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PC-2015-6

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State Of Oklahoma v Kendall Wayne Edwards

PC-2015-6

Filed: Dec. 3, 2015

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Kendall Wayne Edwards

Summary

Kendall Wayne Edwards appealed his conviction for First Degree Murder. The conviction and sentence were vacated, and a new trial was ordered due to newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. Judge Robert L. Hudson dissented.

Decision

IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that Respondent's May 18, 2015, Request for Oral Argument is DENIED, and the December 5, 2014, final judgment of the District Court of Oklahoma County, granting the application for post-conviction relief of Respondent, Kendall Wayne Edwards, by vacating his judgment and sentence and granting him a new trial in Case No. CF-2001-1642, is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2015), MANDATE IS ORDERED ISSUED upon the filing of this decision. IT IS so ORDERED.

Issues

  • Was there a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that warranted post-conviction relief?
  • Did the district court err by granting post-conviction relief based on claims that were procedurally barred?
  • Was newly discovered evidence sufficient to undermine the confidence in the original trial's outcome?
  • Did the admission of certain opinion testimony by a police detective violate Respondent's due process rights?
  • Was there prosecutorial misconduct during the trial that infringed on Respondent's right to a fair trial?
  • Did the trial court's jury instructions and prosecutorial statements concerning self-defense violate Respondent's rights?
  • Was the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for First Degree Murder with malice aforethought?
  • Did the admission of irrelevant character evidence violate Respondent's federal due process rights?

Findings

  • the court erred in granting post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims as they were procedurally barred
  • the newly discovered evidence claim was sufficient to warrant post-conviction relief
  • the evidence was not sufficient to uphold the original murder conviction
  • the ineffective assistance of counsel issue did not affect the outcome of the new trial determination

PC-2015-6

Dec. 3, 2015

State Of Oklahoma

Appellant

v

Kendall Wayne Edwards

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

ORDER AFFIRMING DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT GRANTING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On January 5, 2015, Petitioner, the State of Oklahoma, through counsel Jennifer M. Hinsperger, Assistant District Attorney, filed a Petition in Error and supporting brief with the Clerk of this Court in appeal of a final judgment entered on December 5, 2014, by the Honorable Kenneth C. Watson, District Judge, in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CF-2001-1642. The judgment followed an evidentiary hearing in adjudication of an Application for Post-Conviction Relief that Respondent, Kendall Wayne Edwards, had filed through post-conviction counsel, Paul S. Faulk, on July 13, 2012, and which application Respondent had supplemented on August 29, 2013. (O.R. 23 & 233). The judgment granted post-conviction relief by vacating Respondent’s murder conviction and ordering a new trial for Respondent. Judge Watson granted this relief on Respondent’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and on a claim of newly discovered evidence as shown presented at evidentiary hearings on this latter claim.

On January 27, 2015, the District Court Clerk filed a post-conviction appeal record with this Court’s Clerk. On March 19, 2015, this Court issued an Order requiring the parties to file any objection they might have to the completeness of that record, and it further directed Respondent to file a brief in answer to Petitioner’s brief. No objection to the record was received, and on May 18, 2015, Respondent filed his answer brief and additionally filed Respondent’s Request for Oral Argument on the Claim of Actual Innocence.

I. Procedural Background and Respondent’s Post-Conviction Claims

Respondent was charged by Information with Murder in the First Degree, with malice aforethought, in the March 9, 2001, shooting death of Gerald Lamont Ford. (O.R. 192; Tr. 158.) A jury trial was held before the Honorable Virgil C. Black, District Judge, where Respondent was represented by retained counsel. The jury found Respondent guilty as charged and fixed punishment at life imprisonment. (Tr. 737.) On November 20, 2002, Judge Black sentenced Respondent in accordance with that verdict. Respondent appealed, and the Judgment and Sentence was affirmed. Edwards v. State, No. F-2002-1474 (Okl.Cr. March 4, 2004) (Summ. Op.) (unpublished).

