Shawn A. Detwiler v The State Of Oklahoma

PC-2018-723

Filed: Sep. 5, 2019

For publication

Prevailing Party: Shawn A. Detwiler

Summary

Shawn A. Detwiler appealed his conviction for multiple crimes he committed when he was a juvenile. He was convicted of burglary, robbery, and other offenses and sentenced to serve a total of time ranging from five years to eighty-seven years in prison, with some sentences running consecutively. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied his request for post-conviction relief, stating that his sentences did not amount to life without parole as defined by law, even though he had committed several serious crimes as a minor. In the decision, the court explained that each sentence should be considered individually, and since Detwiler was eligible for parole at different times, his claims were not supported by the law. Judge Lewis dissented, arguing that Detwiler's long sentences effectively meant he had no real chance of being released, which he saw as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

Decision

Before the Court is Petitioner Shawn A. Detwiler's application for post-conviction relief, appealing the Garfield County District Court's denial of post-conviction relief in the following cases: CF-1996-244: Count 1-Burglary in the Second Degree; Count 2-Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property; and Counts 3 and 4-Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle. Petitioner pled guilty to all four counts and was sentenced to five years imprisonment on each count. All counts were ordered to be served concurrently. Petitioner did not appeal these convictions. The sentences for this case were discharged on September 23, 2001. CF-1996-422: Count 1-Robbery with an Imitation Firearm. Petitioner was tried and convicted at a jury trial and sentenced to forty-six years imprisonment. This Court affirmed the Judgment and Sentence in Detwiler v. State, Case No. F-1997-1513 (Okl.Cr., Dec. 11, 1998) (unpublished). CF-1996-423: Count 1-Robbery with a Firearm; and Count 2-Shooting with Intent to Kill. Petitioner was tried and convicted at a jury trial and sentenced to eighty-seven years imprisonment on Count 1, and life imprisonment on Count 2. Both counts were ordered to run consecutively with each other and with CF-1996-422. This Court affirmed the Judgments and Sentences in Detwiler v. State, Case No. F-1998-340 (Okl.Cr., Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished). The District Court denied Petitioner's request for sentence modification on April 12, 2006. CF-1996-482: Count 1-Assault and/or Battery with a Dangerous Weapon; and Count 2-Escape from Confinement. Petitioner pled guilty to both counts and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on Count 1, and three years imprisonment on Count 2. The two counts were ordered to be served concurrently. Petitioner did not appeal these convictions. Petitioner's Count 2 sentence was discharged on January 28, 2000. His Count 1 sentence was discharged on October 14, 2006. Notably, Petitioner's crimes in each of these cases occurred prior to the enactment of Section 13.1 of Title 21, which requires persons convicted of certain enumerated crimes, including crimes committed by Petitioner, to serve not less than 85% of his or her sentence prior to becoming eligible for consideration for parole. Thus, the 85% Rule is not applicable to any of Petitioner's sentences enumerated above. Petitioner argued to the court below that his sentences in the aggregate for crimes he committed as a juvenile violate the United States Constitution's Eighth Amendment as construed in Luna v. State, 2016 OK CR 27, 387 P.3d 956, and are subject to collateral attack. In an order filed June 15, 2018, the Honorable Tom L. Newby, Associate District Judge, denied Petitioner's post-conviction application finding Miller, Montgomery and Luna do not apply to Petitioner's case because he was not sentenced to life without parole or any functional equivalent. Judge Newby further found Petitioner is presently eligible for parole consideration, has previously been considered for parole, and will again be eligible for review. On appeal, Petitioner contends the District Court in analyzing his claims failed to appropriately view his sentences from his separate cases collectively as a de facto life without parole sentence. He thus argues that the District Court's denial of his application was an unreasonable determination under Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, and Montgomery v. Louisiana. To support his claim, Petitioner relies heavily on the Tenth Circuit's decision in Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2017), cert denied, Byrd v. Budder, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 475, 199 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2017). In Budder, the Tenth Circuit interpreted Graham and its progeny as applying to all juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide, and [ ] prohibit[ing] all sentences that would deny such offenders a realistic opportunity to obtain release within their lifetime. Thus, based on this interpretation, the Budder court viewed the juvenile defendant's sentences for four non-homicide offenses in the aggregate as though they were one. This Court recently addressed the Budder decision in Martinez v. State, 2019 OK CR 7, 442 P.3d 154. Noting this Court's independent duty and authority to interpret decisions of the United States Supreme Court, we disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's determination that it is clearly established [law] that Graham applied to offenders with multiple crimes and multiple charges. We further observed that while Budder involved non-homicide offenses, Martinez's multiple crimes included first degree murder. Notwithstanding this distinction, the Court held that where multiple sentences have been imposed, each sentence should be analyzed separately to determine whether it comports with the Eighth Amendment under the Graham/Miller/Montgomery trilogy of cases, rather than considering the cumulative effect of all sentences imposed upon a given defendant. We likewise reach the same determination today. While Petitioner's multiple crimes, like Budder, are non-homicide offenses, this corresponding factor does not frustrate or cause this Court to vary its interpretation in Martinez of Graham and its progeny. The Supreme Court has not explicitly held that stacked sentences imposed in a juvenile case-whether homicide or non-homicide-should be reviewed in the aggregate when conducting an Eighth Amendment analysis. Moreover, Petitioner here asks this Court to go a step further and review his sentences from his multiple and unrelated cases in the aggregate. This request is clearly beyond the bounds of the current law. We thus find, as we did in Martinez, that the Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence for multiple crimes. To do otherwise would effectively give crimes away. Graham, the applicable case in this matter, held a juvenile offender may not be sentenced to life without parole for a non-homicide crime. The Court provided that: The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. A State need not guarantee the offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term. Petitioner here has discharged his sentences in Case Nos. CF-1996-244 and CF-1996-482. As to his remaining two cases, Petitioner effectively received three separate parole-eligible life sentences under Oklahoma law-Case Nos. CF-1996-422 (46 years) and CF-1996-423 (87 years on Count 1 and life imprisonment on Count 2). Petitioner has been considered for parole on his 46-year sentence imposed in Case No. CF-1996-422. While Petitioner is not guaranteed eventual release, it is not because any one of the imposed penalties stemming from his multiple cases, when viewed separately, was unreasonably severe but because he committed multiple crimes on multiple occasions. We thus reject Petitioner's contention that his sentences viewed in the aggregate as though they were one constitute a de facto sentence of life without parole for crimes he committed as a juvenile. Based upon the length of each of Petitioner's sentences, viewed individually, and the current status of the law, we find that Petitioner has some meaningful opportunity to obtain release on parole during his lifetime. Petitioner's claim on post-conviction is thus denied. Petitioner's post-conviction appeal is DENIED.

