F-2019-369

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Joseph Willis Collins v The State of Oklahoma

F-2019-369

Filed: Mar. 4, 2021

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State of Oklahoma

Summary

# Joseph Willis Collins appealed his conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon. Conviction and sentence: 25 years imprisonment and restitution of $7,504.00. #Rowland dissented. In this case, Joseph Willis Collins was found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon after a trial in Oklahoma. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison and was ordered to pay restitution for the victim's losses. Collins argued that his rights were violated during a police interview because he asked to stop answering questions, but the police continued the interrogation. He also raised other issues, like claiming that unfair evidence was presented and that he did not receive adequate help from his lawyer. The judges agreed that the police should have stopped questioning Collins when he expressed discomfort, but they decided that this mistake didn’t affect the trial's fairness because there was a lot of strong evidence against him. Additionally, they found that there were mistakes in how much restitution and fees were set, so they canceled those amounts and sent it back to the lower court to fix. The overall decision to keep Collins's conviction and prison sentence was affirmed, despite some errors. Judge Rowland disagreed with the part about the police violating Collins's rights, believing he didn’t clearly ask to remain silent.

Decision

The judgment of conviction and sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment is AFFIRMED. The award of restitution and the assessment of indigent defense fees are VACATED and REMANDED with instructions. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2021), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • was there a violation of the appellant's 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination due to the continuation of the police interview after invoking the right to remain silent?
  • did irrelevant and prejudicial testimony deprive the appellant of a fair trial?
  • was the appellant denied effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence?
  • was there insufficient proof of the victim's actual losses to support the restitution order?
  • did the trial court err in imposing an indigent defense fee greater than that allowed by statute?
  • did the court err in assessing juror fees in excess of what is allowed by statute?
  • did the accumulation of errors in this case deprive the appellant of due process of law?

Findings

  • the court erred regarding the admission of statements made after Appellant's invocation of right to terminate police interview, but the error was harmless
  • the evidence admitted related to Appellant's cell phone was not abusively prejudicial
  • Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel regarding the admission of evidence
  • the court erred in awarding restitution due to lack of sufficient support, which was vacated and remanded for proper determination
  • the trial court erred in imposing an indigent defense fee greater than the statutory amount, which was vacated and remanded for correction
  • there was no plain or obvious error regarding the assessment of juror fees
  • no cumulative error deprived Appellant of due process


F-2019-369

Mar. 4, 2021

Joseph Willis Collins

Appellant

v

The State of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

JOHN D. HADDEN CLERK
LEWIS, JUDGE: Joseph Willis Collins, Appellant, was tried by jury and found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 645, after former conviction of two or more felonies, in the District Court of Comanche County, Case No. CF-2017-481. The jury sentenced him to twenty-five years imprisonment. The Honorable Scott D. Meaders, District Judge, pronounced judgment and sentence, ordering the defendant to pay $7,504.00 in restitution as well as additional court costs. Mr. Collins appeals in the following propositions of error:

1. After a defendant invokes his right to terminate a police interview, the interview must immediately cease. Since the officer did not immediately cease questioning and Appellant’s subsequent statements were used against him, Appellant’s 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated;
2. Irrelevant and prejudicial testimony deprived Appellant of a fair trial;
3. Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel did not move to exclude irrelevant and prejudicial evidence;
4. There was insufficient proof of the victim’s actual losses or the hardship to the defendant to support the restitution order;
5. The trial court erred in imposing an indigent defense fee greater than that allowed by statute;
6. The court erred in imposing juror fees in excess of what is allowed by statute;
7. The accumulation of error in this case deprived Appellant of the due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution.

In Proposition One, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting in evidence statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Counsel raised no objection to the statements at trial, waiving all but plain error review. Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, ¶ 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923. To obtain relief, Appellant must show that a plain or obvious error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Id. We will correct plain error only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or otherwise causes a miscarriage of justice. Id.

We find that after being warned of his Miranda right to remain silent and questioned in custody for approximately twenty minutes, Appellant’s request, Can I go back downstairs, please? ‘Cause ya’ll are making things awkward for me, objectively invoked his right to remain silent and triggered Miranda’s requirement that all questioning cease immediately. We also reject the State’s view that Appellant’s second, explanatory sentence, Cause ya’ll are making things awkward for me, rendered his request ambiguous or voluntarily re-initiated the interrogation under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 447, 484-485 (1981). The remainder of the interrogation plainly violated Miranda. The resulting statements were inadmissible in the State’s case-in-chief. However, Appellant cannot obtain relief unless the Court also finds that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Because the properly admitted evidence of Appellant’s guilt is overwhelming, we find this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harmon v. State, 2011 OK CR 6, ¶ 32, 248 P.3d 918, 933 (finding erroneous admission of evidence is harmless where properly admitted evidence is overwhelming and prejudicial effect of improper evidence is comparatively insignificant). We therefore also conclude that the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial, and no relief is warranted. Proposition One is denied.

