John D. Hadden v Don Arneilus Ingram

S-2018-164

Filed: Jul. 11, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Don Arneilus Ingram appealed his conviction for trafficking in illegal drugs, possession of a firearm, and possession of proceeds from illegal drugs. Conviction and sentence were reversed. Judge Lewis dissented.

Decision

The District Court's order sustaining Appellee's motion to suppress is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• Was there a lawful basis for the initial stop and detention of Ingram by the police officer?
• Did the officer have probable cause to arrest Ingram for driving without a license?
• Was the search of Ingram's person incident to his arrest lawful under the Fourth Amendment?
• Did the officer have probable cause to believe that contraband was present in the vehicle before conducting a warrantless search?
• Was the suppression of evidence obtained from the vehicle justified based on the circumstances of the case?

Findings

• The court erred in finding that Sgt. Bell's initial contact with Ingram violated the Fourth Amendment.
• Sgt. Bell's initial contact with Ingram was a consensual encounter that did not constitute a seizure.
• Ingram's arrest for driving without a license was lawful and supported by probable cause.
• The search incident to Ingram's arrest was justified and lawful.
• The district court abused its discretion in suppressing the evidence recovered from Ingram's person.
• The warrantless search of Ingram's vehicle was reasonable based on probable cause.
• The suppressed evidence was critical for the State's ability to prosecute Ingram.
• The district court's order sustaining Appellee's motion to suppress is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

S-2018-164

Jul. 11, 2019

John D. Hadden

Appellant

v

Don Arneilus Ingram

Appellee

OPINION

HUDSON, JUDGE: On July 12, 2016, Don Arneilus Ingram, was charged with Count 1: Trafficking in Illegal Drugs, in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2015, § 2-415; Count 2: Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 1283; and Count 3: Possession of Proceeds Derived from a Violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, in violation of 63 O.S.2011, § 2-503.1, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2016-5581. The State alleged in a supplemental information that these felony crimes were all committed by Ingram after former conviction of two or more felonies. Ingram waived preliminary hearing and was bound over on all three counts. Ingram thereafter filed a motion to quash for insufficient evidence and to suppress evidence arising from his detention and from the search of his car. The State filed a responsive pleading opposing Ingram’s motion. On January 31, 2018, a hearing was held before the Honorable Michele D. McElwee, District Judge, on Ingram’s motion to suppress. The hearing was continued to allow Judge McElwee to conduct additional research on the issues presented. On February 2, 2018, Judge McElwee granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. Appellant, the State of Oklahoma, now appeals. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 22 O.S.2011, § 1053(5). For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the district court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

What follows is a summary of testimony from Sergeant Greg Bell of the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD), the sole witness presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Sgt. Bell is an eleven (11) year OCPD veteran who has received training in narcotics investigation and detection. On December 30, 2015, around 11:00 p.m., Sgt. Bell was on routine patrol in a marked patrol unit when he spotted a car driven by Ingram near Northwest 20th and Gatewood. The car Ingram was driving had a paper tag. Sgt. Bell testified that vehicles with temporary tags “always catch [his] eye”. Sgt. Bell observed too that this part of northwest Oklahoma City was a high crime, high drug activity area where numerous arrests for burglaries and drug-related offenses occurred. Indeed, Sgt. Bell has personally made drug arrests in this area. For these reasons, Sgt. Bell decided to turn around, follow the vehicle and watch for any kind of illegal or suspicious activity. As Sgt. Bell followed along, he believed Ingram was aware of the patrol car. Ingram made numerous turns with no apparent motivation or destination before suddenly pulling into the driveway of a residence located at 1630 N.W. 19th Street. Sgt. Bell parked up the street, near the corner, and watched as Ingram and his female passenger sat in the car. After a few minutes, Ingram and his passenger exited the car and walked to a side door off the back of the house. Instead of knocking on the door or going inside, Ingram and his companion stood in the yard and began hugging.