Issues

• Was there a violation of the Eighth Amendment due to the Petitioner’s sentences being viewed as a de facto life without parole sentence?
• Did the District Court err in finding that Miller, Montgomery, and Luna do not apply to the Petitioner’s case?
• Was the aggregate sentencing approach applicable in analyzing the Petitioner’s sentences for Eighth Amendment compliance?
• Did the Court appropriately analyze the severity of individual sentences imposed on the Petitioner in relation to his juvenile status?
• Was the Petitioner provided with a meaningful opportunity for parole during his lifetime based on current legal standards?

Findings

• the court erred in denying post-conviction relief based on the interpretation of juvenile sentencing under the Eighth Amendment
• evidence was sufficient to support the individual sentences imposed for each crime
• the cumulative effect of multiple sentences does not constitute a de facto life without parole for juvenile offenders
• Petitioner has a meaningful opportunity to obtain release on parole during his lifetime

PC-2018-723

Sep. 5, 2019

Shawn A. Detwiler

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

OPINION DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

HUDSON, JUDGE:

Before the Court is Petitioner Shawn A. Detwiler’s application for post-conviction relief, appealing the Garfield County District Court’s denial of post-conviction relief in the following cases: CF-1996-244: Count 1-Burglary in the Second Degree; Count 2-Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property; and Counts 3 and 4-Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle. Petitioner pled guilty to all four counts and was sentenced to five years imprisonment on each count. All counts were ordered to be served concurrently. Petitioner did not appeal these convictions. The sentences for this case were discharged on September 23, 2001. CF-1996-422: Count 1-Robbery with an Imitation Firearm. Petitioner was tried and convicted at a jury trial and sentenced to forty-six years imprisonment. This Court affirmed the Judgment and Sentence in Detwiler v. State, Case No. F-1997-1513 (Okl.Cr., Dec. 11, 1998) (unpublished). CF-1996-423: Count 1-Robbery with a Firearm; and Count 2-Shooting with Intent to Kill. Petitioner was tried and convicted at a jury trial and sentenced to eighty-seven years imprisonment on Count 1, and life imprisonment on Count 2. Both counts were ordered to run consecutively with each other and with CF-1996-422. This Court affirmed the Judgments and Sentences in Detwiler v. State, Case No. F-1998-340 (Okl.Cr., Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished). The District Court denied Petitioner’s request for sentence modification on April 12, 2006. CF-1996-482: Count 1-Assault and/or Battery with a Dangerous Weapon; and Count 2-Escape from Confinement. Petitioner pled guilty to both counts and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment on Count 1, and three years imprisonment on Count 2. The two counts were ordered to be served concurrently. Petitioner did not appeal these convictions. Petitioner’s Count 2 sentence was discharged on January 28, 2000. His Count 1 sentence was discharged on October 14, 2006.

