S-2019-242

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In OCCA case No. S-2019-242, the State of Oklahoma appealed Wesley Warren Peritt Weaver, II's conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Child Under 12. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's ruling that denied the State's request to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior sexual offenses as propensity evidence. One judge dissented. This case started on January 5, 2017, when the defendant, Weaver, was charged with sexually abusing his daughter, A.W., from 2011 to 2016. During a preliminary hearing, A.W. claimed that her father abused her and shared this information with her mother. The case involved testimonies from both A.W.'s mother and a forensic interviewer who assessed A.W. The State later sought to present evidence of previous sexual offenses allegedly committed by Weaver against another child, A.A., to demonstrate a pattern of behavior. A.A. testified that Weaver had molested her several years earlier. However, during a hearing, the trial court decided not to allow this evidence, stating that its probative value was less than the potential for unfair prejudice against Weaver. The State of Oklahoma appealed this ruling. They argued that the trial court made an error in not permitting the sexual propensity evidence, which could provide context for Weaver's behavior in the current case. The appellate court looked closely at the details of the case and the rules surrounding the admissibility of such evidence. Ultimately, the appellate court ruled to affirm the trial court's decision, meaning that the prior offense evidence would not be allowed during the trial against Weaver. The court concluded that the trial court's decision was reasonable and did not abuse its discretion. They found solid reasoning in the trial court's assessment of the evidence's relevance versus its potential negative impact on the jury's perception. One judge disagreed with the majority opinion, believing that the trial court had not fully considered the nuances of the sexual propensity laws and had conflated different types of evidentiary standards. This dissenting opinion emphasized the importance of acknowledging the differences between types of evidence when it comes to sexual offenses. In short, the case involved serious allegations against Weaver regarding his daughter, and while the State attempted to build a strong case by including prior incidents, the court ultimately felt that allowing such evidence would not be appropriate during the trial.

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C-2018-679

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It appears that you've shared a document detailing a legal opinion from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denying a writ of certiorari for petitioner Jerry Ray Hawkins. He was appealing his convictions related to exhibiting obscene material to minors, procuring child pornography, and lewd acts, asserting that his guilty pleas were not made knowingly, that he did not receive conflict-free counsel, and that his sentence was excessive. Here’s a summary of the main points covered in the opinion: ### Case Overview: - **Petitioner**: Jerry Ray Hawkins - **Charges**: Multiple counts including Exhibiting Obscene Material to a Minor, Procuring Child Pornography, and Lewd Acts. - **Sentencing**: Total of twenty years for some charges and ten years for others, with certain counts running concurrently and others consecutively. ### Key Legal Issues Raised by Petitioner: 1. **Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas**: Hawkins argued he should be allowed to withdraw his pleas because they were not made knowingly or voluntarily, claiming that he was misled by his attorney regarding potential plea agreements. 2. **Ineffective Assistance of Counsel**: He claimed that the failure to appoint conflict-free counsel during the plea withdrawal hearing resulted in inadequate legal representation. 3. **Excessive Sentence**: He contended that the aggregate sentence was excessive for the charges he pleaded to. ### Court's Findings: - **Proposition I (Withdrawal of Pleas)**: The court found that Hawkins had waived his right to argue that his pleas were not knowing and voluntary by failing to raise it during his motion to withdraw. Therefore, this claim was denied. - **Proposition II (Ineffective Assistance of Counsel)**: The court concluded that there was no actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's performance, as Hawkins did not accuse his plea counsel of misconduct. Therefore, this claim was also denied. - **Proposition III (Excessive Sentence)**: The court noted that Hawkins similarly failed to raise this issue during the appropriate proceedings, resulting in a waiver of his excessive sentence claim. ### Conclusion: The court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court, concluding that no legal grounds existed to warrant relief. #### Final Notes: Petitioner’s appeals were denied on all fronts, with the court emphasizing the need for claims to be preserved at the trial level to be considered on appeal. If you have any specific questions or need further analysis regarding this case or related legal concepts, feel free to ask!