After five to ten minutes of watching Ingram and his companion hug outside the house, Sgt. Bell decided to make contact. Sgt. Bell pulled his car forward and parked closer, leaving enough room for Ingram to pull out and drive away. Sgt. Bell exited his patrol unit, approached the couple and asked why they were at the residence. Ingram said they were there to “see a friend.” When Sgt. Bell asked for the name of the friend, Ingram was unable to give a name. Sgt. Bell found this response suspicious based on his training and experience so he asked Ingram and the woman for identification. Ingram responded by saying he did not have an I.D. so Sgt. Bell asked for a driver’s license. Ingram responded that he did not have a driver’s license either. At this point, Sgt. Bell placed Ingram under arrest for the crime of driving without a license and handcuffed him. As part of a search incident to arrest, Sgt. Bell recovered $875.00 in cash and a state identification card—not a driver’s license—from Ingram’s pocket. Meanwhile, Ingram’s female companion stood a few feet away holding her purse. When Sgt. Bell walked Ingram to his patrol car, Ingram started to resist and fight with the officer. During the scuffle, Ingram yelled back to his female companion to get in the car and leave. Ingram yelled this six to eight times in a very nervous and agitated manner. While Ingram was yelling for the woman to drive off, Sgt. Bell noticed that she put her purse in the back passenger side of Ingram’s car and started walking around to the driver’s side. Sgt. Bell yelled at the woman not to leave or he would arrest her. At this point, she complied with the officer’s commands and stood in front of the car. Sgt. Bell, in turn, put Ingram on the ground and called for backup. When the backup officers arrived, Ingram and his female companion were placed inside a patrol car. It was at this point that Sgt. Bell learned that Ingram’s driver’s license had been revoked. Upon detaining Ingram and his female companion, Sgt. Bell and the other officers conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle Ingram was driving. Sgt. Bell believed narcotics were inside the car based on Ingram’s inability to give the name of the friend he was supposedly at the house to see; Ingram’s erratic conduct when he was detained; the repeated and frantic yelling at his female companion to drive away in the car; the prominence of drug-related activity in the surrounding neighborhood; the large amount of cash in Ingram’s pocket; and the female companion’s placement of her purse in the backseat of the car while Sgt. Bell was interacting with Ingram. The officers found roughly 230 grams of crack cocaine, some empty baggies and a razor blade inside the car. These items were located inside a trash bag full of clothes in the back seat, near the area where the woman had placed her purse. The officers also found a loaded handgun inside the purse.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

Ingram’s motion to suppress alleged that Sgt. Bell conducted an illegal stop and arrest of him and that the evidence recovered from Ingram’s person and vehicle should be suppressed based on this alleged lawless police conduct. Ingram argued that Sgt. Bell did not witness him commit any public offense. Nor did the officer have reason to believe a felony had been committed. Thus, Ingram reasoned, Sgt. Bell had no lawful grounds to stop and approach him. Because the drug-related evidence was discovered as a result of an illegal search and seizure which violated the Fourth Amendment, Ingram argued the evidence must be suppressed. The State responded that Sgt. Bell engaged in a consensual encounter at all times prior to arresting Ingram for driving without a license. Further, the arrest itself was lawful because Sgt. Bell witnessed Ingram commit the crime of driving without a license. According to the State, Sgt. Bell had probable cause based on the totality of circumstances to believe narcotics evidence was located inside the vehicle. Thus, the State urged that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement articulated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1925) authorized the officers to search the vehicle. The district court granted the defense motion to suppress, finding that Sgt. Bell’s initial contact with Ingram and the female passenger “was unreasonable and not lawful.” Judge McElwee cited the officer’s failure to observe prior to this contact the commission of any traffic offense by Ingram, the fact that Sgt. Bell had never seen Ingram or the passenger before and the location of this initial contact on private property. The district court found the officer’s arrest of Ingram was unlawful thus requiring suppression of “any information that came from that inquiry as far as asking for identification.” The district court likewise found the subsequent search of both Ingram and the vehicle he was driving was “unlawful and unreasonable.” Thus, all evidence seized by authorities in this case must be suppressed. This included the drug evidence found inside the car; the money taken from Ingram’s person; and the gun found inside the purse belonging to Ingram’s female companion. Alternatively, the district court ruled that even if Sgt. Bell’s initial contact with Ingram was lawful, the subsequent search of the automobile was not. Judge McElwee explained that the totality of circumstances leading up to Ingram’s arrest did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed. Further, Ingram’s arrest took place away from his vehicle and therefore he did not have the means or ability to reach inside for a weapon or to dispose of evidence. Moreover, the district court concluded that it was not reasonable to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of driving without a license.

