Ralph William Sisco, Jr. v The State Of Oklahoma
F-2018-749
Filed: Sep. 19, 2019
Not for publication
Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma
Summary
Ralph William Sisco, Jr. appealed his conviction for Lewd Molestation. Conviction and sentence were affirmed: 25 years each for two counts, served one after the other. Judge Rowland wrote the opinion, with Judges Lewis, Kuehn, Lumpkin, and Hudson concurring. Judge Kuehn specially concurred but clarified that the jury could not have reasonably found for a lesser charge of Child Abuse based on the evidence.
Decision
The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.
Issues
- was there sufficient evidence to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt of Lewd Molestation in Count 2
- was he properly bound over at preliminary hearing
- was he denied a fair trial by the admission of evidence of other crimes and bad acts
- was he denied due process by the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury
- was he denied effective assistance of counsel
- did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered his sentences to be served consecutively
- did cumulative errors deprive him of a fair trial and reliable outcome
Findings
- the State proved each element of the crime of lewd molestation in Count 2 beyond a reasonable doubt
- Sisco waived his right to confront witnesses at the preliminary hearing
- the evidence at issue was not inadmissible hearsay as it was invited error
- there was no error in the admission of evidence of other crimes as it was part of the res gestae
- there was no plain error in the trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser offense of child abuse
- Sisco failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel or resulting prejudice
- the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering sentences to be served consecutively
- the cumulative error claim is denied as there were no individual errors sustaining reversal
F-2018-749
Sep. 19, 2019
Ralph William Sisco, Jr.
Appellantv
The State Of Oklahoma
Appellee
v
The State Of Oklahoma
Appellee
SUMMARY OPINION
RALPH WILLIAM SISCO, JR., ) Appellant,
V. ) Case No. F-2018-749
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ) Appellee.
ROWLAND, JUDGE:
Appellant Ralph William Sisco, Jr. appeals his Judgment and Sentence from the District Court of Nowata County, Case No. CF-2017-123, for Lewd Molestation (Counts 1 and 2), in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 1123. The Honorable Curtis L. DeLapp, District Judge, presided over Sisco’s jury trial and sentenced him, in accordance with the jury’s verdict, to twenty-five years imprisonment on each count. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. The trial court also ordered Sisco to serve a term of three years post-imprisonment supervision. Sisco appeals raising the following issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt of Lewd Molestation in Count 2; (2) whether he was properly bound over at preliminary hearing; (3) whether he was denied a fair trial by the admission of evidence of other crimes and bad acts; (4) whether he was denied due process by the trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury; (5) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel; (6) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered his sentences to be served consecutively; and (7) whether cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial and reliable outcome. We find relief is not required and affirm the Judgment and Sentence of the district court.
1. Sisco claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for lewd molestation in Count 2. This Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and will not disturb the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. See Logsdon v. State, 2010 OK CR 7, I 5, 231 P.3d 1156, 1161; Spuehler U. State, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04. In evaluating the evidence presented at trial, we accept the fact-finder’s resolution of conflicting evidence as long as it is within the bounds of reason. See Day v. State, 2013 OK CR 8, 13, 303 P.3d 291, 298. This Court also accepts all reasonable inferences and credibility choices that tend to support the verdict. Coddington v. State, 2006 OK CR 34, I 70, 142 P.3d 437, 456. The State proved each element of the crime of lewd molestation in Count 2 beyond a reasonable doubt. This proposition is without merit.
