Accumulation of Error Archives

F-2021-512

Post author:Staff
Post published:August 4, 2022
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2021-512, Trevor Leif Toppah appealed his conviction for Burglary in the Second Degree and Obstructing an Officer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his judgment and sentence, except for modifying the fee assessed for his indigent defense. One judge dissented. Toppah was found guilty of second degree burglary and obstructing an officer by a district court. The burglary charge was based on the fact that he broke into a parked automobile with the intent to commit theft. During his trial, the judge considered if there was enough evidence to support the burglary conviction, focusing on whether Toppah used force to enter the vehicle and if he had the intention of stealing anything. The court reviewed the evidence and determined that it was enough for a reasonable person to believe Toppah was guilty of burglary. They noted that breaking into a car, even by just opening the door, is considered a form of breaking necessary for a burglary charge. The court also mentioned that proving intent could be done through either direct or indirect evidence, which they found sufficient in Toppah's case. Toppah raised some issues regarding money charged for his defense costs. He argued that the court charged him too much and that it should be less, as stated in the law. Although his lawyer didn’t object to this during the trial, the court noticed that they had made a mistake. They admitted that the fee should have been $250 instead of the $500 that was charged. Lastly, Toppah argued that a series of errors during his trial caused him not to receive a fair trial. However, the court found that the only error that needed correcting was the higher fee, and that this error did not affect the overall fairness of his trial. In summary, the court upheld Toppah's conviction for burglary but corrected the amount he had to pay for the public defense.

F-2004-1188

Post author:Staff
Post published:October 19, 2006
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2004-1188, Daniel Allen Moore appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but remanded the case for resentencing due to a jury instruction error. One judge dissented. On June 9, 2003, Daniel Allen Moore shot 24-year-old Garade Jean Girsback in front of a mobile home where she was babysitting. Girsback was related to Moore's wife and had often lived with their family. That evening, Moore hosted a barbecue and was drinking. Witnesses heard him express anger towards Girsback and make threats about killing her. After becoming upset during their conversation, Moore accidentally fired his gun, hitting Girsback. Moore and his wife left without trying to help, and he disposed of the gun. Later, he told a neighbor it was an accident and claimed he only meant to scare Girsback. The main question during the trial was whether Moore had intended to kill Girsback or whether her death was due to recklessness or negligence. The court found that there was an error because the jury was not properly informed about the punishment options for first-degree murder, specifically failing to instruct that life with the possibility of parole was an option. The state agreed this instruction was missed, but they argued it did not affect the outcome because the defense had mentioned the options during closing arguments. The court decided that the jury's confusion could have influenced their decision, especially since they only deliberated briefly before returning a verdict and sentencing Moore to life without parole. Because of this, the case was sent back for a new sentencing hearing with the correct instructions provided to the jury. Additionally, the court addressed other claims by Moore, like the admission of his statements to police. It concluded these statements were allowed for impeachment purposes and did not violate his rights, as they were spontaneous comments. The defendant also argued there was insufficient evidence and that various errors during trial warranted a different outcome, but the court found that while there were errors, they did not combine to affect the fairness of the trial significantly. In summary, the court upheld the conviction but required that the sentencing be done again with proper jury instructions about the punishments available to them.

F 2001-171

Post author:Staff
Post published:May 31, 2002
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F 2001-171, Emily Dowdy appealed her conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree (DUI). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Emily Dowdy was found guilty of causing a death while driving under the influence of alcohol. Her trial took place in January 2001, and she was sentenced to 25 years in prison. After her conviction, she appealed, arguing ten different points about why her trial was unfair. First, she claimed that she should not have been tried again because of double jeopardy, which means a person cannot be tried for the same crime twice. However, the appellate court said that this was not the case here because the state did not purposefully try to get a mistrial. Second, Dowdy wanted to present a defense that she was involuntarily intoxicated, meaning she did not intend to be drunk, but the court ruled that she could not do this, which the appellate court found was a mistake. This mistake was very important and led to the decision to give her a new trial. The appellate court emphasized that everyone has the right to defend themselves and present their story in court, which Dowdy was not allowed to do. The other points raised by Dowdy, such as claims of unfair trial processes, bias from the judge, and other trial errors, were not addressed because the court believed that the preclusion of her intoxication defense was enough to warrant a new trial. In the end, the appellate court said Dowdy should have another opportunity to present her case to a jury where she could defend herself fully. The judge's decision not to allow her intoxication defense to be presented was seen as very serious and unfair, leading the court to reverse the earlier judgment and order a new trial.