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PR 2018-1203

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Jesse Allen Johnson v The State Of Oklahoma

PR 2018-1203

Filed: May 24, 2019

For publication

Prevailing Party: Jesse Allen Johnson

Summary

# Jesse Allen Johnson appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. Conviction and sentence were vacated and the case was sent back to the District Court for resentencing. Judge Hudson dissented. In this case, Jesse Allen Johnson, who was 17 when he was originally sentenced to life without parole for First Degree Murder, argued that he should have a jury for his resentencing. His previous life sentence was found unconstitutional because he was a minor at the time, leading to the vacating of that sentence in 2018. When it came time for resentencing, Johnson asked for a jury trial, but the judge said he could not have a jury because he had previously given up that right when he pleaded guilty. Johnson then took his case to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. The court decided that he should have a jury for resentencing because he did not truly waive that right with his earlier plea. The court ruled that the district judge had made a mistake by denying Johnson's request for a jury trial. They sent the case back to the lower court to follow the rules set in previous cases about juvenile sentencing, meaning they need to allow a jury to be involved. The court stated that while his original guilty plea remains valid, he has the right to a jury for resentencing. A couple of judges disagreed with this decision. Judge Hudson wrote a dissenting opinion, stating that Johnson had previously waived his right to a jury, and therefore, the judge's decision not to grant a jury for resentencing was correct. Judge Rowland also disagreed, emphasizing that the judge had the authority to make his ruling.

Decision

**ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF AND REMANDING MATTER TO DISTRICT COURT** On November 29, 2018, Petitioner, by and through counsel Melissa A. French, filed an application for an extraordinary writ in this Court from Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-2005-5714. Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ to prohibit the Honorable Ray C. Elliott, District Judge, from resentencing him without empaneling a jury pursuant to 22 O.S.2011, § 929. Petitioner submits the District Court cannot legally sentence him without first empaneling a jury pursuant to the Mandate issued in Jesse Allen Johnson v. State of Oklahoma, Appeal No. PC 2017-755, issued May 22, 2018. Petitioner, age seventeen, entered a blind plea of guilty on November 29, 2006, to First Degree Murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Petitioner's certiorari appeal to this Court was affirmed in a Summary Opinion issued October 3, 2007, Appeal No. C-2007-83. Citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), and Luna U. State, 2016 OK CR 27, 387 P.3d 956, Petitioner filed a post-conviction application in the District Court on March 13, 2017, alleging that because he was a minor at the time he was sentenced, the imposition of a life without parole sentence was unconstitutional. The denial of Petitioner's post-conviction application was appealed to this Court. In an Order issued May 22, 2018, Appeal No. PC 2017-0755, Petitioner's sentence of life without parole was vacated and the matter was remanded to the District Court for resentencing. On August 27, 2018, Petitioner filed in the District Court a request for a jury trial on resentencing to which the State objected. A hearing was held before Judge Elliott on October 18, 2018. Judge Elliott denied Petitioner's request for a jury resentencing as he found Petitioner waived his right to sentencing by a jury when Petitioner entered his blind plea of guilty in 2006. Petitioner is seeking extraordinary relief from this Court to reverse the order denying jury resentencing. For a writ of prohibition Petitioner must establish that (1) a court, officer or person has or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of said power is unauthorized by law; and (3) the exercise of said power will result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy. Rule 10.6(A), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019). In Stevens U. State, 2018 OK CR 11, 422 P.3d 741, the District Court's order denying post-conviction relief was reversed by this Court, and the matter was remanded to the District Court for resentencing. As in the present case where Petitioner entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for First Degree Murder, Stevens was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole when he entered a negotiated plea of guilty in 1996 to First Degree Murder. Stevens directs that the trial court shall schedule the matter for resentencing in accordance with both Sections 812.1 and 929 of Title 22 and to conduct resentencing pursuant to Section 929 of Title 22. Section 929(C) directs that if a written request for a jury trial is filed within twenty days of the date of the appellate court order, the trial court shall impanel a new jury for a new sentencing proceeding. This means there is no judicial discretion in whether or not a judge proceeds with a jury for resentencing. If the State or defendant files a request, but is outside the twenty days, then the trial court must utilize Section 929(B). Allowing for a discretionary decision, Section 929(B) directs that when a criminal case is remanded for vacation of a sentence, the trial court may (1) set the case for a nonjury sentencing proceeding; or (2) if the defendant or the prosecutor so requests in writing, impanel a new sentencing jury. In this case, a written request for a jury trial was not filed within twenty days from the date of this Court's Order granting post-conviction relief. Thus, Section 929(C)'s mandatory language is not at issue, and the judge correctly used Section 929(B) in making a decision. Section 929(B) gives the trial judge the discretion to impanel a jury if requested or to set the case for nonjury sentencing. In making his decision, Judge Elliott denied Petitioner's request for jury trial resentencing based upon a finding that Petitioner waived his right to sentencing by a jury when he entered his blind plea in 2006. This finding is contrary to our decision in Stevens. Petitioner did not waive his rights under Miller when he entered his guilty plea. The Sixth Amendment demands that the trial necessary to impose life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender must be a trial by jury, unless a jury is affirmatively waived. Petitioner's waiver of his right to jury trial in 2006 was not an affirmative waiver of his rights to a jury on sentencing that he now possesses under Miller. Therefore, we find this holding is an abuse of discretion as it is contrary to this Court's holding in Stevens. Petitioner has met his burden for an extraordinary writ. The trial court's denial of Petitioner's request for jury trial resentencing based upon waiver is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for a decision using his discretion under the directives in Stevens v. State, in determining which resentencing procedure pursuant to Section 929 of Title 22 is appropriate. Petitioner's pleas of guilty and convictions remain constitutionally valid. The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit a copy of this Order to the Honorable Ray C. Elliott, District Judge, as well as the parties. IT IS SO ORDERED. WITNESS OUR HANDS AND THE SEAL OF THIS COURT this 24th day of May , 2019.

