In OCCA case No. C-2021-218, the petitioner appealed her conviction for outraging public decency and violation of a protective order. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant the appeal. The court agreed that her due process rights were violated when the district court denied her motions to withdraw her pleas while she was absent from the hearing. No one dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2019-115, Beck appealed his conviction for multiple serious crimes, including First Degree Burglary and Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided that the State of Oklahoma did not have the authority to prosecute him because he is recognized as an Indian and the crimes occurred in what is considered Indian Country. The result was that Beck's convictions were overturned, and the case was sent back with instructions to dismiss the charges. There was a dissenting opinion regarding the application of the law.
In the case of LeJeanna Sue Chronister v. State of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals addressed several appeals raised by the appellant following her conviction for Aggravated Manufacture of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) and her subsequent sentencing to twenty years in prison. The appellant raised three primary propositions of error: 1. **Violation of Rights Regarding the 85% Rule**: The appellant contended that her sentence was unconstitutional because she was not informed that the 85% Rule (requiring her to serve 85% of her sentence before becoming eligible for parole) applied to her case. The court concluded that this argument did not hold merit in a non-jury trial setting, stating that the judge, not a jury, was responsible for sentencing and presumed to know the law. The court found no plain error as the sentence was within the statutory range and was the minimum allowed. 2. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: The appellant claimed her counsel was ineffective for not informing her about the 85% Rule, impacting her decision-making during her trial. The court applied the Strickland standard to evaluate the ineffectiveness claim, concluding that the appellant did not demonstrate how the alleged deficiency in counsel's performance prejudiced her case or altered the outcome. 3. **Cumulative Error**: The appellant argued that the combination of errors denied her a fair trial. The court determined that since none of the individual claims of error warranted relief, the cumulative error argument also lacked merit. Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence imposed by the District Court of LeFlore County, stating that the appellant had not demonstrated any error that would necessitate modifying the sentence or overturning the conviction. The ruling emphasizes the distinction between non-jury trials and jury trials concerning informing defendants about parole-related laws and the importance of counsel's performance under the criteria established by the Strickland case.
**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **ROBERT JOSEPH CLARK, JR.,** **Appellant,** **v.** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** **Appellee.** **No. RE-2018-425** --- **SUMMARY OPINION** **LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:** On April 9, 2015, Appellant Clark, represented by counsel, entered a guilty plea to Count 1, Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (CDS) (Methamphetamine), and Count 2, Possession of a CDS (Psilocybin) in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2014-8289. Sentencing was deferred for five (5) years, subject to terms and conditions of probation. On September 9, 2015, Clark's sentence in Case No. CF-2014-8289 was accelerated, and he was sentenced to eight (8) years each for Counts 1 and 2, all suspended, with terms and conditions of probation. That same date, Clark entered a guilty plea to Count 1, Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon, and Count 2, Possession of a CDS in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2015-3126. He was sentenced to eight (8) years for each count, all suspended, also subject to terms and conditions of probation. Clark's sentences in Case No. CF-2015-3126 were ordered to run concurrently with his sentences in Case No. CF-2014-8289. Additionally, Clark entered a guilty plea in Oklahoma County Case No. CF-2015-3693 for Possession of a CDS, receiving a sentence of three (3) years, all suspended, which was ordered to be served consecutively to his sentence in Case No. CF-2015-3126. On March 24, 2017, the State filed an Application to Revoke Clark's suspended sentences in all three referenced cases, alleging the commission of new offenses in Oklahoma County Case Nos. CF-2016-7039 (possession of stolen property and possession of drug paraphernalia) and CM-2016-2833 (obstructing an officer and failing to wear a safety belt). Following a revocation hearing on April 17, 2018, the District Court of Oklahoma County, presided over by the Honorable Ray C. Elliott, revoked Clark's suspended sentences in full. Clark's sole proposition of error on appeal alleges an abuse of discretion in revoking his suspended sentences, claiming that the sentence is excessive. The revocation of Clark's suspended sentences is AFFIRMED. The scope of review in a revocation appeal is limited to the validity of the revocation order executing the previously imposed sentence. We examine the basis for the factual determination and assess whether there was an abuse of discretion. It is established that violation of even one condition of probation is sufficient to justify the revocation of a suspended sentence. Based on the appeal record, there appears to be no merit in Clark's contention that the full revocation of his suspended sentences is excessive, nor do we find an abuse of discretion in Judge Elliott's decision. **DECISION** The order of the District Court of Oklahoma County revoking Appellant's suspended sentences in Case Nos. CF-2014-8289, CF-2015-3126, and CF-2015-3693 is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision. --- **APPEARANCES AT TRIAL** **THOMAS HURLEY** **ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER** **OKLAHOMA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE** **611 COUNTY OFFICE BLDG.