J.C.T. v State Of Oklahoma

J-2013-87

Filed: Nov. 22, 2013

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: State Of Oklahoma

Summary

**J.C.T. appealed his conviction for robbery with a weapon. Conviction and sentence: affirmed, with remand for resentencing to a 12-year suspended sentence. Judge Lumpkin dissented.**

Decision

The order of the District Court of Cleveland County granting the State's motion to bridge J.C.T. to the Department of Corrections in Case No. CF-2011-365 is AFFIRMED. This matter is REMANDED to the District Court of Cleveland County for sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2013), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• Was there an abuse of discretion by the trial court in sentencing J.C.T. to twelve (12) years incarceration instead of a suspended sentence?
• Did the trial court abuse its discretion by bridging J.C.T. to the Department of Corrections to serve his sentence with no time suspended?
• Did the trial court's failure to grant J.C.T. credit for time served constitute plain error requiring modification of J.C.T.'s sentence?
• Did the appellate record reflect that the trial court provided a memorandum of historical statement to D.O.C. as required by the Youthful Offender Act?

Findings

• the district court's decision to bridge J.C.T. to D.O.C. is affirmed
• the trial court's imposition of a twelve (12) year sentence without suspension was an error
• the trial court will grant J.C.T. credit for time served
• the district court is instructed to resentence J.C.T. as specified in the plea agreement (12 years, suspended)

J-2013-87

Nov. 22, 2013

J.C.T.

Appellant

v

State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

A. JOHNSON, JUDGE: On May 24, 2011, Appellant J.C.T. was charged as a Youthful Offender with one count of Robbery With a Weapon in Cleveland County District Court Case No. CF-2011-763. On August 5, 2011, J.C.T., represented by counsel, entered a guilty plea to the charge. Upon agreement of the parties, the District Court of Cleveland County, the Honorable Tracy Schumacher, District Judge, sentenced him as a youthful offender to twelve (12) years imprisonment, all suspended.

On January 11, 2013, a hearing was held on the State’s motion to bridge which was filed December 14, 2012. The State alleged J.C.T. had seriously injured or endangered the life or health of another by violent behavior and that J.C.T. was 16 years, 10 months and 1 day old at the time the offense was committed. He committed a felony offense while in the custody or under the supervision of O.J.A. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court ordered both parties to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law.

On January 25, 2013, the hearing concluded at which time the court granted the State’s motion to bridge J.C.T. to D.O.C., and sentenced J.C.T. to twelve (12) years in D.O.C. custody. Pursuant to Rule 7.1(6), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2013), J.C.T. appeals from the district court’s order bridging him to D.O.C. raising four issues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing J.C.T. to twelve (12) years incarceration instead of sentencing him to twelve (12) years suspended; (2) Alternatively, the trial court abused its discretion by bridging J.C.T. to the Department of Corrections to serve his sentence with no time suspended; (3) the trial court’s failure to grant J.C.T. credit for time served constitutes plain error requiring modification of J.C.T.’s sentence; and (4) the appellate record does not reflect that the trial court has provided a memorandum of historical statement to D.O.C. as required by the Youthful Offender Act.

Under Rule 11.2(A)(1) of this Court’s rules, this appeal was automatically assigned to the Court’s Accelerated Docket. The Court heard oral argument on May 2, 2013 and took the matter under advisement to consider the validity of the bridging order and the issues related to the appeal of a bridging order. The District Court’s decision to bridge J.C.T. to the D.O.C. is AFFIRMED. This matter is REMANDED to the District Court of Cleveland County, the Honorable Tracy Schumacher, with instructions to sentence J.C.T. as specified in his plea agreement (12 years, suspended) and to grant him credit for time served.

