In OCCA case No. RE-2014-575, Jason Duane Barnes appealed his conviction for violating his probation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the decision to revoke his suspended sentences. The judges noted that the evidence was not enough to support the revocation because the prosecution failed to show that the judgment related to his new crime was final. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2014-22, Padillow appealed his conviction for rape and sexual offenses. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions but reversed a citation for direct contempt of court and vacated the associated sentence. One judge dissented. Earnest Eugene Padillow faced serious charges in two cases related to the sexual abuse of young girls. The first case involved the abuse of his nine-year-old great-niece, S.G., during a single day in August 2007, and the second case involved the sexual assault of his 11-year-old niece, D.P., in 2011. In both instances, Padillow was accused of serious crimes, including rape and inappropriate sexual contact. During the trial, Padillow had a tumultuous relationship with his attorneys. He expressed dissatisfaction with their defense strategies and at times chose to represent himself. This led to a chaotic scene in the courtroom where Padillow violently attacked one of his attorneys, resulting in his removal from the courtroom. Despite his outbursts, the trial proceeded, and he was found guilty. The court sided with the trial judge's decision that Padillow waived his rights to be present during certain trial stages due to his disruptive conduct. Padillow also claimed that his constitutional right to testify was violated when he was removed from the courtroom. However, the court ruled that his violent actions constituted a waiver of that right. In another point of contention, Padillow argued that he should have been given the chance to respond to a direct contempt charge when the judge found him guilty of contempt for his outburst. Although the court acknowledged he did not have the opportunity to be heard, they decided to reverse the contempt finding rather than require a new hearing given the context of his other convictions. Lastly, it was determined that some of the judgment documents contained errors regarding sentences, which the court directed to be corrected. Overall, the court upheld the significant portions of Padillow's convictions while addressing some procedural errors related to his contempt citation and record-keeping in the judgments.
In OCCA case No. RE-2014-96, Blackwell appealed his conviction for Child Abuse. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of Blackwell's suspended sentence but remanded the case to determine whether Blackwell is entitled to credit for time served as a Youthful Offender. One member of the court dissented. Blackwell was charged with First Degree Rape but later pleaded guilty to Child Abuse, and his sentence was delayed for five years on probation. After violating several terms of his probation, the state requested to revoke his suspended sentence. Blackwell claimed that the court did not have the right to revoke his sentence because he argued he was a youthful offender and that his adult conviction was improper. The court explained that the appeal focused on if the revocation was valid rather than the underlying conviction's correctness. Blackwell’s claims related to his conviction need to be addressed through a different legal process, not this appeal. The court also pointed out that issues about the correctness of laws mentioned in the documents were not within their authority to correct in this appeal. Additionally, Blackwell argued that his entire sentence revocation was too harsh. However, the court mentioned that breaking even a single probation rule is enough to revoke the suspended sentence. Finally, Blackwell maintained he should get credit for the days he spent under juvenile custody, and the court agreed to look into this matter further, sending the case back for clarification on this issue. They affirmed the revocation overall but allowed for the investigation into how much credit Blackwell should receive.
In OCCA case No. S-2014-564, Christopher Knight appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance (methamphetamine). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's decision to suppress the evidence found during the search. One judge dissented. Christopher Knight was walking late at night in Ardmore, Oklahoma, when an officer saw him and decided to approach him. The officer, who was still in training, had been told by his supervisor to check on people out late at night. The officer stopped in front of Knight and asked if he could talk to him. Knight agreed to talk, and during their conversation, the officer asked if he could search Knight, to which Knight also said yes. However, the officer later admitted that Knight was not doing anything wrong at the time and there was no good reason for stopping him. Knight argued that the way the officer stopped him made him feel like he had to talk and that he was not free to leave. The court needed to decide if Knight was stopped in a way that violated his rights. The court found that it was not clear that Knight's encounter with the officer was truly voluntary. The State needed to show that Knight felt free to walk away, but there was no evidence that he could easily avoid the officer. Because of this, the court agreed with the trial judge that the evidence collected during the search should not be used against Knight. As a result, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling to suppress the evidence and ordered the case to go back for more proceedings, as long as they followed the decision made. One judge disagreed with this decision, believing that the officer should not be blamed for simply talking to Knight.
