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F-2019-417

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Henry Warren Kwe Kwe v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2019-417

Filed: Jul. 30, 2020

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Henry Warren Kwe Kwe

Summary

Henry Warren Kwe Kwe appealed his conviction for several crimes, including Conjoint Robbery and Shooting with Intent to Kill. His convictions and sentence included nine years for robbery, twenty-eight years for shooting, two years for possessing a sawed-off shotgun, and one year for leaving the scene of an injury accident, all served concurrently. Kwe Kwe raised ten claims on appeal, questioning evidence and procedural issues, but the court affirmed his convictions. Judge Kuehn dissented on one aspect regarding victim compensation assessment.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Victim Compensation Assessment of $150.00 on Count 4 is VACATED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2020), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there a violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 11 regarding multiple punishments for conjoint robbery and shooting with intent to kill?
  • Did insufficient evidence warrant the reversal of the conviction for shooting with intent to kill?
  • Did insufficient evidence warrant the reversal of the conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun?
  • Was the State required to prove that the shotgun exceeded 18 inches before modification?
  • Is 21 O.S.2011, § 1289.18 unconstitutionally overbroad on its face?
  • Did the district court fail to consider required statutory factors during the victim compensation assessments?
  • Was Kwe Kwe denied a fair trial due to improper victim impact statements?
  • Did prosecutorial misconduct deprive him of a fair trial?
  • Did Kwe Kwe receive effective assistance of trial counsel?
  • Did the accumulation of errors deprive him of a fair trial?

Findings

  • the court erred
  • evidence was sufficient
  • evidence was sufficient
  • evidence was sufficient
  • the court erred
  • the court erred
  • the court erred
  • the court did not err
  • the claim is denied
  • the claim is denied
  • the claim is denied
  • the VCA on Count 4 must be vacated

F-2019-417

Jul. 30, 2020

Henry Warren Kwe Kwe

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

ROWLAND, JUDGE: Appellant Henry Warren Kwe Kwe appeals his Judgment and Sentence from the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2016-4098, for Conjoint Robbery (Count 1), in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 800; Shooting with Intent to Kill (Count 2), in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 652(A); Possession of a Sawed-Off Shotgun (Count 4), in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 1289.18; and Leaving Scene of a Collision Involving Injury (Count 5), in violation of 47 O.S.2011, § 10-102.1. The Honorable Sharon K. Holmes, District Judge, presided over Kwe Kwe’s jury trial and sentenced him in accordance with the jury’s verdict to nine years imprisonment and a $2,500.00 fine on Count 1, twenty-eight years imprisonment and a $1,800.00 fine on Count 2, two years imprisonment and a $600.00 fine on Count 4, and one year imprisonment and a $600.00 fine on Count 5. Judge Holmes ordered the sentences to be served concurrently, as well as awarded credit for all time served.

Kwe Kwe raises ten claims on appeal: (1) whether his convictions for both conjoint robbery and shooting with intent to kill violate 21 O.S.2011, § 11; (2) whether his conviction for shooting with intent to kill must be reversed because of insufficient evidence; (3) whether his conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun must be reversed because of insufficient evidence; (4) whether the State’s failure to prove the shotgun exceeded 18 inches before modification requires reversal; (5) whether 21 O.S.2011, § 1289.18(A) is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face; (6) whether the district court failed to consider the required statutory factors in assessing the victim’s compensation assessments; (7) whether he was denied a fair trial because of improper victim impact statements; (8) whether prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial; (9) whether he received the effective assistance of trial counsel; and (10) whether the accumulation of errors deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm the Judgment and Sentence of the district court on all counts. The Victim Compensation Assessment, however, for Count 4 must be vacated for reasons discussed in this opinion.

1. Kwe Kwe claims his convictions for both conjoint robbery and shooting with intent to kill constitute multiple punishment for a single act in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 11(A). He maintains that shooting the victim was the force to effectuate the robbery and therefore his action cannot be punished twice, requiring dismissal of one of the two convictions. Kwe Kwe failed to object on this basis below, waiving review of this claim for all but plain error.

Kwe Kwe has the burden in plain error review to demonstrate that an error, plain or obvious under current law, adversely affected his substantial rights. This Court may correct plain error provided the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or represented a miscarriage of justice. We analyze Section 11 claims by focusing on the relationship between the crimes, considering (1) the particular facts of each case; (2) whether the facts set out separate and distinct crimes; and (3) the intent of the Legislature. If the crimes truly arise out of one act, Section 11 prohibits punishing the act twice or under more than one statute.