1. Validity of Decision to Bridge
J.C.T. argues the trial court abused its discretion in bridging him to D.O.C. custody. [A]buse of discretion is defined as: a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented in support of and against the application. The trial court’s decision must be determined by the evidence presented on the record, just as our review is limited to the record presented. W.C.P. v. State, 1990 OK CR 24, I 9, 791 P.2d 97, 100 (citations omitted); accord C.L.F. v. State, 1999 OK CR 12, I 5, 989 P.2d 945, 946. The District Court may bridge a youthful offender from O.J.A. to D.O.C. only if it finds the State’s motion is supported by clear and convincing evidence, establishing that the youthful offender meets one or more of the statutory criteria warranting such a transfer. Id.; B.J.B. v. State, 2004 OK CR 17, 11 6, 88 P.3d 931, 932. The record in this matter contains more than sufficient evidence to support the court’s ruling granting the State’s motion to bridge. The State established that J.C.T.’S actions met the statutory criteria warranting his transfer to D.O.C. custody or supervision. Id.; B.J.B. v. State, 2004 OK CR 17, IT 6, 88 P.3d 931, 932. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to bridge J.C.T. to D.O.C.

2. Validity of Sentence Imposed
The critical question presented in this appeal is whether the district court, upon bridging a youthful offender to D.O.C. custody, is limited to sentencing the offender to the maximum sentence imposed at the youthful offender’s original sentencing as defined at 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-209(B)(1). We find that it is.

a. Facts
On August 18, 2011, J.C.T. entered a guilty plea to the charges alleged in Cleveland County District Court Case No. CF-2011-763. After verifying that J.C.T. understood successful completion of a rehabilitation plan would result in dismissal of all charges, his release from custody, and expungement of his record, the District Court remanded J.C.T. to the custody of the Office of Juvenile Affairs (O.J.A.) to begin his rehabilitation plan. At this same hearing, the court advised J.C.T. that failure to complete his rehabilitation plan would result in the imposition of a sentence of twelve years in the custody of the Department of Corrections (D.O.C.).

On May 18, 2012, the district court extended O.J.A.’s custody of J.C.T. until December 16, 2012, when he would reach the age of 18 years and 5 months. In November 2012, J.C.T. was placed with his parents, but remained under the supervision of O.J.A. On December 14, 2012, the State filed a Motion For Youthful Offender Review Hearing and for Transfer of Custody and/or Supervision to the Department of Corrections, pursuant to 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-210(B)(5), commonly referred to as a motion to bridge.

At the time J.C.T.’s original sentence was imposed, the court believed that if J.C.T. was bridged to D.O.C. he would be eligible for a twelve (12) year sentence. The district court fully intended to sentence him to such, and stated as much on the record. The State advised the court that if it sought to bridge J.C.T., it would ask for a twelve (12) year sentence. On January 11, 2013, the hearing on the State’s motion to bridge began. It became clear that the district court was unsure of what sentence it had authority to impose in light of the youthful offender statutory sentencing limitations.

At the conclusion of that initial hearing, both parties were ordered to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law, and were directed to appear at a later date when the court would issue its ruling. When the parties appeared at the January 25, 2013 hearing, the court inquired of each as to their interpretation of the statute governing imposition of J.C.T.’s sentence.

The State claimed that to impose the original suspended sentence seemed somewhat silly in light of the gravity of J.C.T.’s offense that led to the State’s filing of the motion to bridge. Considering the nature of the offense, the State argued it would be nonsensical to find the court was limited to placing J.C.T. on probation.

To do so would require the State to wait for him to commit some probationary violation before his suspended sentence could be revoked. The State alleged that the bridging motion was to be treated as a revocation proceeding, arguing that J.C.T.’s violation of the terms and conditions of his probationary placement and supervision made him eligible for all of the sentencing options available to the court, limited only by the twelve (12) year cap of the original sentence. In contrast, J.C.T. argued that, assuming sufficient evidence existed to bridge him at all, the statute governing imposition of an adult sentence as the result of bridging a youthful offender to D.O.C. custody was clear, limiting the court’s authority to imposition of the original sentence, and nothing more.

Arguing that the original twelve (12) year suspended sentence was the one the State sought to have bridged, J.C.T. claimed it was error for the court to impose anything but J.C.T.’s suspended sentence citing 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-209(B)(2) limiting the court’s sentencing authority to the maximum sentence imposed in the original sentence.

J.C.T. argued that if the State wished to incarcerate him for the offense charged in Cleveland County Case No. CF-2011-763, it would have to wait until he violated the terms and conditions of his probation and then timely file an application to revoke based upon that violation. J.C.T. entered into a plea agreement with the State which specified that he would be sentenced, as a youthful offender, to twelve (12) years, suspended.

