J-2013-87

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In OCCA case No. J-2013-87, J.C.T. appealed his conviction for Robbery With a Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's order bridging him to the Department of Corrections and stated that he should be sentenced to twelve years, suspended, and granted credit for time served. One judge dissented. J.C.T. was charged as a youthful offender in 2011 and initially received a twelve-year sentence that was suspended as part of a plea agreement. He was supposed to enter a rehabilitation program. However, after allegations of serious misconduct, the State moved to transfer him to adult custody. A hearing was held to determine whether his actions warranted this change. The court reviewed the evidence and ultimately decided that the state had established a valid reason for transferring J.C.T. to the Department of Corrections. He was found guilty of not complying with the original terms of his sentence. The law allowed for such a transfer based on his behavior while under supervision. During the appeal, J.C.T. raised several issues. He argued that the trial court had misused its discretion by changing the suspension of his sentence to actual time in prison. J.C.T. believed he should only receive the suspended sentence as originally agreed upon. The court had to look at the invalidity of the new sentence imposed and the interpretation of relevant statutes regarding youthful offenders. Ultimately, the OCCA concluded that the district court needed to resentence J.C.T. to follow what was originally agreed—a suspended sentence of twelve years—and provide time served. This ruling was based on the court's interpretation of laws surrounding youthful offenders and the limits on sentencing options upon being bridged to the Department of Corrections. One judge agreed with the majority but argued that the district court had made a correct decision in sentencing J.C.T. to the twelve-year prison term because it reflected a consequence of his violating the terms of his original agreement. However, another judge believed the initial ruling should stand without any changes.

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S-2013-322

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In OCCA case No. S-2013-322, Ridge appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the order that suppressed evidence obtained during the investigative detention. One judge dissented. The case began when a police detective observed what he thought was a drug deal involving Ridge. He saw Ridge in his car and another vehicle pull up next to him. Ridge got into the other car briefly, then returned to his own. Suspecting a drug transaction, the detective blocked Ridge's car and approached it. When he smelled marijuana, he questioned Ridge, who initially claimed the other person was just delivering puppy papers. Eventually, Ridge admitted there was marijuana under his seat. Ridge filed a motion to suppress the evidence from this encounter because he argued that the police did not have a good enough reason to stop him. Initially, a different judge denied Ridge's motion. However, after Ridge requested a reconsideration, the case was transferred to another judge, who granted the motion to suppress. The main issues on appeal were whether the new judge should have been able to review the case and whether the detective had enough reason to stop Ridge. The court ruled that the new judge was allowed to reconsider the motion. They stated that earlier rulings on suppression motions were not final and could be evaluated again. Regarding the stop, the court found that the detective did not have sufficient reason to detain Ridge. They stated that just observing Ridge getting in and out of a car was not enough to suspect him of criminal activity. Overall, the court agreed with the district court’s decision to suppress the evidence, meaning it could not be used in court against Ridge.

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S-2012-1012

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-1012, Barry Lee Brown appealed his conviction for a traffic offense. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the trial court's ruling to suppress evidence and dismiss the prosecution. One judge dissented. The case began when a police officer claimed to have seen a traffic violation, which led to a stop of Barry Lee Brown's vehicle. After stopping him, the officer suspected that Brown might be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. A second officer was called to the scene to perform sobriety tests. Before the trial, Barry Lee Brown argued that the stop was not legal and asked the court to throw out any evidence from the stop. During the hearing, the officer who stopped Brown had trouble remembering exactly what happened. He referred to a report written by the second officer, but that officer had not witnessed the stop himself. Initially, the trial court thought there was enough evidence to say the stop was legal, but later changed its mind. The court reviewed different points raised by the state about why the trial court’s decision should be changed. The state argued that the trial court made mistakes in its decision to suppress the evidence. However, the Appeals Court looked carefully at the facts and decided that the trial court had a good reason to change its decision. They noted that the officer who stopped Brown did not have a clear memory and his testimony was mainly based on what was written in another officer's report. The Appeals Court stated it respects the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly wrong or not supported by the evidence. After reviewing everything, they agreed with the trial court's ruling because it was based on the officer's inability to reliably remember the details of the stop. The Appeals Court also addressed the state’s claim that the trial court should not have been allowed to change its previous ruling. They found that the state did not provide enough legal backing for this claim, so they didn't consider it further. Finally, the court looked at whether the first officer could accurately use the report to refresh his memory about the stop. They concluded that just because he accepted the report as true did not mean it helped him remember the stop accurately. In the end, the court affirmed the decision to suppress the evidence that led to the conviction and agreed to dismiss the case.