In Proposition Two, Appellant argues the admission of irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial data from his cell phone and related testimony, reflecting his relationships with various women and lewd comments about them, was unfairly prejudicial and requires reversal. Appellant objected to this evidence and preserved the question for review. We therefore assess the admission of the evidence for abuse of discretion, which we have defined as a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, contrary to logic and effect of the facts presented. Hancock v. State, 2007 OK CR 9, ¶ 72, 155 P.3d 796, 813; C.L.F. v. State, 1999 OK CR 12, ¶ 5, 989 P.2d 945, 946. We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of this evidence, which helped explain relevant data from the cell phone; and further find that the evidence was insufficiently prejudicial to unfairly impact either the conviction or sentence. Proposition Two is therefore denied.

In Proposition Three, Appellant argues he was deprived of constitutionally effective assistance by trial counsel’s failure to object to evidence admitted in violation of Miranda, and the admission of testimony related to his cell phone data. Reviewing these claims under the deficient performance and prejudice analysis of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), no relief is warranted. The evidence tainted by a Miranda violation led only to harmless error; and neither an error, nor resulting prejudice, is shown by the admission of the cell phone evidence. This precludes relief under Strickland’s prejudice prong. Phillips v. State, 1999 OK CR 38, ¶¶ 103-104, 989 P.2d 1017, 1043-44. Proposition Three is without merit.

In Propositions Four and Five, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in awarding $7,504.00 in restitution and assessing a $1,500.00 indigent defense fee. We review these claims only for plain error, as defined above. The State candidly concedes plain error occurred in both instances. Restitution in a criminal case is authorized in an amount up to three times the amount of the economic loss suffered as a direct result of the criminal act of the defendant. 22 O.S.2011, § 991f(A)(1). The actual loss must be determinable by the court with reasonable certainty. Honeycutt v. State, 1992 OK CR 36, ¶ 31, 834 P.2d 993, 1000. The parties agree that the court did not follow the statutory procedure, and the record contains scant evidentiary support for the current amount, though this amount or even more could prove correct. We will vacate the award of $7,504.00 and remand to the trial court with instructions to determine an amount of restitution, either by agreement or according to the procedures set forth in 22 O.S.2011, § 991f. The indigent defense fee of $1,500.00 will also be vacated and remanded with instructions to impose the specific $1,000.00 amount required by statute, unless another amount is specifically requested by counsel for the indigent person and is approved by the court. See 22 O.S.2011, § 1355.14(A)(4).

In Proposition Six, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in its assessment of $520.00 in juror fees, calculated as the sum of the $20.00 daily cost of the thirteen trial jurors for two days of trial. Appellant concedes the lack of an objection waived all but plain or obvious error. Finding no plain or obvious error under current law, we decline to vacate this portion of the trial court’s order. Proposition Six is denied.

Appellant seeks relief in Proposition Seven based on the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors. We found error in the admission of evidence tainted by a Miranda violation, but determined this error was harmless. We have remedied errors in the restitution order and indigent defense assessment by vacating and remanding for further proceedings. We find no other harmful errors, and no accumulation of unfairly prejudicial effects from individually harmless errors. Proposition Seven is denied.

DECISION

The judgment of conviction and sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment is AFFIRMED. The award of restitution and the assessment of indigent defense fees are VACATED and REMANDED with instructions. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2021), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. 1 Appellant was also acquitted of first degree burglary.
  2. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
  3. 3 Harmon v. State, 2011 OK CR 6, ¶ 32, 248 P.3d 918, 933.
  4. 4 Hancock v. State, 2007 OK CR 9, ¶ 72, 155 P.3d 796, 813; C.L.F. v. State, 1999 OK CR 12, ¶ 5, 989 P.2d 945, 946.
  5. 5 22 O.S.2011, § 991f(A)(1).
  6. 6 22 O.S.2011, § 1355.14(A)(4).
  7. 7 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 645 - Assault with a Dangerous Weapon
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 991f(A)(1) - Restitution
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1355.14(A)(4) - Indigent Defense Fee

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
  • Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
  • Harmon v. State, 2011 OK CR 6, I 32, 248 P.3d 918, 933
  • Hancock v. State, 2007 OK CR 9, I 72, 155 P.3d 796, 813
  • C.L.F. v. State, 1999 OK CR 12, I 5, 989 P.2d 945, 946
  • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
  • Honeycutt v. State, 1992 OK CR 36, I 31, 834 P.2d 993, 1000
  • Phillips v. State, 1999 OK CR 38, I 103-104, 989 P.2d 1017, 1043-44
  • Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)
  • Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)