Ability To Pay Archives - OCCA Opinions

RE-2011-606

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 4, 2013
Post category:RE

In OCCA case No. RE-2011-606, Douglas Raymond Norwood appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug (cocaine) with intent to distribute. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the order revoking Norwood's suspended sentences but vacated the portion of the order that unlawfully lengthened his sentences. One judge dissented. Here's a simple summary of what happened in the case: Norwood was given a six-year sentence for possessing cocaine, but this was suspended, meaning he didn’t have to go to jail right away if he followed certain rules. Later, he had problems following those rules, which led to more charges against him for drug possession. He confessed to these new charges and took a plea deal, which resulted in longer sentences. After some time, a judge reviewed his case and decided to reduce his sentences but required him to go to a program called Avalon after he got out of jail. Norwood didn’t manage to get into Avalon because he couldn't pay the admission fees, which led the judge to completely revoke his suspended sentences. Norwood argued in court that the judge shouldn’t have done that because he had followed some of the rules, and he claimed he didn't intend to break those rules. However, the court found that he didn’t follow the requirement to report to Avalon properly. In the final decision, the court agreed with Norwood about a mistake in how his sentence was handled, stating that the judge had taken away more time than he should have. But overall, the court decided that Norwood had violated his probation, so he had to serve his time in jail as determined by the judge.

F-2011-4

Post author:Staff
Post published:September 6, 2012
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2011-4, Dara D. Payton appealed her conviction for Driving a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Drugs, Second and Subsequent Offense. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the order of deferment from the District Court. One judge dissented. Payton was found guilty after a bench trial, which is a trial without a jury. The judge decided not to give her a final judgment or sentence right away, instead deferring it for five years. Payton appealed this decision, raising three main points. First, she argued that her arrest should not have happened because it was made outside the officer's jurisdiction, and the officer did not follow the rules for making a citizen's arrest. Second, she claimed that she should not have to pay certain costs and fees because she relies only on disability benefits for her income. Third, she said the written order of deferment did not match what the judge said in court. The court found that Payton's arrest was legal. Even though the officer was outside his normal area, the court believed he was justified in his actions due to fresh pursuit, meaning he was actively following Payton because he saw her breaking the law. The judge stated that the officer followed Payton, observed her erratic driving behavior, and called for more help when Payton could not pass a sobriety test. The arrest was determined to be lawful under the circumstances. Regarding the costs and fees Payton questioned, the court said it could not decide the issue because she had not properly followed the procedures to dispute them. Payton did not request a hearing or show evidence about her financial situation to the court, making it unclear if the costs should be adjusted. For the written deferment order, the court acknowledged that it did not accurately represent what the judge had said. They decided to send the case back to the District Court to fix these errors so that the written order matched what the judge had pronounced in court, specifically that the deferment period would end on December 11, 2015, and that the supervision by the district attorney would only last for the first two years. In summary, while the court agreed with the deferment and found Payton's arrest valid, they also recognized the need to correct the written order to reflect the judge's original statements properly. The judge's conclusions about the case led to an affirmation of the deferment but a remand for the clerical corrections.

RE-2010-706

Post author:Staff
Post published:December 1, 2011
Post category:RE

In OCCA case No. RE-2010-706, Cynthia McGhee appealed her conviction for embezzlement and using a computer to defraud. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the order revoking three years of her suspended sentence. One judge dissented. Here is a brief summary of the case: Cynthia McGhee was originally sentenced in 2004 for embezzlement and related charges. She received a total of fifty years in prison, but twenty of those years were suspended, meaning she did not have to serve that time in prison as long as she followed certain rules. One of the rules was that she had to pay back a large amount of money, over $244,000, which she had taken in the embezzlement. In 2010, the state accused her of not paying the money she owed. A judge held a hearing to discuss this. McGhee admitted she did not pay the restitution but argued that it was not because she didn't want to, but because she couldn't afford to. The judge decided to revoke three years of her suspended sentence because McGhee failed to pay. On appeal, the court looked at whether the district judge made a mistake. The court found that McGhee had shown enough evidence to suggest that her inability to pay was not her fault. They explained that a person's probation should not be revoked for not paying money unless it is proven they could have paid it and chose not to. The original judge had not considered McGhee's ability to pay when making the decision. Therefore, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided that the revocation of McGhee's suspended sentence was an abuse of discretion, meaning the judge made a wrong choice. They reversed the decision and sent the case back for a new hearing to determine if McGhee could pay the restitution.

F-2010-572

Post author:Staff
Post published:November 17, 2011
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2010-572, Earsley appealed her conviction for uttering two or more bogus checks exceeding $500.00. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the order that accelerated her deferred sentence. The decision was based on the finding that the lower court did not consider Earsley's ability to pay restitution and court costs, which Earsley argued was a necessary factor in determining whether her failure to pay was willful. One member of the court dissented.

F-2008-438

Post author:Staff
Post published:June 26, 2009
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2008-438, Marcus Laquine Petty appealed his conviction for Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon and Domestic Assault and Battery. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment and sentence of the District Court, but found that a hearing was needed regarding the amount of the Victim's Compensation Assessment. Two members of the court dissented regarding the second count of the conviction.

F-2005-392

Post author:Staff
Post published:February 21, 2002
Post category:F

In OCCA case No. F-2000-638, Ray Lamont Hubbard appealed his conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree. In a published decision, the court decided that the assessment of incarceration costs against him needed further review because the process used to determine those costs was not followed properly. The opinion noted that Hubbard's ability to pay was considered, but remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to correctly calculate the incarceration costs. In OCCA case No. F-2000-194, Troy Don Cape also appealed the assessment of incarceration costs after pleading guilty to Driving While Intoxicated. The court similarly decided to vacate the amount of costs assessed against him because the required procedure for determining the costs was not adequately followed. Both cases were sent back for hearings to determine appropriate incarceration costs. One judge dissented on the decision to vacate and remand, believing that the assessments were already supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial courts had acted within their discretion.