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S-2013-103

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In OCCA case No. S-2013-103, Uriel Alajandro Lopez and Maria Magana appealed their conviction for Trafficking in Illegal Drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling which granted a motion to suppress evidence. One judge dissented. Lopez and Magana were charged in McIntosh County after Trooper Koch stopped their vehicle. Before the trial started, they filed to suppress evidence related to the traffic stop and the search of their vehicle. The district court agreed and granted their motions, leading the state to appeal. The state argued two main points for the appeal. First, they believed the trooper had a valid reason to stop the vehicle, claiming that Magana broke traffic laws by following another vehicle too closely and failing to move for an emergency vehicle. However, the court found that the trooper's basis for the stop was questionable because the laws did not support his reasoning. The trooper said Magana was driving less than two seconds behind a truck, which he thought was unsafe. But he was unable to prove that this was a valid reason under the law. The rules of driving were not clear enough to justify his stop. The court noted that the trooper’s idea of a two-second rule was not mentioned in the traffic laws, which made it hard to understand if there was any real violation. The court also looked at a second reason the state provided, which was that the trooper had seen Magana not move to the left lane for an emergency vehicle. However, the trooper didn’t take any action based on this perceived violation when he stopped the car. Since this point wasn't strongly developed during the hearing, the court didn’t consider it either. Second, the state argued that searching the vehicle was legal because of signs of criminal activity and the consent given by both Lopez and Magana. But since the first argument about the stop was not valid, the search did not hold up in court. Therefore, the appeal was denied and the decision to suppress the evidence was upheld. In conclusion, the court agreed with the district court's decision to grant the motion to suppress, stating that the trooper did not have a good reason for the stop. The opinion from the court was not published for public record, but it reinforced the importance of adhering to the rules of evidence and the proper procedures during traffic stops.

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RE 2012-0711

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In OCCA case No. RE 2012-0711, Creekmore appealed his conviction for Lewd Molestation. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the order revoking Creekmore's suspended sentence and remand for a new hearing. One member of the court dissented.

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RE 2012-0848

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In OCCA case No. RE 2012-0848, Andrell Jackson appealed his conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance and related charges. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentence for one of the cases but vacated the revocation for the other case and sent it back for further proceedings. One judge dissented.

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F-2011-661

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In OCCA case No. F-2011-661, Mark Tracey Vernon appealed his conviction for five counts of First Degree Rape by Instrumentation and one count of Forcible Oral Sodomy. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse his conviction and remand the case for a new trial. One judge dissented. Vernon had been found guilty in a non-jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment on the rape charges and twenty years for the sodomy charge, with the sentences to be served one after another. Initially, he faced fourteen counts of rape and five of sodomy, but some were dismissed or he was acquitted of others during the trial. Vernon claimed that he did not receive a fair trial due to ineffective assistance from his lawyer. The court agreed and found that his defense attorney did not present important evidence that could have helped Vernon. This included failing to interview a witness who might have provided helpful information and not questioning the investigating officer about past allegations against one of the victims. The court noted that these mistakes were not part of a reasonable trial strategy. After reviewing the trial and additional evidence presented during a hearing, the court decided that Vernon's lawyer's performance was inadequate. Because of this, they believed that the trial's outcome could have been different if the mistakes had not happened. Vernon's judgment was reversed, and the case was sent back for a new trial to ensure that he gets a fair chance to defend himself.

