State Of Oklahoma v Isaac Paul Bell

S-2013-127

Filed: Sep. 8, 2013

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Isaac Paul Bell

Summary

Isaac Paul Bell appealed his conviction for Possession of a Weapon on School Property. The court upheld the decision to dismiss his case and ruled that the initial stop and search of his vehicle were not justified. Judge Kurt Glassco had already decided to dismiss the case because the police did not have enough reason to detain Bell based on the situation. The court concluded that the officer acted wrongfully and that Bell's consent to search was not valid because it followed an illegal detention. No judges disagreed with the decision.

Decision

The Order of the District Court of Tulsa County Sustaining the Defendant's Motion to Quash and Dismiss is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2013), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• Was there reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of the defendant based on the presence of weapons in plain view?
• Did the defendant's consent to search the vehicle result from a valid public safety exception to Miranda?
• Did the State show probable cause for the bindover regarding the defendant's possession of a handgun on school property without a license?

Findings

• The district court did not err in suppressing the evidence due to lack of reasonable suspicion for detention.
• The district court did not err in suppressing the evidence as the public safety exception to Miranda did not apply.
• Proposition III is moot as a result of the resolutions of Propositions I and II.

S-2013-127

Sep. 8, 2013

State Of Oklahoma

Appellant

v

Isaac Paul Bell

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

Michael S. Richie Smith, Vice Presiding Judge:

Isaac Paul Bell was charged with Possession of Weapon on School Property in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1280.1, in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2012-4704. On January 28, 2013, Bell filed a Motion to Quash and Dismiss. The Honorable Kurt Glassco sustained that motion after a February 4, 2013 hearing. The State appeals. The State raises three propositions of error in support of its petition:

I. The district court erred in suppressing the evidence because the presence of weapons in plain view justified detention of the defendant and provided reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle;

II. The district court erred in suppressing the evidence because defendant’s consent to search was in response to the officer’s valid inquiry as to other weapons in the vehicle under the public safety exception to Miranda; and

III. The district court erred in quashing the bindover because the State showed probable cause that defendant was in violation of the statute relating to handguns on school property since he was not licensed to carry the gun under the Oklahoma self-defense act.

After thorough consideration of the entire record before us, including the original record, transcripts, exhibits and briefs, we find that the law and evidence do not require relief. 1 In its Petition in Error, the State describes the appeal as brought under 22 O.S.2011, §§ 1053(4) and (5). Subsection 5 of § 1053 allows for expedited State appeals where a trial court has suppressed or excluded evidence and appellate review would be in the best interests of justice. This statutory provision was added to allow the State to bring what is essentially an interlocutory appeal, where evidence has been suppressed but the case continues. Bell’s case was dismissed. Whatever relief this Court may grant, it cannot include remanding the case for further proceedings. As the case has been dismissed, § 1053(5) is not the appropriate avenue for this appeal. State v. Love, 2004 OK CR 11, 11 n.1, 85 P.3d 849, 849 n.1. The appropriate statutory section for the State’s appeal of the trial court’s decision quashing and dismissing the case is § 1053(4).

We find in Propositions I and II that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining Bell’s motion. We review a ruling on a motion to quash for abuse of discretion. State v. Delso, 2013 OK CR 5, ¶ 5, 298 P.3d 1192, 1193-94. An abuse of discretion is an unreasonable or arbitrary action taken without proper consideration of the facts and law at issue, a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, against the logic and effect of the facts presented. Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, ¶ 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170. An officer conducting an investigative stop must have, at least, an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or driver is in violation of the law. McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, ¶ 24, 37 P.3d 130, 136. The question is whether the officer’s action was justified when it began, and whether his subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the initial interference. Id.; United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The State must show that an investigative detention is temporary, lasts no longer than necessary for the purposes of the stop, and used the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel an officer’s suspicion in a short period of time. McGaughey, 2001 OK CR 33, ¶ 27, 37 P.3d at 137.