2. Prior to preliminary hearing the State filed a notice, pursuant to 12 O.S.Supp.2013, § 2803.1, that it intended to introduce hearsay statements at the preliminary hearing. This notice was addressed at the beginning of preliminary hearing and defense counsel specifically stated that he had no objection to the introduction of the hearsay evidence. At preliminary hearing the State called Deputy Wofford and Kara Marts who each testified about what other individuals told them. Wofford testified about what D.M.’s and H.M.’s mother and grandmother told him about the allegations made by the children and Marts testified about what D.M. and H.M. said to her during their forensic interviews. Sisco complains on appeal that the introduction of this hearsay evidence at preliminary hearing violated his right to confrontation under the federal and state constitutions and resulted in him being bound over for trial based upon inadmissible hearsay evidence. Because Sisco did not file a motion to quash or preserve his Confrontation Clause issue we review this issue for plain error on appeal. See Burgess v. State, 2010 OK CR 25, 16, 243 P.3d 461, 464 (failure to file motion to quash waives appellate review for all but plain error); Miller U. State, 2013 OK CR 11, I 104, 313 P.3d 934, 971 (failure to preserve Confrontation Clause challenge waives review for all but plain error). Sisco argues that the United States Constitution requires that a defendant have the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him at preliminary hearing. Noting the limited scope and purpose of preliminary hearing, the United States Supreme Court held in Barber U. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), that: The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. This precedent has been followed by federal courts and this Court. Aside from his unpersuasive Sixth Amendment claim, Sisco also asserts that the Oklahoma Constitution and the Oklahoma Statutes, when read together, guarantee a right of confrontation at preliminary hearing. This right, however, is not without limitation. The scope of the right to confrontation of accusers at preliminary examination, like the scope of a preliminary examination itself, is subject to reasonable legislation. Randolph U. State, 2010 OK CR 2, I 30, 231 P.3d 672, 682. Furthermore, this Court has held that [t]he preliminary examination provided by Article II, section 17 of the Oklahoma Constitution is ‘a personal privilege for benefit of accused, which may be waived by him. Id. 2010 OK CR 2, IT 27, 231 P.3d at 681 (quoting Ex parte Pruitt, 1949 OK CR 66, 89 Okla. Crim. 312, 207 P.2d 337, 339). Accordingly, this Court has held that the limited right to confront witnesses at preliminary hearing is subject to waiver by conduct inconsistent with a purpose to exercise it. Id. (citing Miles U. State, 1954 OK CR 33, 15, 268 P.2d 290, 298). Defense counsel in the present case did not merely fail to object to the evidence at issue; counsel stated on the record that he had no objection to the evidence. This operated as a waiver of the limited right to confront witnesses at preliminary hearing as it exhibited conduct inconsistent with the purpose of exercising the right of confrontation.
3. We turn next to Sisco’s argument that the evidence at issue was inadmissible hearsay. It is true, as Sisco asserts, that failure to object to the introduction of hearsay generally waives review for all but plain error. See Martinez v. State, 2016 OK CR 3, I 53, 371 P.3d 1100, 1113. However, defense counsel in the present case did not merely fail to object to the evidence at issue; counsel stated on the record that he had no objection to the evidence. Thus, this claim is waived as invited error. See Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 34, 422 P.3d 788, 799 (To the extent that defense counsel was in agreement with the district court’s pretrial ruling and then did not object to [the] testimony at trial, the claim is waived as invited error.). See also Cuesta-Rodriguez U. State, 2010 OK CR 23, I 73, 241 P.3d 214, 237 (where defendant did not object to language at trial and included it in requested jury instruction claim was waived as invited error). There was no plain error and relief is not required.
4. Sisco argues on appeal that error occurred when the State introduced evidence of other uncharged crimes at trial. Because none of the evidence at issue was met with a contemporaneous objection, review is for plain error only. See Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923. To be entitled to relief for plain error, an appellant must show: (1) the existence of an actual error (i.e., deviation from a legal rule); (2) that the error is plain or obvious; and (3) that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Id. The basic law is well established – when one is put on trial, one is to be convicted – if at all – by evidence which shows one guilty of the offense charged; and proof that one is guilty of other offenses not connected with that for which one is on trial must be excluded. Lott v. State, 2004 OK CR 27, 40, 98 P.3d 318, 334. See also Miller, 2013 OK CR 11, 89, 313 P.3d at 966 (Any criminal conviction obtained through a trial must be based upon evidence establishing that the defendant committed the charged crime(s), rather than evidence of other offenses.). However, [i]f a defendant’s conduct is part of the res gestae of the charged offense, then it is not considered other crimes or bad acts evidence. Vanderpool U. State, 2018 OK CR 39, I 24, 434 P.3d 318, 324 (citing Rogers v. State, 1995 OK CR 8, II 20-21, 890 P.2d 959, 971). Evidence of bad acts or other crimes may be admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence is considered part of the res gestae, when: (1) it is so closely connected to the charged offense as to form part of the entire transaction; (2) it is necessary to give the jury a complete understanding of the crime; or (3) when it is central to the chain of events. Eizember v. State, 2007 OK CR 29, I 77, 164 P.3d 208, 230. See also Andrew U. State, 2007 OK CR 23, I 42, 164 P.3d 176, 190. The evidence at issue was part of the res gestae of crimes charged. Furthermore, the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 12 O.S.2011, 2403. There was no error, plain or otherwise, in the admission of this evidence.
