In OCCA case No. F-2004-1261, Jonathan Dwight Harjo appealed his conviction for rape in the first degree. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentence to ten years in prison. One judge dissented regarding the sentence modification.
In OCCA case No. RE 2005-0315, #Matthews appealed his conviction for #Burglary. In a (published) decision, the court decided #to vacate the two-year sentence imposed in CF-1999-365, affirm the acceleration of the deferred sentence in CF-2003-14, and affirm the termination from Drug Court. #None dissented. Kevin Paul Matthews got into trouble with the law a while back. He pled no contest to a charge for running a roadblock and was given a sentence where he didn’t have to spend much time in prison right away. Instead, he was supposed to follow certain rules and help the community. However, he later messed up by not completing his required community service. Then, he got into even more trouble and pleaded guilty to burglary, agreeing to join a special program called Drug Court instead of going straight to prison. This program was meant to help him get better. But after some time, the State said he wasn’t following the rules and asked the judge to send him to prison instead. The judge agreed and decided Matthews needed to go to prison for more time, ruling that any previous time he served didn’t count towards his new sentence. Matthews felt that the judge made mistakes and that he shouldn't have been punished as harshly as he was. Matthews brought his case to a higher court, saying the judge didn't have the right to put him back in prison for the earlier offense because too much time had passed. He also said the judge shouldn’t have made him wait so long without setting an end date to his drug treatment program. Ultimately, the higher court agreed that the judge had made an error in punishing Matthews without accounting for the time he had already served. However, they kept the part where Matthews had to go to prison for his burglary charge because he had failed to follow the rules of the Drug Court. They decided to send the case back to the lower court for more review about what should happen next. So, in the end, Matthews got relief on some of his issues, but not all, showing that while he had some rights, he still needed to take responsibility for his actions.
In OCCA case No. C-2005-211, the petitioner appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography and producing child pornography. In a published decision, the court decided to deny the petition for writ of certiorari and affirm the judgment while modifying the sentences. One judge dissented. Chad Justin Berntson entered guilty pleas to two serious charges related to child pornography in December 2004. In February 2005, he was sentenced to ten years in prison for each charge, with the sentences set to be served at the same time. He later asked to change his pleas, but the court said no. Berntson argued there were misunderstandings with the plea deal and claimed that one of the charges was not applied correctly, which made his plea involuntary. He also felt that the ten-year sentences were too harsh. After looking closely at his claims and the documents related to his case, the court decided that he did not have a misunderstanding about his plea. They noted that Berntson knew what to expect as they both agreed on a sentence of ten years. However, the court found that he was charged incorrectly with one of the counts, meaning he should have faced a lesser maximum sentence according to the different law that applied. Because of that, they changed the judgment and sentence for that count to five years instead. In the end, the court denied Berntson's request to change his plea, but they adjusted his sentence. They set both counts to five years in prison instead of the original ten years. The two sentences would still be served at the same time. One judge disagreed with how the court modified the sentences, believing that if Berntson entered a valid plea and got the sentence he expected, it should not be changed. This judge thought the court was wrong to alter the charges and punishments after the fact.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-682, Felix Finley, IV appealed his conviction for Manslaughter in the First Degree. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm his conviction but reversed and remanded the case for resentencing. One member of the court dissented. Finley had been tried by a jury and found guilty of Manslaughter after he stabbed a man during a fight. He argued that he acted in self-defense because the other man was bigger, older, and hitting him. He raised several issues in his appeal, asking why the jury instructions on self-defense were not clear enough and arguing that evidence presented against him was unfair. The court reviewed the case closely. They found the jury's instruction about self-defense was correct and that the evidence indeed indicated that Finley was not acting in self-defense when he stabbed the man. They also felt that despite some irrelevant evidence being presented during the trial, it did not change the outcome of the jury's decision regarding his guilt. However, the court agreed that Finley’s sentence of 70 years was too long without proper guidance to the jury about parole eligibility, which might have affected how they viewed the seriousness of the sentence they were giving. Therefore, while his conviction was upheld, the court mandated a new sentencing hearing to correct these issues. This case highlights the importance of clear rules in court and how the way information is presented to a jury can influence their decisions on guilt and punishment.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-1226, Anthony Jerome Johnson appealed his conviction for multiple crimes, including felony eluding an officer, obstructing an officer, and robbery with a firearm. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm his convictions for eluding an officer and robbery with a firearm, but reversed the conviction for obstructing an officer, with instructions to dismiss that charge. One judge dissented regarding the reversal of the obstruction charge. The case stemmed from an incident where Johnson carjacked a woman’s car and fled from police after they initiated a traffic stop. During his escape, he ran numerous stop signs and caused danger to others on the road. Following a high-speed chase, he crashed the car and then ran on foot, trying to evade capture from arresting officers. At trial, Johnson was found guilty and sentenced to several years in prison as well as a fine for the offenses committed. On appeal, he argued four points. First, he claimed that the charges against him violated protections against double jeopardy, stating that the actions he took should not be counted as separate crimes since they arose from one act of fleeing. Second, he contended that evidence for felony eluding was not sufficient, suggesting the situation warranted a lesser charge. Third, he asserted that there was insufficient evidence for the armed robbery conviction. Lastly, he believed inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony supported reducing his sentence. The court, after reviewing the case thoroughly, determined that the convictions and sentences for eluding and robbery were valid. The court found sufficient evidence supporting these convictions, including testimony from eyewitnesses and evidence that directly linked Johnson to the robbery. However, they agreed with Johnson's argument regarding the obstructing charge, concluding both his car and foot chases should be treated as one continuous act of fleeing, therefore only allowing the conviction for eluding. In the end, the court affirmed the convictions for eluding an officer and robbery but instructed that the obstruction charge be dismissed. The dissenting opinion expressed a different view on the obstruction charge, arguing that Johnson's actions could be considered separate acts deserving of distinct charges.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-314, the appellant appealed his conviction for the Manufacture of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (methamphetamine). In an unpublished decision, the court decided to modify the conviction to Attempting to Unlawfully Manufacture Methamphetamine. One judge dissented. Here’s a summary of the case: Morton D. Hayner was found guilty of making methamphetamine in a trial. The jury sentenced him to life in prison and imposed a $50,000 fine. Hayner argued that the evidence was not enough to prove he manufactured meth, he should have been given chances for lesser charges, and that the fine was too high for him since he didn't have much money. The court looked carefully at the evidence and agreed with Hayner on the first point. They said he was actually trying to manufacture meth but had not finished the process when the police arrived. So, they changed his conviction from manufacturing to attempting to manufacture. On the second point, the court found that Hayner was not denied the chance to consider lesser charges. For the third point, the court decided the fine was appropriate because it matched the seriousness of the crime. In conclusion, Hayner's conviction was changed to Attempting to Unlawfully Manufacture Methamphetamine, but the life sentence and fine were kept the same.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-422, the Appellant appealed his conviction for Shooting with Intent to Kill and related offenses. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the conviction but modify the sentences for certain counts. One judge dissented. The case involved Jerry Lee Mays, who was found guilty of multiple charges, including shooting with intent to kill and possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. The jury sentenced him to several years in prison, varying by count. Appellant believed that the evidence presented at trial was not enough to support his conviction for shooting with intent to kill. He argued that there was no proof of his intent to kill a specific person when he fired his weapon. Mays also claimed that his convictions violated double jeopardy laws, which protect individuals from being tried for the same crime multiple times. He argued that he should not be punished for both possession of a firearm and shooting with intent to kill since they were related offenses. Additionally, he felt that his punishment for possession of a firearm was excessive, that the jury should not have considered assault and battery as a lesser offense, and that the jury did not receive adequate instructions about his right to a fair trial. The court carefully reviewed Mays's arguments and considered all the evidence from the trial. They found that the jury had enough evidence to convict him of shooting with intent to kill. Even though Mays focused on the victim’s perception of his actions, the law does not depend solely on that view but considers all evidence as part of understanding a defendant's intent. The court also concluded that Mays's double jeopardy claim did not hold since he committed two separate offenses at different times. The first offense was possessing the firearm, and the second offense was shooting at people, which were considered distinct. In terms of sentencing, the court recognized that Mays's conviction for possession relied on prior felony convictions, which were also used in different charges. However, they concluded this did not unfairly impact his sentence. Important to note was that the trial court had made an error in telling the jury that Mays's conviction for assault and battery could be enhanced due to previous felonies, which was incorrect for a misdemeanor charge. The judges found that this error did not change the overall outcome significantly, so it was ruled as harmless. They did acknowledge a need to change the length of Mays's sentence for shooting with intent to kill from forty years to thirty years for each of those counts due to one of Mays's points about jury instructions that were missed. Ultimately, the court affirmed most of Mays's convictions and modified some sentences. Despite some errors, the judges felt that Mays received a fair trial overall, and the necessary adjustments to his sentences did not warrant a full new trial.