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S-2012-834

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-834, the State of Oklahoma appealed an order that granted a motion to dismiss several charges against Jeffrey Porras. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling. One judge dissented. The case involved charges against Porras, who is a physician. He was accused of committing sexual battery and rape against multiple victims while they were receiving medical treatment. The accusations included five counts of sexual battery and one count of second-degree rape, with the incidents alleged to have occurred in different counties over a period of time from 2005 to 2007. The trial court dismissed some of the counts because it felt that the incidents were not part of a single plan or scheme. The law allows for multiple charges to be tried together if they are connected in a way that shows they are part of the same pattern of criminal behavior. However, the court decided that the alleged crimes in Oklahoma County and Cleveland County were separate and did not meet the criteria for joining them in one trial. In making this decision, the court looked at how the offenses occurred over a span of two years and did not significantly overlap in timing or in the way they were committed. This means that the crimes did not depend on each other and were not part of a continuous plan that would justify being tried together. The appellate court agreed with the trial judge's reasoning, stating that there was no clear error in the decision to dismiss those charges. The ruling reaffirmed that the charges from different counties could be handled separately without causing injustice to anyone. The dissenting judge, however, believed that the charges should not have been dismissed since they had common elements and were related to his actions as a doctor. The dissent argued that since all victims were patients and the incidents happened in similar situations, it was appropriate to consider them as part of a greater plan to commit these crimes. In conclusion, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision to dismiss certain charges against Porras, maintaining that the evidence did not sufficiently show a connection that warranted a single trial for all the charges.

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F-2011-693

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In OCCA case No. F-2011-693, Michael Wayne Dorsey appealed his conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree and Shooting with Intent to Kill. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Dorsey's conviction and his sentences but vacated the $5,000 victim compensation assessment set by the trial court. One member of the court dissented. Dorsey was found guilty by a jury of manslaughter and shooting with intent to kill. The jury decided on a punishment of thirty years for manslaughter and five years for the shooting charge, which would be served one after the other. Dorsey argued that he should have been allowed to use self-defense as a reason for both charges, but the court found that the instructions given to the jury were correct. Dorsey also claimed that the trial judge made an error with jury instructions regarding self-defense and intoxication, but the court disagreed. He further asserted that his lawyer was not effective because there was no objection raised to those jury instructions, but the court ruled that there was nothing wrong with the instructions in the first place. Lastly, Dorsey objected to the judge imposing the victim compensation amount without considering several important factors. The court agreed that the judge did not properly assess the situation and sent the case back to the trial court for a new decision on the compensation amount. Thus, the main outcome was that while Dorsey's conviction was upheld, the court required a reconsideration of the victim compensation assessment based on certain statutory factors outlined in the law.

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M-2011-1083

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In OCCA case No. M-2011-1083, the appellant appealed his conviction for resisting an officer. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. The case involved Franklin Savoy Combs, who was found guilty of resisting an officer after a jury trial. The trial took place in Hughes County, and the appellant received a sentence of ninety days in jail and a fine of $300. Combs later appealed this decision, challenging the way he represented himself in court. In his appeal, Combs argued that the trial court did not properly inform him of the risks of self-representation. The court looked at the records from the trial to see if Combs had knowingly decided to waive his right to have a lawyer. They found that there was not enough evidence to show that he fully understood what he was doing when he chose to represent himself. The court explained that before someone can represent themselves, it is very important that they know what that means and what they might be giving up. If there are doubts about whether a person really understood their rights, those doubts should be viewed in favor of that person. Since the court determined that Combs did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, they decided that his conviction needed to be reversed. The case was sent back for a new trial where he can have proper legal representation.

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S-2012-554

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-553, Frank Lee Armstrong appealed his conviction for unlawful drug charges. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling that suppressed the evidence obtained during the search of a vehicle occupied by Armstrong and Sheila Carol Johnson. Johnson also appealed her conviction in a related case, S-2012-554. The court found that the law enforcement officers did not execute the search warrant in a timely manner as required, which led to the suppression of the evidence. The judge's determination was based on the conclusion that the search was not conducted immediately as directed by the issuing judge, and therefore, the court upheld the lower court's decision, sustaining the motions to suppress. No dissenting opinion was filed.

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S-2012-553

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-553, Armstrong appealed his conviction for unlawful drug possession and distribution. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the ruling that evidence obtained during a search of a vehicle occupied by Armstrong and Johnson should be suppressed. Johnson dissented. The case started when police met with an informant who said they could buy methamphetamine from Armstrong. The police observed a controlled purchase of drugs and later obtained a search warrant for Armstrong's home. They executed this search warrant a few days later and found Armstrong and Johnson in a car outside his residence, where they discovered several drug-related items. Both Armstrong and Johnson hired the same lawyer and filed motions to suppress the evidence from the car search. The district court agreed with their argument that the police had not executed the search warrant immediately, as the warrant required. Because of this, the court decided the search was not valid. The appeals court looked into whether the district court had made a mistake. They decided that the court did not abuse its discretion and confirmed the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence. This means that the evidence collected during the search could not be used against them in court. The court emphasized that the terms of the warrant were not followed as required. The ruling highlighted the importance of following legal procedures when executing search warrants. In summary, Armstrong's appeal was not successful, and the ruling to suppress the evidence was upheld.