The State charged Kwe Kwe by second amended Information with conjoint robbery accomplished by means of force and/or fear by threatening [the victim]. The elements instruction for conjoint robbery, however, omitted any reference to fear and listed only a taking by force. The two prosecutors trying the case addressed the shooting during each of their portions of the closing argument. During the first closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the robbery occurred after the victim was shot, i.e., the robbers shot the victim first and then took her purse containing her phone and keys. She also said that the robbery and the shooting were happening together. In addressing force in relation to the robbery specifically, she stated, By force. Ladies and gentlemen, [the victim] was shot in the back with a shotgun. I don’t know how much more forceful it gets. In the final closing argument, however, the other prosecutor argued the victim was shot to preclude her from identifying her robbers, stating they intended to kill her SO that she would not ever make them be accountable. The district court defined force in the jury instructions as follows: Force, of any degree, used to obtain or to retain possession of property or to prevent or to overcome resistance to its taking. Force used only as a means of escape is not sufficient to establish robbery.

The evidence showed that Kwe Kwe initiated the robbery with his two accomplices by asking the victim repeatedly for money as well as suggesting she accompany them to an ATM, while one of his accomplices displayed a weapon. Realizing the gravity of her situation, the victim tried to draw attention to herself and to remove herself from the situation. She made noise and turned away from her robbers, most likely to flee, and one of the robbers shot her in the back with a shotgun. The plain view of the accomplice’s weapon was the force of some degree that overcame her resistance and caused her to abandon any interest in her property and seek to escape. Hence, the shooting was not the force that parted her from her property but rather was to stifle her efforts to escape or obtain help and to eliminate a witness SO the robbers would not be caught or identified. The fact the robbers absconded with her purse after the shooting was incidental under these circumstances and did not make the shooting part and parcel of the robbery. Though the crimes were committed during a continuing course of overlapping conduct, we find that the robbery and shooting were separate and distinct. Conviction and punishment for these crimes therefore does not offend Section 11. This claim is denied.

2. Kwe Kwe argues his shooting with intent to kill conviction must be reversed and dismissed for insufficient evidence. He contends the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that he was the shooter or that he aided and abetted the shooter with an intent to kill. He maintains that without evidence placing a gun in his hands or evidence showing he somehow, by act or counsel, aided or encouraged the shooter, he may not be held responsible as a principal. This claim is without merit. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury; we accept all reasonable inferences and credibility choices that tend to support the verdict. We further recognize that the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence and either, or any combination of the two, may be sufficient to support a conviction. We examine pieces of evidence together in context rather than in isolation, and we will affirm a conviction so long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn from the record as a whole, the jury might fairly have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Any person who directly commits the act constituting the offense or aids and abets in a crime’s commission is a principal. In order to convict the accused for aiding and abetting in a crime, the State must show that he or she procured the crime to be done, or aided, assisted, abetted, advised or encouraged its commission. Although mere presence or acquiescence, without participation, does not constitute a crime, only slight participation is needed to change a person’s status from a mere spectator into an aider and abettor.

The district court submitted the uniform instructions on aiding and abetting that correctly set forth the law. The State had to prove that Kwe Kwe knowingly and with criminal intent aided and abetted in the commission of shooting with intent to kill. Criminal intent is nothing more than a design to commit a crime or to commit acts the probable consequences of which are criminal. Kwe Kwe was the leader in the robbery and he explicitly directed the victim to be quiet before asking for money, pointing to her purse when she said she had none, and then suggesting she accompany them to an ATM. The victim noticed the robber to Kwe Kwe’s left was holding a weapon and she tried to draw attention to herself for help. When she turned away, one of the men shot her in the back and one grabbed her purse in their getaway. The trial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficiently established Kwe Kwe could be convicted as a principal. He instigated the robbery and perpetrated it with an armed partner. He later admitted to possessing a shotgun and police found two sizes of shotgun shells in his car. Jurors could fairly infer that Kwe Kwe was well aware his confederate was armed. He shushed the victim from the beginning, evidencing an intent to avoid detection for his criminal misconduct. Despite inconclusive evidence of the actual shooter’s identity, the circumstantial evidence supported a finding that Kwe Kwe, at the very least, possessed a common desire with his armed confederate to avoid apprehension at all costs and a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he aided and encouraged his armed accomplice in the crime of shooting with intent to kill.

