In OCCA case No. RE 2016-0218, the appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentence but instructed the lower court to remove the requirement for post-imprisonment supervision from the revocation order. One member of the court dissented.
In OCCA case No. M-2016-596, Lyndol Keith Nunley appealed his conviction for Domestic Abuse - Assault and Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction. One judge dissented. The case began with a non-jury trial in which Nunley was found guilty of committing domestic abuse against someone he knew. The judge sentenced Nunley to pay a fine and to spend time in county jail. Initially, he was required to serve his jail time day for day, meaning he would serve the full year without any reductions. However, this requirement was later changed. Nunley appealed for three main reasons. First, he claimed his lawyer did not do a good job because there was no record of what happened during the trial, which made it hard for him to appeal. The court explained that to prove a lawyer was ineffective, a person must show how this caused them harm. Since Nunley did not give enough proof or show that any errors happened during the trial, his claim was not accepted. Second, Nunley argued that his sentence was too harsh. He believed the day for day term made his punishment excessive. However, since that requirement was removed after he filed his appeal, this argument was no longer valid. Lastly, Nunley pointed out that he received the maximum penalty allowed by law. The court noted that while it did impose the maximum jail time, his fine was much lower than what he could have received. The judges decided that Nunley did not show that his sentence was shocking or unfair, so they rejected his request to change it. In the end, the judges upheld the decision made in the lower court, meaning Nunley had to serve his sentence as it was decided.
In OCCA case No. M 2015-1099, Phantirath appealed her conviction for engaging in prostitution and operating a place of prostitution. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse her convictions because she was not allowed to enter a guilty plea, which is a right for defendants. One judge dissented, stating that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the plea.
In OCCA case No. F-2016-82, Angel Marie Proctor appealed her conviction for First Degree Murder, Kidnapping, and Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse and remand the kidnapping conviction with instructions to dismiss, while affirming the other convictions. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. C-2016-140, Hiram Frank Mutters appealed his conviction for Child Sexual Abuse. In a published decision, the court decided to grant him a new hearing. One judge dissented. Mutters pleaded no contest to Child Sexual Abuse on December 7, 2015, and was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and a fine. He later wanted to withdraw his plea, so he filed a motion. However, during the hearing for this motion, he was not present because he was taken to another facility. His lawyer thought Mutters would prefer to stay away from jail rather than return for the hearing. This decision meant that Mutters could not explain his reasons for wanting to withdraw his plea. The court found that it is very important for a person to be present during such hearings because their testimony is vital. Since Mutters was not there, the hearing did not meet the required standards for fairness. Thus, the court ruled that the case should go back for a new hearing where Mutters can be present to share his side of the story and explain why he thinks he should withdraw his plea.
In OCCA case No. S-2016-169, Patrick Lee Walker appealed his conviction for distributing a controlled dangerous substance (methamphetamine) within 2,000 feet of a school. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's ruling that granted Walker's motion to quash and dismissed the case. One judge dissented. The case began when Walker was charged in Kay County District Court with distributing methamphetamine after a controlled purchase was made by a confidential informant. A deputy had coordinated this controlled buy and testified that the informant bought meth from Walker at a location in Kay County. The informant was searched before the transaction to ensure she had no drugs. After meeting Walker, they drove together to Osage County where the exchange happened. There was a lack of evidence presented about the exact location where the drugs were handed over, which was crucial to prove that the crime occurred within the required distance of a school. During the preliminary hearing, the judge decided that while the distribution started in Kay County, there wasn't enough evidence to show that the drugs were handed over in that county or within 2,000 feet from a school. Because of this, the judge dismissed the case when Walker's defense claimed that the evidence was insufficient. The court discussed whether the trial court had made an error in dismissing the case. The main two arguments from the State's appeal were that the district court wrongly decided it didn't have the required evidence for venue and that it unfairly denied the State's request to amend the Information (the official charge). The court explained that the State must show probable cause that a crime happened and clarify where that crime occurred. They noted that although it was shown that a crime likely happened, it was not in the form correctly charged due to not proving all essential elements of the offense, as required under Oklahoma law. While the trial court's decision to dismiss the case was recognized as legally incorrect, it did not lead to a different outcome because the State did not ask to amend the charge during the hearing. Therefore, even though the lower court may have acted without the right understanding of the law regarding amendments, it did not influence the decision because of the procedural issues involved. The court ultimately upheld the dismissal of the charges against Walker, agreeing with the lower court's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of the crime occurring within the jurisdiction required by law. The ruling was affirmed, and thus the case remained closed without further proceedings.