5. Sisco argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of child abuse and on impeachment of witnesses by prior inconsistent statements. It is settled law that trial courts have a duty to instruct the jury on the salient features of the law raised by the evidence with or without a request. Hogan, 2006 OK CR 19, I 39, 139 P.3d at 923 (citing Atterberry U. State, 1986 OK CR 186, I 8, 731 P.2d 420, 422). See also Soriano U. State, 2011 OK 9 CR 9, I 36, 248 P.3d 381, 396. This Court normally reviews a trial court’s choice of jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. See Cipriano U. State, 2001 OK CR 25, I 14, 32 P.3d 869, 873. However, because the record does not show that trial counsel either requested these instructions or objected to the trial court’s failure to give them review is for plain error only. See Rutan v. State, 2009 OK CR 3, I 78, 202 P.3d 839, 855. To be entitled to relief for plain error, an appellant must show: (1) the existence of an actual error (i.e., deviation from a legal rule); (2) that the error is plain or obvious; and (3) that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Hogan, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d at 923. This Court will only correct plain error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice. Stewart v. State, 2016 OK CR 9, I 25, 372 P. 3d 508, 514. It is true that the trial court must instruct on any lesser included offense warranted by the evidence. Jones U. State, 2006 OK CR 17, I 6, 134 P.3d 150, 154, (citing Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41, II 10-12, 991 P.2d 1032, 1036-37) (lesser included instructions should be given if supported by the evidence). An underlying requirement of Shrum, however, is that a lesser offense instruction should not be given unless the evidence would support a conviction for the lesser offense. Id. A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction only when prima facie evidence of the lesser included offense has been presented at trial. See Ball v. State, 2007 OK CR 42, I 32, 173 P.3d 81, 90 (citing Glossip U. State, 2001 OK CR 21, 9 28, 29 P.3d 597, 603-04). Prima facie evidence of a lesser included offense is that evidence which would allow a jury rationally to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater. Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, IT 7, 419 P.3d 271, 277 (quoting Davis v. State, 2011 OK CR 29, 101, 268 P.3d 86, 116). The evidence presented at trial was not prima facie evidence which would have allowed the jury rationally to find Sisco guilty of child abuse and acquit him of lewd molestation. Thus, there was no plain error in the trial court’s failure, sua sponte, to give the jury an instruction on child abuse. While there were some inconsistencies in the accounts of certain details of the events alleged, the jury heard the trial testimony of the two child victims and viewed their forensic interviews. The jury was instructed that it was their job to assess the credibility of the witnesses and determine the weight to be given their testimony. Plain error review requires a reasonable probability that the alleged error affected the outcome. That test isn’t met here, and this proposition is denied.
6. Sisco contends that he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel. This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo, to determine whether counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance, if any, prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial with reliable results. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Malone v. State, 2013 OK CR 1, I 14, 293 P.3d 198, 206. Under this test, Sisco must affirmatively prove prejudice resulting from his attorney’s actions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067; Head v. State, 2006 OK CR 44, I 23, 146 P.3d 1141, 1148. To accomplish this, it is not enough to show the failure had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Head, 2006 OK CR 44, I 23, 146 P.3d at 1148. Rather, Sisco must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. This Court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if the claim can be disposed of on the ground of lack of prejudice. See Malone, 2013 OK CR 1, I 16, 293 P.3d at 207. Sisco first complains that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to quash which resulted in the waiver of error at preliminary hearing. Because a motion to quash would have been properly overruled the failure to request the same was not ineffective assistance. See Stover v. State, 1984 OK CR 14, I 11, 674 P.2d 566, 568 (trial counsel’s failure to demur or move for a directed verdict was not ineffective assistance where the motions would not have been granted). Sisco contends that he was also rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by trial counsel’s failure to object to improperly admitted other crimes evidence. Because the evidence at issue was properly admissible as part of the res gestae of the charged crimes counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to object to its admission. Cf. Jackson v. State, 2016 OK CR 5, I 13, 371 P.3d 1120, 1123 (trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to object where there was no error). Finally, Sisco asserts that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the jury be instructed on a lesser related offense and given an instruction on how to consider inconsistent statements of witnesses. As noted in discussion of error raised in Proposition 4, an instruction on the crime of child abuse was not warranted by the evidence. While an instruction on how to consider inconsistent statements of witnesses would have been proper, Sisco’s claim of ineffective assistance for failure to request the same fails because he has not shown prejudice. His ineffective assistance of counsel claim is denied.