In OCCA case No. M-2013-1049, Wilson appealed his conviction for Domestic Abuse Assault and Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. One judge dissented. Wilson was charged with Domestic Abuse Assault and Battery in 2012. In February 2013, after a trial without a jury, he was found guilty. The judge sentenced him to one year in jail, with thirty days to be served, and imposed a $500 fine. Wilson challenged his conviction by raising several issues, including that he was not properly informed about his right to a jury trial and that he did not knowingly waive that right. The court found that there was no valid waiver of Wilson's right to a jury trial in the court record. They explained that for a waiver to be valid, the defendant must clearly understand what they are giving up. Since there were no documents or transcripts showing that Wilson knew about his right to a jury trial or chose to waive it, the court ruled that there was fundamental error. The majority opinion concluded by reversing Wilson's conviction and ordering a new trial because of the issues surrounding the jury trial waiver. One judge disagreed and believed that the record showed Wilson had been properly informed about his rights and that he had made a competent choice to proceed with a bench trial. However, the majority decision carried the ruling, leading to a new trial for Wilson.
In OCCA case No. F-2014-3, Edwin Jermaine Daniels appealed his conviction for several serious crimes including burglary, robbery, kidnapping, and assault. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm most of the trial court's decisions but did vacate some of the fines associated with his sentences. One judge dissented. During the trial, Daniels was found guilty of multiple counts connected to violent crimes he committed with a co-defendant. The judge sentenced him to a total of many years in prison and imposed fines for each count. Daniels raised several issues on appeal, arguing that there were mistakes made during his trial that affected the fairness of the process. First, he claimed that the jury instructions were confusing and reduced the State’s burden to prove guilt. The court found that since there were no objections to the instructions during the trial, they did not affect the trial's result. Second, Daniels objected to being told the fines were mandatory, but the court found that this was also a mistake that the State admitted to; thus, the fines were removed for certain counts. He also claimed prosecutorial misconduct, arguing that comments made by the prosecutor during the trial unfairly influenced the jury. The court ruled that these comments did not significantly change the trial's outcome. Daniels further contended that he did not receive effective legal assistance. The court concluded that his lawyer's performance did not meet a standard of failure that would have changed the trial's result. In the end, while the court affirmed the convictions, it removed the fines that were wrongly imposed, ensuring that Daniel's rights were respected where the trial process fell short.
In OCCA case No. J-2014-980, the Appellant appealed his conviction for Lewd or Indecent Acts to a Child Under 16. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate the order adjudicating him as a delinquent child due to the lack of sufficient evidence that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a trial by jury. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2013-732, Bryan Thomas Delaney appealed his conviction for Escape from a Penal Institution and Resisting Arrest. In a published decision, the court decided to modify his sentence for post-imprisonment supervision but upheld the rest of his conviction. One member of the court dissented. Delaney was found guilty by a jury after a trial where he faced charges for escaping a jail and resisting the police. As a result of these charges, he was sentenced to 18 years in prison for the escape and 1 year in the county jail for the resisting arrest. The judge also ordered him to have 2 years of supervision after his prison time. Delaney argued that he was treated unfairly during the sentencing. He felt that the jury was wrongly told that his previous felony convictions could lead to a harsher sentence. However, he did not raise this issue during the trial, which made it harder for him to win the appeal. The court found that his past crimes were separate incidents and did not fall under the rules for counting prior offenses. Delaney also claimed that his lawyer did not do a good job because they did not challenge the jury instruction about the prior convictions. For his appeal to be successful on this point, he needed to show that his lawyer's mistakes really changed the outcome of his trial. The court decided that, since the jury's instruction was appropriate, his lawyer's actions did not affect his case. Finally, the court noted that while neither side pointed it out, Delaney was sentenced to longer supervision than what the law allows. They corrected this by reducing the supervision time to just 1 year. In summary, the court made some changes to Delaney's post-prison supervision but agreed with the rest of his sentencing and conviction. The decision was mostly upheld, and only one part was changed to be in line with the law.
