F-2018-194

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-194, the appellant appealed his conviction for sexual abuse of a child under twelve and child sexual abuse. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions. One judge dissented. The appellant, William Harold Pittman, was convicted by a jury for serious crimes against children. The jury gave him a punishment of thirty years in prison for each crime, and both sentences were meant to be served one after the other. The judge who oversaw the trial also ordered the appellant to pay various costs and fees. Pittman appealed his conviction, claiming that the trial court made a mistake by allowing expert testimony about something called the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). He argued that this evidence was not relevant and should not have been allowed, saying it was not proven to be reliable. The court explained that the decision to allow expert evidence is usually up to the trial judge. If a specific objection is made during the trial, then the appeal cannot rely on a different argument later. Pittman did not object during the trial to the CSAAS evidence based on its relevance or reliability, which made his chance for appeal more difficult. To win an appeal based on a plain error, the appellant needs to show three things: that there was a real error, that it was obvious, and that the error affected the case's outcome. The court found that Pittman could not prove any such errors in this case. The court stated that previously, CSAAS had been accepted as reliable evidence in prior cases. This evidence can help explain why some children might take a long time to talk about the abuse or might change their statements after initially making claims. In this case, the court confirmed that the CSAAS evidence was relevant to the victim's delay in talking about the abuse. Pittman also claimed that there wasn't enough data to prove CSAAS was reliable and asked the court to reconsider accepting it as reliable evidence. However, the court refused to change its stance, stating that it would not revisit this issue. Lastly, Pittman argued that the CSAAS testimony was too supportive of the victim's story and could not be considered harmless. The court pointed out that this evidence was permissible because it only served to support what the victim and other witnesses testified about. The court ultimately found no errors in the trial regarding the way CSAAS evidence was handled, and therefore affirmed the judgments and sentences against Pittman.

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F-2012-437

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In OCCA case No. F-2012-437, Mark J. Lawler appealed his conviction for rape in the first degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Mark J. Lawler was found guilty of rape in the first degree by a jury and given a sentence of thirty-five years in prison. He claimed that the trial court made mistakes during his trial. First, Lawler thought he should have been allowed to represent himself instead of having a lawyer. He argued that this was his right under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The court agreed with him, stating that he had clearly asked to represent himself at least five days before the trial, which was a reasonable request. The court also found that Lawler understood the risks involved in defending himself without a lawyer. The trial court was wrong to deny his request, so that was a significant error. Second, Lawler argued that he did not get a speedy trial, which is another right he had under the law. Although there were delays in the trial, the court found that they were not entirely Lawler's fault. The reasons for the delays included busy courts and other issues that were not intentional. However, the court also decided that Lawler did not show he was hurt by the delay, so they did not agree with his claim on this point. In summary, the court found that the trial court made a mistake by not allowing Lawler to represent himself. Because of this error, they reversed his conviction and sent the case back for a new trial.

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F-2010-1123

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In OCCA case No. F-2010-1123, Chance appealed his conviction for First Degree Burglary and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify his sentence. One judge dissented. Chance was found guilty of breaking into a building with the intent to commit a crime and also had illegal drug items in his possession. The jury decided his punishment: thirty years in prison for the burglary and one year in jail for the drug paraphernalia. The court added that these sentences would be served at the same time. Chance raised a few complaints. He argued the prosecutor made improper statements about probation and parole during the trial, which made it unfair for him. He also believed the procedures and instructions during his drug paraphernalia case were wrong and that the court didn't follow the right steps when deciding how much money he should pay back to the victim for restitution. After looking closely at the case, the court agreed that there were mistakes made. The court recognized that the references to probation and parole might have affected the jury's decision on sentencing. Because of this, they lowered Chance's prison sentence from thirty years to twenty years. For the drug paraphernalia charge, the jury was told the wrong information regarding potential punishment, which the court found to be a serious error. They changed Chance's sentence for this from one year in jail to thirty days instead. Lastly, the court agreed with Chance's complaint about the restitution process. They decided the original amount couldn’t stand and ordered the lower court to re-evaluate how much he needed to pay the victim. In summary, the court kept the guilty verdict but changed the length of Chance's sentences and ordered a new hearing for restitution amounts. One judge felt that the original prison sentence should not have been changed since there was no clear evidence of unfairness affecting the jury.

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F-2005-440

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In OCCA case No. F-2005-440, Zachary Michael Hudson appealed his conviction for First Degree Manslaughter. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction but modified his sentence. One judge dissented. Zachary Hudson was tried by a jury for First Degree Murder, but the jury found him guilty of the lesser offense of First Degree Manslaughter. They recommended a punishment of twenty years in prison and a $10,000 fine. The trial judge followed this recommendation when he sentenced Hudson. After the trial, Hudson raised several points of error in his appeal. He claimed he was not given a fair trial because he thought the court was too involved and was biased toward the State. However, the court found that the judge was simply ensuring that witnesses understood the questions and did not show any partiality. Hudson also argued that there wasn't enough evidence to support the conviction for manslaughter, and he believed the jury instructions were incorrect. The court found evidence that Hudson fought with the person who died, left, returned, and then ran over that person with his car. This evidence led the court to believe that the jury could find Hudson guilty, as they might think he acted out of anger or passion rather than by accident. Hudson’s last point was about not having the jury instructed on the 85% Rule, which explains how much of a sentence must be served before someone can be eligible for parole. The court agreed that the jury needed this information and decided to modify Hudson's sentence from twenty years to fifteen years in prison while keeping the $10,000 fine. In summary, the court affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence because they wanted to ensure that the jury had clear information about parole eligibility, which would help them make informed decisions.

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