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RE-2011-710

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In OCCA case No. RE-2011-710, Jermaine Richard Newton appealed his conviction for two counts of Assault with a Dangerous Weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the revocation order of his suspended sentences to time served. One judge dissented. Newton had originally pleaded guilty to the charges and was given a ten-year suspended sentence, which meant he would not go to prison right away as long as he followed certain rules. One of the rules was that he could not break any laws. Later, he was accused of violating a protective order that had been put in place to keep him away from a specific person. The court examined whether there was enough evidence to show that Newton had broken the order. They found that there was enough proof that he had violated the order by being near the person it was intended to protect. The court also looked at whether the decision to revoke his suspended sentences was fair or too harsh. The judges noted that he was young and hadn't been in trouble before this violation. They concluded that sending him to prison for the full ten years was not necessary since he hadn't done anything very dangerous lately. In the end, the court decided he should not serve the full ten years but should instead be given a second chance, and they ordered that he should be returned to probation. The judges who agreed with this decision believed it was a fair outcome. However, one judge disagreed and felt that the original decision to revoke his suspended sentences should stand.

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F-2012-437

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In OCCA case No. F-2012-437, Mark J. Lawler appealed his conviction for rape in the first degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse and remand for a new trial. One judge dissented. Mark J. Lawler was found guilty of rape in the first degree by a jury and given a sentence of thirty-five years in prison. He claimed that the trial court made mistakes during his trial. First, Lawler thought he should have been allowed to represent himself instead of having a lawyer. He argued that this was his right under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The court agreed with him, stating that he had clearly asked to represent himself at least five days before the trial, which was a reasonable request. The court also found that Lawler understood the risks involved in defending himself without a lawyer. The trial court was wrong to deny his request, so that was a significant error. Second, Lawler argued that he did not get a speedy trial, which is another right he had under the law. Although there were delays in the trial, the court found that they were not entirely Lawler's fault. The reasons for the delays included busy courts and other issues that were not intentional. However, the court also decided that Lawler did not show he was hurt by the delay, so they did not agree with his claim on this point. In summary, the court found that the trial court made a mistake by not allowing Lawler to represent himself. Because of this error, they reversed his conviction and sent the case back for a new trial.

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F-2012-168

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In OCCA case No. F-2012-168, Tommie Joe Moore appealed his conviction for Distribution of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, and Trafficking in Illegal Drugs. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Moore's convictions but modified his fine on one count. One judge dissented. Moore was found guilty after a jury trial and received a sentence of twenty years for Distribution and a $25,000 fine, ten years for Possession and a $7,500 fine, and twenty-five years for Trafficking with another $25,000 fine. The sentences for the Distribution and Possession counts were ordered to be served at the same time, but the Trafficking sentence was to be served afterward. Moore raised several points in his appeal. He argued that the fine for the Distribution count was too high and that it should be corrected. He claimed that the jury should have been instructed about a lesser charge related to Possession and that he did not get a fair trial because of mistakes made during the trial, including some comments made by the prosecution. He also stated that the sentences he received were too harsh and should not have been served one after another, but at the same time. After reviewing all the evidence and arguments, the court agreed that the fine for the Distribution count was indeed too high and changed it to $10,000. However, the court found that there was no need for a lesser charge instruction, and that the prosecution's actions did not affect the fairness of Moore's trial. The sentences given to Moore were within legal limits, and the court did not think they were excessively harsh. In the end, the court affirmed Moore's convictions but made a change to reduce the fine in one of the counts. This meant that while the convictions stood, Moore would not have to pay the original high fine, and he could continue to serve his sentences as ordered.