In OCCA case No. RE-2005-355, Bobby Ray Wyles, Jr. appealed his conviction for Second Degree Burglary and False Personation. In a published decision, the court decided that the trial judge wrongly ordered Wyles’ sentences to run consecutively with a later sentence instead of concurrently, which violated the original sentencing agreements. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. RE 2005-0473, the appellant appealed his conviction for burglary in the second degree and knowingly concealing stolen property. In a published decision, the court decided to reverse the revocation of his suspended sentences because the hearing was not held within the required twenty days. The appellant had a dissenting opinion.
In OCCA case No. PR-2006-120, a petitioner appealed her conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled drug (methamphetamine) and driving without seatbelts. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petitioner's request for relief in part and deny it in part. One judge dissented. The case began when the petitioner was charged with possessing methamphetamine and driving without a seatbelt. She initially agreed to a plea deal with the state, which involved accepting guilt for the drug charge and a fine for the seatbelt violation. However, when the petitioner refused to follow through with the state’s conditions for the plea, she attempted to enter a non-negotiated or blind guilty plea. The judge refused to accept her blind plea and insisted she proceed to trial, stating she did not have an absolute right to plead guilty. The petitioner believed she should be allowed to enter her guilty plea without the state’s conditions. This disagreement led her to file a petition with the court seeking orders to either allow her to plead guilty or to prevent the judge from forcing her to go to trial. After reviewing the facts of the case, the court found that the petitioner had a clear legal right to have her guilty plea accepted if it met the necessary legal requirements. The court noted that it was a mistake for the judge to reject her plea without evaluating whether it was voluntary and if there was a factual basis for it. The court granted part of the petitioner’s request by directing the district court judge to conduct a hearing on her blind plea and accept it if it correctly fulfilled the legal standards. However, the court denied her request to have her plea regarding the seatbelt violation accepted, as that plea required the judge’s approval. The dissenting judge expressed concerns about whether the petitioner had truly shown that she was being harmed by the trial court's refusal to accept her plea, suggesting that any challenges to a guilty plea rejection should typically be taken up in direct appeals rather than with this type of petition. The dissenting judge also supported the trial judge's discretion, arguing that the right to a jury trial must be upheld. In summary, the court ruled that the petitioner should be given a chance to enter her guilty plea under the law, but that her plea regarding the seatbelt violation did not have to be accepted.