Notably, Petitioner’s crimes in each of these cases occurred prior to the enactment of Section 13.1 of Title 21, which requires persons convicted of certain enumerated crimes, including crimes committed by Petitioner, to serve not less than 85% of his or her sentence prior to becoming eligible for consideration for parole. Thus, the 85% Rule is not applicable to any of Petitioner’s sentences enumerated above.

Petitioner argued to the court below that his sentences in the aggregate for crimes he committed as a juvenile violate the United States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment as construed in Luna v. State, 2016 OK CR 27, 387 P.3d 956, and are subject to collateral attack. In an order filed June 15, 2018, the Honorable Tom L. Newby, Associate District Judge, denied Petitioner’s post-conviction application finding Miller, Montgomery and Luna do not apply to Petitioner’s case because he was not sentenced to life without parole or any functional equivalent. Judge Newby further found Petitioner is presently eligible for parole consideration, has previously been considered for parole, and will again be eligible for review.

On appeal, Petitioner contends the District Court in analyzing his claims failed to appropriately view his sentences from his separate cases collectively as a de facto life without parole sentence. He thus argues that the District Court’s denial of his application was an unreasonable determination under Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, and Montgomery v. Louisiana. To support his claim, Petitioner relies heavily on the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2017), cert denied, Byrd v. Budder, U.S. , 138 S. Ct. 475, 199 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2017). In Budder, the Tenth Circuit interpreted Graham and its progeny as applying to “all juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide, and [ ] prohibiting . all sentences that would deny such offenders a realistic opportunity to obtain release” within their lifetime. Thus, based on this interpretation, the Budder court viewed the juvenile defendant’s sentences for four non-homicide offenses in the aggregate as though they were one.

This Court recently addressed the Budder decision in Martinez v. State, 2019 OK CR 7, 442 P.3d 154. Noting this Court’s “independent duty and authority to interpret decisions of the United States Supreme Court[,]” we disagreed with the Tenth Circuit’s determination that it is “clearly established [law] that Graham applied to offenders with multiple crimes and multiple charges.” We further observed that while Budder involved non-homicide offenses, Martinez’s multiple crimes included first degree murder. Notwithstanding this distinction, the Court held “that where multiple sentences have been imposed, each sentence should be analyzed separately to determine whether it comports with the Eighth Amendment under the Graham/Miller/Montgomery trilogy of cases, rather than considering the cumulative effect of all sentences imposed upon a given defendant.” In reaching this determination, this Court observed that “even after Graham, Miller, and Montgomery, [juvenile] ‘defendants convicted of multiple offenses are not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ on their aggregate sentence.”

We likewise reach the same determination today. While Petitioner’s multiple crimes, like Budder, are non-homicide offenses, this corresponding factor does not frustrate or cause this Court to vary its interpretation in Martinez of Graham and its progeny. The Supreme Court has not explicitly held that stacked sentences imposed in a juvenile case-whether homicide or non-homicide-should be reviewed in the aggregate when conducting an Eighth Amendment analysis. Moreover, Petitioner here asks this Court to go a step further and review his sentences from his multiple and unrelated cases in the aggregate. This request is clearly beyond the bounds of the current law. We thus find, as we did in Martinez, that the Eighth Amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence for multiple crimes. To do otherwise would effectively give crimes away.

Graham, the applicable case in this matter, held a juvenile offender “may not be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime.” The Court provided that: The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. A State need not guarantee the offender eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term. Petitioner here has discharged his sentences in Case Nos. CF-1996-244 and CF-1996-482. As to his remaining two cases, Petitioner effectively received three separate parole-eligible life sentences under Oklahoma law-Case Nos. CF-1996-422 (46 years) and CF-1996-423 (87 years on Count 1 and life imprisonment on Count 2). Petitioner has been considered for parole on his 46-year sentence imposed in Case No. CF-1996-422. While Petitioner is not guaranteed eventual release, it is not because any one of the imposed penalties stemming from his multiple cases, when viewed separately, was unreasonably severe but because he committed multiple crimes on multiple occasions.

We thus reject Petitioner’s contention that his sentences viewed in the aggregate as though they were one constitute a de facto sentence of life without parole for crimes he committed as a juvenile. Based upon the length of each of Petitioner’s sentences, viewed individually, and the current status of the law, we find that Petitioner has some meaningful opportunity to obtain release on parole during his lifetime. Petitioner’s claim on post-conviction is thus denied.

