State Of Oklahoma v Mario Alexander

S-2015-723

Filed: Sep. 8, 2016

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Mario Alexander

Summary

Mario Alexander appealed his conviction for Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Marijuana), Public Intoxication, and Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. The conviction and sentence were dismissed. Judge Lumpkin dissented. In this case, the police stopped Alexander's car for a traffic issue. During the stop, the officer noticed signs of intoxication, found out Alexander had an outstanding warrant, and arrested him. However, Alexander argued that the evidence found during the stop should not be used against him because the traffic stop was illegal. The district court agreed and decided to suppress the evidence, meaning it couldn't be used in court, because it believed the officer had acted improperly. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld this decision, stating that the officer's actions violated Alexander's rights. The court affirmed the dismissal of the charges against him.

Decision

The ruling of the trial court sustaining Alexander's Motion to Suppress and Dismiss is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2016), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• Was there an abuse of discretion by the district court in sustaining Alexander's motion to suppress evidence and dismissing the charges against him?
• Did the traffic stop conducted by the Oklahoma Highway Patrol trooper meet legal requirements for justification at its inception?
• Was Alexander's removal from the car and subsequent handcuffing justified under the circumstances of the traffic stop?
• Did the trooper's discovery of Alexander's outstanding warrant constitute an intervening circumstance that attenuated the causal connection between any illegal stop and the evidence seized?
• Was the trooper's conduct during the traffic stop characterized as flagrant misconduct, warranting the suppression of evidence obtained?

Findings

• the district court properly sustained Alexander's Motion to Suppress
• the State's arguments regarding the legality of the traffic stop and subsequent actions of the trooper were rejected
• the discovery of the outstanding warrant did not attenuate the taint of the illegal stop
• the trooper's conduct was found to be flagrant and not merely a mistake

S-2015-723

Sep. 8, 2016

State Of Oklahoma

Appellant

v

Mario Alexander

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

JOHNSON, JUDGE:

The State of Oklahoma charged Appellee Mario Alexander in the District Court of Okmulgee County, Case Number CF-2014-543, with Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Marijuana), Second and Subsequent Offense (Count 1), in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2012, § 2-402, Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Count 2) in violation of 63 O.S.2011, § 2-405, and Public Intoxication (Count 3) in violation of 37 O.S.Supp.2013, § 8. Alexander filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his person during a traffic stop and to dismiss the case against him. (O.R. 30) The district court held a hearing on July 30, 2015 and August 7, 2015, and the Honorable Kenneth E. Adair sustained Appellee Alexander’s Motion to Suppress and Dismiss. The State of Oklahoma appeals that order. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 22 O.S.2011, § 1053 and affirm the district court’s order for reasons discussed below.

BACKGROUND

On November 9, 2014, an Oklahoma Highway Patrol trooper on routine patrol observed two vehicles on the side of the road. A pickup truck with two occupants appeared disabled because its hood was opened. A maroon car with three occupants drove away as the trooper approached. The trooper did not check on the disabled pickup, but instead pursued and stopped the maroon car because it had a cracked windshield and an inoperable third brake light. The trooper asked the occupants for identification, including Appellee Alexander who was the front seat passenger. Alexander identified himself and explained that he had no identification with him. The trooper had Alexander come back to his cruiser to get [Alexander’s] information because he identifies all car occupants during every stop for officer safety. (P.H. 8, 13) At preliminary hearing the trooper testified he detected the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Alexander while in his cruiser and noticed Alexander had slurred speech and lethargic movements. (P.H. 9) The trooper confirmed Alexander’s identity and learned he had an outstanding warrant. (P.H. 9) The trooper said he placed Alexander under arrest for the outstanding warrant and for public intoxication. (P.H. 9) At the suppression hearing, the trooper’s account of the traffic stop differed in several respects. He claimed that he detected the odor of alcohol when the driver opened his door. (Supp.Hrg. 23) He said he asked for identification and began to separate the suspects, the subjects, to see where the alcohol was coming from. (Supp.Hrg. 25) He testified he had Alexander exit the car because of suspicions from Alexander’s behavior that he was intoxicated. (Supp.Hrg. 25- 27) The trooper said he immediately smelled the odor of alcohol about Alexander as Alexander exited the car. (Supp.Hrg.27) Although he denied handcuffing Alexander before putting him in the cruiser, he changed his position after the prosecutor asked if he would disagree if the dashcam video showed otherwise. (Supp.Hrg. 28) The trooper claimed he had no intention of arresting Alexander at that point and told Alexander explicitly that he was not under arrest. (Supp.Hrg 28) He verified Alexander’s identity and discovered Alexander had an outstanding warrant. (Supp.Hrg. 29) The trooper conceded that he omitted information from his report concerning Alexander’s intoxication because he made a deal that if Alexander was honest about the location of any contraband on his person the trooper would not include a charge of public intoxication.¹ (Supp.Hrg. 35-36) Alexander admitted he had marijuana in his shoe in response to the trooper’s questions.