Moreover, Kwe Kwe fled from police to hide a sawed-off loaded 20-gauge shotgun on a rooftop before turning himself in to the police less than twelve hours after the robbery/shooting. Although there was no evidence the victim was shot with Kwe Kwe’s shotgun, he refused to account for his whereabouts at the time of the robbery and made statements evidencing some knowledge of the event. His post-offense conduct lent further support of his involvement in the crime. Because the evidence was sufficient to show he aided and abetted in the crime of shooting with intent to kill, his conviction may stand. This claim is denied.

3. Kwe Kwe argues his conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun must be reversed and dismissed for insufficient evidence. He contends the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the barrel of the firearm he possessed was less than 18 inches. This claim is without merit. Title 21 O.S.2011, § 1289.18(A) states: Sawed-off shotgun shall mean any firearm capable of discharging a series of projectiles of any material which may reasonably be expected to be able to cause lethal injury, with a barrel or barrels less than eighteen (18) inches in length, and using either gunpowder, gas or any means of rocket propulsion. The officer who collected Kwe Kwe’s shotgun identified State’s Exhibit 18 as the shotgun he collected. He explained that the gun was a 20-gauge single shot sawed-off shotgun and that the original barrel had been shortened and modified from its original configuration. The lead detective testified that 18 inches is the measurement that determines whether or not a weapon is sawed-off. He stated that [t]he length measured from inside the barrel must be greater than 18 inches to prove a weapon is not ‘sawed-off’. The detective explained that he inspected the firearm and it did not exceed 18 inches. Kwe Kwe claims the detective’s testimony was insufficient to show the firearm was less than 18 inches and did not exclude the possibility the shotgun was exactly 18 inches and therefore not sawed-off. Jurors saw the shotgun in person and heard testimony concerning its modifications and barrel length. The district court instructed the jury that a sawed-off shotgun, among other things, was a gun designed with a barrel more than eighteen inches in length which has been reduced to less than eighteen inches in length. Kwe Kwe never challenged his possession of a sawed-off shotgun and his attorney referred to the shotgun as sawed-off at trial as well as conceded guilt on that charge during closing argument. Viewing the direct and circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the necessary elements. Accordingly, we find that Kwe Kwe’s conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun may also stand.

4. Kwe Kwe argues his conviction for possession of a sawed-off shotgun must be reversed and dismissed because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the barrel of the shotgun was longer than 18 inches prior to its modification. This claim is likewise without merit. Under the statute in effect when Kwe Kwe was charged with possessing the shotgun, the prosecution was not required to prove the original length of the barrel prior to modification. Effective November 1, 2019, well after the commission of the instant crime, the legislature amended the definition of sawed-off shotgun to exclude any weapon so designed with a barrel less than eighteen (18) inches in length, provided it has an overall length of twenty-six (26) inches or more. There is nothing in the amended Section 1289.18 to suggest the legislature intended the amendment to be retroactive. That Kwe Kwe’s jury was instructed that a sawed-off shotgun was one that was designed with a barrel more than eighteen inches in length which has been reduced to less than eighteen inches in length was of no consequence. Kwe Kwe’s jury had to find under the instruction that the shotgun was less than 18 inches in length and the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of that fact. Any error in the definition of a sawed-off shotgun in this case was harmless. For these reasons, we reject Kwe Kwe’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge. This claim is denied.

5. Kwe Kwe argues 21 O.S.2011, § 1289.18 is unconstitutionally overbroad because it applied to any gun under 18 inches thereby incorporating protected functioning handguns. His failure to raise this claim below waives the issue for appellate review for all but plain error. We have long held that statutes are presumed constitutional and the burden to prove otherwise rests on the party attacking the constitutionality of the statute. It is also well settled that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court. We examine Kwe Kwe’s conduct without regard to hypothetical applications of the law. Kwe Kwe was not convicted of possessing a protected handgun. The firearm he possessed was a 20-gauge sawed-off shotgun, whose barrel, originally somewhat longer, had been modified and reduced to less than eighteen inches. Kwe Kwe did not dispute at trial either his possession of the gun or its status as sawed-off. Because Section 1289.18(A) was constitutionally applied to Kwe Kwe’s possession of the 20-gauge shotgun whose barrel had been modified to less than 18 inches, we will not entertain his constitutional overbreadth challenge. This claim is denied.