In OCCA case No. C-2005-398, Elisa Nielson appealed her conviction for Lewd Acts with a Child Under the Age of 16. In a published decision, the court decided to grant the petition for certiorari and remand the case for further proceedings. One judge dissented from the decision. Elisa Nielson had entered a guilty plea for her crime on February 7, 2005. The judge sentenced her to twenty years in prison, but she would only have to serve ten years if she followed certain rules. Nielson later wanted to take back her guilty plea because she thought there was confusion about what her sentence would be. She argued that a deal was made where she wouldn't be sentenced to more than five years in prison, but when it came time for sentencing, the judge did not follow that recommendation. Nielson brought her case to a higher court, saying that the trial judge should have let her change her mind about the guilty plea before sentencing. The higher court looked at all the facts and agreed with her. They found that the confusion about the plea meant she should have been allowed to withdraw it. The court decided Nielson's issue about the sentence was not relevant after they allowed her to withdraw her plea. So, they granted her request and sent the case back to the lower court to work things out according to their ruling. One judge disagreed and said that Nielson understood what she was doing when she accepted her guilty plea. He thought the agreement was clear and that the lower court had done everything correctly. He would not have granted her appeal.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-67, Marrio D'Shane Willis appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction. One judge dissented. Marrio D'Shane Willis was found guilty by a jury for robbing someone while using a gun. Because he had a previous conviction, the court gave him a sentence of ten years in prison and a fine. Willis did not agree with this decision and decided to appeal. Willis claimed that his attorney did not do a good job in representing him during the trial. He said that the only witness who identified him as the robber had made a mistake and that there was evidence to support that claim which was not presented in the trial. Willis asked for another chance, known as a new trial, based on this new information. The appeals court looked into Willis's claims and sent the case back to a lower court to find more information. This lower court had a hearing where they listened to the eyewitness. During this hearing, the eyewitness changed his story and said he was not sure about his identification of Willis during the trial. He even said he thought another person might be the actual robber. The appeals court found that Willis’s attorney did not try hard enough to prove that the eyewitness might have made a mistake. They decided that if the attorney had investigated this more during the trial, it could have led to a different result. They believed Willis was treated unfairly because of his lawyer's mistakes. After reviewing everything, the appeals court reversed Willis's conviction, meaning he would not be found guilty anymore based on the trial's results. They agreed with the findings of the lower court that the eyewitness's changed testimony made it difficult to trust what he had said during the trial. In conclusion, the court said that the way Willis was represented in court was not good enough, and because of that, they decided he should not have been convicted of robbery.
In OCCA case No. C-2005-524, Robert Scott Pebbles appealed his conviction for First Degree Rape. In a published decision, the court decided to grant his appeal and allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. One judge dissented. Pebbles had pled guilty to the charge as part of a plea agreement and was given a five-year suspended sentence. However, he later claimed that his attorney pressured him into pleading guilty. He stated that he did not understand the requirements of his probation and was misled about the possible consequences of his plea, including a misunderstanding of the maximum punishment for his crime. During a hearing about his motion to withdraw the plea, Pebbles testified that his attorney had told him he could face the death penalty for the rape charge. The court found that the plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily because Pebbles had been misadvised about the range of punishment. The U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that the death penalty for rape was unconstitutional, which means Pebbles could not face such a punishment. The court reviewed affidavits from attorneys involved in the case that supported Pebbles' claim of being misadvised. The Attorney General acknowledged Pebbles was indeed not eligible for the death penalty for rape. As a result of these findings, the court decided that Pebbles' guilty plea should be withdrawn. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-997, Johnny Freddy Locust appealed his conviction for burglary in the first degree. In an unpublished decision, the court affirmed the judgment but modified his sentence to fifteen years imprisonment. One judge dissented in part, expressing disagreement with the court's decision to modify the sentence without it being raised in the appeal. Johnny Freddy Locust was found guilty by a jury for breaking into a building without permission. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison and a fine after the trial judge decided his punishment. Locust appealed, saying that the trial had mistakes. He argued that the instructions given to the jury were wrong and that the evidence did not prove he was guilty. He also claimed his lawyer did not do a good job defending him, and that overall, the errors during the trial meant that he did not get a fair chance. During the appeal, the court looked closely at what Locust's arguments were and reviewed the evidence from his trial. They found that while there was a mistake in not giving the jury proper instructions about consent, this mistake did not change the outcome of the trial. They agreed that even though the instructions were important, Locust still had enough evidence against him to be found guilty. The court also said that even though his lawyer could have done better by not asking for the right instructions, this did not likely change the trial's final result. In the end, they decided to lower his prison sentence from twenty years to fifteen years. The judgment against him for breaking and entering remained the same, and he still had to pay the fine. One judge disagreed with the decision to change the sentence because it was not an issue brought up during the appeal, believing that the matter had been overlooked. Overall, Locust's appeal led to a shorter prison term, but his conviction still stood.