In OCCA case No. F-2015-561, Walter LaCurtis Jones appealed his conviction for three crimes: Feloniously Pointing a Firearm, Possession of a Firearm After Former Felony Conviction, and Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions and sentences for the first two counts but reversed and dismissed the conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon. One judge dissented. Walter Jones was found guilty after a trial without a jury. He received seven years in prison for each of the first two counts, which would be served at the same time, and one year in county jail for the third count. The judge also ordered that he would have one year of supervision after his prison time. Jones raised several arguments in his appeal. He argued that there was not enough evidence to support his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon, claiming he did not use a dangerous weapon and had no intention to hurt anyone. The court agreed with him on this point and reversed that conviction. For the charge of Feloniously Pointing a Firearm, Jones argued that the gun he pointed at someone was not a real firearm because it was missing a part and could not shoot. However, the court found there was enough evidence to support that he pointed a gun designed to shoot, therefore, they upheld that conviction. In the case of Possession of a Firearm After Former Felony Conviction, Jones contended that the gun could not fire, so he should not have been found guilty. The court decided that it was unnecessary for the gun to be able to fire to prove he had possession of it as a felon, thereby upholding this conviction as well. Lastly, Jones claimed he was facing double punishment for the same crime, which the court did not accept because the two charges involved different actions and did not violate any laws regarding double punishment or double jeopardy. Thus, the court confirmed his sentences for the first two counts while reversing the count for Assault and Battery.
In OCCA case No. PC-2015-6, Kendall Wayne Edwards appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling that granted post-conviction relief, vacating Edwards's murder conviction and ordering a new trial based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence. One judge dissented. The case stemmed from an incident on March 9, 2001, where Edwards was accused of shooting Gerald Lamont Ford during a fight outside a convenience store. Edwards was convicted at trial and sentenced to life imprisonment, but he sought post-conviction relief in 2012, claiming several errors occurred during his trial, including improper admission of evidence and ineffective legal representation. The court's analysis focused primarily on the newly discovered evidence claim, which was that another witness, Larika A. Alexander, could potentially exonerate him by stating she saw him being beaten and heard the gunshot without witnessing him fire the weapon. The lower court agreed that this evidence was significant enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial and held that Edwards deserved a new trial. While the majority opinion supported this conclusion, a dissenting judge argued that the new evidence did not sufficiently meet the standard required to warrant a new trial since it was cumulative and lacked materiality. The dissent emphasized that the jury had already evaluated the credibility of the witnesses during the original trial. Ultimately, the court's decision to uphold the lower court's granting of a new trial was based on the notion that justice required the possibility of a different outcome with this new testimony. Thus, Edwards was granted the opportunity for a re-examination of the case.
In OCCA case No. F-2014-974, Donald Edward Tolliver, Jr. appealed his conviction for Shooting With Intent to Kill. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction and sentence but vacated the restitution order, requiring a new determination of the victim's losses. One judge dissented. Tolliver was found guilty by a jury and received a thirty-five-year sentence, with thirty-two years suspended. He had to pay over $10,000 in restitution, which he appealed, arguing several points about his trial. He claimed the trial court made several errors. First, he believed the court should have instructed the jury on lesser-included offenses, like Assault and Battery, but the court noted that Tolliver had proclaimed his innocence and did not show he committed any lesser crime. Second, he argued the court should have included an instruction about flight, which might help explain his actions after the shooting. However, because he did not properly ask for this during the trial, the court ruled he could not bring this up on appeal. Third, he accused the prosecution of misconduct, arguing this affected his chance for a fair trial. However, the court found that while some actions by the prosecution could be questionable, they didn't constitute an error that would change the outcome of the trial. In his fourth argument, Tolliver said the court didn't follow proper rules regarding restitution calculations. The appellate court agreed with this point, stating that the evidence did not clearly show the victim's actual losses. Fifth, he argued the thirty-five-year sentence was excessive. The court disagreed, finding the sentence appropriate given the crime. Finally, he claimed that all the errors combined took away his right to a fair trial, but the court noted there wasn’t enough evidence to support this claim either. Ultimately, while Tolliver's conviction and sentence were upheld, the restitution order was sent back to the lower court for further consideration of the victim's financial losses.