On March 20, 2009, Respondent filed an Application for Post-Conviction Relief, but Judge Watson denied that Application on July 8, 2009. In Respondent’s latest post-conviction application that results in this appeal, Respondent raised eight grounds for post-conviction relief:

1. That admission of certain opinion testimony by a police detective was improper and deprived Respondent of due process and a fair trial (O.R. 30-40);
2. That prosecutorial misconduct and comments by the trial court and the prosecutors occurring during voir dire, and the jurors additionally viewing Respondent in handcuffs at different times throughout the trial proceedings, diminished the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof and violated Respondent’s right to due process (O.R. 41-51);
3. That the State’s cross-examination of Respondent improperly commented on Respondent’s right to have counsel during his questioning by police (O.R. 51-54);
4. That Respondent’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in not imposing proper objections to the errors identified in the three foregoing post-conviction claims and to hearsay evidence at trial, and that Respondent’s appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in not asserting on direct appeal an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim based on those issues (O.R. 54-64);
5. That newly discovered evidence that Respondent was not the triggerman entitles him to post-conviction relief (O.R. 64-68);
6. That the jury instructions and the prosecution’s statements concerning self-defense violated Respondent’s federal due process rights to a fair trial (O.R. 68-69);
7. That the evidence was insufficient as a matter of federal law to support a conviction of First Degree Murder with malice aforethought (O.R. 69-71); and
8. That the admission of irrelevant character evidence violated Respondent’s federal due process rights (O.R. 71-72).

With the exception of his fifth ground for relief wherein Respondent alleges newly discovered evidence, each of the foregoing claims presented issues that were raised or could have been raised in Respondent’s direct appeal or in his prior post-conviction application. For that reason, those claims were each barred as being either waived or res judicata.

In granting Respondent post-conviction relief, Judge Watson relied in part on Respondent’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. In Proposition II on appeal, Petitioner contends that this was error, as Respondent’s claim was procedurally barred because of his direct appeal and prior post-conviction application. We agree. Respondent’s Application more than once acknowledged that the acts cited as trial counsel ineffectiveness were each apparent from the record. (O.R. 55 & 62.) Respondent stated, Again, these instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were apparent from the record, no legitimate strategy excuses their exclusion from the direct appeal. (O.R. 62.) As Respondent’s direct appeal and prior post-conviction proceedings caused Respondent’s ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims to be procedurally barred, it was error for the District Court to grant him post-conviction relief based on these ineffective assistance allegations.

II. Analysis of Newly Discovered Evidence Claim

Nothing in the District Court’s order shows that its decision in favor of Respondent’s newly discovered evidence claim turned on its decision to grant post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. By every indication, these rulings were independent of one another. The District Court’s finding that Respondent suffered prejudice because he received ineffective assistance appears distinct from its finding that the outcome of Respondent’s trial is now in doubt because of the new evidence. Consequently, if we affirm the District Court’s decision on Respondent’s newly discovered evidence claim—a claim the District Court evaluated independently from that of Respondent’s ineffective assistance claim—the error occurring in disposition of the ineffective assistance claim becomes moot and standing alone does not require reversal.

A. Test for Establishing a Post-Conviction Claim for Newly Discovered Evidence and Standards of Appellate Review

The District Court observed that for new evidence to meet the standard of newly discovered evidence sufficient for overturning a conviction, it must meet the following four-part test: (1) the evidence must be material; (2) the evidence could not have been discovered before trial with due diligence; (3) the evidence cannot be cumulative; and (4) the evidence must create a reasonable probability that, had the newly discovered evidence been introduced at the original trial, it would have changed the outcome. Hunter v. State, 1992 OK CR 19, I 15, 829 P.2d 64, 67.

In an appeal from a trial court’s decision granting or denying a newly discovered evidence claim, we review for an abuse of discretion. Whether a post-conviction motion for new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence will be granted is within the discretion of the trial court and this Court will not reverse unless there is an abuse of that discretion. Hale v. State, 1991 OK CR 27, I 11, 807 P.2d 264, 268.

B. Evidence at Respondent’s Jury Trial

Respondent admitted at trial that at a 7-11 convenience store at North Harvey and Northwest Wilshire in Oklahoma City, and while he carried a handgun in the waistband of his pants, he confronted a group of rival gang members on the sidewalk outside the store’s entrance. Consequently, it is undisputed that Respondent was present and instigated the confrontation that ended in the shooting death of Gerald Lamont Ford. The key issue before the jury was whether Respondent was the one firing the shot that killed Ford. The pathologist performing the post-mortem examination on Ford’s body testified Ford was shot from the front and died from a single bullet wound that struck Ford’s heart and lung in a manner that would cause death in several minutes.