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S-2012-573

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-573, the appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance (methamphetamine). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the orders of the lower court. The dissenting opinion was not specified. In this case, the appellant was charged after being arrested by a trooper from the Oklahoma Highway Patrol. A preliminary hearing took place, and the judge decided there was not enough evidence to proceed with a trial. The state disagreed and appealed this decision. Another judge upheld the first decision, leading to the current appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. The main issue in the appeal focused on whether the highway patrol trooper had the authority to arrest the appellant. After careful consideration and a hearing, the court found no error in how the lower courts handled the case. They determined that the facts and legal interpretations were correct, and therefore, the original decision was upheld. The case was reviewed under specific procedures that allow this kind of state appeal, and the court confirmed that there was no abuse of discretion in the previous rulings. As a result, the final rulings and orders from the lower courts were affirmed, and the court ordered that their decision be enforced.

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RE-2011-138

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In OCCA case No. RE-2011-138, the appellant, a man named Steven Wayne Robertson, appealed his conviction for several felonies. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the revocation of his suspended sentences but modified one of his sentences to a lower term of imprisonment. One judge dissented. Robertson had pleaded guilty to serious crimes including aggravated assault and battery, assault with a dangerous weapon, and other offenses. He had been sentenced to fifteen years in prison, but the execution of that sentence was suspended, meaning he wouldn’t serve time if he followed certain rules in a special program. Later, the state stated that Robertson had broken the rules of the program. He had failed several drug tests and had some run-ins with the law. The judge held a hearing to look into these claims. The evidence showed that Robertson was not following the program's rules and was not cooperating with mental health services. When the judge decided to revoke Robertson’s suspended sentence, he explained that he believed that enough evidence supported this decision. The court also looked at whether original sentences were too long. It was decided that, for the aggravated assault and battery charge, the length of the sentence was more than what the law allowed. Ultimately, while the court upheld the decision to revoke Robertson's sentence for breaking the program rules, they changed his original sentence for one of the charges to the correct legal maximum allowed.

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S-2012-166

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-166, Moises Gonzales-Tello appealed his conviction for Aggravated Trafficking in Heroin. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the district court's ruling to suppress evidence gathered during a traffic stop. One judge dissented. The State of Oklahoma appealed a decision made by the district court. This decision was based on a traffic stop where law enforcement officers discovered evidence of a crime, but the evidence was later deemed inadmissible. The district court ruled that the stop had taken too long and that the officer did not have a proper reason to keep the suspect detained after the initial reason for the stop was completed. During the traffic stop, the officer noticed several unusual things that made him suspicious. He called for a drug-sniffing dog to come to the scene. Even though the officer asked for permission to search the car, he did not actually let the suspect leave and did not return his driver's license or paperwork. The dog arrived about 30 minutes after the stop began, but did not find anything. After the dog didn't indicate any signs of drugs, the officer conducted his own search and found a significant amount of heroin. The court looked closely at whether the officer had enough reason to continue holding the suspect after the initial reason for the traffic stop was accomplished. While the State argued that the officer's actions were justified, the court explained that to search a car without a warrant, an officer must have either permission from the owner or a strong reason to believe the car contains evidence of a crime. In this case, the dog did not find anything and the officer did not get enough proof that would justify a search. If there had been clear consent from the suspect for the search, the situation might have been different. However, the way the officer asked for consent made it seem as if the suspect did not truly have a choice. When the court reviewed the case, they found that the district court made a reasonable decision in ruling that the initial detention was too long and that the search was not justified. The State also argued against using the Exclusionary Rule, which prevents illegally obtained evidence from being used in court. The court did not agree with the State on this argument, as they did not provide enough support for their claim. In summary, the court decided to maintain the district court's order to suppress the evidence found during the traffic stop, agreeing that the officers did not follow the correct procedures.