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-129, Denise Sue Watie appealed her conviction for sexually abusing a minor. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to affirm the judgment but modify the sentence. One judge dissented. Denise Sue Watie was found guilty by a jury in Tulsa County for sexually abusing her son. The jury suggested that she should serve eight years in prison. She was sentenced accordingly on January 24, 2005. After her conviction, she decided to appeal the decision, stating several reasons why she believed the trial was unfair. First, Watie claimed the court made an error by allowing certain evidence that she thought was unnecessary and repetitive. However, the court found that the admission of a videotaped interview of the complainant was acceptable under the law. Since the court followed the correct procedures, this part of her appeal was denied. Next, Watie argued that her confession to the police should not have been allowed because it was taken without informing her of her rights. The court examined how the police interviewed her. They noted that she was not arrested and could leave at any time. Because of this, the court concluded that the interview was not a custodial interrogation and did not require the police to read her the Miranda rights. Thus, Watie's statements were considered voluntary, and these claims were also denied. Watie also contended that the jury should have been instructed about the requirement that she would serve at least 85% of her sentence in prison. The court agreed that this information was important and should have been provided to the jury upon Watie’s request. Due to this oversight, her sentence was modified from eight years to six years. Lastly, Watie claimed that her sentence was too harsh. Since the court found that the jury should have been informed about the 85% rule, they reduced her sentence but did not fully agree with her position on its harshness. The decision to modify the sentence made her final argument about the severity of the punishment unnecessary. In conclusion, the judgment of the district court was affirmed, but her sentence was reduced to six years. The appeal brought attention to important legal procedures, but ultimately, the court decided that the original conviction stood, with a slight change to the length of time she would serve in prison.
In OCCA case No. C-2005-493, Billy D. Stout appealed his conviction for violating the Sex Offenders Registration Act. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant Stout the right to withdraw his guilty plea. One judge dissented. Stout had pleaded guilty to not registering as a sex offender. He was sentenced to five years in prison and fined $5000. However, Stout later argued that he did not fully understand what he was pleading guilty to, especially because he could not read or write. After leaving jail, he was not properly informed that he needed to register whenever he moved to a new place. Stout said that when he was released from jail, he received paperwork that he could not read, and no one explained to him that he had to register. Although Stout eventually registered once he understood the requirement, he faced charges for not having registered earlier. The court found that Stout's plea was not made willingly and that there was no clear reason to support the plea in the first place. Stout's lawyer did not present any strong arguments during the plea withdrawal hearing, and it seemed they did not understand the law themselves. The court noted that the lack of help Stout received from his lawyer contributed to his confusion and affected his ability to make a fully informed decision about his plea. Overall, the judges concluded that Stout's case should be revisited, and he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and possibly go to trial. The law encourages trying cases in court rather than accepting a guilty plea without a fair understanding.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-1081, Charles Edward Moore, Jr. appealed his conviction for robbery with firearms, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm most of his convictions and modify some sentences. One of the judges dissented. Charles Edward Moore faced serious charges and was found guilty by a jury. He received a total of fourteen years for each robbery, ten years for each kidnapping, and ten years for possession of a firearm related to a past felony. The judge ordered that Moore serve these sentences one after the other. On appeal, Moore argued several points. First, he believed he was unfairly punished for two separate robbery counts concerning the same incident. However, the court decided that this did not violate any laws about double punishments. Next, Moore claimed a conflict between his robbery conviction and the charge for possession after a felony. The court agreed with Moore regarding this point and reversed his conviction for that charge. Additionally, Moore argued that the trial court made an error by not allowing a jury instruction about his eligibility for parole. The court found this to be a mistake but decided to change the sentences for the robbery convictions from fourteen years to ten years each. The court maintained the trial judge's decision to have the sentences served consecutively. Moore also argued that he did not receive effective help from his lawyer, but the court believed that his case would not have ended differently even with better representation. He further disagreed with the court's admission of evidence about his past wrongdoings, but the court denied that claim too. Lastly, Moore asserted that the combined errors during his trial should lead to a reversal. The court disagreed and upheld the decisions made during the trial. In summary, while the court agreed to modify some of Moore's sentences, it affirmed most of the convictions and found no significant errors that would affect the overall outcome of the trial.