A review of the plea of guilty summary of facts reflects that exact agreement. The plea agreement notations specify that J.C.T. is to be placed in O.J.A. custody and out of home placement, and that periodic review hearings would be conducted pursuant to 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-210. The district court’s pronouncement from the bench was that J.C.T. was to be sentenced, as a youthful offender, to twelve (12) years, suspended.

J.C.T., the State and the district court all agreed that the sentence imposed was the sentence agreed upon by the parties.

b. Analysis
The youthful offender sentencing statutes resemble the statutes governing imposition of suspended or deferred sentences applied to adult offenders. When a youthful offender is found guilty or enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, O.J.A. conducts a presentence investigation. The court then holds a hearing as specified in 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-209(A)(2) and imposes a youthful offender sentence. Title 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-202 defines the term sentenced as a youthful offender to mean the imposition of a court order making disposition of a youthful offender as provided by 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-209. This court order shall constitute an adult criminal sentence if the youthful offender is transferred to the custody or supervision of the Department of Corrections. 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-202(A)(2)(emphasis added).

Section 2-5-209(B)(1) provides that the youthful offender shall be subject to the same type of sentencing procedures and duration of sentence as an adult convicted of a felony, including suspension or deferment. The statute also requires that any sentence imposed on a youthful offender shall be served in the custody or supervision of O.J.A. until (1) the expiration of the sentence, (2) the youthful offender is discharged or (3) the youthful offender reaches the age of 18, whichever occurs first.

Section 2-5-209(B)(2) specifies The sentence imposed shall not exceed the maximum sentence already imposed in the originating sentence. (Emphasis added). When read together, sections 2-5-209(B)(1) and (2) require the sentencing court, upon reviewing the status of a youthful offender who has reached the age of 18 years, to impose an adult sentence at that time, unless it discharges the youthful offender from custody or returns him to O.J.A. until the offender reaches the age of 18 years and 5 months.

Prior to the youthful offender reaching the age of 18 (or 18 years and 5 months, if custody has been extended) and upon good cause shown by the moving party, the court may conduct a review hearing to decide whether it should bridge (transfer custody or supervision of a youthful offender) the defendant to D.O.C. See 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-210(B)(5). Upon finding that transfer is warranted, the court is required to issue an order transferring custody, which shall be deemed an adult conviction. 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-210(C).

This bridging order is appealable when entered, and is statutorily required to include the following: (1) detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the grounds alleged in the State’s motion (10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-210(B)(5); (2) a judgment and sentence for an adult conviction (10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-210(C)); and (3) a detailed memorandum or historical statement of the Youthful Offender Act as applied to the offender being transferred to D.O.C., including the date of the offense, the date of the adjudication as a youthful offender, the date of the filing of the motion to transfer custody of the offender to the adult criminal system, and the date of the imposition of the adult sentence.

The sentencing statute clearly limits the length of the youthful offender’s adult sentence, requiring that it be no longer than the original sentence imposed against the defendant as a youthful offender. We have no published authority governing this aspect of the youthful offender bridging statute.

The goal of statutory construction is to discern the intent of the Legislature, which is never presumed to have done a vain and useless act. Elementary rules of statutory interpretation require us to avoid any statutory construction which would render any part of a statute superfluous or useless. A statute should be given a construction according to the fair import of its words taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision.

The Youthful Offender Act is unique and specific in its application to a very limited subset of offenders who are given special consideration and treatment specifically because they are not adults. The statutory language governing the imposition of an adult sentence upon bridging a youthful offender to D.O.C. custody is quite clear.

We find nothing nonsensical in the statutory language which allows the district court, in its discretion, to impose an original sentence in a youthful offender case after determining what sentence best suits the needs of the individual youthful offender and the State. The statute allows the sentencing court a variety of sentencing options, including all of those available for sentencing adult offenders. The statute is specific and unambiguous.

The confusion in this case resulted when the State and the District Court assumed that a motion to bridge under the youthful offender statute was the equivalent of a revocation proceeding in an adult case. The law governing the revocation of a suspended sentence is likewise quite clear. At a hearing where the State seeks revocation of an adult defendant’s suspended sentence, the question is whether the sentence originally imposed should be executed, and the court makes a factual determination as to whether or not the terms of the suspended sentence have been violated.