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C-2018-698

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The text you provided is a legal summary opinion from the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma, regarding the case of Joe Saucedo Guerrero. The opinion details the background of the case, the pleas entered by the petitioner, the subsequent motion to withdraw those pleas, and the court's final decision denying the petitioner's request for relief. Here is a breakdown of the main points: 1. **Case Background**: - Joe Saucedo Guerrero pled guilty to multiple charges including Lewd or Indecent Proposal to a Child, Soliciting a Minor for Indecent Exposure/Photos, and Possession of Child Pornography. - He was sentenced to a total of twenty years for the first seven counts and five years for the eighth count, with all sentences running consecutively. 2. **Motion to Withdraw Plea**: - Guerrero filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas shortly after sentencing, claiming his pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily, misunderstanding of the charges, ineffective assistance from his counsel, and that the sentences were excessive. - The judge denied this motion after a hearing where Guerrero was the only witness. 3. **Propositions of Error**: - The court examined Guerrero's arguments which included claims of inadequate factual basis for the pleas, ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the sentences were excessive. - The court found that Guerrero had waived some claims due to failure to raise them properly in his motion or during the hearing. 4. **Court's Findings**: - The court held that Guerrero's pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily, especially since he had been informed of all charges and had signed a plea form acknowledging them. - The court found no evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel that warranted the withdrawal of his plea. - The court concluded that the sentences imposed were within statutory limits and not excessive. 5. **Final Decision**: - The court denied Guerrero's petition for certiorari and affirmed the district court's judgment and sentence. This summary captures the critical elements of the judicial opinion and reflects the legal reasoning utilized by the court in reaching its conclusion.

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C-2017-271

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**IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA** **JUSTON DEAN COX,** *Petitioner,* **v.** **STATE OF OKLAHOMA,** *Respondent.* **FILED** *DEC 14 2017* **SUMMARY OPINION GRANTING CERTIORARI IN PART AND REMANDING THE CASE TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL** **LUMPKIN, PRESIDING JUDGE:** Petitioner Juston Dean Cox was charged in the District Court of McIntosh County on August 23, 2005, with Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies (Case No. CF-2005-152A). An Amended Information filed on November 28, 2005, added ten additional counts of Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property. Petitioner was bound over for trial on five counts after the Preliminary Hearing on November 30, 2005, and trial was set for April 17, 2006. Subsequently, charges were filed against Petitioner for Escape from a County Jail and Destruction of a Public Building (Case No. CF-2005-172A) on September 19, 2005, followed by additional charges for Escape from a Penal Institution on January 5, 2006 (Case No. CF-2006-04) and January 26, 2006 (Case No. CF-2006-14). On January 26, 2006, Petitioner entered into negotiated guilty pleas for all four cases, resulting in concurrent sentences of thirty years. On February 6, 2006, Petitioner filed a request to withdraw his plea. A hearing was held on March 23, 2006, where the trial court denied his request. Petitioner filed Applications for Post-Conviction Relief on August 13, 2014, and June 9, 2016, leading to a hearing on December 1, 2016, where the trial court recommended allowing Petitioner an appeal out of time. This Court granted that request on January 6, 2017, and appointed counsel to represent the Petitioner. At the March 9, 2017, hearing to discuss the motion to withdraw, it was established that counsel had not prepared a formal motion for withdrawal. Petitioner was not actively represented during this critical hearing, as his plea counsel took no part in the proceedings despite being present. The court did not adequately address the lack of representation or question Petitioner regarding his rights to counsel. A criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel at a motion to withdraw hearing (Carey v. State, 1995 OK CR 55). The court's failure to appoint conflict-free counsel and its allowance for Petitioner to proceed without adequate representation constituted a violation of his constitutional rights. Given that Petitioner raised claims regarding the voluntariness of his plea, the harmless error doctrine does not apply. Accordingly, we find marginal grounds to question the diligence of prior representations and affirm that this situation merits careful reconsideration. **DECISION** Certiorari is granted in part. The order of the district court denying Petitioner's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is *REVERSED* and the case is remanded to the District Court for *APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL* to evaluate whether to further pursue the withdrawal of the guilty pleas. *MANDATE to be issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.* **APPEARANCES IN DISTRICT COURT** **COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER:** Ariel Parry **COUNSEL FOR THE STATE:** Thomas C. Giulioni, Mike Hunter (Attorney General), O.R. Barris III, Gregory Stidham (Assistant District Attorneys), Jay Schniederjan (Assistant Attorney General) *OPINION BY: LUMPKIN, P.J. LEWIS, V.P.J.: Concur in Results HUDSON, J.: Concur KUEHN, J.: Concur ROWLAND, J.: Concur* [Click Here To Download PDF](https://opinions.wirthlawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/C-2017-271_1733992184.pdf)

