Darrin Wayne Culley v The State Of Oklahoma

RE-2018-348

Filed: Sep. 26, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Darrin Wayne Culley appealed his conviction for Child Abuse. Conviction and sentence were partially revoked, with Culley initially receiving a 15-year suspended sentence, but 10 years were subsequently revoked. Judge Kuehn dissented.

Decision

The partial revocation of Appellant's suspended sentence in Pontotoc District Court Case No. CF-2010-425 is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• Was there a violation of Appellant's due process rights during the revocation hearing?
• Did the Appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel that resulted in his stipulation to the State's Motion to Revoke?

Findings

• the trial court did not err in revoking Appellant's suspended sentence when the record demonstrates that he received a fair hearing as required by due process
• Culley's stipulation to the State's revocation application was knowing and voluntary
• the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit
• the partial revocation of Appellant's suspended sentence in Pontotoc District Court Case No. CF-2010-425 is AFFIRMED

RE-2018-348

Sep. 26, 2019

Darrin Wayne Culley

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

HUDSON, JUDGE: On February 24, 2014, Appellant Culley, represented by counsel, entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of Child Abuse in Pontotoc County Case No. CF-2010-425. He was sentenced to fifteen (15) years imprisonment, suspended in full. On September 28, 2016, the State filed a Motion to Revoke Suspended Sentence, alleging that Culley committed the new offense of Domestic Abuse – Assault and Battery – Second or Subsequent Offense as charged in Pontotoc County Case No. CF-2016-602. A combined revocation hearing (Case No. CF-2010-425) and preliminary hearing (Case No. CF-2016-602) was held December 20, 2017. Culley stipulated to the allegations in the State’s Motion to Revoke (Case No. CF-2010-425) and entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges in Case No. CF-2016-602. At the conclusion of the hearing the Honorable Greg Pollard, Special Judge, revoked ten (10) years of Culley’s fifteen (15) year suspended sentence. From this Judgment and Sentence Culley appeals, raising two propositions of error:

I. The trial court erred in revoking Appellant’s suspended sentence when the record does not show he received a fair hearing as required by due process under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7, of the Oklahoma Constitution; and

II. Mr. Culley was denied effective assistance of counsel that resulted in his stipulation to the State’s Motion to Revoke.

The partial revocation of Culley’s suspended sentence is AFFIRMED. Culley alleges at Proposition I that his revocation hearing due process rights were violated because his stipulation to the State’s revocation application was not knowing and voluntary. At Proposition II he argues that his stipulation to the State’s revocation application was a result of counsel’s ineffective assistance. As these two claims are integrally related, they will be addressed jointly.

The United States Supreme Court has established that defendants have minimum due process rights at parole revocation hearings, which include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).

Culley does not allege that he was deprived of any of the Morrissey protections. Rather, he argues that counsel was ineffective, resulting in a defective revocation hearing. In support of this claim, Culley argues that he only met with counsel twice prior to the revocation hearing and the two did not discuss potential defenses to the alleged probation violations. Culley alleges he received the State’s plea and stipulation offer the morning of the combined revocation/preliminary hearing, and felt rushed or pressured into accepting the State’s offer, making his stipulation invalid. Culley did not object to the trial court’s acceptance of his stipulation, and we review his claim for plain error only. Simpson U. State, 1994 OK CR 40 I 2, 876 P.2d 690, 693. To prevail on a plain error claim, Culley must show an actual error, which is plain or obvious, that affects a substantial right. Bench U. State, 2018 OK CR 31, I 22, 431 P.3d 929, 945.

This Court has rejected the argument that stipulations at a revocation hearing are the functional equivalent to a guilty plea. Robinson U. State, 1991 OK CR 44, 2-3, 809 P.2d 1320, 1321. Culley cites no controlling authority, and we find none, requiring that a stipulation to a revocation application meet the stringent knowing and voluntary criteria established by the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court governing the acceptance of a guilty plea. Fields U. State, 1996 OK CR 35, I 28, 923 P.2d 624, 629; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).

Nevertheless, the trial court questioned Culley extensively, inquiring if he had reviewed the State’s proposed agreement, if he was pressured into stipulating to the State’s revocation application, if he was acting under his own free will, if he had a free and clear mind, and if he understood the consequences of stipulating. When asked if he was prepared to stipulate to the State’s claim that he violated the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence probation, Culley replied [T]hat is one hundred percent correct. It is clear that Culley’s stipulation was knowing and voluntary, despite his claims to the contrary. Culley was fully aware of the consequences of stipulating to the State’s revocation application, and that the consequences of the stipulation would result in incarceration. We find no error here.

We also find no merit in Culley’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Hansen v. State, 2009 OK CR 13, 35, 206 P.3d 1020, 1031. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the standard set forth in Strickland U. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Smith U. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289, 120 S.Ct. 746, 765, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) ([Petitioner] must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.). A defendant must show both (1) deficient performance, by demonstrating that counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable, and (2) resulting prejudice, by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland U. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-66. And we recognize that [a] court considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Harrington U. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (quoting Strickland U. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065).

Culley has not shown, with a reasonable probability, that the trial court’s decision to partially revoke his suspended sentence would have been different but for counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance. Culley has failed to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient or objectively unreasonable, and he is unable to show any resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064. Culley’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.

DECISION
The partial revocation of Appellant’s suspended sentence in Pontotoc District Court Case No. CF-2010-425 is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

1. Culley was sentenced to ten (10) years in Case No. CF-2016-602, the sentence to be served concurrently with his suspended sentence in Case No. CF-2010-425. Culley's appeal of that conviction was dismissed by this Court at Culley's request on June 27, 2018. See Culley v. State, C-2018-90 (June 27, 2018) (Not for Publication).
2. The United States Supreme Court has established that defendants have "minimum" due process rights at parole revocation hearings, which include "(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
3. Culley cites no controlling authority, and we find none, requiring that a stipulation to a revocation application meet the stringent "knowing and voluntary" criteria established by the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court governing the acceptance of a guilty plea. Fields U. State, 1996 OK CR 35, I 28, 923 P.2d 624, 629; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969).
4. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Smith U. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289, 120 S.Ct. 746, 765, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) ("[Petitioner] must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.").
5. A defendant must show both (1) deficient performance, by demonstrating that counsel's conduct was objectively unreasonable, and (2) resulting prejudice, by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland U. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-66.
6. "[A] court considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must apply a 'strong presumption' that counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Harrington U. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (quoting Strickland U. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065).
7. Culley's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

No Oklahoma statutes found.

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)
• Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690
• Bench v. State, 2018 OK CR 31, 431 P.3d 929
• Robinson v. State, 1991 OK CR 44, 809 P.2d 1320
• Fields v. State, 1996 OK CR 35, 923 P.2d 624
• Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969)
• Hansen v. State, 2009 OK CR 13, 206 P.3d 1020
• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984)
• Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289 (2000)
• Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011)
• Culley v. State, C-2018-90 (June 27, 2018) (Not for Publication)