7. Sisco notes that the jury sentenced him on each count to the minimum sentence possible which was twenty-five years imprisonment. He asserts that the trial judge’s order that his sentences be served consecutively resulted in an excessive sentence. Title 22 O.S.2011, § 976 grants trial courts broad discretion to order that sentences be served consecutively or concurrently. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to run sentences consecutively or concurrently for an abuse of discretion. Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170. In the absence of proof to the contrary, however, this Court must presume a judge’s decision to impose consecutive sentences was made without passion or prejudice and in compliance with the law. Riley U. State, 1997 OK CR 51, IT 21, 947 P.2d 530, 535. Additionally, we will not disturb a sentence within statutory limits unless, under the facts and circumstances of the case, it is SO excessive as to shock the conscience of the Court. Baird v. State, 2017 OK CR 16, I 40, 400 P.3d 875, 886. Sisco’s crimes were committed against young girls under the age of twelve. He was sentenced to the minimum term of imprisonment possible on each of the convictions. The facts and circumstances support the sentence and do not shock the conscience. The trial court’s decision to order the sentences be served consecutively was not an abuse of discretion and did not result in an excessive sentence. Relief is not required.
8. Sisco asserts that even if no individual error in his case merits reversal, the cumulative effect of the errors committed warrants a new trial or sentence modification. The cumulative error doctrine applies when several errors occurred at the trial court level, but none alone warrants reversal. Although each error standing alone may be of insufficient gravity to warrant reversal, the combined effect of an accumulation of errors may require a new trial. Martinez, 2016 OK CR 3, I 85, 371 P.3d at 1119. Cumulative error does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial when the errors considered together do not affect the outcome of the proceeding. Baird, 2017 OK CR 16, I 42, 400 P.3d at 886. A cumulative error claim is baseless when this Court fails to sustain any of the alleged errors raised on appeal. Id. There were no errors, either individually or when considered together, that deprived Sisco of a fair trial. This claim is denied.
DECISION
The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.
Footnotes:
- 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 1123.
- 12 O.S.Supp.2013, § 2803.1.
- Logsdon v. State, 2010 OK CR 7, I 5, 231 P.3d 1156, 1161; Spuehler U. State, 1985 OK CR 132, "I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04.
- Day v. State, 2013 OK CR 8, 13, 303 P.3d 291, 298.
- Coddington v. State, 2006 OK CR 34, I 70, 142 P.3d 437, 456.
- Burgess v. State, 2010 OK CR 25, 16, 243 P.3d 461, 464.
- Miller U. State, 2013 OK CR 11, I 104, 313 P.3d 934, 971.
- Barber U. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968).
- Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987).
- California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1934-35, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970).
- United States v. Mitchell-Hunter, 663 F.3d 45, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2011).
- Peterson U. California, 604 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010).
- United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 836 (7th Cir. 1985).
- United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 677-78 (5th Cir. 1972).
- United States v. Hernandez, 778 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1219-27 (D.N.M. 2011).
- Office of State Chief Examiner ex rel. E. Scott Pruitt v. Reeves, 2012 OK CR 10 12, 280 P.3d 357, 359.
- Randolph v. State, 2010 OK CR 2, "I 30, 231 P.3d 672, 682.
- Wortham U. State, 2008 OK CR 18, I 12, 188 P.3d 201, 205.
- Howell v. State, 1994 OK CR 62, "I 18, 882 P.2d 1086, 1091.
- State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73, I 9, 815 P.2d 190, 192.
- Ex parte Pruitt, 1949 OK CR 66, 89 Okla. Crim. 312, 207 P.2d 337, 339.
- Martinez v. State, 2016 OK CR 3, I 53, 371 P.3d 1100, 1113.
- Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923.
- Lott v. State, 2004 OK CR 27, 40, 98 P.3d 318, 334.
- Vanderpool U. State, 2018 OK CR 39, I 24, 434 P.3d 318, 324.
- Eizember v. State, 2007 OK CR 29, I 77, 164 P.3d 208, 230.
- Andrew U. State, 2007 OK CR 23, I 42, 164 P.3d 176, 190.