Issues

  • Was there a legal requirement for the District Court to empanel a jury for the resentencing of the Petitioner?
  • Did the Petitioner waive his right to a jury trial during the initial plea agreement?
  • Was the trial court's decision to deny a jury resentencing an abuse of discretion in light of precedents set by previous cases?
  • Did the twenty-day requirement for filing a jury trial request, as outlined in 22 O.S. § 929, apply to the Petitioner's case?
  • Did the rulings in Miller and Montgomery create a new constitutional right to jury sentencing for juvenile offenders that supersedes previous waivers of that right?

    • Findings

  • The court vacated the trial court's denial of Petitioner's request for jury trial resentencing.
  • The court remanded the matter to the trial court for a decision using discretion under the directives in Stevens v. State.
  • The court found that Petitioner did not waive his rights under Miller when he entered his guilty plea.
  • The court held that the trial court must follow the procedures established in Section 929 of Title 22 for resentencing.
  • Petitioner's pleas of guilty and convictions remain constitutionally valid.

    • PR 2018-1203

    May 24, 2019

    Jesse Allen Johnson

    Appellant

    v

    The State Of Oklahoma

    Appellee

    OPINION

    ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF AND REMANDING MATTER TO DISTRICT COURT

    On November 29, 2018, Petitioner, by and through counsel Melissa A. French, filed an application for an extraordinary writ in this Court from Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-2005-5714. Petitioner seeks an extraordinary writ to prohibit the Honorable Ray C. Elliott, District Judge, from resentencing him without empaneling a jury pursuant to 22 O.S.2011, § 929. Petitioner submits the District Court cannot legally sentence him without first empaneling a jury pursuant to the Mandate issued in Jesse Allen Johnson v. State of Oklahoma, Appeal No. PC 2017-755, issued May 22, 2018.

    Petitioner, age seventeen, entered a blind plea of guilty on November 29, 2006, to First Degree Murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Petitioner’s certiorari appeal to this Court was affirmed in a Summary Opinion issued October 3, 2007, Appeal No. C-2007-83. Citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 136 S.Ct. , 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), and Luna v. State, 2016 OK CR 27, 387 P.3d 956, Petitioner filed a post-conviction application in the District Court on March 13, 2017, alleging that because he was a minor at the time he was sentenced, the imposition of a life without parole sentence was unconstitutional. The denial of Petitioner’s post-conviction application was appealed to this Court. In an Order issued May 22, 2018, Appeal No. PC 2017-0755, Petitioner’s sentence of life without parole was vacated and the matter was remanded to the District Court for resentencing.

    On August 27, 2018, Petitioner filed in the District Court a request for a jury trial on resentencing to which the State objected. A hearing was held before Judge Elliott on October 18, 2018. Judge Elliott denied Petitioner’s request for a jury resentencing as he found Petitioner waived his right to sentencing by a jury when Petitioner entered his blind plea of guilty in 2006. Petitioner is seeking extraordinary relief from this Court to reverse the order denying jury resentencing.

    For a writ of prohibition Petitioner must establish that (1) a court, officer, or person has or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of said power is unauthorized by law; and (3) the exercise of said power will result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy. Rule 10.6(A), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019).

    In Stevens v. State, 2018 OK CR 11, ¶¶ 31, 38-40, 422 P.3d 741, 749-751, the District Court’s order denying post-conviction relief was reversed by this Court, the matter was remanded to the District Court for resentencing, and the procedures for conducting said resentencing were established. As in the present case where Petitioner entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for First Degree Murder, Stevens was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole when he entered a negotiated plea of guilty in 1996 to First Degree Murder. Stevens directs that the trial court shall schedule the matter for resentencing in accordance with both Sections 812.1 and 929 of Title 22 and to conduct resentencing pursuant to Section 929 of Title 22.