DISCUSSION

The State argues the district court abused its discretion in sustaining Alexander’s motion to suppress evidence and ultimately dismissing the charges against him. The State contends that the traffic stop was justified at its inception and that Alexander’s removal from the car was reasonable. The State concedes that handcuffing Alexander before placing him in the trooper’s cruiser does not comport to the dictates of current case law and that the trooper’s continued questioning of Alexander after handcuffing him was inappropriate. The State argues suppression of the marijuana and rolling papers found on Alexander, however, was unwarranted because the trooper’s subsequent discovery of Alexander’s outstanding warrant constituted an intervening circumstance breaking the connection between the illegal arrest and discovery of contraband. The State insists that the trooper’s actions were not flagrantly illegal and exclusion of the evidence is unwarranted. When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we give great deference to the factual findings and credibility determinations of the district court, and review those findings only for clear error. See Terry v. State, 2014 OK CR 14, I 6, 334 P.3d 953, 955, cert. denied, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 2053, 191 L. Ed. 2d 958 (2015). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and exercise our independent judgment as to whether an officer’s encounter with a criminal defendant was lawful. Id. Generally, the discovery of an outstanding warrant is a significant intervening event that gives police probable cause to arrest a defendant independent from any illegal stop and seizure. See Jacobs v. State, 2006 OK CR 4, 19 9-11, 128 P.3d 1085, 1088-89. We adopted the rule in Jacobs that If, during a non-flagrant but illegal stop, the police learn the defendant’s name, and the disclosure of that name leads to the discovery of an outstanding warrant for the defendant’s arrest, and the execution of that warrant leads to the discovery of evidence, the existence of the arrest warrant will be deemed an independent intervening circumstance that dissipates the taint of the initial illegal stop vis-à-vis the evidence discovered as a consequence of a search incident to the execution of the arrest warrant. Id. at IT 10, 128 P.3d at 1089 quoting McBath v. State, 108 P.3d 241, 248 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). We observed that this rule balanced a defendant’s right against illegal search and seizure with the community’s expectation that a valid arrest warrant may be served upon a subject, even if police learned about the arrest warrant after an illegal stop. Id. at II 11. We also found the rule discouraged police from flagrantly illegal, investigatory seizures while at the same time avoided punishing police for mistakes or errors made in good faith. Id. The United States Supreme Court recently considered whether police discovery of a valid arrest warrant sufficiently attenuated the connection between an unconstitutional detention and the evidence seized incident to the arrest for the warrant. See Utah v. Strieff, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 2016 WL , , 3369419 (June 20, 2015). The Court framed the question under review as whether the attenuation doctrine applies when an officer makes an unconstitutional investigatory stop; learns during that stop that the suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant; and proceeds to arrest the suspect and seize incriminating evidence during a search incident to that arrest. Strieff at *3. The Court answered affirmatively, holding that the evidence the officer seized as part of the search incident to arrest is admissible because the officer’s discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest. Id. The Court in Strieff analyzed three factors identified in Brown v. Illinois² in deciding whether the discovery of a valid arrest warrant was a sufficient intervening event to break the causal chain between the unlawful detention and the discovery of drug-related evidence on the accused. The factors considered ² 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) 5 were (1) the temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Id. at *5. The Court held that the short time frame between the illegal stop and the search weighed in favor of suppression. The discovery of the defendant’s arrest warrant constituted an intervening circumstance that strongly weighed in favor of the State. The third factor—the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct—also favored the State because the officer was at most negligent. The district court in Alexander’s case did not explicitly address the first two factors considered in Strieff (and Brown); the circumstances, however, are similar to those in Strieff with the first factor favoring suppression because of the short time frame between the detention and the search and the second factor favoring the State because of the discovery of Alexander’s warrant. The district court concentrated on the third factor, finding in this case it favored suppression because the trooper’s actions during the traffic stop amounted to conduct that should be deterred rather than good faith, honest mistakes. The court found portions of the trooper’s testimony inconsistent and unbelievable including his reasons for the traffic stop, his suspicions of Alexander’s intoxication and his handcuffing of Alexander in the name of officer safety. The court was particularly troubled by the trooper’s removal of Alexander from the car to verify his identity and the trooper’s immediate restraint of Alexander with handcuffs. The court found the restraint amounted to an arrest in spite of the trooper’s assurances to Alexander that he was not under arrest. The court was further troubled by the trooper’s failure to warn Alexander of his constitutional rights following the discovery of his arrest warrant and by the manner in which the trooper obtained Alexander’s unwarned confession that he had weed in his shoe. The trooper elicited the incriminating statement by offering to forgo a public intoxication charge if Alexander was honest and volunteered the location of any contraband on his person. The district court found the illegality had a quality of purposefulness and that the impropriety of the arrest and subsequent unwarned questioning was obvious and flagrantly abusive. That court was fairly convinced the trooper embarked upon the traffic stop in the hope that something beyond the vehicle’s defective equipment problems might turn up. The district court’s factual findings and credibility choices are not clearly wrong and we defer to them. Moreover, the district court applied the correct legal standard. The first and third of the Strieff/Brown factors support suppression. The unlawful arrest, the failure to give Miranda warnings and the coercive questioning prompting Alexander’s confession demonstrate a flagrant abuse of Alexander’s Fourth Amendment rights.