In OCCA case No. RE-2013-1027, Justin Michael Jay appealed his conviction for Forgery in the Second Degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand the case for corrections. One judge dissented. Justin Michael Jay was in trouble with the law and had a suspended sentence, which means he wouldn’t have to serve time in jail if he followed the rules. He had pleaded guilty to forgery and was given a suspended sentence of five years, but he had to spend the first 30 days in jail. However, things changed when he was accused of breaking the rules of his probation. The State, which is the side that brings charges, said that Jay did not pay the money he owed for supervision, restitution (the money owed to victims), and court costs. They also noted that Jay was charged with more crimes: Domestic Abuse and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Because of these new charges and failures to pay, the State asked the court to revoke Jay's suspended sentence. The court held a hearing to discuss Jay's situation. After listening to the evidence and arguments, the judge decided to revoke the rest of Jay's suspended sentence. This meant that Jay would have to serve the time he had left, which was almost five years. Later, the court filed a document that said Jay was revoked for 4 years and 335 days, and that he would have to be supervised after getting out of jail. Jay appealed this decision, arguing two main points. First, he claimed that the amount of time the judge revoked was wrong because he should have received credit for more days served when he was part of a special program for youthful offenders. Both Jay and the State agreed on this point, saying he should have been credited for 183 days instead of just 30. Therefore, they asked to change the revocation time to 4 years and 182 days. The second point Jay argued was that the court did not have the authority to order him to be under supervision after finishing his time in jail because the law about that only applies to those who were sentenced after November 1, 2012. Since Jay's original guilty plea and sentencing were before that date, the judge should not have included that supervision requirement. In the end, the court agreed with Jay on both points. They reversed the judgment that included the incorrect time and the unnecessary supervision requirement. They ordered the lower court to make the corrections and update the documents accordingly.
In OCCA case No. RE-2013-848, a person appealed his conviction for attempting to make methamphetamine. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the trial court did not have the authority to revoke the person's suspended sentence because the hearing on the revocation was not held within the required twenty days. The court reversed the revocation and sent the case back for further actions. One judge dissented from this opinion.
In OCCA case No. F-2013-668, Aaron M. Holmes appealed his conviction for Possessing A Firearm After Felony Conviction. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify his sentence. One judge dissented. Aaron M. Holmes was found guilty by a jury for having a gun after previously being convicted of felonies. The jury sentenced him to life in prison and a fine of $10,000. Holmes appealed the conviction, stating several reasons he believed the trial was unfair. He argued that the prosecutor made mistakes by asking the jury to think about evidence from the first part of the trial in later parts. He also claimed his lawyer didn't help him well and that the jury was unfairly influenced by information about his past sentences, leading to a harsh punishment. The jury did clear Holmes of two other charges related to robbery and assault. During the court's review, it was found that the prosecutor was correct in including evidence from the earlier stages of the trial when discussing Holmes's situation. Because Holmes did not raise this concern during the trial, he could not challenge it fully on appeal. Concerning Holmes's claim about the prosecutor mentioning his past sentences, the court found that this was indeed a mistake since it could affect how the jury decided on his punishment. Because the jury opted for the maximum sentence possible, the court modified Holmes's punishment from life in prison to 30 years. As for the argument about the lawyer, the court decided it didn't make sense to say the lawyer was ineffective since the earlier issue was found not to be an actual error. Thus, this part of Holmes's appeal was denied. The court ultimately decided to keep the conviction but changed the length of the prison sentence to be less than what was initially given.
In OCCA case No. J-2014-326, J.L. appealed his conviction for Assault with a Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Dangerous Weapon on School Property. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm J.L.’s adjudication of delinquency. One judge dissented. The case began when a petition was filed against J.L. on August 16, 2013, highlighting the two charges. The lower court found J.L. delinquent on April 8, 2014. J.L. argued that the evidence was not enough to show that he intended to harm someone. He also claimed that there wasn’t proof that the knife he had was indeed a dangerous weapon against school rules and that the judge acted like a prosecutor instead of remaining neutral. The court looked at the evidence closely. They needed to see if any reasonable person could find J.L. guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite some conflicting testimony about the events, the evidence presented was enough to support the conclusion that J.L. committed an assault with a dangerous weapon. Regarding J.L.'s second point about the knife, the court determined that photographs provided were adequate to prove that it was a prohibited weapon on school grounds. In the third argument, J.L. said the judge did not stay neutral when he handled the knife in court. The judge asked someone to bring in the knife and then had J.L. confirm that the knife shown was similar to his. Since J.L. didn’t object to this during the trial, he could not complain about it later unless he could prove it was a serious mistake. The court explained that J.L. had to show that there was a real error that changed the outcome of the case. Since he couldn’t show this, the court decided not to take action on his claims. Ultimately, the court upheld the lower court's decision that J.L. was delinquent for the charges against him. The opinion concluded with directions for the lower court to adjust one of the charges to a lesser offense.
