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F-2018-994

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Katesha Christine Childers v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2018-994

Filed: Nov. 21, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Katesha Christine Childers appealed her conviction for First Degree Murder (Count 1) and Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon (Count 2) from the District Court of Tulsa County. She was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and one year for the firearm charge, with both sentences served at the same time. Judge Kelly Greenough presided over the case. Childers raised several issues, including whether the evidence was enough to support her murder conviction, whether the jury should have been instructed on heat-of-passion manslaughter, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. She also argued about the admission of certain witness testimonies and claimed she did not receive a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The court decided that the evidence was sufficient to show that Childers acted with the intent to kill her husband, and that she was not entitled to a lesser instruction on heat-of-passion manslaughter because there wasn't enough evidence to support that claim. It also held that her counsel acted reasonably and that any statements she made about shooting her husband were properly corroborated by other evidence. Overall, the court found no error or injustice in the trial process. Therefore, they affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court. No justices dissented.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • was the trial evidence sufficient to support the conviction for first degree murder?
  • did the district court err by failing to submit an instruction on first degree heat-of-passion manslaughter?
  • was there ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction?
  • did the district court err in admitting testimony from lay witnesses about Childers's statements regarding the shooting?
  • was there a denial of a fair trial due to the admission of inadmissible hearsay?
  • was there prosecutorial misconduct that denied Childers a fair trial?
  • did cumulative error deprive Childers of a fair trial?

Findings

  • evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for first degree murder
  • the district court did not err by failing to submit an instruction on first degree heat-of-passion manslaughter
  • Childers was not denied effective assistance of counsel regarding the instruction on first degree heat-of-passion manslaughter
  • the district court did not err in admitting testimony from lay witnesses about Childers's alleged confession
  • Childers was not denied a fair trial due to the admission of inadmissible hearsay
  • Childers was not denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct
  • cumulative error did not deprive Childers of a fair trial

F-2018-994

Nov. 21, 2019

Katesha Christine Childers

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

ROWLAND, JUDGE:

Appellant Katesha Christine Childers appeals her Judgment and Sentence from the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2017-3783, for First Degree Murder (Count 1), in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2012, § 701.7(A) and Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon (Count 2), in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 1283. The Honorable Kelly Greenough, District Judge, presided at her jury trial and sentenced her, in accordance with the jury’s verdict, to life imprisonment on Count 1 and one year imprisonment on Count 2. Judge Greenough ordered the sentences to be served concurrently and awarded credit for time served. Childers raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial evidence was sufficient to support her conviction for first degree murder; (2) whether the district court erred by failing to submit an instruction on first degree heat-of-passion manslaughter; (3) whether she was denied effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to request an instruction on first degree heat-of-passion manslaughter; (4) whether the district court erred in admitting testimony from three lay witnesses that Childers told them she shot the victim; (5) whether she was denied a fair trial because of the admission of inadmissible hearsay; (6) whether she was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct; and (7) whether cumulative error deprived her of a fair trial. We find relief is not required and affirm the Judgment and Sentence of the district court.

1. Childers argues her first degree murder conviction must be reversed and dismissed for insufficient evidence. She contends the prosecution failed to prove she acted with malice aforethought and intended to kill her husband. She maintains the evidence supported, at best, first degree heat-of-passion manslaughter and plausibly showed that she shot the victim in an emotional response to the fact that he was moving his things out of the marital home and refused to surrender his house keys. This claim is without merit. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the trier of fact; we accept all reasonable inferences and credibility choices that tend to support the verdict. We further recognize that the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence and either, or any combination of the two, may be sufficient to support a conviction. We examine pieces of evidence together in context rather than in isolation, and we will affirm a conviction so long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn from the record as a whole, the jury might fairly have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Malice [aforethought] may be formed in the instant before the fatal act, and may be established from the fact of the killing alone. Heat-of-passion requires adequate provocation and words alone, however insulting, will not constitute adequate provocation sufficient to reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter. The evidence showed that Childers had a verbal altercation with her husband, retrieved a gun, chased him from the front of their duplex, and fired at him at least twice as he ran across the carport toward the unit next door. She confessed to a friend that she shot her husband during a fight about some keys. The prosecution presented evidence the two had argued in the past and that the victim was afraid of his wife. Childers’s anger with her husband for moving out provided motive. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we find the evidence amply proved Childers killed her husband with a deliberate intent to end his life, i.e., malice aforethought. This claim is denied.

2. Childers complains the district court failed to properly instruct the jury on the law applicable to her case. She contends the district court erred by not including, sua sponte, an instruction on first degree heat-of-passion manslaughter. Because Childers neither objected to the district court’s jury instructions nor requested the omitted instruction, review is for plain error only. Childers has the burden in plain error review to demonstrate that an error, plain or obvious under current law, adversely affected her substantial rights. Childers cannot meet her burden because there was no evidence to support a first degree heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction. Evidence must warrant a lesser related offense instruction. Childers said she shot her husband during an argument about house keys. There was no evidence her husband threatened her. The evidence showed that he was trying to get away from her and that she pursued him. Therefore, we find Childers has not shown the commission of an error, plain or otherwise, in the omission of a first degree heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction and deny this claim.

