Application to Revoke Suspended Sentence Archives

RE-2018-868

Post author:Staff
Post published:September 12, 2019
Post category:RE

**FILED IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS / OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **SEP 12 2019** **JOHN D. HADDEN** **CLERK** --- **MISTY DAWN BARRETT,** **Appellant,** **V.** **No. RE-2018-868** **THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:** Appellant Misty Dawn Barrett appeals from the revocation of her suspended sentences in Muskogee County District Court Case Nos. CF-2016-439, CF-2017-126, CF-2017-127, and CF-2017-129. Appellant faced multiple charges across these cases, including Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, Larceny of an Automobile, and Identity Theft, among others. After entering pleas and being convicted, she received several sentences which were subsequently suspended to be served concurrently. The State filed an Application to Revoke Suspended Sentence in all four cases, leading to a partial revocation of five years of her suspended sentences on October 25, 2017. A second Application to Revoke was filed on July 25, 2018, for new alleged crimes, leading to a revocation hearing where the trial court, presided over by Judge Mike Norman, revoked her remaining suspended sentences in full. In her appeal, Appellant argues that the full revocation was excessive, asserting that her past actions should have been anticipated due to her struggles with drug addiction, and claiming that incarceration is not an effective remedy for her situation. The decision to revoke a suspended sentence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court. A revocation will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion (Jones v. State, 1988 OK CR 20, ¶ 8, 749 P.2d 563, 565). The State established sufficient grounds for revocation through competent evidence presented during the hearing. Appellant had previously benefited from leniency when only part of her suspended sentence was revoked. After reoffending post-incarceration, Appellant demonstrated that a suspended sentence is a privilege rather than a right (Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, ¶ 8, 990 P.2d 894, 897). **DECISION** The full revocation of Appellant's suspended sentences in Muskogee County District Court Case Nos. CF-2016-439, CF-2017-126, CF-2017-127, and CF-2017-129 is **AFFIRMED**. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the **MANDATE** is ordered to be issued upon the filing of this decision. --- **AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF MUSKOGEE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE MIKE NORMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE** **APPEARANCES AT REVOCATION** **DANIEL MEDLOCK** 620 W. BROADWAY MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 **COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT** **APPEARANCES ON APPEAL** **NICOLLETTE BRANDT** P.O. BOX 926 NORMAN, OK 73070 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** **TIMOTHY KING** ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY 220 STATE ST. MUSKOGEE, OK 74401 **COUNSEL FOR STATE** **MIKE HUNTER** OKLA. ATTORNEY GENERAL **CAROLINE HUNT** ASST. ATTORNEY GENERAL 313 N.E. 21st STREET OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105 **COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE** --- **OPINION BY:** KUEHN, V.P.J. **LEWIS, P.J.:** CONCUR **LUMPKIN, J.:** CONCUR **HUDSON, J.:** CONCUR **ROWLAND, J.:** CONCUR RA/F --- [**Click Here To Download PDF**](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-868_1734360560.pdf)

RE-2001-887

Post author:Staff
Post published:April 30, 2002
Post category:RE

In OCCA case No. F-2001-687, the appellant appealed her conviction for Uttering Two or More Bogus Checks Exceeding $50.00. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to remand the matter for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. One judge dissented. The case began in 1995 when the appellant entered a plea of Nolo Contendere, which means she did not admit guilt but accepted the punishment for the crime. She was found guilty of writing bad checks to a grocery store, and her sentence was put on hold for five years, during which she had to pay restitution and other costs. However, she violated her probation by not making payments or reporting to her probation officer, leading to the state requesting her sentence be enforced in 1999. On May 23, 2001, the court found the appellant had violated her probation and sentenced her to one year in jail. She was also ordered to pay restitution for her bad checks, but the total amount was very high compared to the checks she admitted writing. The appellant argued that she should not have to pay such a large amount of restitution because she was not convicted of all the other related checks that contributed to that total. There were many checks between different years, and she felt the court had made an error by imposing restitution for checks she never had to answer for in court. Additionally, the appellant felt that the court had not looked into whether she could afford to pay the restitution without hardship to herself or her family. The court had different amounts recorded for restitution over time, which contributed to her confusion regarding what she owed. Also, when she was jailed, the appellant thought the fees for her time in jail were unfair and more than the actual cost of her incarceration. She claimed that the costs were not justified by evidence and that no one checked if paying these fees would create a financial burden for her. The court recognized the problems she raised about her case, particularly regarding her obligation to pay the reported costs and restitution without proof they were correct or fair. They decided that the lower court needed to review everything again: why the appellant was ordered certain restitution, if she could afford to pay it, and what the correct amounts should be. In summary, the court referred the case back to the lower court to have them investigate these issues further. The goal was to ensure that the appellant's rights were protected and that the law was being correctly applied.