The gun used in the shooting was never found, despite a thorough sweep of the crime scene area and a search of the house where, immediately after the shooting, police located Respondent. It is undisputed that only one shot was fired and that it left a 9mm shell casing at the scene. At jury trial, Respondent admitted that when the shooting occurred, he was active in a Bloods street gang, used the name K Evil, and had several gang tattoos including one using the letters CK meaning Crip Killer. Respondent further acknowledged that on March 9, 2001, at about 5:30 P.M., he walked up to the entrance of the 7-11 with a handgun on his right hip under his shirt and confronted several Crips gang members with the use of gang-sign hand gestures and derogatory language. Respondent said as he confronted these gang members, a man in a green jersey came out from between parked cars and hit him. Respondent identified this individual as Wilbert Lee Brewer III. Respondent testified that as he struggled with Brewer, six or seven males who were in the company of Brewer came to Brewer’s aid. Respondent stated that during this fight:
I felt somebody tug at the gun like they was trying to take it off of me so I reached for it. As I reached for it, the gun fell and hit the ground.

The gun fell, I bent over to try to pick the gun up. One of them kicked it. It slid out towards the middle of the parking lot and I heard somebody say, get the gun, cuz, get the gun. By then I knew that I wasn’t going to get that gun before they was going to get that gun, so I took off running towards the east. They was on me the whole time, still hitting me.

Respondent continued by explaining, that he was on his knees when the shot was fired, that he did not see the shooter, but only heard the shot. When he got to his feet, Respondent saw Brewer holding the gun that Respondent had carried. Respondent said that he ran to the car, got in, told the driver, Katherine Toahty, to go, and Toahty then drove Respondent to a house several blocks away. At the house, Respondent got out of the car just before it was concealed in the home’s garage. According to Respondent, while still outside speaking to individuals in the front yard and asking them to look to see if he may have been shot by his own gun, police arrived at the house. On their arrival, Respondent ran inside the house. Officers entered the home to retrieve Respondent and found him inside a small bathroom, and after which they eventually transported him to the police station for questioning. Respondent stated that it was not until detectives questioned him at the police station that he learned someone had been struck by the gunshot. Respondent testified that during that questioning, Brewer walked by the door, and he immediately told the detectives, that’s the guy that I seen with the gun right there; but the detectives responded saying, everybody said you had it, and they did not otherwise seem interested.

After Respondent’s attorney, Guinise Marshall, arrived at the police station that evening and spoke with Respondent, he gave his videotaped statement to police about what had occurred, and that recording was played for the jury. Respondent confessed that he had lied during that statement about not having a gun, about being driven to the store by Toahty, and about speaking to Katie Taylor, a witness and young woman inside the 7-11 to whom Respondent had given a note and had written down his cell phone number, his street-gang name, and utilized letters having gang symbols. During his cross-examination, Respondent continued to insist that he did not shoot or kill anyone and that the two girls (Katie Taylor and Julia Elder), who had testified Respondent was the shooter, were lying about that.

The State’s key eyewitnesses at the 7-11 that day were Katie Taylor and Julia Elder. These individuals testified that the two of them and Katie’s sister, Stacy, were all at the 7-11 in a Suburban SUV in order to get some change to wash the SUV. Parking directly in front of the 7-11 next to the car Toahty was driving, Elder remained in the back seat and Stacy in the front passenger seat, while Taylor went inside the store for the change needed for the car wash. While Taylor was inside the store, Respondent came up to her and asked her for her phone number. She refused to give it to him, but Respondent wrote down his phone number and his K-Evil name and gave it to Taylor and left. Taylor then stood at the register counter to pay for her purchases. While standing there, she could see out the front doors of the store, she witnessed a confrontation between Respondent and a group of black males walking up from the gas pumps. As she paid the cashier and walked to the front doors to exit the store, she saw Respondent pull up his shirt showing a gun, make some gang signs, and swear at the other men. Standing at the doors, Taylor saw Ford sneak out from between the parked cars and hit Respondent. Taylor watched the fight begin and move from the sidewalk into the parking lot. Taylor said Respondent was bent over during most of the fighting and that something was dropped because everybody right there bent down for a second. You could see them down towards the ground, fighting, and at that moment, you seen the defendant stand up with the gun in his hand, aiming, you heard a gunshot almost simultaneously. While Taylor remained inside the store, Elder, from the back seat of the Suburban, watched Respondent come out of the store and get in the red maroon car that Toahty was driving. As that car began to drive away and pull out of the parking lot, it stopped and Respondent began yelling out the window towards some people in the parking lot. Respondent then got out of the car and approached four black males who had exited a black and white Caprice that looked like an old police car. Respondent lifted up his shirt several times to reveal a gun in his waistband and cursed at them. According to Elder, the other men didn’t seem like they wanted a problem at first, but then Ford, who was crouched down between the parked cars, ran out and hit Respondent in the face. At that point, the others began hitting Respondent as he tried to escape into the parking lot in the direction of where Toahty had moved the maroon car. Elder explained that as the fight continued in the parking lot, she heard something fall, and saw somebody reaching down and people kind of scattered. At first, Elder was not sure whether the item that had fallen was the cell phone that she had seen clipped onto Respondent’s pants or was instead the gun from Respondent’s waistband. Elder said that when Respondent raised back up his hands were free, but then she saw him reach into his waistband for his gun. She then saw Respondent aiming the gun as he backed away from the crowd of people and fired. Elder then saw Ford hit the concrete hard and [he] didn’t get back up. Ford’s friends loaded Ford into the black and white Caprice and drove off while Respondent entered the maroon car and sped away. Elder testified that she had no doubt that Respondent had fired the gun. When Taylor, while looking out the store window, heard the gunshot, it appeared to her that Ford was trying to stand up, turn, and run, but instead fell on his face right behind the Suburban. Respondent then backed up with the gun in his hand and ran out of sight around the corner of the building, while Ford was taken away by his friends. When Taylor joined Elder in the Suburban immediately after the shooting, Elder was on the speakerphone to 911 describing what had happened. Taylor joined that conversation, telling the lady on 9-1-1 that the guy that had just shot the gun, committed the murder, had just gave me his phone number. The recording of this 911 call was played for the jury.