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F-2012-212

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In OCCA case No. F-2012-212, Bryce Andrew Davis appealed his conviction for Aggravated Assault and Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided that the District Court abused its discretion in ordering restitution, and they remanded the case for modification of the restitution order. One member of the court dissented. The case began when Bryce Andrew Davis entered a plea to the crime of Aggravated Assault and Battery against a minor at a Walmart store. The minor suffered serious injuries, including a crushed cheekbone and an orbital wall fracture, needing significant medical treatment. After Davis completed a rehabilitation program, a hearing was held to determine the amount of restitution he would have to pay to cover the victim's expenses. The court ordered Davis to pay a total of $30,528.43 in restitution, which was meant to cover the victim's medical expenses, lost wages of his parents due to caring for him, travel costs for doctor visits, and fees for copying records. However, Davis argued that the restitution amount was too high and that the court had exceeded its authority by not limiting the amount to the actual economic loss suffered by the victim. The law states that restitution is only supposed to cover actual financial detriment suffered by the victim, meaning help for their real costs like medical bills that have to be paid out of pocket. Davis pointed out that the amount awarded to the victim included expenses that were not certain, such as lost wages for the victim's father and future medical costs. After reviewing the evidence and the court's decisions, the appellate court found that the trial court did not calculate the restitution correctly. They realized that the court had used the total medical bills before insurance adjustments, which was not allowed. Instead, they should have calculated the actual amount paid by the family, which was much lower. The court modified the restitution order to reflect three times the actual economic damage for medical costs, reducing that portion of the restitution significantly. They also struck down the father's lost wages because there was not enough proof to support the amount claimed. The future medical costs award was also removed because they were too uncertain and speculative. The decision outlined the need for a clear basis for any loss that a victim claims, stating that the evidence must be strong enough to establish real losses. The court upheld other parts of the restitution order, which were justified. In summary, the court found that while the victim suffered injuries and needed help, the original calculations for restitution went beyond what was allowed by law, leading to significant modifications in the amount that Davis would have to pay. They ordered adjustments to ensure that restitution reflected actual, proven losses.

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S-2012-194

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-194, Campbell appealed his conviction for Driving Under the Influence. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's ruling to suppress evidence and dismiss the case, meaning Campbell's charges were dropped. No one dissented. Here’s a summary of what happened: James Monroe Campbell was accused of driving under the influence of alcohol. Before the trial began, he asked the court to dismiss the case by filing a request called a Motion to Dismiss. During a hearing before the trial, the judge decided that the evidence against Campbell should not be used, and this meant the case was dismissed. The State of Oklahoma, unhappy with this decision, decided to appeal, which means they wanted another court to review what happened. They filed their appeal based on certain laws that say they have the right to challenge the dismissal of cases when it involves important evidence being excluded. The State argued two main points in its appeal. First, they claimed the judge made a mistake by dismissing Campbell's case because he believed Campbell broke the law by not staying entirely in one lane while driving. Second, they argued the judge was wrong because the police officer had a good reason to stop Campbell’s car in the first place. To decide if the original judge made a mistake, the court looked at whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to pull Campbell over. A reasonable suspicion is a legal term meaning the officer had a good reason to believe a law was possibly being broken. The officer in this case stated that he stopped Campbell because he saw Campbell's car touch the line marking the lane. However, when the judge looked closely at the evidence, including a video of the incident, she thought that Campbell was driving pretty straight and did not see enough evidence to support the claim that he was breaking any laws. The judge also mentioned that the officer’s concerns did not seem strong enough to justify the stop. Therefore, she decided to dismiss the case because there was not enough evidence to support stopping Campbell's car. When reviewing the situation, the appeals court sided with the original judge's decision and agreed that there was no abuse of discretion, meaning they believed she made the correct choice based on the information available. The court also stated that since the issue of Campbell possibly driving under the influence wasn't raised during the earlier hearing, they could not consider that during the appeal. In conclusion, the court upheld the decision to suppress evidence and dismissed the charges against Campbell, which was a win for him.

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C-2011-875

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In OCCA case No. C-2011-875, #Edgar Lee Ussery appealed his conviction for #possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute. In an #unpublished decision, the court decided #to deny the petition for a writ of certiorari. #No one dissented. In this case, Edgar Lee Ussery entered a guilty plea to two counts of possession with intent to distribute drugs. He did this after a previous felony conviction. By working with the Drug Court program, he hoped to avoid a long prison sentence. However, if he did not complete the program, he faced up to twenty years in prison for each count. Later, the state asked to terminate Ussery's participation in the Drug Court because of new felony charges he faced. The judge agreed, and Ussery was sentenced to twenty years in prison for each count, served at the same time. Ussery wanted to take back his guilty plea, so he asked the court to let him withdraw it. He argued that the court wrongly kicked him out of Drug Court. He also claimed that he didn’t fully understand what he was pleading to at the time. The court looked at these claims. They found that Ussery knew what he was agreeing to when he made his plea. They also decided that the judge wasn't wrong to remove him from Drug Court based on his new felony charges. However, Ussery pointed out some mistakes in the process. He argued that the judgment didn’t show he got credit for the time he had already served and incorrectly said he had two previous felony convictions instead of one. The court agreed that his sentence needed some correction to reflect he would get credit for time served and recognized that only one felony conviction was used for his case. They sent the case back to fix these issues but left the other parts of Ussery’s sentence the same. In conclusion, the court denied his request to withdraw his plea, but they did agree to fix some details about how his conviction was recorded.