In OCCA case No. F-2012-1029, Dustin Kyle Martin appealed his conviction for Second Degree Felony Murder and Accessory to Second Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Martin's conviction for Second Degree Felony Murder but reversed the conviction for Accessory to Second Degree Murder, with instructions to dismiss that count. One judge dissented regarding the classification of being a principal and an accessory to the same crime. Martin was found guilty of both murder and being an accessory, which raised questions about whether one person can be convicted of both for the same crime. The court explained that under Oklahoma law, a person involved in a crime can be considered either a principal or an accessory, but cannot be both for the same offense. The trial court made an error by allowing the accessory charge to remain when Martin was already convicted of murder. During the trial, Martin's lawyers pointed out that he was convicted as a principal for the murder, so being convicted as an accessory to the same murder didn't make sense legally. The prosecution agreed that this was an error. Thus, the court decided to reverse the accessory conviction but kept the murder conviction intact. Martin also argued that there were many other problems during the trial, including mistakes in the jury instructions and the admission of prejudicial evidence, but the court found that these issues either did not affect the verdict or were harmless errors. The judges considered everything and concluded that the conviction for felony murder was supported by enough evidence, while the evidence wasn’t sufficient to support him being an accessory. In summary, the final decision of the court affirmed the murder conviction, while the accessory conviction was dismissed.
In OCCA case No. C-2013-1046, Ronald Franz appealed his conviction for Accessory After the Fact to Shooting with Intent to Kill. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant his petition for writ of certiorari and remanded the case to the district court for a proper hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. S-2013-790, the State of Oklahoma appealed the conviction of Fowler for Domestic Assault and Battery in the Presence of a Minor. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to uphold the ruling of the trial court, which prohibited the testimony about another incident of domestic violence involving Fowler and his former girlfriend. One judge dissented. Here's a summary of the case. Fowler was charged with domestic violence against his wife, Andrea, in front of their young son. Before the trial, the State wanted to use evidence of past violent behavior by Fowler to strengthen their case. They aimed to show that Fowler had a pattern of violent actions, including a similar incident against a former girlfriend, Terri East, and another against Andrea in the past. However, the trial court allowed some evidence but ultimately decided that the specific incident involving Terri East could not be used in court. The court ruled this evidence was not relevant enough to help prove the current case against Fowler. The judge felt that bringing in this past incident would unfairly bias the jury against Fowler without directly connecting it to the charges at hand. The State argued that the evidence would show a pattern of behavior and that Fowler's actions were not accidental. However, the court found that the two incidents weren't closely related enough to justify including the evidence about Terri East. The court based its decision on legal standards that say other crimes cannot be used simply to paint a bad picture of a person's character. In the end, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, supporting the idea that each case should be proven based on the evidence directly related to the charges, rather than on past actions that might suggest a person is guilty. The case concluded with the court ruling in favor of Fowler, maintaining the exclusion of the evidence against him.
In OCCA case No. F-2012-703, Heather Ann Jones appealed her conviction for Second Degree Murder, Robbery Committed by Two or More Persons, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, and Child Neglect. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction for Robbery but otherwise affirmed the Judgment and Sentence from the District Court. One judge dissented. Heather Ann Jones was found guilty after a jury trial in Sequoyah County. The jury sentenced her to fifteen years for Second Degree Murder, five years for Robbery, a fine for Conspiracy to Commit Robbery, and one year in jail for Child Neglect, with all sentences running at the same time. Jones raised several issues on appeal. First, she questioned whether there was enough evidence to support her convictions. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's decisions, as it showed that Jones knew her accomplices intended to commit robbery. Even though initially the victim let them in, it was shown that they used deception to gain entry, which made their actions unlawful. Second, Jones argued that it was wrong for the trial court to allow testimony about her behavior during a TV interview after her daughter was shot. The court found that while the video of the interview was inadmissible, the investigator’s testimony about her demeanor did not count as hearsay and did not unfairly affect the trial. Jones also claimed that statements made by a witness to the police were wrongly admitted, claiming it deprived her of a fair trial. Despite the admission being deemed an error, the court ruled that since the witness testified in court about the same things, the error did not impact the outcome significantly. Jones's objection to some character evidence used against her related to her behavior following her daughter’s shooting was dismissed, as the court believed it directly supported the charge of Child Neglect. She also argued that being convicted for both Robbery and Second Degree Murder was unfairly punishing her twice for the same act. The court agreed, finding that the acts were part of the same crime, so they reversed her conviction for Robbery. In terms of ineffective assistance of counsel, Jones claimed her lawyer should have objected to several pieces of evidence, including the TV interview, police statements, and character evidence. The court ruled that her lawyer's performance did not prejudicially affect the outcome because the decisions were matters of which objections would not have made a difference. Finally, Jones asked for a review of all issues together, hoping that their combined impact on her trial would show that she did not receive a fair trial. However, the court found the errors were not enough to change the outcome. Overall, the court reversed Jones's conviction for Robbery but affirmed the rest of her convictions and sentences.
