F-2018-36

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In OCCA case No. F-2018-36, Robert Eugene Brewer appealed his conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Child Under 12. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm Brewer's conviction. One judge dissented. Brewer was tried in Tulsa County for sexually abusing a child under the age of 12. He was convicted by a jury and sentenced to seven years in prison. He was also ordered to serve three years of supervision after his prison term. Brewer appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court made a mistake by allowing evidence related to other crimes that he believed had not been proven. The court reviewed the evidence and arguments presented. The main issue was whether the trial court had the right to let in evidence that showed Brewer had a pattern of behavior related to sexual abuse. This type of evidence is sometimes called propensity evidence. Brewer argued that the trial court should have held a special hearing before allowing this evidence and should have required witnesses to testify in person. However, the court found that the trial judge had done a thorough job. The judge had held multiple hearings and considered the evidence carefully. The judge did not make a mistake by allowing the evidence because they had enough information to decide it was relevant and necessary for the case. Even though Brewer did not object to the evidence when it was presented during the trial, the court considered whether there was a serious mistake that affected the fairness of the trial. After reviewing everything, the court concluded that the trial judge acted correctly. In summary, the court believed that the evidence presented was acceptable and did not harm Brewer's case. Therefore, Brewer’s conviction was upheld, but the court also instructed the district court to make some corrections to its legal documents regarding the correct law that applied to Brewer's actions at the time of the crime. The decision was to keep Brewer's sentence in place while correcting the legal documentation properly.

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F-2005-716

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In OCCA case No. F-2005-716, #Smith appealed his conviction for #Indecent or Lewd Acts with Child Under Sixteen. In an unpublished decision, the court decided #to reverse and remand for a new trial. #n dissented. In this case, Smith was found guilty of committing indecent acts with a young girl named T.C., who was ten years old at the time of the incidents. It all began when T.C. and her family traveled to Oklahoma due to the death of her grandmother. While in Oklahoma, Smith befriended T.C.'s parents and was allowed to spend time with T.C. while her parents worked. One day, Smith took T.C. to a swimming pool. Several women observed Smith engaging in suspicious behavior with T.C., such as fondling her and kissing her inappropriately. They felt that T.C. looked scared and uncomfortable. After watching the situation for about two hours, they called the police. The police spoke to T.C. and her parents, but at first, T.C. denied that anything inappropriate had happened. However, during the police investigation, Smith made troubling statements, including mentioning that he had previously been convicted of a similar crime against his own daughter. During the trial, T.C. testified that she thought of Smith like a grandfather and said he never touched her inappropriately at the pool. However, the other witnesses provided consistent testimonies about what they observed. The jury ultimately believed the eyewitnesses over T.C.'s denial of the abuse. Smith's defense argued that the evidence was not sufficient, and they challenged whether the trial was fair. They also raised several legal points regarding sentencing and the inclusion of evidence from past crimes. The court agreed with some of these points, particularly regarding the trial's fairness and the admissibility of evidence related to Smith's prior convictions. In the end, the court reversed Smith's conviction and ordered a new trial because they found issues in how evidence and instructions were handled during the original trial. Smith will now have another chance to contest the accusations against him.

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F-2001-558

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In OCCA case No. F-2001-558, Medlin appealed her conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree by Heat of Passion. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse her judgment and dismiss the case. One judge dissented. The case began when a jury found Medlin guilty of Manslaughter for the shooting death of her husband, Jay Medlin. The jury sentenced her to four years in prison. Medlin argued that the trial court made a mistake by allowing instructions on a lesser charge of Manslaughter since she believed her actions were in self-defense due to previous abuse from her husband. Throughout their marriage, Medlin testified about the many times she and her children had been harmed by Jay. On the night of the shooting, after Jay verbally threatened the family and struck Medlin, she took a gun and shot him multiple times while he was asleep, believing she was defending herself and her children from further harm. At the appeal, the court determined that the evidence did not support a jury instruction on Manslaughter because Medlin had intended to kill her husband. The trial court's instructions to the jury were incorrect because they could only find that she had meant to cause death. Since the evidence only pointed to a conviction for murder, the court concluded that the previous conviction must be dismissed under the law. Thus, the court reversed the conviction and ordered the lower court to dismiss the case entirely, which also meant Medlin could not be tried for First Degree Murder again after the jury had found her not guilty of that charge. The dissenting opinion argued that the judge gave the jury a fair chance to decide based on the evidence presented and that the jury's actions were reasonable based on what they had seen and heard during the trial. In conclusion, the court's ruling in this case emphasized that if there is no substantial evidence showing that a lesser charge could apply, then that instruction should not be presented to the jury.

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