The State suggests McGaughey does not apply to this case. Although the factual circumstances differ, the legal test remains the same. Officer Berenger approached Bell to discuss a student parking permit. As Bell got out of his truck, Berenger saw two sheathed hunting knives stored in the driver’s door side pocket. Without discussing the parking permit, Berenger immediately handcuffed Bell and asked if he had anything else in the truck. Nothing in the record supports any conclusion that Bell responded inappropriately or threatened Berenger in any way, or that Berenger’s actual personal safety, or the safety of the school, were at issue. Nor was Bell breaking any state law. State law allows hunting knives, properly stored, and in a privately owned vehicle, to be brought on school property, where the vehicle is used to transport a student and is not left unattended on school property. 21 O.S.Supp.2012, § 1280.1(C). This precisely describes Bell’s possession of the hunting knives at the time he was approached by Berenger.

Bell’s detention was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the initial stop – the parking permit; nor did Berenger use the least intrusive means reasonably available to dispel or verify his suspicions in a short amount of time. The State relies on several cases to argue that detention was justified because the knives were in plain view, or that Berenger had a reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying Bell’s detention. All these cases differ significantly in facts from Bell’s case. Although Berenger’s initial reason for approaching Bell’s truck was valid, it did not constitute a violation of state law. The record shows Berenger observed nothing constituting a violation of state law, Bell was neither threatening nor nervous, nor were there any other circumstances which might have aroused Berenger’s suspicion, apart from the properly sheathed and stored knives.

The State argues that Bell’s subsequent consent to search his car was valid, because the public safety exception justified Berenger in questioning Bell without first giving Miranda warnings. Miranda warnings must be given if a person is in custody or otherwise significantly deprived of freedom of action. Bryan v. State, 1997 OK CR 15, ¶ 15, 935 P.2d 338, 351. A person is in custody if, in the same circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). The public safety exception applies where the situation demands that officers ask questions necessary to secure their own safety or that of the public. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984). The United States Supreme Court described this as having an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated with the weapon. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8, 104 S.Ct. at 2633 n. 8. The record does not support a conclusion that the public safety exception applies here.

We must consider whether Bell’s illegal detention tainted his subsequent consent to the search of his truck. Again, McGaughey is instructive. There, we discussed the issue of consent to search during unlawful detention, setting forth three factors for consideration: (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal detention and the consent, (2) any intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s unlawful conduct. McGaughey, 2001 OK CR 33, ¶ 38, 37 P.3d at 141. Here, Bell’s consent followed immediately his illegal detention and there were no intervening circumstances. Berenger immediately handcuffed Bell before engaging in any investigation, and Bell had at that point broken no laws; the record does not suggest Berenger’s further conduct was improper or had an illegal purpose. Weighing these factors, the State did not show Bell’s consent was voluntary. Furthermore, Bell’s consent was given only after he had been handcuffed, and an armed, uniformed officer questioned him without first giving Miranda warnings. Under these circumstances, we cannot find Bell’s consent to search overcame the taint of his illegal detention.

Given our resolution of Propositions I and II, Proposition III is moot.

DECISION

The Order of the District Court of Tulsa County Sustaining the Defendant’s Motion to Quash and Dismiss is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2013), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Click Here To Download PDF

Footnotes:

1. Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1053(4)
2. Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1053(5)
3. 21 O.S.Supp.2012 § 1280.1(C)
4. Bryan v. State, 1997 OK CR 15, 15, 935 P.2d 338, 351
5. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)
6. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984)
7. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)
8. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
9. McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, 24, 37 P.3d 130, 136
10. McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, 27, 37 P.3d at 137
11. McGaughey v. State, 2001 OK CR 33, 38, 37 P.3d at 141
12. Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170
13. State U. Love, 2004 OK CR 11, 11 n.1, 85 P.3d 849, 849 n.1
14. State U. Delso, 2013 OK CR 5, 5, 298 P.3d 1192, 1193-94

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1280.1 - Possession of Weapon on School Property
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1053(4) - Appeals by the State
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1053(5) - Expedited State Appeals

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

No case citations found.