- Riley U. State, 1997 OK CR 51, IT 21, 947 P.2d 530, 535.
- Baird v. State, 2017 OK CR 16, I 40, 400 P.3d 875, 886.
- Jones U. State, 2006 OK CR 17, I 6, 134 P.3d 150, 154.
- Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41, II 10-12, 991 P.2d 1032, 1036-37.
- Ball v. State, 2007 OK CR 42, I 32, 173 P.3d 81, 90.
- Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, IT 7, 419 P.3d 271, 277.
- Cuesta-Rodriguez U. State, 2010 OK CR 23, I 73, 241 P.3d 214, 237.
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
- Head v. State, 2006 OK CR 44, I 23, 146 P.3d 1141, 1148.
- Jackson v. State, 2016 OK CR 5, I 13, 371 P.3d 1120, 1123.
Oklahoma Statutes citations:
- Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1123 (2015) - Lewd Molestation
- Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2803.1 (2013) - Hearsay exceptions
- Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2403 (2011) - Exclusion of evidence
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 976 (2011) - Sentences; consecutive or concurrent
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 17 (2010) - Rights of the accused at preliminary examination
- Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 (2011) - Sentencing in felony cases
Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:
No Oklahoma administrative rules found.
U.S. Code citations:
- 16 U.S.C. § 1011 - National Park System
- 22 U.S.C. § 976 - Sentences
- 21 U.S.C. § 1123 - Lewd Molestation
- 6 U.S.C. § 668 - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Other citations:
No other rule citations found.
Case citations:
- Logsdon v. State, 2010 OK CR 7, I 5, 231 P.3d 1156, 1161
- Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04
- Day v. State, 2013 OK CR 8, 13, 303 P.3d 291, 298
- Coddington v. State, 2006 OK CR 34, I 70, 142 P.3d 437, 456
- Burgess v. State, 2010 OK CR 25, 16, 243 P.3d 461, 464
- Miller v. State, 2013 OK CR 11, I 104, 313 P.3d 934, 971
- Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968)
- Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52, 107 S.Ct. 989, 999, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987)
- California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1934-35, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)
- Office of State Chief Examiner ex rel. E. Scott Pruitt v. Reeves, 2012 OK CR 10, 12, 280 P.3d 357, 359
- Randolph v. State, 2010 OK CR 2, I 30, 231 P.3d 672, 682
- Wortham v. State, 2008 OK CR 18, I 12, 188 P.3d 201, 205
- Howell v. State, 1994 OK CR 62, I 18, 882 P.2d 1086, 1091
- State v. Tinkler, 1991 OK CR 73, I 9, 815 P.2d 190, 192
- Miles v. State, 1954 OK CR 33, 15, 268 P.2d 290, 298
- Martinez v. State, 2016 OK CR 3, I 53, 371 P.3d 1100, 1113
- Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 34, 422 P.3d 788, 799
- Cuesta-Rodriguez v. State, 2010 OK CR 23, I 73, 241 P.3d 214, 237
- Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
- Lott v. State, 2004 OK CR 27, 40, 98 P.3d 318, 334
- Miller v. State, 2013 OK CR 11, 89, 313 P.3d at 966
- Vanderpool v. State, 2018 OK CR 39, I 24, 434 P.3d 318, 324
- Rogers v. State, 1995 OK CR 8, II 20-21, 890 P.2d 959, 971
- Eizember v. State, 2007 OK CR 29, I 77, 164 P.3d 208, 230
- Andrew v. State, 2007 OK CR 23, I 42, 164 P.3d 176, 190
- Jones v. State, 2006 OK CR 17, I 6, 134 P.3d 150, 154
- Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41, II 10-12, 991 P.2d 1032, 1036-37
- Ball v. State, 2007 OK CR 42, I 32, 173 P.3d 81, 90
- Davis v. State, 2018 OK CR 7, I 7, 419 P.3d 271, 277
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)
- Malone v. State, 2013 OK CR 1, I 14, 293 P.3d 198, 206
- Stover v. State, 1984 OK CR 14, I 11, 674 P.2d 566, 568
- Jackson v. State, 2016 OK CR 5, I 13, 371 P.3d 1120, 1123
- Riley v. State, 1997 OK CR 51, IT 21, 947 P.2d 530, 535
- Baird v. State, 2017 OK CR 16, I 40, 400 P.3d 875, 886
- Martinez v. State, 2016 OK CR 3, I 85, 371 P.3d at 1119