ANALYSIS

The State brings this appeal under 22 O.S.2011, § 1053(5) and challenges the district court’s order granting the defense motion to suppress. Section 1053(5) provides that the State may appeal “upon a pretrial order, decision, or judgment suppressing or excluding evidence where appellate review of the issue would be in the best interests of justice.” We find that the best interests of justice warrant review of the State’s appeal because the suppressed evidence forms a substantial part of the State’s evidence. Thus, the State’s ability to prosecute Ingram in this case is substantially impaired absent the suppressed evidence and our review here is appropriate.

“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence based on a complaint of an illegal search and seizure, this Court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are not supported by competent evidence and are therefore clearly erroneous. We review the trial court’s legal conclusions based on those facts de novo.”

Applying this standard of review to the present case, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Sgt. Bell’s initial contact with Ingram violated the Fourth Amendment. Ingram had a right under both the United States and Oklahoma constitutions to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. However, Sgt. Bell’s initial contact with Ingram and his female companion in the yard of the residence did not constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. “Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, or by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen.” There is no seizure in these situations so long as the person would feel free under the totality of the circumstances “to disregard the police and go about his business.”

The record in the present case shows that Sgt. Bell approached Ingram and engaged in conversation with him about the couple’s purpose for being at the residence. Sgt. Bell did not activate the emergency lights on his patrol unit or brandish a weapon. And the record does not show that he used a commanding or threatening manner or tone of voice when he made contact with Ingram and his companion. Nor did he block Ingram’s car in the driveway. The record shows Ingram and his companion stood outside the house and hugged for five to ten minutes before Sgt. Bell approached and the couple did not move from this location during the officer’s initial contact. The record shows too that Ingram answered the officer’s questions and did not attempt to walk away or end the conversation. Under the total circumstances, Sgt. Bell’s contact with Ingram in the yard amounted to a consensual encounter.

The occurrence of this consensual encounter on private property is of no consequence. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable government intrusion not only inside one’s home but also within the curtilage, that is, the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home” and “to which the activity of home life extends” such as the front porch and yard. However, assuming arguendo that Sgt. Bell entered the curtilage around the home, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Ingram lived at the 1630 N.W. 19th Street address or was anything other than a stranger to the property. Ingram’s statement to Sgt. Bell that he was there to see a friend does not suggest Ingram had any possessory or privacy interest in the property.

Moreover, Sgt. Bell testified that he returned to the residence and spoke with the people who lived there. The occupants of the house said they did not know Ingram or the female. It is well settled that “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted.” Fourth Amendment rights may only be enforced “where a search and seizure infringes on a defendant’s own rights.” In the present case, Ingram failed to meet his burden of showing that he had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the curtilage of the residence which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

We find too that Sgt. Bell’s arrest of Ingram, and the officer’s subsequent search of both Ingram and the car, were reasonable. Ingram was arrested for driving without a license only after admitting he did not have a driver’s license. Sgt. Bell witnessed Ingram driving the car minutes earlier. This gave Sgt. Bell probable cause to arrest Ingram for this crime. Because Sgt. Bell was authorized to arrest Ingram, the warrantless recovery of the $875.00 in cash from Ingram’s pocket was justified as a search incident to arrest.