In OCCA case No. RE-2012-1043, Phillip Wade Barton appealed his conviction for violating probation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the revocation of his ten-year suspended sentence. No one dissented. Phillip Wade Barton had originally pled guilty to trying to make a controlled substance and was given a ten-year suspended sentence in 2010. This meant he wouldn't go to prison, but he had to follow certain rules. In May 2011, he got in trouble again for trying to make a controlled substance, which led the state to ask for his probation to be revoked. In October 2012, a hearing took place to see if Barton really broke the rules of his probation. The state presented only one piece of evidence, which was a document showing that Barton had pleaded guilty to the new crime. However, this document did not prove that he violated his probation since the new crime's judgment was not final. The court stated that for the state to revoke a suspended sentence due to a new crime, they either need to show that the new crime's conviction is final or prove each part of the new crime. Since the state did not provide the necessary evidence, the court agreed with Barton and decided to reverse the revocation of his suspended sentence. They sent the case back to the lower court to make sure everything was handled correctly.
In OCCA case No. S-2013-687, the appellant appealed his conviction for DUI manslaughter. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling, stating that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the appellant's actions were the direct cause of the victim's death. Two justices dissented from the decision. The case involved an incident that took place on October 11, 2012, when the appellee was charged with first-degree manslaughter. This charge stemmed from the accidental death of his wife, Linda Vaughan, while he was driving under the influence of alcohol. During the preliminary hearing, it was revealed that Vaughan was intoxicated, with a blood alcohol level of .14, and that his wife had exited the truck he was driving. She was killed when he accidentally ran over her. Vaughan argued that the state's evidence failed to show that his driving while intoxicated was the direct cause of Linda's death. Testimony from a highway patrolman indicated that while Vaughan may have been more aware of his surroundings if he were sober, Linda's death would have occurred regardless of his intoxication. The court examined whether the state had presented enough evidence to prove that the appellee's actions directly caused the victim's death. They found that the evidence showed Linda made the choice to leave the vehicle and that her death was caused by her own actions, not by the appellee's impaired driving. Because there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of DUI manslaughter, the court upheld the decision of the lower court, which had granted Vaughan's demurrer, meaning they did not find probable cause to believe a crime had been committed. In the end, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that the evidence was not strong enough to support the charge against Vaughan. The decision did not minimize the tragedy of the accident but emphasized the importance of concrete evidence in such cases.