In OCCA case No. C 2014-920, John Edward Oxford appealed his conviction for several serious crimes including robbery, burglary, and conspiracy. In a published decision, the court decided to deny his appeal but also ordered a hearing to review the amount of restitution he was ordered to pay. Oxford was charged with multiple counts and, on July 10, 2014, he entered a blind plea, which means he pleaded guilty without negotiating a deal, to all the charges. The court sentenced him to a total of over 70 years in prison and ordered him to pay about $67,539 in restitution to the victims. After his sentencing, Oxford tried to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming he did not understand the charges and was not fully informed about his rights. The trial court held a hearing on this and ultimately denied his request. Oxford then appealed this decision, arguing several points. First, he believed he should not have been sentenced for certain counts because it violated laws against double punishment. However, the court noted that his arguments about double jeopardy were not raised in the earlier stages and thus were not considered. Second, he argued there wasn't enough evidence to support the restitution amount, but again the court found this issue had not been raised before and rejected it. Oxford also claimed he did not receive effective legal help during his plea and the hearing to withdraw it. The court agreed that there were problems with how his attorney handled the restitution order, focusing mainly on the lack of detailed documentation justifying the restitution amount. This lack of evidence meant the restitution order was not valid. While the court found that Oxford's guilty plea was made voluntarily, it did acknowledge inadequate support for the restitution order. Therefore, it denied his appeal regarding the guilty plea but vacated the restitution order, sending the case back to the lower court for a proper review of how much compensation was truly owed to the victims. One judge dissented, noting that the case should have been looked at more closely regarding the earlier claims. So, in summary, the appeal was mainly denied except for the part about restitution, which was sent back to the lower court for further review.
In OCCA case No. S-2013-509 and S-2013-510, two individuals appealed their convictions for first-degree murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the dismissal of the charges against them based on their claim of immunity under the Stand Your Ground law. The court found that the appeal by the State of Oklahoma was not authorized to challenge the dismissal order. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. S-2013-509, Julio Juarez Ramos and Isidro Juarez Ramos appealed their convictions for first-degree murder. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling granting the Appellees immunity from prosecution under Oklahoma's Stand Your Ground law. #1 dissented.
In OCCA case No. S-2014-564, Christopher Knight appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance (methamphetamine). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's decision to suppress the evidence found during the search. One judge dissented. Christopher Knight was walking late at night in Ardmore, Oklahoma, when an officer saw him and decided to approach him. The officer, who was still in training, had been told by his supervisor to check on people out late at night. The officer stopped in front of Knight and asked if he could talk to him. Knight agreed to talk, and during their conversation, the officer asked if he could search Knight, to which Knight also said yes. However, the officer later admitted that Knight was not doing anything wrong at the time and there was no good reason for stopping him. Knight argued that the way the officer stopped him made him feel like he had to talk and that he was not free to leave. The court needed to decide if Knight was stopped in a way that violated his rights. The court found that it was not clear that Knight's encounter with the officer was truly voluntary. The State needed to show that Knight felt free to walk away, but there was no evidence that he could easily avoid the officer. Because of this, the court agreed with the trial judge that the evidence collected during the search should not be used against Knight. As a result, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling to suppress the evidence and ordered the case to go back for more proceedings, as long as they followed the decision made. One judge disagreed with this decision, believing that the officer should not be blamed for simply talking to Knight.
In OCCA case No. F-2014-3, Edwin Jermaine Daniels appealed his conviction for several serious crimes including burglary, robbery, kidnapping, and assault. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm most of the trial court's decisions but did vacate some of the fines associated with his sentences. One judge dissented. During the trial, Daniels was found guilty of multiple counts connected to violent crimes he committed with a co-defendant. The judge sentenced him to a total of many years in prison and imposed fines for each count. Daniels raised several issues on appeal, arguing that there were mistakes made during his trial that affected the fairness of the process. First, he claimed that the jury instructions were confusing and reduced the State’s burden to prove guilt. The court found that since there were no objections to the instructions during the trial, they did not affect the trial's result. Second, Daniels objected to being told the fines were mandatory, but the court found that this was also a mistake that the State admitted to; thus, the fines were removed for certain counts. He also claimed prosecutorial misconduct, arguing that comments made by the prosecutor during the trial unfairly influenced the jury. The court ruled that these comments did not significantly change the trial's outcome. Daniels further contended that he did not receive effective legal assistance. The court concluded that his lawyer's performance did not meet a standard of failure that would have changed the trial's result. In the end, while the court affirmed the convictions, it removed the fines that were wrongly imposed, ensuring that Daniel's rights were respected where the trial process fell short.
