate this principle. Therefore, the decision from the lower court was upheld, meaning the appellee would not face penalties from the new law. The ruling confirmed that once someone has completed their deferred sentence, they should not have to follow new rules that were created after the fact regarding possession of firearms.