In OCCA case No. F-2013-36, Jasper appealed his conviction for Conspiracy, Kidnapping, Attempted First Degree Rape, and First Degree Robbery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm Jasper's convictions but modify the sentence for First Degree Robbery. One judge dissented. Jasper was found guilty by a jury of four serious crimes. For Conspiracy, he was sentenced to ten years and fined $5,000. For Kidnapping, he received a 20-year sentence. Attempted Rape meant he was sentenced to 22.5 years, and for First Degree Robbery, he was given ten years. The sentences were supposed to be served one after the other, which made his total time in prison very long. Jasper raised several arguments on why he thought his convictions should be changed. He argued that the evidence didn't prove he was part of a conspiracy to commit rape, meaning there wasn't enough proof of an agreement to commit a crime. He also claimed that he shouldn't have been punished for both Kidnapping and Attempted Rape because they were connected to the same act. He believed this meant he faced double punishment for the same offense, which should not happen. Regarding his robbery conviction, Jasper contended that he shouldn't be punished for it because of double jeopardy, a rule that stops someone from being tried for the same crime twice. He also claimed the judge made a mistake when telling the jury about the sentence they could give him for robbery, which he believed went against his rights. Another argument was that some evidence presented during the trial wasn't fair and made him look bad but was not relevant to the case. He asserted that a lot of hearsay evidence was introduced that made his trial unfair and that his lawyer didn’t help him properly. After review, the court found that Jasper's conviction for Conspiracy was supported enough by evidence for the jury to make its decision. They ruled that the convictions for Kidnapping and Attempted Rape were also valid because they were considered separate crimes, meaning he could be punished for both. The claim of double jeopardy concerning his robbery conviction was rejected because the crimes he committed had different elements, making each punishment lawful. When it came to the sentencing instructions for First Degree Robbery, the court recognized a clear error since the jury was told wrong information about the possible sentence. They found that the minimum prison term should have been five years instead of ten. Because of this mistake, Jasper’s sentence for First Degree Robbery was modified. Other claims by Jasper about unfair evidence and the effectiveness of his lawyer did not convince the court to overturn his other convictions. The court believed that, aside from the sentencing issue, his trial was fair overall. At the end, the court kept Jasper’s convictions for Conspiracy, Kidnapping, and Attempted First Degree Rape as they were but changed his sentence for First Degree Robbery to five years. Thus, the court’s decision was mostly in favor of maintaining the original verdict and just correcting the sentencing issue.
In OCCA case No. RE-2012-1076, Stacy Gene Bellis appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the revocation of his suspended sentence. One judge dissented. Stacy Gene Bellis had originally pled guilty to Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon and was sentenced to twelve years, with part of the sentence being suspended if he completed a drug treatment program. However, the State then accused Bellis of breaking the rules of his suspended sentence by committing new crimes. A hearing was held to decide the State's accusations. The judge reviewed evidence from a separate trial Bellis had regarding new charges against him. The judge used this evidence to justify revoking Bellis's suspended sentence. Bellis appealed this decision, arguing that it was wrong for the judge to use evidence from his other trial without his agreement. The court agreed with Bellis, stating that it was not proper to take evidence from one case and use it in another without the defendant's permission. As a result, the court reversed the decision to revoke Bellis's suspended sentence and instructed for a new hearing to take place, where proper evidence should be presented. No other actions were ordered, and the judges involved agreed to this outcome, except for one who had a different opinion.
In OCCA case No. F-2011-962, Jonas Alan Thornton appealed his conviction for Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse Thornton's conviction and remand the case for a new trial due to concerns over the impartiality of the trial judge. One judge dissented. Thornton was convicted after a non-jury trial where the judge was someone he had previously consulted while looking for legal advice regarding the case against him. The incident occurred in January 2010 when Thornton allegedly fired a handgun into a house. After being arrested, he spoke with the judge, who was not in his judge role at that time. Later, the judge was elected and presided over Thornton’s trial. During the appeal, Thornton claimed that the judge should have recused himself because of their prior interaction, which could influence how the judge viewed the case. The court found that the judge failed to follow rules requiring him to step aside, which led to a decision that Thornton did not receive a fair trial. The court stated that even though Thornton did not directly ask for the judge to disqualify himself at the time, this did not eliminate the obligation for the judge to recognize a conflict of interest. The relationship between Thornton and the judge meant that the fairness of the trial could be doubted. As a result, the court ruled that Thornton's conviction needed to be reversed, and he would get a new trial. This decision effectively set aside the earlier trial's results and meant that any further claims Thornton made concerning his representation or other trial aspects were not addressed since the focus was on the impartiality of the judge.
In OCCA case No. F-2013-11, James Earl Darton appealed his conviction for first degree murder, possession of a firearm after a felony conviction, and domestic assault and battery. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Darton's convictions and sentences while modifying the sentence for the domestic assault and battery charge. One judge dissented. Darton was found guilty of killing Kimberly Ragland, who was found shot in her car. Prior to her death, Ragland had a tumultuous relationship with Darton, which included a previous altercation that led her to seek a protective order against him. This protective order prohibited Darton from being near her, which he violated on the night of the murder. On that night, after a fight where Darton hit Ragland and used a stun gun on her, she was later taken away by Darton, where her murder occurred. Darton was arrested and claimed he had left with a different person. The jury found him guilty based on evidence presented during the trial, including his motive for killing Ragland due to financial loss from the protective order. In his appeal, Darton raised several issues. First, he argued that the sentence for domestic assault was improperly increased based on a law that was not applicable at the time of his offense. The court agreed that this was indeed an error and reduced his sentence for that charge. He also claimed evidence of his drug dealing should not have been allowed during the trial. However, the court found that this evidence was relevant to show Darton’s motive to murder Ragland since her protective order affected his ability to sell drugs. Lastly, Darton asserted that he did not have competent legal representation during his trial. The court reviewed his claims about his lawyer’s performance and ultimately decided that his attorney’s actions were part of a reasonable strategy and did not significantly harm Darton's case. Overall, the court affirmed most of the lower court's judgments but corrected the sentence related to the domestic assault charge.
