Appellate Decision Archives

F-2018-284

Post author:Staff
Post published:July 11, 2019
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2018-284, Carl Wayne Gundrum, Jr. appealed his conviction for first-degree rape and lewd acts with a child under 16. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions and sentences. One judge dissented. Gundrum was found guilty by a jury in Cleveland County and received a 30-year sentence for the rape and a 20-year sentence for the lewd acts. Both sentences are to be served consecutively, meaning he must serve them one after the other. Before the appeal, he argued several things regarding his trial. First, he claimed that his right to a speedy trial was violated because there was a delay of about 21 months from his arrest to the trial. The court looked at four things to decide if his right was violated: how long the delay was, why it happened, whether he asked for a speedy trial, and whether he was hurt by the delay. The court found that the delay was not enough to violate his speedy trial rights. Second, Gundrum argued that the court made a mistake by allowing evidence of another child molestation case to be shown in his trial. His lawyer objected to this evidence being used, and the court said that it was appropriately admitted, so they found no error here. Third, Gundrum claimed there was bad behavior from the prosecutors that made his trial unfair. Many of these actions were not objected to during the trial, so the court only looked at the ones that were considered plain errors. They decided that the prosecutor's actions did not change the outcome of the trial significantly enough to cause an unfair result. Fourth, he argued that his lawyer did not do a good job by not objecting to the prosecutor's misconduct. The court reviewed this situation and found that Gundrum could not prove that he was harmed by this lack of action, so his claim did not work out. Finally, Gundrum sought relief by stating that all these errors together made his trial unfair. However, since the court found no individual errors, they concluded that there could not be an accumulation of errors either. In the end, the court affirmed Gundrum's conviction and stated that he must serve a significant portion of his sentences before he could be considered for parole.

F-2005-1161

Post author:Staff
Post published:March 15, 2007
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2005-1161, Isaac Gardner appealed his conviction for Forcible Oral Sodomy and Attempted Sexual Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Gardner's conviction but modified his sentence from twenty years to fifteen years imprisonment. One judge dissented. During the trial, Gardner was found guilty of Forcible Oral Sodomy and the jury recommended a lengthy prison sentence based on evidence presented, including Gardner's past admissions about similar actions. Although the judge allowed some evidence regarding Gardner's past, they did not believe it overly impacted the trial since the jury ultimately acquitted him of the Attempted Sexual Battery charge. Gardner argued that he did not receive a fair trial due to this evidence, but the court disagreed, noting that he had been warned about what evidence would be used against him. They also highlighted that his conviction was upheld because the jury was able to examine the evidence properly. Additionally, Gardner claimed that he should have been informed about parole eligibility under the 85% Rule, which says he would need to serve most of his sentence before being eligible for parole. The court acknowledged this misstep and reduced his sentence accordingly. In summary, the court confirmed that while Gardner’s initial trial and conviction stood, his sentence was adjusted to reflect what he had rightfully requested before the trial began.

PR-2006-120

Post author:Staff
Post published:April 18, 2006
Post category:PR

In OCCA case No. PR-2006-120, a petitioner appealed her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug (methamphetamine) and driving without seatbelts. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petitioner's request for relief in part and deny it in part. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner was charged with possessing methamphetamine and driving without a seatbelt. She initially agreed to a plea deal with the state, which involved accepting guilt for the drug charge and a fine for the seatbelt violation. However, when the petitioner refused to follow through with the state’s conditions for the plea, she attempted to enter a non-negotiated or blind guilty plea. The judge refused to accept her blind plea and insisted she proceed to trial, stating she did not have an absolute right to plead guilty. The petitioner believed she should be allowed to enter her guilty plea without the state’s conditions. This disagreement led her to file a petition with the court seeking orders to either allow her to plead guilty or to prevent the judge from forcing her to go to trial. After reviewing the facts of the case, the court found that the petitioner had a clear legal right to have her guilty plea accepted if it met the necessary legal requirements. The court noted that it was a mistake for the judge to reject her plea without evaluating whether it was voluntary and if there was a factual basis for it. The court granted part of the petitioner’s request by directing the district court judge to conduct a hearing on her blind plea and accept it if it correctly fulfilled the legal standards. However, the court denied her request to have her plea regarding the seatbelt violation accepted, as that plea required the judge’s approval. The dissenting judge expressed concerns about whether the petitioner had truly shown that she was being harmed by the trial court's refusal to accept her plea, suggesting that any challenges to a guilty plea rejection should typically be taken up in direct appeals rather than with this type of petition. The dissenting judge also supported the trial judge's discretion, arguing that the right to a jury trial must be upheld. In summary, the court ruled that the petitioner should be given a chance to enter her guilty plea under the law, but that her plea regarding the seatbelt violation did not have to be accepted.

F-2002-718

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 22, 2003
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2002-718, Veronica Coronado appealed her conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction. One judge dissented. Veronica was found guilty of trafficking illegal drugs and was sentenced to ten years in prison with a fine of $25,000. After reviewing the case closely, the court found an important problem with how the police searched Veronica. The judges stated that her rights were violated because the search did not follow the rules laid out in the U.S. Constitution. According to the Constitution, people should not be subjected to unreasonable searches. The judges referred to an important case, Terry v. Ohio, which explains that police can only search someone if they have good reasons to believe that the person is dangerous. In Veronica's case, the officer who searched her did not have specific reasons to believe she was armed or dangerous. The search was done just as a normal procedure. Also, after the officer looked and determined she was not carrying a weapon, the officer had no right to take anything from her without a warrant, which is a legal document allowing police to search. Therefore, since the search was not done the right way, any evidence found during that search should not have been used against her in court. Because of these issues, the judges decided that Veronica should not have been convicted and ordered that her case be dismissed.

F-2001-609

Post author:Staff
Post published:May 14, 2002
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2001-609, John Henry Harris appealed his conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction with instructions to dismiss the case. One judge dissented. John Henry Harris was found guilty in a trial without a jury. The court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison and a fine of $25,000. However, Harris appealed this decision, arguing that the police had violated his rights during the arrest. The main issue was whether the police were allowed to enter Harris's home without a warrant. The court reviewed the case law related to the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, police need a warrant to enter a person's home, unless there are special circumstances. One of these situations is called hot pursuit, which means the police can follow someone closely if they believe a crime has been committed and the person might escape. In this case, the court found that Harris's arrest did not require a warrant since the police were trying to apprehend him for minor traffic violations and a misdemeanor charge. They ruled that there were no exceptional circumstances that would justify entering the home without a warrant. The court also emphasized that the police needed to show that waiting for a warrant would have resulted in the loss of evidence, which they did not prove. As a result, the court stated that the trial court had made a mistake by not agreeing to Harris's request to dismiss the evidence obtained during the illegal entry into his home. Since the evidence was critical for his conviction, the court had no choice but to reverse Harris's guilty verdict and instructed the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. The dissenting opinion believed that the police acted properly. The dissenting judge pointed out that Harris committed multiple traffic violations and tried to escape from the police by running into a house where he did not live. When the police arrived, the homeowners informed them that Harris should be chased. The dissenting judge felt that the police were justified in entering the home to make the arrest and to prevent potential harm to the homeowners. In summary, the court’s decision to reverse Harris’s conviction was based on the belief that his rights were violated through an illegal entry into his home without a warrant.