In OCCA case No. F-2013-1129, Aaron Mitchell Stigleman appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand the case for a new trial. One judge dissented. The case involves Aaron Stigleman, who shot and killed his mother in Elk City, Oklahoma, on February 13, 2013. At the time of the incident, he lived with his girlfriend and mother, both of whom had a history of drug use, specifically methamphetamine. Aaron was believed to be suffering from paranoia and hallucinations due to his drug use leading up to the shooting. Witnesses, including his girlfriend, testified that he accused them of trying to kill him before he shot his mother in the head. During his trial, Stigleman's attorneys failed to secure an expert witness to help argue that he was under the influence of methamphetamine and not in control of his actions at the time of the crime. They tried to get funding for an expert, but their requests were either late or not sufficiently justified. As a result, they could not present an argument related to his mental state or introduce expert testimony that could aid in the defense of insanity or diminished capacity. The court noted that Stigleman's behavior before, during, and after the incident indicated the possibility of a serious mental health issue caused by drug use, which warranted an expert’s evaluation. The silence of an expert on the mental health issues surrounding his drug use could have made a significant difference in the outcome. The court ruled that Stigleman’s attorneys did not adequately represent him by failing to present a complete defense. The decision emphasized that the right to present a complete defense is constitutionally guaranteed. Based on these findings, the court deemed it necessary to grant Stigleman a new trial to allow for proper evaluation of his mental state. While one judge expressed disagreement, arguing that the defense had not shown that the lack of expert testimony prejudiced Stigleman's case, the majority concluded that the claims and evidence presented merited a reversal and a new opportunity for a fair trial.
In OCCA case No. SR-2013-1187, the State appealed the conviction of Carson for lewd molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling. One judge dissented. Carson was charged with six counts of lewd molestation. A jury found him not guilty on three charges and couldn’t make a decision on the other three, which are still unresolved. The appeal centered around whether the district court made the right call when allowing evidence about past sexual abuse involving a different perpetrator. The State argued that this evidence should not have been allowed under a law known as the Rape Shield statute, designed to protect victims by limiting the introduction of their past sexual behavior. The district court, however, let the defense question the victim about these other incidents. The State believed this was a mistake and wanted the court to review the evidence ruling. However, the court decided not to do so. They trust the trial court's judgment on these matters unless there is clear proof of a mistake. The court said the State did not show that the trial court made an error in allowing the evidence. In summary, the OCCA upheld the decision made by the district court, ruling that they acted within their rights, and the case for Carson was allowed to stand as it was.
In OCCA case No. C-2013-973, Nick Rodriguez appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence with Great Bodily Injury, Driving a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol (Subsequent Felony), and Driving with License Revoked. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions and sentences for Driving Under the Influence with Great Bodily Injury and Driving with License Revoked but to reverse and dismiss the conviction for Driving a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol (Subsequent Felony). One justice dissented. Rodriguez was charged in Garfield County after entering a plea of nolo contendre, which means he did not contest the charges. He was sentenced to 10 years for each of the first two counts, which were to be served one after the other, while he received a one-year sentence for the last count, to be served at the same time as one of the other sentences. Rodriguez later asked to withdraw his pleas, but the court denied his application. He claimed his appeals were based on four main points: 1) that he should not have been punished for both charges of DUI because it was against the rules, 2) that he did not understand what he was doing when he pleaded guilty, 3) that he did not get good help from his lawyer, and 4) that his sentence was too harsh. The court reviewed his arguments. For the first point, they noted that Rodriguez didn't mention this issue when he first asked to withdraw his pleas, so they couldn't consider it now. The court also found that Rodriguez's pleas were made voluntarily, meaning he understood what he had done. His argument about not having a good lawyer was accepted partly because the lawyer had not raised the double punishment issue. In the end, the court decided to keep the first and third convictions but agreed to toss out the second conviction because it was unfair to punish him twice for the same action. However, they determined that the remaining sentences were suitable based on the situation, meaning they found no reason to change them. Through this decision, the court tried to ensure fairness and that justice was served correctly in the case against Rodriguez.