DECISION

Petitioner’s post-conviction appeal is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

APPEARANCES ON APPEAL

DEBRA K. HAMPTON
HAMPTON LAW OFFICE
3126 S. BLVD., #304
EDMOND, OK 73013
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER
NO RESPONSE FROM THE STATE

OPINION BY: HUDSON, J.
LEWIS, P.J.: DISSENT
KUEHN, V.P.J.: DISSENT
LUMPKIN, J.: CONCUR
ROWLAND, J.: CONCUR

LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE, DISSENTING:

I respectfully dissent. Petitioner’s three consecutive sentences for his crimes of armed robbery and shooting with intent to kill, all committed when he was a juvenile, effectively consign him to imprisonment for his natural life without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release on parole based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. This is a cruel and unusual punishment that violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

I continue to operate on the assumptions that the Department of Corrections and the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board calculate parole eligibility for any sentence over 45 years, including a life sentence, as equivalent to 45 years; and that Petitioner is eligible for parole on a non-85% felony, committed before July 1, 1998, no later than the expiration of 1/3 of the sentence (15 years). Petitioner is 40 years old, and has been in prison more than two decades, during which time he has discharged other sentences. He has been considered for, and denied parole, on his current 46-year sentence. If he discharges or obtains parole from this sentence, he must then serve at least 1/3 of each of his remaining consecutive life-equivalent sentences before he is eligible for parole. From this, I infer that he faces a likely minimum of 30 more years of imprisonment before he has any meaningful opportunity for release based on his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.

Discounting the possibilities that (1) Petitioner receives parole on each of his remaining sentences on the earliest possible date, and (2) some five decades of imprisonment would have no negative impact on his current life expectancy (about age 80), I conclude that his chances of any meaningful opportunity to obtain actual release on parole someday are at best slim, and, more realistically, none.

Today’s holding is a stark breach of the basic principles underlying the decision in Graham v. Florida. Graham recognized that juveniles as a class “have lessened culpability [and] are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” By virtue of a juvenile’s youth, immaturity, and incomplete cognitive and emotional development, “[i]t is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” And juveniles “are more capable of change than adults.”

The Supreme Court in Graham concluded that “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.” Graham thus recognized a categorical rule prohibiting a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole-the worst non-capital sentence in the law-for a juvenile offender who did not commit murder, i.e., the only crime deserving of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

The Court’s “interpretation” of Graham today ignores these guiding principles. The only distinction here is between those juveniles serving life without parole for one non-homicide crime or two (in this case, three, not that it matters). The lack of any meaningful opportunity to obtain eventual release on parole based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation is the same.

Of course, the Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes “will remain behind bars for life.” Corrections and parole officials may determine that some juvenile offenders are permanently incorrigible or irreparably corrupt, and must never be released. But the holding in Graham prohibits a sentencing regime which determines from the outset that juvenile offenders “never will be fit to reenter society.”

The Eighth Amendment thus gives “all juvenile non-homicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform,” and thereby earn their eventual release. Given what this Court can reasonably know about Petitioner’s life expectancy, and the probable administration of his consecutive life-equivalent sentences by State officials, today’s “independent” interpretation of Graham ratifies a cruel and unusual punishment that the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids.

I am authorized to state Vice Presiding Judge Kuehn joins in this dissent.

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Footnotes:

1. 1999 Okla.Sess.Laws Ch. 4 (HB 1008) § 30, available at hhttp://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=369137.
2. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012).
3. Montgomery U. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016).
4. Graham U. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010).
5. O'Neil U. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331, 12 S. Ct. 693, 696-97, 36 L. Ed. 450 (1892).
6. 57 O.S.Supp.2018, § 332.7 (A)(1).
7. 57 O.S.Supp.2018, $332.7(I).

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1 - Sentencing for Certain Crimes
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 - Sentences for Juvenile Offenders
• Okla. Stat. tit. 57 § 332.7(A)(1) - Parole Eligibility
• Okla. Stat. tit. 57 § 332.7 - Parole Considerations

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

• 18 U.S.C. § juvenile offenders and life sentences - prohibiting life imprisonment without parole for juvenile offenders
• 57 O.S.Supp.2018, § 332.7 - parole eligibility for felonies

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Detwiler v. State, Case No. F-1997-1513 (Okl.Cr., Dec. 11, 1998) (unpublished)
• Detwiler v. State, Case No. F-1998-340 (Okl.Cr., Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished)
• Luna v. State, 2016 OK CR 27, 387 P.3d 956
• Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012)
• Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 136, 136 S. Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016)
• Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2017)
• Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010)
• Martinez v. State, 2019 OK CR 7, 442 P.3d 154
• Commonwealth v. Foust, 2018 Pa. Super. 39, 180 A.3d 416 (2018)
• O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 12 S. Ct. 693, 36 L. Ed. 450 (1892)