Taylor said that she saw no one else besides Respondent come up with a gun, and that when the shot was fired, Ford was at a distance of nine to ten feet. Taylor acknowledged that she had testified at the preliminary hearing that she did not see the gun go off, but that she did see Respondent aim and shoot the gun using both hands. Although it had appeared to her that Ford was shot in his back while getting up, she said the gunshot occurred as Ford was getting up with a twist motion off the ground and that he fell before he could take a step. Elder also testified that when Respondent pulled his gun, Ford was turning to run. But she too acknowledged that at preliminary hearing, she had testified the crowd, including Ford, was running away from Respondent as he pulled his gun and that she had therefore believed Ford’s back was toward Respondent when he was shot. She explained, however, that the sequence of events that involved something dropping to the ground, Respondent picking it up, his rising back up, his pulling out the gun, and his backing away and firing it, all happened at the snap of [her] fingers; thus, whether the crowd had scattered at the moment something hit the ground or at the moment Respondent pulled the gun was the cause for any confusion about her prior testimony and statements to police.

In addition to presenting the testimony of Taylor and Elder, the State also provided the testimony of the seven surviving men who were involved, along with Ford, in the confrontation with Respondent. The testimony of these seven revealed that all but one or two of the eight men were members of Crip gangs and that they were all traveling together in two cars, with four men in each vehicle, when they pulled into the 7-11: one group of four in the black and white Caprice and the other group in a blue Buick Regal in which Ford was riding. Of these seven witnesses, only two (one of whom was Brewer) testified that they actually saw Respondent shoot Ford. Between these two, the manner in which they described Respondent shooting Ford varied significantly. Brewer stated Respondent fired the gun using two hands while standing and facing Ford, but the other man testified that Respondent, while he was being struck by several of them, bent over to pick up his dropped gun, and while still being hit, aimed behind and shot the gun.