In OCCA case No. F-2013-305, Lonnie Waylon Craighead appealed his conviction for endeavoring to manufacture methamphetamine. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Craighead's conviction and sentence. One judge dissented. Craighead was found guilty in a jury trial and sentenced to thirty years in prison with a $50,000 fine. He raised several complaints about his trial, including that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof, his arrest was not lawful, and his rights were violated during questioning. He also claimed that the evidence against him was not strong enough, and he was not given fair representation by his lawyer. After reviewing the case, the court wrote that they did not see a problem with how the prosecution handled the case. They felt there was enough evidence for the jury to find Craighead guilty. The court believed the police had valid reasons for stopping and questioning him. They stated that Craighead had been informed of his rights before being interviewed and that he agreed to talk. The court also noted that while the prosecutor made a few mistakes, they did not harm Craighead’s right to a fair trial. The details of his previous crimes were shared, but it did not seem to affect the outcome of the trial. The jury also had enough evidence to verify that Craighead had prior felony convictions. Regarding the claim of ineffective help from his lawyer, the court decided that Craighead was not denied a good defense. They found that the sentence he received was not excessive, given the nature of his actions and past crimes. However, the court did find an issue with the jail fees Craighead was assessed after sentencing. These fees were not discussed during the trial, and Craighead was not given a chance to contest them. Therefore, the court sent the case back to the district court to address the jail fee situation. In summary, the court upheld Craighead’s conviction but revised the part about the jail fees, ordering a hearing for that matter.
In OCCA case No. F 2012-1131, Antonio Herman Cervantes appealed his conviction for sixty-nine counts of child sexual abuse and one count of child physical abuse. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court while ordering the correction of the sentencing documentation. One judge dissented. Cervantes was found guilty of serious crimes against children and received a significant prison sentence of forty years for each count. The court decided that some counts would be served concurrently, while others would be served consecutively. This meant that Cervantes would spend a long time in prison before being eligible for parole. Cervantes raised several issues in his appeal. First, he argued that the jury instructions at his trial were not correct, but the court found that these instructions were adequate since there were no objections made at the trial. Therefore, the court only looked for plain errors and did not find any. Next, Cervantes claimed that many of his convictions should not have happened because they involved double punishment for the same act. However, the court disagreed, stating that the evidence showed these were separate acts that could be considered individual offenses. Cervantes also thought that the trial judge did not treat him fairly. Yet, since there were no objections to any of the judge's comments during the trial, the court reviewed these comments and concluded that they did not show bias against Cervantes. He further claimed that he was denied a speedy trial. The court reviewed the reasons for trial delays, noting that they mostly stemmed from issues with his defense attorneys and were not caused by the state. The court decided that the delays were not a violation of his rights because he did not demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the wait. Cervantes also argued that there were mistakes in how his previous convictions were presented during the trial, but he did not raise objections when the evidence was introduced, so the court did not find any reversible error. Another point he raised was that the written judgment did not match what was said in court regarding his sentence. The court agreed that his sentencing documents needed to be corrected to reflect the proper orders given during the trial. Cervantes also suggested that his lawyer did not provide effective assistance because he failed to complain about certain aspects during the trial. However, the court found that there was no evidence of how this alleged absence of support affected the outcome of his case. He also noted instances of what he thought was misconduct by the prosecution but concluded that overall, he was not denied a fair trial due to these points. The court found that his sentences were appropriate and did not see any major errors that would warrant changing its earlier decisions. Finally, the court ruled that there was no cumulative effect of errors since no individual error was found to be significant enough to affect the fairness of the trial. Thus, the court affirmed the conviction while ordering the necessary corrections in the documentation of the sentence.