DECISION

The ruling of the trial court sustaining Alexander’s Motion to Suppress and Dismiss is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2016), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

1. The trooper conceded that he omitted information from his report concerning Alexander's intoxication because he made a deal that if Alexander was honest about the location of any contraband on his person the trooper would not include a charge of public intoxication.¹ (Supp.Hrg. 35-36)
2. The trooper did not list public intoxication in his report, but the District Attorney elected to file that charge against Alexander. (Supp. 40-41)
3. See Terry v. State, 2014 OK CR 14, ¶ 6, 334 P.3d 953, 955, cert. denied, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 2053, 191 L. Ed. 2d 958 (2015).
4. See Jacobs v. State, 2006 OK CR 4, ¶¶ 9-11, 128 P.3d 1085, 1088-89.
5. See Utah v. Strieff, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 2016 WL , , 3369419 (June 20, 2015).
6. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-402 (2012) - Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance
• Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 2-405 (2011) - Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
• Okla. Stat. tit. 37 § 8 (2013) - Public Intoxication
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1053 (2011) - Jurisdiction and Authority of Court

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found

Case citations:

• Terry v. State, 2014 OK CR 14, I 6, 334 P.3d 953, 955, cert. denied, U.S. , 135 S. Ct. 2053, 191 L. Ed. 2d 958 (2015)
• Jacobs v. State, 2006 OK CR 4, 19 9-11, 128 P.3d 1085, 1088-89
• McBath v. State, 108 P.3d 241, 248 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005)
• Utah v. Strieff, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 2016 WL , , 3369419 (June 20, 2015)
• Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)