In OCCA case No. S-2013-315, David Johns appealed his conviction for larceny. In a published decision, the court decided that a trial court cannot modify the terms and conditions of a negotiated deferred judgment without the consent of the State. The case involved Johns, who had entered a guilty plea and was placed on deferred judgment for five years. He filed a motion to change the terms of his deferred judgment, and the trial court agreed to shorten it and dismiss the case, which the State appealed. The court explained that under current laws, the trial court does not have the authority to shorten the deferment period once a plea agreement is in place. This ruling was made to prevent issues that could discourage prosecutors from agreeing to deferred judgments in the future. The court emphasized that any changes to the terms of a deferred judgment must follow statutory guidelines, and the trial court may only act when the conditions are met at the end of the deferment period. It upheld the idea that modifying an agreement without proper authority is not allowed. Therefore, the original decision to cut Johns' probation short was not supported by the law. The court's answer to the reserved question of law confirmed that the trial court was not authorized to cut short the period of deferment after the terms of the plea agreement had been established. #n dissented.
In OCCA case No. F-2012-545, Jimmy Dale Stone appealed his conviction for lewd molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand his convictions for a new trial. One judge dissented. Jimmy was found guilty by a jury on several counts of lewd molestation involving children. He was sentenced to a total of eight years in prison, with some of the sentences running one after the other and one running at the same time as another. He had to serve a majority of his sentence before he could be considered for parole. On appeal, Jimmy raised several important points. He argued that the judge didn’t explain all the important parts of the law about lewd molestation to the jury. He believed the evidence used against him wasn’t enough to prove he had done anything wrong. He claimed that the jury was influenced by people who talked about the case before it started. He felt he was not given a fair chance at trial because of things the prosecutor said about the victims. Also, he said he should have had money for an expert witness to help prove his side. He believed that presenting other crimes as evidence was unfair. Finally, he argued that all these mistakes together affected the fairness of his trial. The main issue that the court found was a big mistake in how the jury was instructed about the law. There are specific things that must be proven to convict someone of lewd molestation. To be found guilty, it must be shown that the defendant knowingly did something wrong and that they intended to do it. This was not explained correctly to the jury during the trial. The court found that some parts of the legal instructions given did not include important elements needed to prove the case. Although there was an argument about whether this error was harmful, the court decided it was serious enough to affect the outcome of the trial. They concluded that omitting the requirement that the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally could have changed how the jury viewed the evidence and questions raised during the trial. Since the evidence against him was not overwhelming enough to guarantee he was guilty regardless of these instructions, the decision was made to reverse the conviction. Because of this significant error, the court said that Jimmy should get a new trial where the jury would be properly instructed on the law. The other issues he raised in his appeal were not discussed because the main error already warranted a new trial.
In OCCA case No. F-2012-1126, Kevon Andra McLaren appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and conspiracy to commit robbery with a firearm, among other charges. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse one of the counts of kidnapping while affirming the other convictions. One judge dissented. In the case, McLaren was found guilty of several serious crimes, including robbery, kidnapping, and shooting with intent to kill. The court focused on multiple offenses he committed against several people, determining that some of the convictions did not violate laws against double punishment because they were for different acts against different victims. However, they found one of the kidnapping charges was too similar to a robbery charge; thus, they reversed that particular conviction. Additionally, McLaren challenged the trial court’s decision to order restitution, claiming it did not follow proper procedures. However, the court ruled that he did not raise this issue correctly and that there was enough evidence to support the restitution ordered for the victims. Overall, while the court reversed one conviction, most of McLaren's convictions and sentences were upheld.