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RE-2013-939

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In OCCA case No. RE-2013-939, Quinton Blake Richardson appealed his conviction for larceny of merchandise from a retailer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the order that revoked a part of his suspended sentence based on a conflict of interest involving his attorney. One judge dissented. Mr. Richardson had originally entered a guilty plea to stealing items worth over $500 from a Wal-Mart and was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment, which was suspended under probation. However, he later faced a motion to revoke his suspended sentence. This motion claimed he violated his probation with new charges in Kansas for threatening and hitting a person, as well as failing drug tests. During the revocation hearing, Mr. Richardson's attorney had previously represented the victim in his case, which created a conflict of interest. The victim testified against Mr. Richardson, and the court judged that this situation affected how well Mr. Richardson was defended. The court emphasized that if a lawyer has a conflict of interest that harms their representation, the defendant may have their case overturned. Therefore, since the court believed Mr. Richardson did not get the fair help he needed because of the attorney's former relationship with the victim, they decided to reverse the revocation of his sentence and sent the case back for further proceedings. Additionally, the court found that other issues raised by Mr. Richardson about paperwork errors were not necessary to address further because of the main reversal decision. Overall, this case highlighted the importance of fair legal representation and how conflicts of interest can lead to wrong decisions in court.

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F-2012-1014

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In OCCA case No. F-2012-1014, David Lynn Fleming appealed his conviction for Breaking and Entering, Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Methamphetamine and Marijuana), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions but modified the sentence for the Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance to thirty years. One judge dissented regarding the modification of the sentence. Fleming was tried and found guilty of breaking into a home and possessing illegal drugs. The jury gave him a total of fifty years in prison for one count of drug possession. The main arguments in his appeal focused on whether he was punished too harshly for one act, issues with how the trial was conducted, and improper influences on the jury. The court found some merit in his claims about the evidence presented but ultimately upheld his convictions, changing only the sentence for drug possession based on a legal error made during the trial.

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F-2007-638

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In OCCA case No. F-2007-638, Watson appealed his conviction for multiple drug-related offenses. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse some of his convictions, modify others, and rescind certain fines. One judge dissented. Watson was found guilty of trafficking in illegal drugs, possession of a firearm during a felony, and other charges. He was sentenced to many years in prison, with his sentences running one after another. Watson argued that the search warrant used to search his home was not valid, that he was unfairly tried for multiple offenses that seemed to be the same crime, that he had been treated unfairly during the trial, and that he didn’t have good representation from his attorney. The court looked closely at the evidence and found that the warrant to search his home was valid. They noticed that the charges for drug trafficking should not have occurred at the same time for methamphetamine and cocaine since this counted as double punishment for one act. Therefore, they decided to reverse that conviction. They also reversed the conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun because it was tied to the same act as possessing a firearm during the crime. The court agreed there was enough evidence to support his convictions for having a firearm during a felony and for concealing stolen property. They noted that while the prosecutor made a small mistake during their closing argument, it was unlikely that it would change the outcome of the case since the evidence against Watson was strong. Watson's convictions were modified, which means his sentences were reduced. The court overturned specific unfair fines and affirmed the remaining charges, stating that the changes would not shock anyone’s sense of fairness. The judges believed the final combined sentence still made sense and was fair. In conclusion, while the court made changes to Watson’s convictions and sentences, they found most of the trial's foundation to be reasonable, ensuring that these decisions aligned with the law. The case will return to the lower court to fix some details in line with the appellate court's ruling.