In OCCA case No. M 2005-0332, the appellant appealed his conviction for reckless driving. In a published decision, the court decided to modify the conviction from reckless driving to speeding due to insufficient evidence of reckless behavior. One judge dissented. The case started when the appellant received a traffic ticket for speeding, going 90 mph in a 65 mph zone. The traffic stop occurred on a dry day with moderate traffic. The officer who stopped the appellant said he did not see anything dangerous other than the speeding. The appellant was guilty of speeding, but the state argued that speeding was enough to prove reckless driving. For reckless driving, the law requires showing that someone acted with culpable negligence, which means the behavior must be more than just speeding. The court cited past cases that supported this idea, indicating that simply going over the speed limit is not automatically reckless driving. The state claimed that because there were other cars on the road and the appellant passed an intersection, that made the speeding reckless. However, the appellant pointed out that while he was speeding, he did not engage in reckless behavior that would endanger others. Another issue in the case was that the trial judge asked a witness about intersections but did not allow the appellant to ask the witness questions afterward. The court found that this was a mistake because everyone has the right to question witnesses against them. In the end, the court decided that while the appellant was guilty of speeding, there wasn't enough evidence for the reckless driving charge. They changed the conviction to speeding, removed the reckless driving sentence, and sent the case back to the lower court to decide the proper punishment for speeding.
In OCCA case No. M 2005-0332, the appellant appealed his conviction for reckless driving. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to vacate the conviction and modify it to a lesser charge of speeding. One judge dissented. The case began when the appellant received a speeding ticket on September 17, 2003, for going 90 mph in a 65 mph zone. During the trial, the judge found the appellant guilty of reckless driving and sentenced him to 90 days in jail, with 30 days to serve and the rest suspended, along with a $300 fine. The appellant did not appeal in time but was allowed to do so later. During the appeal, the appellant claimed two main points. First, he argued that his speeding did not meet the level of culpable negligence needed for reckless driving. The law requires more than just speeding to prove reckless driving. The state argued that speeding around other cars during the day showed enough negligence to support the conviction. Second, the appellant contended that he was not allowed to cross-examine a witness after the judge asked a question about intersecting roads. The judge’s questioning provided new information that had not been discussed before. The court pointed out that the appellant had the right to confront witnesses and cross-examine them, which was denied in this case. Ultimately, the court found that there was not enough evidence to support the reckless driving charge and modified the conviction to speeding instead. The court agreed to vacate the reckless driving sentence and sent the case back to the district court for proper sentencing on the speeding charge.
In OCCA case No. C 2005-628, Roscoe Dansby appealed his conviction for First Degree Manslaughter and Obtaining Money by Means of a False Check. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari. The court found that Dansby was deprived of effective assistance of counsel during a critical stage of the process because his attorney had a conflict of interest. Thus, the court remanded the case for a new hearing on the motion to withdraw guilty pleas and ordered that a conflict-free counsel be appointed. One judge dissented.
In OCCA case No. F 2004-1124, the appellant appealed his conviction for Shooting with Intent to Kill. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. One judge dissented. The case involved Keith William Matson, who was convicted in Garvin County for shooting with the intent to kill. On May 17, 2004, he chose to have a judge decide his case instead of a jury. However, when the judge made the decision on August 10, 2004, Mr. Matson was not present, and he did not get the chance to hear closing arguments from his lawyer before the verdict was given. Mr. Matson raised a number of issues in his appeal. He argued that the judge should not have been able to make orders after a certain date, that the way the judge found him guilty was not allowed by Oklahoma law, and that he was not there when the judgment was announced. He also claimed that he had been denied a fair trial because of the unusual way the trial was conducted and that he did not get good legal help. The appeals court looked closely at what happened in the trial. It noted that after an earlier attempt to have a jury trial in October 2003 ended in a mistrial because the jury could not agree, Mr. Matson was advised by his lawyer to waive the right to a jury and allow the judge to review transcripts of the earlier trial. However, the law clearly states that a defendant must be present and allowed to have closing arguments during a trial, which did not happen in Mr. Matson's case. Because of these issues, the appeals court decided that Mr. Matson’s conviction needed to be reversed, and he deserved a new trial. The court stated that it was important to make sure that every defendant has a fair trial and their rights are fully protected. The decision made by the judge during the last trial was found to be a serious mistake, which led to the court ruling in favor of a new trial for Mr. Matson. In summary, the court found that the procedure used in Mr. Matson's trial did not follow the law and was unfair, which is why they reversed the conviction and called for a new trial.