** **320 ROBERT S. KERR AVE.** **OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102** **COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT** **KIRK MARTIN** **ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY** **OKLAHOMA COUNTY** **320 ROBERT S. KERR SUITE 505** **OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102** **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE** **OPINION BY:** LEWIS, P.J. **KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur** **LUMPKIN, J.: Concur** **HUDSON, J.: Concur** **ROWLAND, J.: Concur** --- [Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/RE-2018-425_1734692953.pdf)
In OCCA case No. PC 2017-755, the petitioner appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In a published decision, the court decided to vacate the previous sentence and allow for resentencing with a jury. The dissenting opinions argued against the majority decision, indicating that the judge had the discretion to deny jury resentencing based on prior waivers. The case started when the petitioner was just seventeen years old and pleaded guilty to First Degree Murder in 2006. Originally, he was sentenced to life in prison without the chance for parole. After some time, he claimed that this sentence was unfair because he was a minor when he was sentenced. The court agreed and decided to let him be resentenced but had to deal with the issue of whether his resentencing should involve a jury. The petitioner argued that since he was seeking resentencing, he should be allowed a jury trial. However, the state disagreed, pointing out that he had waived his right to a jury trial when he originally pleaded guilty. The judge decided that because of this waiver, he didn’t have to give the petitioner a jury for resentencing. In this case, the court looked at previous decisions that said when a juvenile is sentenced to life without parole, they should have a jury trial unless they give up that right. The majority of the court found that the petitioner did not truly waive his right to a jury for the resentencing, as he was relying on new rules from recent important cases. Ultimately, the court decided that it was wrong for the judge to deny the jury resentencing. They chose to vacate that decision and said the case should go back to the lower court to figure out the right way to do the resentencing, with the ability to include a jury if the petitioner asked. The dissenting opinions argued that the judge had actually acted correctly by denying the request for a jury because the petitioner had already waived that right back when he pleaded guilty. They believed that the rules shouldn’t allow a person to change their mind long after the original decision. The court ordered that the petitioner’s guilty plea and conviction were still valid, but they needed to follow the correct process under the law for the new sentencing.
In OCCA case No. MAC-2017-458, Harris appealed her conviction for possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to remand for further proceedings, agreeing that Harris was denied her right to a proper evidentiary hearing to withdraw her guilty plea. One judge dissented, expressing concerns about the approach taken by the majority in requiring a hearing despite the lack of detailed reasoning in the motions to withdraw.
In OCCA case No. F-2014-1019, Charles Leonard Bennett, III appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment of the district court. One judge dissented. Bennett was found guilty after a trial where the judge, not a jury, listened to the case. He received a sentence of fifteen years in prison. Bennett raised several issues on appeal. He first argued that the evidence did not prove he did not act in self-defense. The court found enough evidence that a reasonable person could decide he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This means they believed the victim and the facts presented at the trial supported the conviction. Bennett also wanted to argue other issues that could lead to a new trial. However, he decided to withdraw those arguments and only focus on the issues that might lead to his case being dismissed or his sentence being changed. He signed a document saying he knew what he was doing by waiving those rights. Another issue was about restitution, which is when a person convicted of a crime has to pay the victim for their losses. Bennett contested the court's order for him to pay restitution because the required paperwork showing the victim's losses was not properly presented during the trial. Since no proof of the victim's financial losses was provided, the court agreed that the restitution order was arbitrary and sent the case back to the district court to properly determine the victim's losses. Overall, while Bennett's conviction was upheld, the court required a re-evaluation of the restitution owed to the victim. The case was sent back to the district court for this purpose, but other than that, the court found no significant errors that would change the outcome of the case.
In OCCA case No. S-2012-573, the appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance (methamphetamine). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the orders of the lower court. The dissenting opinion was not specified. In this case, the appellant was charged after being arrested by a trooper from the Oklahoma Highway Patrol. A preliminary hearing took place, and the judge decided there was not enough evidence to proceed with a trial. The state disagreed and appealed this decision. Another judge upheld the first decision, leading to the current appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. The main issue in the appeal focused on whether the highway patrol trooper had the authority to arrest the appellant. After careful consideration and a hearing, the court found no error in how the lower courts handled the case. They determined that the facts and legal interpretations were correct, and therefore, the original decision was upheld. The case was reviewed under specific procedures that allow this kind of state appeal, and the court confirmed that there was no abuse of discretion in the previous rulings. As a result, the final rulings and orders from the lower courts were affirmed, and the court ordered that their decision be enforced.