The consequence of bridging a youthful offender to D.O.C. custody is the actual imposition of an adult sentence. It is a final order, appealable when entered. Until a youthful offender has been bridged, the original sentence imposed is considered an unexecuted youthful offender sentence. Execution of the sentence occurs upon bridging which is the imposition of an adult sentence.

If the original youthful offender sentence was suspended, deferred or subject to some other probationary term or condition, the statutory language authorizes the district court to impose an adult sentence no greater than the original youthful offender sentence. That the judge in this case misunderstood what sentence she was authorized to impose in the event J.C.T. was bridged is apparent.

J.C.T.’s behavior, which prompted the motion to bridge, would have constituted sufficient grounds to revoke his suspended sentence had he been previously sentenced as an adult. But he wasn’t. While we understand the district court’s confusion, we find no ambiguity in either the statute or the district court’s pronouncements which would allow imposition of the twelve (12) year sentence in this case.

This Court has held that pronouncements from the bench control over written conflicting orders. In this instance, there is no conflict between the pronouncement of the sentence by the judge and the written order memorializing the same, nor is there a conflict between the original sentence imposed and the plea agreement entered into between the State and J.C.T.

The discrepancy occurred in the interpretation of the statute governing the consequences of bridging J.C.T. to D.O.C. custody, specifically what sentencing limitations existed in the event the State filed a motion to bridge.

DECISION

The order of the District Court of Cleveland County granting the State’s motion to bridge J.C.T. to the Department of Corrections in Case No. CF-2011-365 is AFFIRMED. This matter is REMANDED to the District Court of Cleveland County for sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2013), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

1. O.J.A.
2. Id.; B.J.B. v. State, 2004 OK CR 17, 11 6, 88 P.3d 931, 932.
3. 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-210(B)(5).
4. 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-209(B)(1).
5. 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-210(C).
6. 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-209(B)(2).
7. Id.
8. 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-210(C).
9. 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-210(D).

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 10A § 2-5-209(B)(1) - Youthful offender sentencing procedures
• Okla. Stat. tit. 10A § 2-5-210(B)(5) - Motion to bridge authority
• Okla. Stat. tit. 10A § 2-5-202(A) - Sentencing as a youthful offender
• Okla. Stat. tit. 10A § 2-5-210(C) - Transfer to Department of Corrections
• Okla. Stat. tit. 10A § 2-5-209(B)(2) - Limitations on sentencing

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
• W.C.P. v. State, 1990 OK CR 24, I 9, 791 P.2d 97, 100
• C.L.F. v. State, 1999 OK CR 12, I 5, 989 P.2d 945, 946
• B.J.B. v. State, 2004 OK CR 17, 11 6, 88 P.3d 931, 932
• State U. District Court of Oklahoma County, 2007 OK CR 3, I 17, 154 P.3d 84, 87
• Vilandre v. State, 2005 OK CR 9, I 5, 113 P.3d 893, 896
• State U. Anderson, 1998 OK CR 67, I 3, 972 P.2d 32, 33
• Byrd v. Caswell, 2001 OK CR 29, I 6, 34 P.3d 647, 648-649
• Evans v. Trimble, 1987 OK CR 257, "I 14, 746 P.2d 680, 685
• Robinson v. State, 1991 OK CR 44, I 3, 809 P.2d 1320, 1322
• Tilden v. State, 2013 OK CR 10, T 3, P.3d
• Burnham v. State, 2002 OK CR 6, fn. 2; 43 P.3d 387, 390
• Degraffenreid U. State, 1979 OK CR 88, 599 P.2d 1107
• Bishop v. State, 1979 OK CR 9, IT 4, 593 P.2d 505, 507
• Marutzky v. State, 1973 OK CR 398, IT 5, 514 P.2d. 430, 431
• Bumpus v. State, 1996 OK CR 52, IT 5, 925 P.2d 1208, 1209-1210
• Davis v. State, 1993 OK CR 3, IT 11, 845 P.2d 194, 197
• LeMay U. Rahhal, 1996 OK CR 21, 911 18-21, 917 P.2d 18