3. Childers contends she is entitled to relief because of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. She faults defense counsel for failing to request a first degree heat-of-passion manslaughter instruction. This claim is without merit. This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine: (1) whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient; and (2) whether counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial with reliable results. This Court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if there is no showing of harm. Childers cannot show the necessary prejudice because she was not entitled to the instruction. It would defy logic to find defense counsel ineffective for not requesting an unwarranted jury instruction. This claim is denied.

4. Childers claims the district court erred in admitting her confession to lay third party witnesses because the statements were not sufficiently corroborated. This claim is without merit because Childers’s statements that she shot her husband were sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence. The confession corroboration rule requires substantial independent evidence tending to support the confession’s trustworthiness. The statements reported by the three lay witnesses were substantially similar, i.e., that Childers said she shot her husband during a dispute. Childers admitted to police that she was the only female in the area immediately after her husband was shot. A neighbor saw a black female with a gun in her hand immediately after hearing a gunshot. The medical examiner confirmed that the victim had been shot and died as a result of that wound. There was substantial proof, independent of Childers’s statements, that tended to establish the trustworthiness of her purported confession. The district court instructed the jury that it could not convict Childers based upon her statements unless they were confirmed and supported by other evidence of the material and basic fact or facts necessary for the commission of the offense charged and that it must disregard her confession unless it was corroborated. Childers has not shown the commission of an error, plain or otherwise, in the admission of her statements. This claim is denied.

5. Childers complains she was denied a fair trial because of the admission of inadmissible hearsay. We review evidentiary rulings preserved by objection for an abuse of discretion. Some of the challenged evidence was met with objection while some was not. The evidence implicating Childers was convincing. The shooting was witnessed by Childers’s duplex-unit neighbor as well as another neighbor. The evidence further showed that Childers’s relationship with her husband was turbulent. Based on the record, there is no proof the jury did not follow the district court’s instruction to disregard the objectionable statements or that Childers was prejudiced by the error. Hence, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in its handling of the violation of its order to exclude the gun reference.

6. Childers argues she was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. The record shows the prosecutor failed to redact a reference to Childers’s being an ex-con in her police interview. The district court declined to grant a mistrial, and elected instead to instruct the jury to disregard the last statements of the investigating officer. The DVD was then played to the end without further incident. Based on the record before us, there is no proof the jury did not follow the district court’s instruction to disregard the ex-con reference or that Childers was prejudiced by the error. We find the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Childers’s motion for mistrial or in its handling of the ex-con reference.

7. Childers claims that even if no individual error in her case merits relief, the cumulative effect of the errors committed requires favorable sentence modification. The commission of several trial errors does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial when the errors considered together do not affect the outcome of the proceeding. Moreover, a cumulative error claim has no merit when this Court fails to sustain any of the errors raised on appeal. There are no errors, considered individually or cumulatively, that merit relief in this case. This claim is denied.

**DECISION**

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. Under 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1, Childers must serve 85% of her sentence of imprisonment on Count 1 before she is eligible for parole consideration.
  2. Mason U. State, 2018 OK CR 37, I 13, 433 P.3d 1264, 1269; Spuehler U. State, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04.
  3. Robinson v. State, 2011 OK CR 15, I 18, 255 P.3d 425, 432.
  4. Tryon v. State, 2018 OK CR 20, I 71, 423 P.3d 617, 639.
  5. Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, 99 7-8, 419 P.3d 271, 277.
  6. Smith v. State, 2007 OK CR 16, I 64, 157 P.3d 1155, 1175.
  7. Scott U. State, 1995 OK CR 14, I 15, 891 P.2d 1283, 1291.
  8. Brown U. State, 2018 OK CR 3, I 111, 422 P.3d 155, 176.
  9. 12 O.S.2011, § 2803(2).
  10. 12 O.S.2011, § 2615.
  11. Tafolla v. State, 2019 OK CR 15, I 45, 446 P.3d 1248, 1263.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7 (2012) - First Degree Murder
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283 (2014) - Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1 (2015) - Parole Eligibility
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2803 (2011) - Hearsay Exceptions
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2615 (2011) - Rule of Sequestration

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Mason v. State, 2018 OK CR 37, I 13, 433 P.3d 1264, 1269
  • Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04
  • Robinson v. State, 2011 OK CR 15, I 18, 255 P.3d 425, 432
  • Tryon v. State, 2018 OK CR 20, I 71, 423 P.3d 617, 639
  • Bivens v. State, 2018 OK CR 33, I 27, 431 P.3d 985, 995
  • Hammick v. State, 2019 OK CR 21, I 8, 449 P.3d 1272, 1275
  • Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
  • Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, I 7-8, 419 P.3d 271, 277
  • Smith v. State, 2007 OK CR 16, I 64, 157 P.3d 1155, 1175
  • Scott v. State, 1995 OK CR 14, I 15, 891 P.2d 1283, 1291
  • Brown v. State, 2018 OK CR 3, I 111, 422 P.3d 155, 176
  • Harris v. State, 2019 OK CR 22, I 19, 450 P.3d 933, 944
  • Lamar v. State, 2018 OK CR 8, I 54, 419 P.3d 283, 297
  • Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 800
  • Tafolla v. State, 2019 OK CR 15, I 45, 446 P.3d 1248, 1263
  • Malone v. State, 2013 OK CR 1, I 14, 293 P.3d 198, 206
  • Bland v. State, 2000 OK CR 11, I 113, 4 P.3d 702, 731
  • Bosse v. State, 2017 OK CR 10, I 45, 400 P.3d 834, 852

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