In OCCA case No. C-2010-765, Polk appealed his conviction for multiple counts including Child Sexual Abuse, First Degree Rape by Instrumentation, Kidnapping, and Lewd Molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant his appeal in part by reversing and dismissing the conviction for Lewd Molestation but affirmed the other convictions. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. C-2010-1033, Shawn Leroy Harger appealed his conviction for Child Abuse. In a published decision, the court decided to grant Harger's petition for a writ of certiorari. The judgment and sentence of the district court were reversed, and the matter was remanded for a new hearing on Harger's application to withdraw his plea with separate, conflict-free counsel. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2007-909, Val Wilkerson appealed his conviction for Rape by Instrumentation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment but modified his sentence from thirty years to fifteen years imprisonment. One judge dissented. Val Wilkerson was found guilty by a jury in Haskell County for a serious crime. The jury decided on a punishment of thirty years in prison. After the trial, Wilkerson felt that things went wrong and he raised several points to appeal. First, he argued that the State used too much unfair evidence from other incidents that made him look bad. He thought this made the trial unfair. Second, he believed it was wrong for the prosecutors and police to mention that he had stayed quiet when asked questions. Third, he said the court did not give the jury the correct instructions. Lastly, he claimed that all these mistakes together made his trial unfair. The Court looked over everything carefully and agreed that the way other crimes were presented was a problem. They found that even though some earlier actions of Wilkerson were similar to what he was accused of, the older incidents happened a long time ago and should not have been brought up so much in his trial. The Court determined that while some bad evidence was allowed, the main evidence against Wilkerson was enough for the jury to find him guilty. However, the additional bad evidence likely influenced the length of the sentence because the prosecutor asked the jury to consider these past actions when deciding on punishment. Since the Court believed that the jury was distracted by this unfair evidence while deciding on the punishment, they changed the sentence to fifteen years instead of thirty. They also concluded that other issues raised by Wilkerson either did not affect the trial’s fairness or were fixed by the trial court’s instructions. In summary, the court upheld the conviction but agreed that the punishment was too harsh and lowered it. One judge disagreed and believed the case should be tried again.
In OCCA case No. RE 2006-0482, Juston Dean Cox appealed his conviction for multiple charges related to the concealment of stolen property and other offenses. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of Cox's suspended sentences but remanded the cases for resentencing to correct the terms to what was originally ordered. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. S-2007-779, Wilma Fay Jackson appealed her conviction for eighty-four felony counts and two misdemeanor counts of Obtaining Money by False Pretenses. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's dismissal of the case. One judge dissented. The case began when Jackson was charged with serious offenses for falsely representing herself as a licensed practical nurse (LPN) and receiving payments for work she did under that title. However, the district court found that there wasn't enough evidence to support the claims against her and dismissed the charges. The state then appealed this decision, claiming that the district court made a mistake in its ruling. The court looked closely at the evidence and the laws involved. They determined that the district court had correctly dismissed the charges because the state did not prove that Jackson had committed the crime as charged. The court pointed out that a key part of the crime was missing—a false representation that resulted in getting something of value without giving anything in return. The district court had ruled that the state did not show enough proof that Jackson had committed fraud. In the dissenting opinion, one judge expressed a different view. This judge believed that even though Jackson had worked at the nursing home, she had misrepresented her qualifications. The judge argued that the nursing home had been tricked into paying her as if she was a licensed nurse and that this should matter legally. The dissenting opinion felt that Jackson's actions deprived the nursing home of the services they expected. In conclusion, the appeal did not change the outcome, and the district court's dismissal of the charges against Jackson was upheld.
In OCCA case No. F 2004-582, Ryan Golden appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In a published decision, the court decided that he was entitled to a new trial because he was not given the correct number of chances to challenge jurors. The ruling was that the trial court's mistake was serious enough to affect the fairness of the trial, and because of this error, the original sentence was reversed and a new trial was ordered. One judge dissented, arguing that there should have been a demonstration of actual prejudice or harm caused by the mistake.
In OCCA case No. F-2003-1316, Jason Van Dusen appealed his conviction for Rape by Instrumentation and First Degree Rape. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the judgments but modify the sentences to thirty years of imprisonment for each count, to be served one after the other. One judge dissented. Van Dusen was found guilty in Blaine County after a trial. The jury decided on the sentences based on what they heard during the trial. Van Dusen raised concerns about not having a fair sentencing because information was given about parole and the length of the sentences. He also claimed that the prosecutor acted in a way that was unfair, which made his trial not just. The court looked carefully at everything from the trial and the arguments made by both sides. They agreed that the prosecutor should not have mentioned parole in the closing arguments, which is why they decided to change Van Dusen's sentences from seventy-five years to thirty years for each count, making the total time to be sixty years. The judges felt that this was a fair adjustment, considering the improper comments made during the trial.
In OCCA case No. RE-2001-749, Lloyd Samuel Heath, Jr. appealed his conviction for the revocation of suspended sentences. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the revocation of his suspended sentence. One judge dissented. Lloyd Samuel Heath, Jr. had originally entered a guilty plea for Second Degree Burglary and Concealing Stolen Property in 1993. He was given three years of imprisonment on both charges, but these sentences were suspended, meaning he wouldn’t go to jail if he followed certain rules. However, he committed another crime in 1993, which violated the terms of his suspended sentences. In 1994, the State applied to revoke his suspended sentences because of this new crime. There was a significant delay before the hearing actually took place. Heath was not given a hearing until 2000, which was almost six years after the application to revoke was filed. He argued that the State did not act quickly enough and that this delay meant the revocation should not happen. The State admitted that they had made a mistake and agreed with Heath’s concerns about the delay. The court agreed with Heath’s argument and decided to reverse the order that revoked his suspended sentence. They also instructed the lower court to dismiss the case. The decision meant that Heath’s original sentences were not enforced, and he would not have to serve them because the State did not handle the process in a timely manner.