In OCCA case No. S-2013-687, the appellant appealed his conviction for DUI manslaughter. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling, stating that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the appellant's actions were the direct cause of the victim's death. Two justices dissented from the decision. The case involved an incident that took place on October 11, 2012, when the appellee was charged with first-degree manslaughter. This charge stemmed from the accidental death of his wife, Linda Vaughan, while he was driving under the influence of alcohol. During the preliminary hearing, it was revealed that Vaughan was intoxicated, with a blood alcohol level of .14, and that his wife had exited the truck he was driving. She was killed when he accidentally ran over her. Vaughan argued that the state's evidence failed to show that his driving while intoxicated was the direct cause of Linda's death. Testimony from a highway patrolman indicated that while Vaughan may have been more aware of his surroundings if he were sober, Linda's death would have occurred regardless of his intoxication. The court examined whether the state had presented enough evidence to prove that the appellee's actions directly caused the victim's death. They found that the evidence showed Linda made the choice to leave the vehicle and that her death was caused by her own actions, not by the appellee's impaired driving. Because there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of DUI manslaughter, the court upheld the decision of the lower court, which had granted Vaughan's demurrer, meaning they did not find probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. In the end, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the evidence was not strong enough to support the charge against Vaughan. The decision did not minimize the tragedy of the accident but emphasized the importance of concrete evidence in such cases.
In OCCA case No. F-2011-962, Jonas Alan Thornton appealed his conviction for Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse Thornton's conviction and remand the case for a new trial due to concerns over the impartiality of the trial judge. One judge dissented. Thornton was convicted after a non-jury trial where the judge was someone he had previously consulted while looking for legal advice regarding the case against him. The incident occurred in January 2010 when Thornton allegedly fired a handgun into a house. After being arrested, he spoke with the judge, who was not in his judge role at that time. Later, the judge was elected and presided over Thornton’s trial. During the appeal, Thornton claimed that the judge should have recused himself because of their prior interaction, which could influence how the judge viewed the case. The court found that the judge failed to follow rules requiring him to step aside, which led to a decision that Thornton did not receive a fair trial. The court stated that even though Thornton did not directly ask for the judge to disqualify himself at the time, this did not eliminate the obligation for the judge to recognize a conflict of interest. The relationship between Thornton and the judge meant that the fairness of the trial could be doubted. As a result, the court ruled that Thornton's conviction needed to be reversed, and he would get a new trial. This decision effectively set aside the earlier trial's results and meant that any further claims Thornton made concerning his representation or other trial aspects were not addressed since the focus was on the impartiality of the judge.
In OCCA case No. F-2012-1039, Earnest Toby Bearshead appealed his conviction for Robbery with a Firearm and False Personation. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction for Robbery with a Firearm but reversed his conviction for False Personation. One judge dissented. Bearshead was found guilty of two crimes: Robbery with a Firearm and False Personation. The jury decided he should go to prison for nine years for the robbery and five years for the false personation. The sentences would be served one after the other. Bearshead did not argue against the robbery conviction but did challenge the false personation conviction based on three main issues. First, Bearshead claimed that there wasn't enough evidence to prove he committed false personation. The law says that to be guilty of false personation, a person has to pretend to be someone else and do something that could cause that person to face legal issues or gain some benefit. Bearshead argued that since a video of him talking to the police was not officially accepted as evidence, he could not be said to have assumed another person's identity. Despite this claim, the court found that Bearshead had indeed provided evidence of using a false name when talking to the police. A detective testified that Bearshead initially said his name was “Oscar” and later corrected it to “Toby.” The detective had noted this on a form, showing that Bearshead tried to lie about his identity. The second point Bearshead raised was that even if he did use a false name, he did not do anything to get someone else in trouble, as there were no legal issues connected to the name Oscar Bearshead. The State argued he would have benefitted in some way, such as avoiding responsibility for the robbery. However, there was no evidence that showed Bearshead actually gained anything from pretending to be Oscar. He still faced the charges and was found guilty of the robbery. The court pointed out that Bearshead's jury was not instructed about the possibility of benefiting from using a false name, which was necessary for proving false personation in this case. Without clear evidence that he gained any benefits from the impersonation, the court decided the State did not meet the burden of proving all parts of the crime. As a result, the court reversed Bearshead's conviction for False Personation and ordered it to be dismissed. However, his conviction for Robbery with a Firearm stood, and he would still serve the sentence related to that crime. The decision led to one judge expressing a different opinion from the others.
