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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA L.M.P., ) ) NOT FOR PUBLICATION Appellant, ) V. ) Case No. J-2008-02 ) THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ) FILED ) IN COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS Appellee. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ) ) MAY – 6 2008 SUMMARY OPINION MICHAEL S. RICHIE CLERK CHAPEL, JUDGE: Appellant has appealed from an order of the Oklahoma County District Court, the Honorable Carol Hubbard, District Judge, denying her motion for certification as youthful offender. Pursuant to Rule 11.2(A)(1), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2008), this appeal was automatically assigned to the Accelerated Docket of this Court. Appellant’s propositions of error were presented in oral argument on March 27, 2008, pursuant to Rule 11.2(F). At the conclusion of the oral argument, the parties were advised of this Court’s decision. In one proposition of error, Appellant contends she established by a preponderance of the evidence she should be tried and sentenced as a youthful offender, not an adult, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for certification as a youthful offender. In cases of this nature, this Court will review the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of 1 In Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-2007-1057, Appellant was charged with Murder in the First Degree. Pursuant to the statutory law applicable at the time the crime was committed, 10 O.S.Supp.2006, Section 7306-2.5(A) version 2, Appellant is presumed to be an adult. discretion by the trial court in reaching its decision. See C.L.F. v. State, 1999 OK CR 12, 989 P.2d 945, 946. We have defined “abuse of discretion” as a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented in support of and against the application. Id. After a review of all the evidence presented to the trial court, we find Appellant established by a preponderance of the evidence she should be treated as a youthful offender. See C.R.B. v. State, 1999 OK CR 1, 973 P.2d 339. As such, we find the trial court’s ruling denying Appellant’s motion for youthful offender certification was an abuse of discretion.² Decision IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that the order of the District Court of Oklahoma County denying Appellant’s motion to be sentenced as a Youthful Offender is REVERSED. IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THIS COURT that this matter is REMANDED to the District Court with directions that Appellant is to be certified as a youthful offender. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2008), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the filing of this decision. ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL BENJAMIN C. BROWN BENJAMIN C. BROWN JAMES L. HUGHES, JR. 5905 CLASSEN COURT, SUITE 2025905 CLASSEN COURT, SUITE 202 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73118 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73118 DAVID R. SLANE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 901 NW 12TH STREET OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73106 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 2 Our finding in this proposition of error, renders moot Appellant’s other claims of error. 2 JENNIFER E. CHANCE JENNIFER E. CHANCE ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY OKLAHOMA COUNTY OKLAHOMA COUNTY 320 ROBERT S. KERR 320 ROBERT S. KERR SUITE 505 SUITE 505 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE OPINION BY: CHAPEL, J. LUMPKIN, P.J.: DISSENT JOHNSON, J., V.P.J.: CONCUR JOHNSON, A., J.: DISSENT LEWIS, J.: CONCUR 3 A. JOHNSON, JUDGE, DISSENTING: The trial court held a comprehensive hearing and filed a thorough and well- reasoned order explaining its ruling denying L.M.P.’s application for youthful offender status. Its findings are supported by the record. Our standard of review in this matter is deferential and relief is available only if we find that the trial court abused its discretion. See C.L.F. v. State, 1999 OK CR 12, I 5, 989 P.2d 945, 946. The question here is not whether the juvenile arguably met her burden, but whether the trial court’s denial of youthful offender status to L.M.P. is clearly contrary to the applicable law and facts presented. It is not. For this reason, I dissent. I am authorized to state that Judge Lumpkin joins in this dissent.

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