    Section 929(C) directs that if a written request for a jury trial is filed within twenty days of the date of the appellate court order, the trial court shall impanel a new jury for a new sentencing proceeding. This means there is no judicial discretion in whether or not a judge proceeds with a jury for resentencing. If the State or defendant files a request, but is outside the twenty days, then the trial court must utilize Section 929(B).

    Allowing for a discretionary decision, Section 929(B) directs that when a criminal case is remanded for vacation of a sentence, the trial court may (1) set the case for a nonjury sentencing proceeding; or (2) if the defendant or the prosecutor requests in writing, impanel a new sentencing jury. In this case, a written request for a jury trial was not filed within twenty days from the date of this Court’s Order granting post-conviction relief. Thus, Section 929(C)’s mandatory language is not at issue, and the judge correctly used Section 929(B) in making a decision.

    Section 929(B) gives the trial judge the discretion to impanel a jury if requested or to set the case for nonjury sentencing. In making his decision, Judge Elliott denied Petitioner’s request for jury trial resentencing based upon a finding that Petitioner waived his right to sentencing by a jury when he entered his blind plea in 2006.

    This finding is contrary to our decision in Stevens. Petitioner did not waive his rights under Miller when he entered his guilty plea. The Sixth Amendment demands that the trial necessary to impose life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender must be a trial by jury, unless a jury is affirmatively waived. Petitioner’s waiver of his right to jury trial in 2006 was not an affirmative waiver of his rights to a jury on sentencing that he now possesses under Miller.

    Therefore, we find this holding is an abuse of discretion as it is contrary to this Court’s holding in Stevens. Petitioner has met his burden for an extraordinary writ. The trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s request for jury trial resentencing based upon waiver is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court for a decision using his discretion under the directives in Stevens v. State, 2018 OK CR 11, ¶¶ 38-39, 422 P.3d 741, 750-751, in determining which resentencing procedure pursuant to Section 929 of Title 22 is appropriate. Petitioner’s pleas of guilty and convictions remain constitutionally valid.

    The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit a copy of this Order to the Honorable Ray C. Elliott, District Judge, as well as the parties.

    IT IS SO ORDERED.

    DAVID B. LEWIS, Presiding Judge
    DANA KUEHN, Vice Presiding Judge
    GARY L. LUMPKIN, Judge

    Footnotes:

    1. 22 O.S.2011, § 929.
    2. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).
    3. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).
    4. Luna U. State, 2016 OK CR 27, 387 P.3d 956.
    5. Stevens U. State, 2018 OK CR 11, III 31, 38-40, 422 P.3d 741, 749-751.
    6. 22 O.S.2011, § 929(C).
    7. 22 O.S.2011, § 929(B).
    8. Stevens, 2018 OK CR 11, T 23, 422 P.3d at 748.
    9. Stevens, 2018 OK CR 11, I 34, 422 P.3d at 750.
    10. 21 O.S.2011, § 701.10a.
    11. Hicks U. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 2229, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 (1980).
    12. Clemons U. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1447, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990).
    13. Lewis U. State, 2009 OK CR 30, I 4, 220 P.3d 1140, 1142.
    14. Huddleston v. State, 1985 OK CR 12, I 12, 695 P.2d 8, 10.
    15. Dobbs v. State, 1970 OK CR 124, I 6, 473 P.2d 260, 262.
    16. State U. Cooper, 2018 OK CR 40, I 11, 434 P.3d 951, 954.

    Oklahoma Statutes citations:

    • 22 O.S. 2011 § 929 - Resentencing procedures
    • 21 O.S. 2011 § 701.10a - Resentencing in death penalty cases
    • 21 O.S. 2011 § 701.8 - Sentencing for First Degree Murder

    Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

    U.S. Code citations:

    Other citations:

    Case citations:

    ## Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma

  • Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
  • Luna v. State, 2016 OK CR 27, 387 P.3d 956
  • Stevens v. State, 2018 OK CR 11, III 31, 422 P.3d 741, 749-751
  • Johnson v. State, Case No. C-2007-0083 (unpublished) (Okla. Crim. App., Oct. 3, 2007)
  • Lewis v. State, 2009 OK CR 30, I 4, 220 P.3d 1140, 1142
  • Huddleston v. State, 1985 OK CR 12, I 12, 695 P.2d 8, 10
  • Dobbs v. State, 1970 OK CR 124, I 6, 473 P.2d 260, 262
  • Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)
  • Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016)
  • Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 2229, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 (1980)
  • Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 746, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1447, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990)

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