In OCCA case No. F-2004-649, Franklin Lee Gibbs, Jr. appealed his conviction for First-Degree Murder and Felon in Possession of a Firearm. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction due to an error in jury selection. Gibbs was only given five peremptory challenges instead of the nine he was supposed to have under the law. This was considered a violation of his due process rights, leading the court to order a new trial. Additionally, one judge dissented on some points, but the key reason for the reversal was the error in jury selection.
In OCCA case No. F 2004-816, Martin appealed his conviction for several serious crimes against children. In a published decision, the court decided to affirm the convictions but modified the sentences. One judge dissented. Solly Lee Martin, Jr. was found guilty of multiple charges which included lewd molestation, attempted forcible oral sodomy, and child sexual abuse. The trial happened in Ottawa County, where he received very long sentences for these crimes, which involved terms that ranged from 10 years to life in prison. Some sentences were ordered to be served together, while others had to be served after. During his appeal, Martin claimed he was not given a fair trial. He argued that the trial judge wouldn't allow him to show evidence about the complainant's past which he thought could help his case. In another claim, he said that some testimony during the trial was unfairly negative against him and could influence the jury's decision. The court looked closely at Martin's complaints. They found that he did not properly follow the rules to show the evidence he wanted to introduce, so his first complaint was not accepted. For the second complaint, the court agreed that some of the testimony presented was error, as it talked too much about what the crime might do to the victims in the future, which is generally not allowed in these types of cases. Despite these issues, the court decided that overall, Martin's convictions would remain, but they agreed to change his sentences. Instead of them running one after the other, they made them all run at the same time. The final decision was that although the court kept the convictions, there were changes to make sure the sentences were fair.
In OCCA case No. F-2005-619, Ralph Emerson Jones, Jr. appealed his conviction for Unlawful Possession of Methamphetamine. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. Two judges dissented. Ralph Jones was found guilty by a jury for having methamphetamine and was sentenced to two years in prison. He believed that the evidence against him was not enough to prove he knew he had the drug, claiming that just having drug paraphernalia was not good enough for a conviction. When reviewing the case, the court found that there was a problem during the trial. Jones was only allowed to use three of his five chances to challenge potential jurors, which is not what the law says should happen. This was seen as a violation of his rights, and the court ruled that he should get a new trial. The final decision was to throw out Jones’s conviction and start the trial over again. Two judges disagreed with this decision, arguing that the appeals court should only look at issues that were raised during the trial and that the evidence actually supported Jones’s conviction. They felt that giving him another chance could lead to unnecessary complications since he might not even want to go through a new trial.
In OCCA case No. F 2004-1238, James Alan Wade appealed his conviction for Embezzlement of Rented Property. In an unpublished decision, the court decided to reverse the conviction and remand the case with instructions to dismiss. One judge dissented. Mr. Wade was found guilty by a jury of embezzling a rented car and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. He appealed this conviction, raising several arguments. He claimed there wasn't enough evidence to prove his prior felony convictions and that his sentence was too harsh. He also argued that his lawyer didn’t do enough to protect his rights during the trial. The court looked closely at whether there was enough proof that Mr. Wade had committed the crime he was accused of. One key point was whether the car he rented was valued correctly according to the law. The court found that the prosecution didn't provide evidence proving the car's value was over $1,000, which is necessary for the embezzlement charge. Because of this lack of evidence, the court decided that Mr. Wade should not have been convicted and ordered that the case be dismissed. The dissenting judge, however, thought that there was enough evidence for the jury to make their decision and believed the conviction should be upheld.