S-2013-415

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In OCCA case No. S-2013-413 & 415, Mark Anthony Herfurth appealed his conviction for Failure to Register as a Sex Offender and Sex Offender Living within 2000 feet of a School. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling to dismiss the charges against him. One judge dissented. Mark Anthony Herfurth was taken to court because he was accused of not registering as a sex offender and for living too close to a school after he had been convicted of a crime related to indecent exposure. In his earlier conviction, he had agreed to register as a sex offender for a certain number of years. However, when laws changed in 2007, it meant that people in his situation could be assigned a risk level and have to register for longer. Herfurth argued that he shouldn't be held to the new law because he had already completed his requirements from his original plea. The judge agreed with him and dismissed the charges, saying that the laws could not be applied to him retroactively. The State of Oklahoma did not agree with this decision. They believed that the new law should apply to Herfurth since he was still required to register as a sex offender. They argued that laws are meant to protect the public, and because he was registering at the time of the new law's change, he should follow the new rules. However, upon review, the court decided that the lower court did not make a mistake. They concluded that the 2007 law was a significant change and should only apply going forward, not backward. The court also stated that applying the 2007 law to Herfurth after his original plea would have changed his obligations unfairly. Therefore, the appeals court agreed with the lower court's decision to dismiss the charges against Herfurth, stating that they have a duty to interpret laws as they were intended at the time of the original guilty plea. The dissenting judge felt differently, believing that the law should have applied to Herfurth based on the new requirements.

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S-2010-540

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In OCCA case No. S-2010-540, Cavner appealed his conviction for Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to uphold the district court's decision to suppress the evidence. One judge dissented. The case began when the State of Oklahoma charged Cavner with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol. He argued that the traffic stop was not justified because there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The district court agreed to suppress the evidence but did not dismiss the case entirely. On appeal, the State argued that the district court made an error by suppressing the evidence. When reviewing these kinds of cases, the court looks at the facts presented and defers to the trial court's findings unless something is clearly wrong. It was nighttime when Deputy Yarber observed a vehicle in the parking lot of an abandoned grocery store. He noted that the car left the parking lot in a lawful manner as he and another officer approached. The deputy did not mention any specific criminal activity and had no reason to believe something illegal was happening. Another officer had previously looked into possible drug activity in the area, but that had not been reported recently. In such situations, officers are allowed to check on people they find in unusual circumstances. However, since the vehicle drove away from the parking lot before Yarber could approach, he needed to stop it on a highway, which changes the situation from a simple question into a detention, known as a traffic stop. The law requires that a traffic stop must be supported by something more than just a hunch or general suspicion. The court explained that deputies must have reasonable suspicion to make a legal traffic stop. They look for specific facts suggesting that a crime may be occurring, which was not the case here. The deputy did not have enough evidence or reasons to suspect that Cavner was committing a crime simply because he was in the parking lot of an abandoned store late at night. The court referenced a prior case to support its decision, comparing the circumstances to those in a previous ruling where a stop was also deemed unlawful due to lack of reasonable suspicion. In Cavner's case, the court ruled that the officers did not have enough evidence to justify the traffic stop. Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's order to suppress the evidence gathered during the stop, meaning the evidence could not be used against Cavner. The decision highlighted the importance of having proper legal grounds for police actions, ensuring that citizens' rights are protected under the law.

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F-2000-948

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In OCCA case No. PR-99-1326, the Petitioners appealed their conviction for murder and shooting with intent to kill. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the mistrial declared by the judge was not justified and therefore double jeopardy bars the State from retrying the Petitioners. One judge dissented. The case began when the Petitioners were charged with serious offenses. The first trial ended in a mistrial, which the judge declared after issues arose during a witness's cross-examination. The attorneys raised concerns about whether the prosecution had failed to provide evidence that could help the defense. This evidence related to the witness's background and credibility. The judge felt that the defense attorney’s questions may have harmed the trial, which led him to call for a mistrial. However, after reviewing the trial's events, the court found that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial. In other words, the situation did not require such an extreme remedy. The court felt that a warning could have been sufficient to address any perceived problems before resorting to declaring a mistrial. Ultimately, the review concluded that the judge made errors in declaring the mistrial and, as a result, the defendants could not be tried again for these charges. The opinion emphasized that once a jury is discharged without sufficient reason, it can lead to violating the defendants' rights under the double jeopardy clause, which prevents someone from being tried for the same crime twice.

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