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J-2004-1117

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In OCCA case No. J-2004-1117, the appellant appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder and three counts of Assault with Intent to Kill. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the denial of the appellant's request to be certified as a Youthful Offender but reversed the decision regarding the Assault charges, allowing those to be tried as a Youthful Offender. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant was charged as an adult with serious crimes, including murder. The appellant wanted to be treated as a Youthful Offender, which would mean he could receive rehabilitation instead of severe punishment. A special judge conducted hearings to decide if the appellant could be certified as a Youthful Offender, meaning he would be tried in a different system designed for young people. During the hearings, expert witnesses gave differing opinions about whether the appellant could be helped and rehabilitated if treated as a Youthful Offender. One expert believed the chances were good, while others thought the appellant needed more time to be rehabilitated. Based on all the information and expert opinions, the judge decided not to certify the appellant as a Youthful Offender and instead required him to be tried as an adult for the murder charge. On appeal, the appellant argued three main points: first, that the judge made a mistake by not certifying him as a Youthful Offender, second, that the judge should have removed himself from the case, and third, that he should not have been charged as an adult for the Assault with Intent to Kill counts since those should be treated as Youthful Offender crimes. The court looked at the evidence presented in the trial, including testimonies from experts and details of the appellant's life. The conclusion was that the judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding the appellant should be tried as an adult for the murder charge. However, the court did agree with the appellant concerning the Assault with Intent to Kill charges; since he was between 15 and 17 and those charges are typically handled differently, the court ordered that he be processed as a Youthful Offender for those counts. In the end, the court upheld the decision regarding the murder charge but reversed the decision on the Assault with Intent to Kill charges, indicating that the appropriate course was for those to be treated under the Youthful Offender system.

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F-2000-1138

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In OCCA case No. F-2000-1138, the appellant appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. The case involved David Land Ashlock, who was found guilty of Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon after a jury trial in Creek County. The jury sentenced him to forty years in prison and a fine of ten thousand dollars. Mr. Ashlock raised three issues on appeal about his trial. First, he argued that the trial court made a mistake by not allowing a defense instruction about defending another person. Second, he claimed that he was denied a fair trial because the jury convicted him of a crime that was not in the original charges against him. Finally, he said the prosecutor made an error by trying to explain the term reasonable doubt during the trial. The court looked closely at these issues and agreed with Mr. Ashlock on the second point. They found that he was wrongfully convicted of a crime that was not explicitly charged against him. The original charges were about first-degree manslaughter, but during the trial, the jury was instructed on Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon without Mr. Ashlock’s consent. The court said that when a defendant objects to a lesser crime being included in the instructions, they should have the right to decide to stick with the main charge only. Mr. Ashlock’s lawyer had clearly objected, and the trial court should have respected his choice not to include the lesser charge of Assault and Battery. Because of this error, the court decided that Mr. Ashlock did not receive a fair trial. They concluded that the trial court had made a mistake, which warranted reversing his conviction. As a result, the court instructed to dismiss the case entirely.

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F-1999-1293

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In OCCA case No. F 99-1293, #1 appealed his conviction for #4 counts of Lewd Acts with a Child. In an unpublished decision, the court decided #3 counts were affirmed and #1 count was reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss. #0 dissented. #1, William Dean Carter, was found guilty in a jury trial after being accused of committing inappropriate acts against children. These acts happened a long time ago, but the case took a while to come to court. Carter was sentenced to several years in prison for his crimes. Carter claimed that his rights were violated during the trial. He said he should not have been charged because the time limit for bringing the case to court had passed. He also argued that the prosecution made unfair comments during the trial and that he did not get a fair chance to defend himself. The court looked closely at all the details of the case. They found that for two of the counts against Carter, the prosecution was valid, but for the other two, the time limit had expired. Because of this, those two counts were dismissed. The judges felt that the evidence against Carter was strong enough for some of the charges, even if there were some errors during the trial. In conclusion, the court said that two of Carter's convictions would stay, but the other two would be thrown out and should not continue in court.

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