The sole question remaining is whether Sgt. Bell’s warrantless search of the vehicle was reasonable. A police officer may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if the officer has probable cause to believe based on the known facts that there are illegal drugs or other contraband inside the vehicle. In the present case, Sgt. Bell had probable cause based on the totality of circumstances to believe that contraband was located inside the car. The large wad of cash recovered from Ingram’s pocket; Ingram’s refusal to identify himself using the state identification card located in his pocket; the surrounding area’s prominence as a high-crime area; Ingram’s physical resistance when placed under arrest and repeated, frantic directives to his female companion to drive away in the car; along with the female companion’s placement of her handbag in the backseat of the car while Sgt. Bell was scuffling with Ingram, all supported a finding of probable cause that narcotics or evidence of illegal drug activity would be found in the car. The district court thus abused its discretion in suppressing evidence recovered from the officers’ search of the car.

Based upon the total circumstances, Ingram’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by his initial encounter with Sgt. Bell; his search incident to arrest for driving without a license; and the officers’ subsequent search of the automobile. Based upon the foregoing, the district court abused its discretion in granting Ingram’s motion to suppress.

DECISION

The District Court’s order sustaining Appellee’s motion to suppress is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.

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Footnotes:

1. Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-415
2. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283
3. Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-503.1
4. 22 O.S.2011, § 1053(5)
5. Carroll U. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1925)
6. Arizona U. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009)
7. 22 O.S.2011, § 1053(5)
8. 22 O.S.2011, § 196
9. 47 O.S.2011, § 6-112
10. 47 O.S.Supp.2016, § 6-303
11. Wyoming U. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999)
12. Pennsylvania U. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1031 (1996)
13. United States U. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982)
14. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307, 119 S. Ct. at 1304
15. Illinois U. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)
16. Harjo U. State, 1994 OK CR 47, I 22, 882 P. 2d 1067, 1073
17. Marshall v. State, 2010 OK CR 8, IT 49, 232 P.3d 467, 479
18. Hallcy v. State, 2007 OK CR 2, I 10, 153 P:2d 66, 68-69

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-415 - Trafficking in Illegal Drugs
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283 - Felon in Possession of a Firearm
• Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-503.1 - Possession of Proceeds Derived from a Violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1053(5) - Appeals by the State
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 196 - Warrantless Arrests
• Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 6-112 - Driving Without a License
• Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 6-303 - Driving Without a Valid License
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1115.1 - Eligibility for Release

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
• State v. Strawn, 2018 OK CR 2, II 18, 419 P.3d 249, 253
• State v. Alba, 2015 OK CR 2, II 4, 341 P.3d 91, 92
• Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009)
• Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386
• California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1552
• State v. Goins, 2004 OK CR 5, II 17-18, 84 P.3d 767, 770-71
• Coffia v. State, 2008 OK CR 24, II 11, 191 P.3d 594, 598
• Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6-7, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15
• Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742
• Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670, 201 L. Ed. 2d 9
• Hill v. State, 1972 OK CR 211, II 56, 500 P.2d 1080, 1090
• Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S. Ct. 961, 966
• State v. Marcum, 2014 OK CR 1, II 7, 319 P.3d 681, 683
• Champeau v. State, 1984 OK CR 54, I 11, 678 P.2d 1192, 1196
• Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, IT 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170
• Williams v. State, 2008 OK CR 19, I 27, 188 P.3d 208
• Harvey v. State, 1969 OK CR 220, I 9, 58 P.2d 336, 338
• Stouffer v. State, 2006 OK CR 46, I 60, 147 P.3d 245, 263
• Price v. State, 1911 OK CR 54, 5 Okla. Crim. 147, 113 P. 1061, 1062
• Edwards v. State, 1913 OK CR 108, 9 Okla. Crim. 306, 131 P. 956, 961
• Johnson v. State, 1988 OK CR 182, 761 P.2d 884, 887
• United States v. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017)
• Seabolt v. State, 2006 OK CR 50, I 5, 152 P.3d 235, 237
• Smith v. State, 2018 OK CR 4, I 3, 419 P.3d 257, 259
• Runnels v. State, 2018 OK CR 27, I 41, 426 P.3d 614, 624
• Harjo v. State, 1994 OK CR 47, I 22, 882 P.2d 1067, 1073
• Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332
• Marshall v. State, 2010 OK CR 8, IT 49, 232 P.3d 467, 479
• Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11