6. Kwe Kwe argues the district court’s $600.00 Victim Compensation Assessment ($150.00 per count) must be vacated because the district court ordered the assessment without considering the statutory factors outlined in 21 O.S.2011, § 142.18(A). He further maintains that only two of his four convictions qualify for the assessment, namely his convictions for conjoint robbery and shooting with intent to kill (Counts 1 and 2). He requests the Court either remand the matter for a proper hearing or modify the assessment to the minimum of $50.00 on each of Counts 1 and 2. Kwe Kwe did not object to the assessment below and appellate review is for plain error only. Title 21 O.S.2011, § 142.18(A) requires the district court to charge a victim compensation assessment (VCA) between $50.00 and $10,000.00 against any person convicted of a felony involving criminally injurious conduct. When calculating the VCA, the district court must consider the severity of the crime, the [defendant’s] prior criminal record, the expenses of the victim of the crime, and the ability of the defendant to pay, as well as the economic impact of the victim compensation assessment on the dependents of the defendant.

In Kwe Kwe’s case, the severity of the robbery and shooting were addressed when the victim testified during trial. The victim’s expenses were touched upon when she testified about her hospital stay, surgeries, and her ongoing health issues. The circumstances surrounding his vehicle collision were addressed through various witnesses. Although Kwe Kwe’s pauper’s affidavit is not in the record, he was originally appointed a public defender and later a conflict defender. The record also reveals that the district court properly ordered, received and considered a presentence investigation report (PSI). Under 22 O.S.Supp.2017, § 982, the Department of Corrections shall include in a PSI: a voluntary statement from each victim of the offense concerning the nature of the offense and the impact of the offense on the victim and the immediate family of the victim, the amount of the loss suffered or incurred by the victim as a result of the criminal conduct of the offender, and the age, marital status, living arrangements, financial obligations, income, family history and education, prior juvenile and criminal records, associations with other persons convicted of a felony offense, social history, indications of a predisposition to violence or substance abuse, remorse or guilt about the offense or the harm to the victim, job skills and employment history of the offender. A properly conducted PSI addresses the statutory factors for the imposition of a victim compensation assessment.

Because the record shows that the district court properly ordered, received and considered a presentence investigation report, we have no trouble finding that the district court properly considered each of the factors set forth in Section 142.18(A) in imposing the VCA on Counts 1, 2 and 5. We cannot, however, find that a VCA was warranted on Count 4 – Possession of a Sawed-Off Shotgun. Section 142.18(A) requires the district court to charge a VCA against any person convicted of a felony which results in bodily injury, threat of bodily injury or death to a victim. Without proof the shotgun Kwe Kwe possessed was the one used in the robbery/shooting, we cannot find that his crime of possession involved criminally injurious conduct. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s VCA on Counts 1, 2 and 5, and vacate the VCA on Count 4.

7. Kwe Kwe claims he was denied a fair trial from the admission of improper victim impact evidence. He claims it was error for the prosecutor to elicit testimony from the victim about her injuries, including their post-crime effects, and for the prosecutor to discuss the victim’s lasting injuries during closing argument. According to Kwe Kwe, the only reason for the evidence and argument was to invoke the prejudice and passions of the jury. Because he did not object to either the evidence or argument below, appellate review is for plain error only. Although victim impact evidence is inadmissible in a non-capital trial except at the formal sentencing hearing, the evidence Kwe Kwe challenges was relevant and did not constitute inadmissible victim impact evidence.

The State alleged the crime of shooting with intent to kill in Count 2, or in the alternative, assault and battery with a deadly weapon. The challenged evidence demonstrated the severity of the victim’s injuries and tended to prove the required intent to kill necessary for conviction. In addition, the alternative charge required the prosecution to prove an assault and battery with an instrument designed or constructed to cause death or great bodily injury. Based on this record, Kwe Kwe cannot show any error from the admission of this testimony. Nor can he show the prosecutor misused this evidence in closing argument by asking the jury to consider the impact of the shooting on the victim. Because Kwe Kwe has not established the commission of obvious error, he is not entitled to relief and this claim must be denied.

8. Kwe Kwe argues he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. Kwe Kwe’s objections to the challenged remarks below preserved this claim for appellate review. This Court will not grant relief on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct unless the misconduct effectively deprived the defendant of a fair trial or a fair and reliable sentencing proceeding.

As previously mentioned, both parties enjoy a wide latitude in closing argument to argue the evidence and reasonable inferences from it. Kwe Kwe claims the prosecutor erred by arguing about the role of the defense expert’s testimony, asking the jury to disregard evidence, and defining reasonable doubt. Defense counsel objected to the challenged remarks and the district court sustained almost all of them. A review of the record shows that not only did the district court halt the prosecutor’s complained-of statements, the court properly instructed the jury from the beginning that argument by the attorneys is not evidence. The court also submitted accurate instructions on evaluating witness credibility, eyewitness identifications, and the burden of proof. The district court’s rulings that ended the prosecutor’s questionable arguments coupled with its accurate instructions remedied any error. This claim is denied.