In OCCA case No. F-2011-1059, Cristopher Lyn Kibbe appealed his conviction for various crimes, including Attempted Second Degree Burglary, Second Degree Burglary, Driving with a Revoked License, and Conspiracy to Commit Burglary. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence on the second and third counts, but modify the sentence on the attempted burglary to ten years. One judge dissented. Kibbe was found guilty by a jury and received a twenty-year sentence for each of the first two counts, while a fine of $100 was imposed for driving with a revoked license. His trial raised several issues related to judicial conduct and evidence. First, Kibbe argued that his trial was shaped unfairly by improper comments or testimonies from the prosecution. He claimed that a police officer made prejudicial remarks. However, the court found that the trial judge acted appropriately by not ordering a mistrial, as the errors cited were not fundamentally harmful to the fairness of the trial. Second, Kibbe contended that the evidence presented was not enough to support the jury's decision. The court determined that the testimony from his accomplice was properly corroborated and sufficient to justify the jury's verdicts. Kibbe also claimed that he was denied his right to present a full defense. Parts of his statements to police were not allowed into evidence. However, the court noted that many of Kibbe's exculpatory statements were presented before the jury, so it was unclear if additional statements would have made a difference. The appeal included complaints about evidence used during the sentencing phase. Kibbe's prior convictions were mentioned, and he argued that they should not have been because they were from similar transactions. The court upheld the trial judge’s decision to allow those convictions as proper evidence for sentencing enhancement. Kibbe's claims of prosecutorial misconduct were largely dismissed as well. Although he pointed out several alleged wrongdoings by the prosecutor, the court found that the arguments did not amount to significant error. Ultimately, the court modified Kibbe's sentence on one of the counts due to a clear legal error regarding the length of the sentence. The court reduced this sentence from twenty years to ten years, which adhered to statutory guidelines. The court did not find that the cumulative errors impacted Kibbe’s right to a fair trial, and therefore, most of his convictions and sentences were upheld. The decision was to confirm the judgment on Counts 2 and 3, and modify the sentence on Count 1.
In OCCA case No. F-2011-473, Joseph Randal Arndt appealed his conviction for Robbery with a Firearm. In a published decision, the court decided that Arndt's right to cross-examine his co-defendant was denied, which required a reversal of his conviction and a new trial. One judge dissented. The case involved Arndt, his co-defendant, and another man who planned to buy marijuana from a person named Ouni. Instead of a legal transaction, things turned violent when Arndt's accomplice pulled a gun and shot Ouni when he thought he was cheated. Arndt was in the car during this event and was accused of participating in the robbery. During the trial, Arndt argued that he should have been allowed to question his co-defendant about important details that could affect his case. These details included accusations that Arndt had a shotgun and was told to push Ouni out of the vehicle. Arndt's lawyer objected when this information was presented during the trial, but the judge denied the request to cross-examine the co-defendant. Arndt maintained that both he and the co-defendant claimed to have no knowledge of any robbery plan. When the co-defendant testified against Arndt, the court should have allowed Arndt to cross-examine him. The court found that the judge's failure to do so was a serious error that harmed Arndt's rights. In conclusion, the decision emphasized that when someone testifies against you in court, you have the right to question them. Since Arndt was not given this opportunity, the court decided that he deserves a new trial where he can fully defend himself.
In OCCA case No. J 2013-0130, D.I.S. appealed his conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the order adjudicating D.I.S. as a delinquent child and remand the matter to the District Court with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. This case began when a Juvenile Petition was filed on July 25, 2012, against D.I.S., who was just 14 years old. He was charged with three counts of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon in Pontotoc County. After a hearing on February 5, 2013, the judge found that D.I.S. had committed the offenses and declared him a delinquent child. He was ordered to stay with his mother under supervision until another court hearing about his situation. D.I.S. appealed this decision, arguing that the evidence wasn’t strong enough to prove he used a dangerous weapon, or that he had intent to cause serious harm. The law requires that to be declared a delinquent child, the evidence must clearly show proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeals court agreed with D.I.S. and said that the evidence was not sufficient to support the idea that he was guilty of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. Therefore, they reversed the previous ruling and instructed the lower court to dismiss the case against him. The case was important because it highlighted the need for strong evidence when judging a child in the juvenile justice system. The court made it clear that if the facts aren’t strong enough, they cannot find a child guilty of serious charges. This ruling protects the rights of young people by ensuring they are only judged based on solid evidence.