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C-2011-945

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In OCCA case No. C-2011-945, Hall appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and assault with a dangerous weapon. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to deny Hall's petition to withdraw his plea but reversed the conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon with instructions to dismiss it. One judge dissented.

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C-2011-1119

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In OCCA case No. C-2011-1119, Hollis Michael Anson appealed his conviction for Manufacturing a Controlled Dangerous Substance. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to remand the case for a proper hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. One judge dissented. Hollis Michael Anson was charged in Osage County District Court with making a controlled dangerous substance. He pleaded guilty, which means he admitted to the crime. After that, he was given a long sentence of twenty-five years in prison. Later, he wanted to take back his guilty plea, so he filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. However, the court did not agree with his request after a hearing. In his appeal, Anson claimed there were mistakes made that affected his trial and his plea. He argued that his lawyer had a conflict of interest, which meant that his lawyer could not effectively help him. This was because the same lawyer had worked on his plea and sentencing, which made it hard for the lawyer to clearly represent Anson during the hearing to withdraw his plea. Anson believed that there wasn’t enough proof that he understood what he was pleading guilty to. He also thought that the sentence he received was too harsh. After looking closely at all the details of the case, the court agreed that there was a significant problem with Anson's representation during the motion to withdraw his plea. They found that his lawyer did not provide the help he needed because he couldn't argue properly without pointing out his own mistakes. So, the court said they would send the case back to the lower district court. There, Anson would have the chance to have a different lawyer represent him—one without any conflicts—to properly address his concerns about withdrawing his guilty plea. This was an important decision because it meant Anson would have another chance to argue his case.

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S-2012-214

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In OCCA case No. S-2012-214, Nhanh Van Dang and Nhi Thi Nguyen appealed their conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs and conspiracy to traffic in illegal drugs. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the lower court's decision to suppress the evidence, meaning the charges against them could not proceed. One judge dissented. The case began when law enforcement stopped the vehicle driving by Dang and Nguyen. They were suspected of breaking traffic laws, but the court found that the officers did not have enough reason to pull them over. The original judge ruled that there wasn’t enough evidence to support the stop, which led to the suppression of the evidence gathered afterward. The state tried to argue that the stop was justified because of alleged traffic violations. However, the appeals court agreed with the lower court's decision, saying the evidence did not clearly show that the officers had a good reason to stop the vehicle. Since the stop was deemed improper, the gathered evidence could not be used in court against Dang and Nguyen. Therefore, the appeals court confirmed that the right decision was made by the lower court in suppressing the evidence, reinforcing the idea that fair legal procedures must be followed.

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F-2011-482

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In OCCA case No. F-2011-482, Christopher D'Shun Cleveland appealed his conviction for perjury. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify his sentence from ten years to seven years imprisonment but otherwise affirmed the conviction. One judge dissented. The case began when Cleveland was found guilty of perjury in the District Court of Oklahoma County and was sentenced to ten years in prison. He raised two main points in his appeal. First, he claimed that two witnesses, who were attorneys, should have been sworn before they testified. He argued this violated both a state law and his constitutional rights. However, the court found that the trial judge’s reminder to the attorneys that they were testifying under oath was adequate, and no major error was shown. In his second point, Cleveland argued that the jury should have been instructed to consider whether the statements he made were important to the case when deciding his sentence. He believed that not allowing this instruction led to a sentence that was too harsh. While the court recognized that the denial of this instruction was an error, it ultimately decided that the error was not severe enough to overturn the conviction. Instead, they modified his sentence length. Overall, Cleveland's punishment was reduced, but his conviction remained in place. The court stated its decision firmly, ensuring that Cleveland's rights were considered, while also balancing the necessary legal standards.

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