9. Kwe Kwe claims he is entitled to relief because of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He faults defense counsel for failing to raise a Section 11 multiple punishment challenge regarding Counts 1 and 2, failing to challenge the constitutionality of 21 O.S.2011, § 1289.18(A), and for failing to object to either the victim compensation assessments or the alleged victim impact evidence. This claim requires no relief.

This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine: (1) whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient; and (2) whether counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial with reliable results. Kwe Kwe’s claim must fail for lack of prejudice. The merits of the underlying claims have been considered and rejected in the previous propositions of error. The only exception is our conclusion that the district court erroneously imposed a $150.00 VCA on Count 4 which we vacate. Kwe Kwe cannot otherwise show there is a reasonable probability the outcome of his case would have been different had defense counsel raised a Section 11 claim, challenged the constitutionality of 21 O.S.2011, § 1289.18(A), objected to the alleged victim impact evidence, or challenged the VCA on Counts 1, 2, and 5. This claim is therefore denied.

10. Kwe Kwe claims that even if no individual error in his case merits relief, the cumulative effect of the errors committed requires reversal or modification of his conviction. The cumulative error doctrine applies when several errors occurred at the trial court level, but none alone warrants reversal. Although individual errors may be of insufficient gravity to warrant reversal, the combined effect of an accumulation of errors may require a new trial. The commission of several trial errors does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial when the errors considered together do not affect the outcome of the proceeding. Other than the erroneous assessment of the $150.00 VCA on Count 4, there are no errors, considered individually or cumulatively, that merit further relief in this case. This claim is denied.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED. The Victim Compensation Assessment of $150.00 on Count 4 is VACATED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2020), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 800
  2. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 652(A)
  3. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1289.18
  4. Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 10-102.
  5. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 11
  6. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1289.18(A)
  7. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 142.18(A)
  8. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 142.3
  9. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1289.18(A)
  10. Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 982
  11. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1289.18(A)

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 800 (2011) - Conjoint Robbery
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 652(A) (2011) - Shooting with Intent to Kill
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1289.18 (2011) - Possession of a Sawed-Off Shotgun
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 10-102 (2011) - Leaving Scene of a Collision Involving Injury
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 11 (2011) - Multiple Punishments
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 172 (2011) - Principle in Commission of Crime
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 142.18(A) (2011) - Victim Compensation Assessment
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 982 (2017) - Presentence Investigation Report
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1289.18(A) (2019) - Sawed-Off Shotgun Definition

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Tafolla v. State, 2019 OK CR 15, I 37, 446 P.3d 1248, 1261
  • Hammick v. State, 2019 OK CR 21, I 8, 449 P.3d 1272, 1275
  • Sanders v. State, 2015 OK CR 11, I 8, 358 P.3d 280, 284
  • Davis v. State, 1999 OK CR 48, II 13, 993 P.2d 124, 126
  • Mason v. State, 2018 OK CR 37, I 13, 433 P.3d 1264, 1269
  • Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04
  • Mitchell v. State, 2018 OK CR 24, I 11, 424 P.3d 677, 682
  • Williams v. State, 2008 OK CR 19, I 87, 188 P.3d 208, 226
  • Lockett v. State, 2002 OK CR 30, I 14, 53 P.3d 418, 423
  • State v. Hurt, 2014 OK CR 17, I 11, 340 P.3d 7, 9
  • Norton v. State, 2002 OK CR 10, I 18, 43 P.3d 404, 409
  • Arganbright v. State, 2014 OK CR 5, I 15, 328 P.3d 1212, 1216
  • State v. Howerton, 2002 OK CR 17, I 18, 46 P.3d 154, 158
  • Wilkins v. State, 1999 OK CR 27, I 6, 985 P.2d 184, 185
  • State v. Johnson, 1992 OK CR 72, I 3, 877 P.2d 1136, 1139
  • Walters v. State, 1993 OK CR 4, 848 P.2d 20
  • Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 39, 139 P.3d 907, 923
  • Lamar v. State, 2018 OK CR 8, I 54, 419 P.3d 283, 297
  • Croan v. State, 1984 OK CR 69, I 10, 682 P.2d 236, 238
  • Mack v. State, 2008 OK CR 23, I 9, 188 P.3d 1284, 1289
  • Malone v. State, 2013 OK CR 1, I 14, 293 P.3d 198, 206
  • Tafolla v. State, 2019 OK CR 15, I 45, 446 P.3d 1263

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