C. Respondent’s Newly Discovered Evidence Claims

The evidence alleged to be newly discovered, as presented by Respondent at the post-conviction evidentiary hearings, consisted of testimony from three individuals. Larika A. Alexander was one of those three individuals, and it was her testimony that the trial court found met the test for newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial. The trial court found Respondent’s remaining two witnesses did not qualify as newly discovered evidence, because one witness’s information could have been discovered with the use of due diligence, and the other witness had no material evidence to offer, as he had recanted his unsworn statements that Respondent was not the shooter. According to Alexander, she was a passenger in a car driven by her cousin when they approached the 7-11 on the afternoon of March 9, 2001. Alexander admitted that when this occurred, she was doing [s]omething [she] wasn’t supposed to be doing: smoking marijuana. As the two neared the 7-11, they saw a group of at least seven black males beating up on another black male who had lighter colored skin. Seeing this, they slowed to a stop in the middle of the street and watched the fight at a distance of about 15 to 20 yards away. Alexander identified Respondent as an individual who looked like the man who was being beaten. She described what she saw by saying, first he getting beat in the face real bad by these dudes but then he kind of roll over and got on his stomach to protect himself, but that wasn’t really working cause they was pounding him out, they was pounding him out hard. Alexander testified that this beating lasted about a good five, six minutes, but ended when the gunshot went off. Alexander stated that as they parked their car to the side of a business that was next door to the 7-11, she saw the dark-skinned dudes riding off, they run to their car so they can get out of there, but it’s a dark-skinned dude and a light-skinned dude still on the ground even after the gunshot went off. Getting out of the car and peering around the corner of the neighboring building, Alexander said she witnessed the light-skinned man hop up, get in the back seat of a car driven by a female, and then speed off. Alexander claimed that when the gunshot went off she was looking at the brawl and the man on the ground had his hands by his head trying to, like, protect his self or whatever. Asked if there was any way that this individual could have fired a shot at that point, Alexander replied, Uhm, I don’t think so. He had to be Superman. I don’t know how he gone and do that. During cross-examination, Alexander admitted that she could not see Respondent 100 percent of the time with the number of people in the mob around him. She also admitted that she never saw a gun at any time, and that she left quickly as soon as Respondent got up because she saw that guy laying on the ground [and] knew it was a murder at that point, and didn’t want to stick around and talk to nobody and be a snitch like I am now. Alexander confessed that because of the length of time that had passed, the whole ordeal was pretty vague. Alexander was asked why she was just now providing testimony about what she had witnessed years ago. She explained that her cousin had told her about recently being at the 7-11 where the shooting occurred, and while there, she saw Respondent’s mother passing out flyers that asked for witness information. Alexander described her reaction to her cousin’s information as follows: I really don’t want nothing to do with it, but after a while, kind of talking to my granny and stuff, talking about God, she was like you need to come forward, so that’s why I’m here. Alexander explained she felt guilty for not doing the right thing, because after the shooting, she had been through hell and lost [her] kids to a gang lifestyle.

D. District Court’s Newly Discovered Evidence Ruling

In granting Respondent post-conviction relief, Judge Watson was critical of the testimony of the seven male witnesses. He observed that they were members from a rival gang of that to which Respondent belonged and that they gave conflicting testimony about how the shooting occurred. He further discounted the testimony of Taylor and Elder on perceiving it to be different from that which they had previously provided. Judge Watson found that they had told police after the shooting their views were obscured and they never saw [Respondent] with a gun. They then testified at preliminary hearing that they saw [Respondent] shoot the victim in the back as he ran away. Judge Watson believed that both women had changed their testimony at trial to comport with the physical evidence that the victim had been shot in the chest. Judge Watson found Alexander’s testimony to be particularly credible in that she did not know Respondent and came forward of her own volition. He further characterized Alexander’s testimony as compelling as it supports the [Respondent]’s lone testimony that he was not the shooter and was even more compelling when examined in the entire context of the record which reflects a questionable verdict based on the conflicting testimony of eyewitnesses as to material facts.

In urging error in the District Court’s having granted Respondent relief on this record, the State cites to the lack of citations to the record by Judge Watson, and contends the conclusions the court reaches suggest that the court did not actually take the record of the original proceedings into consideration. Unless otherwise shown, we presume regularity in trial court post-conviction proceedings. Nevertheless, even setting aside this presumption, a review of the post-conviction appeal record reveals that those conflicts and irregularities in testimony on which Judge Watson has relied are in fact present in the trial record. Additionally, in making its argument against the District Court’s decision, the State neglects to acknowledge or specifically address the trial evidence that was consistent with Respondent’s claim that another individual had picked up the fallen gun during the fight and shot Ford. Boiled down, the State’s position is simply that it disagrees with Judge Watson’s conclusion that the jury verdict rested on conflicting eyewitness testimony and that confidence in that verdict is undermined by Alexander’s new testimony. The test, however, is not whether the State, or even this Court, might have exercised its discretion differently than did the trial court in adjudicating Respondent’s claim; rather, the test is instead whether the trial court’s decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, this Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, but instead determines if there is any evidentiary support in the record for the trial judge’s decision, for if there is, no abuse of discretion occurs. Because there exists portions of the record in Respondent’s case that will provide some support for those findings of fact and conclusions of law reached by the trial court, and because we must accord a high degree of deference to such findings and conclusions and to the weight and credibility choices made by the trier of fact concerning the testimony on which it bases its findings and conclusion; we FIND that the District Court’s judgment granting Respondent post-conviction relief must be affirmed.

IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that Respondent’s May 18, 2015, Request for Oral Argument is DENIED, and the December 5, 2014, final judgment of the District Court of Oklahoma County, granting the application for post-conviction relief of Respondent, Kendall Wayne Edwards, by vacating his judgment and sentence and granting him a new trial in Case No. CF-2001-1642, is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2015), MANDATE IS ORDERED ISSUED upon the filing of this decision.

IT IS so ORDERED.

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Footnotes:

  1. O.R. 23 & 233
  2. O.R. 30-40
  3. O.R. 41-51
  4. O.R. 51-54
  5. O.R. 54-64
  6. O.R. 64-68
  7. O.R. 68-69
  8. O.R. 69-71
  9. O.R. 71-72
  10. 22 O.S.1991, § 1080 et seq.
  11. Thomas v. State, 1994 OK CR 85, T 3, 888 P.2d 522, 525
  12. Hooper v. State, 1998 OK CR 22, T 4, 957 P.2d 120, 123
  13. Woodruff v. State, 1996 OK CR 5, I 2, 910 P.2d 348, 350
  14. Berget v. State, 1995 OK CR 66, I 6, 907 P.2d 1078, 1081-82
  15. Paxton v. State, 1996 OK CR 4, I 2, 910 P.2d 1059, 1061
  16. Jones v. State, 1983 OK CR 127, I 3, 668 P.2d 1170, 1171
  17. Boyd v. State, 1996 OK CR 12, I 3, 915 P.2d 922, 924
  18. Stiles v. State, 1995 OK CR 51, I 2, 902 P.2d 1104, 1105
  19. Hunter v. State, 1992 OK CR 19, I 15, 829 P.2d 64, 67
  20. May v. State, 1976 OK CR 328, I 10, 75 P.3d 891, 892
  21. 22 O.S.2011, § 1080(d)
  22. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)
  23. Patterson v. State, 2002 OK CR 18, I 20, 45 P.3d 925, 930
  24. Hale v. State, 1991 OK CR 27, I 11, 807 P.2d 264, 268
  25. Brown v. State, 1997 OK CR 1, I 33, 933 P.2d 316, 324-25
  26. W.D.C. v. State, 1990 OK CR 71, I 8, 799 P.2d 142, 145
  27. Glover v. State, 1974 OK CR 126, I 14, 524 P.2d 51, 53
  28. Sheppard v. State, 1987 OK CR 4, I 4-5, 731 P.2d 989, 990

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1080 (2011) - Post-Conviction Procedure Act
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 952 (2011) - Motion for New Trial
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 (2011) - First Degree Murder, Malice Aforethought
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 11-801 (B)(1) (2011) - Traffic Regulations

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Edwards v. State, No. F-2002-1474 (Okl.Cr. March 4, 2004) (Summ. Op.) (unpublished)
  • Thomas v. State, 1994 OK CR 85, 888 P.2d 522, 525
  • Hooper v. State, 1998 OK CR 22, 957 P.2d 120, 123
  • Woodruff v. State, 1996 OK CR 5, 910 P.2d 348, 350
  • Berget v. State, 1995 OK CR 66, 907 P.2d 1078, 1081-82
  • Paxton v. State, 1996 OK CR 4, 910 P.2d 1059, 1061
  • Jones v. State, 1983 OK CR 127, 668 P.2d 1170, 1171
  • Boyd v. State, 1996 OK CR 12, 915 P.2d 922, 924
  • Stiles v. State, 1995 OK CR 51, 902 P.2d 1104, 1105
  • Hunter v. State, 1992 OK CR 19, 829 P.2d 64, 67
  • May v. State, 1976 OK CR 328, 75 P.3d 891, 892
  • Patterson v. State, 2002 OK CR 18, 45 P.3d 925, 930
  • Hale v. State, 1991 OK CR 27, 807 P.2d 264, 268
  • Brown v. State, 1997 OK CR 1, 933 P.2d 316, 324-25
  • W.D.C. v. State, 1990 OK CR 71, 799 P.2d 142, 145
  • Glover v. State, 1974 OK CR 126, 524 P.2d 51, 53
  • Bland v. State, 2000 OK CR 11, 4 P.3d 702, 714
  • Jennings v. State, 92 Okl.Cr. 347, 223 P.2d 562, 569
  • Sheppard v. State, 1987 OK CR 4, 731 P.2d 989, 990

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