Aaron Thomas Brock v The State Of Oklahoma
F-2018-562
Filed: Dec. 12, 2019
Not for publication
Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma
Summary
# Aaron Thomas Brock appealed his conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit a felony. Conviction and sentence were affirmed. Judge Kuehn, Judge Lumpkin, and Judge Hudson concurred while Judge Rowland also concurred in the result. In this case, Aaron Thomas Brock was found guilty of two crimes: robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit a felony. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison for the robbery and 5 years for conspiracy, with the two sentences to be served one after the other. Brock argued that his rights were violated under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), which means he should have been brought to trial within 180 days. However, the court found that he did not properly submit the needed documents to trigger those rights. The court ruled that there was no valid evidence to show that the required paperwork was sent to the Oklahoma County District Attorney and Court Clerk. In his second argument, Brock claimed that there was not enough evidence to prove he committed the robbery. The court disagreed, stating that there was enough evidence for a reasonable person to believe he was guilty. Because of these reasons, the appeals court decided to uphold his convictions and sentences.
Decision
The judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.
Issues
- Was there a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act that required Mr. Brock's conviction to be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss?
- Did the State's evidence prove Mr. Brock's guilt of robbery with a dangerous weapon beyond a reasonable doubt, such that due process requires his case to be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss?
Findings
- the court did not err, a proper detainer was filed against Appellant
- the court did not err, Appellant did not sufficiently prove he made a proper request for final disposition
- the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon
F-2018-562
Dec. 12, 2019
Aaron Thomas Brock
Appellantv
The State Of Oklahoma
Appellee
v
The State Of Oklahoma
Appellee
SUMMARY OPINION
LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:
Aaron Thomas Brock, Appellant, was tried by jury and found guilty of Count 1, robbery with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 801; and Count 2, conspiracy to commit a felony, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 421, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2015-8935. The jury set punishment at thirty (30) years imprisonment on Count 1 and five (5) years imprisonment on Count 2. The Honorable Timothy R. Henderson, District Judge, pronounced judgment and ordered the sentences served consecutively. Mr. Brock appeals in the following propositions of error:
1. The State’s violation of the mandates of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act requires that Mr. Brock’s conviction be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss;
2. The State’s evidence was insufficient to prove Mr. Brock’s guilt of robbery with a dangerous weapon beyond a reasonable doubt such that due process requires his case to be reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss.
Appellant claims a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) Act in Proposition One. The IAD is a compact among 48 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, and the United States. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3403, 87 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1985). It is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Id. Hence, the IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction. Id.; New York U. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S. Ct. 659, 662, 145 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2000). Oklahoma codified the IAD in 1977 in Title 22, Section 1345 et seq. Fulgam U. State, 2016 OK CR 30, I 6, 400 P.3d 775, 778.
1 Appellant must serve 85% of his sentence on Count 1 before being eligible for consideration for parole. 22 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1(8).
2 Appellant claims his rights pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) were violated when the State failed to bring him to trial within the 180-day time frame mandated by Article III of the IAD. 22 O.S.2011, § 1347.
Appellant makes a two-pronged argument to show that he complied with the IAD. He first claims that a proper detainer was lodged against him and he forwarded the proper documentation to the Oklahoma County District Attorney’s office and the Oklahoma County Court Clerk’s office to trigger the running of the time limits under Article III of the IAD. The trial court recognized four requirements for Article III to be triggered: First, the defendant has to be serving a term of imprisonment in a party state; second, charges are pending against the defendant in another party state; third, a detainer has been lodged against the defendant; fourth, the defendant has caused 2 Appellant attempted to raise this issue prior to his trial by filing a motion for writ of mandamus with this Court. On April 9, 2018, Appellant petitioned this Court for a Writ of Mandamus ordering the trial court to dismiss the charges against him due to the violation of the IAD. This Court denied the writ stating that Appellant/Petitioner was not entitled to the writ because the question involved an exercise of discretion on the part of the district court in weighing the evidence to determine when requirements of the IAD were triggered. See Brock v. Henderson, Case No. MA-2018-352 (Okl.Cr., April 20, 2018)(unpublished).
3 written notice and request for final disposition to be delivered to the appropriate prosecuting authority and court. The trial court ruled that there was nothing sent from the District Attorney’s office to the prison; thus, there was no proper detainer lodged against Appellant. The trial court also ruled that there were no documents in the Court Clerk’s file and no documents in the District Attorney’s file, thus Appellant could not show that he triggered the IAD.
The first issue here, and one of the issues on which the trial court based its decision, is whether a proper detainer was lodged against Appellant while he was in federal custody. This Court has yet to decide what constitutes a proper detainer. The United States Supreme Court, however, has discussed the matter in some detail. The United States Supreme Court has defined a detainer as a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for the agency, or that the agency be advised when the prisoner’s release is imminent. Fex U. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 45, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1087, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993). [A] detainer may be lodged against a prisoner on the initiative of a prosecutor or law enforcement officer. United States U. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 358, 8 S.Ct. 1834, 1838, 56 L. Ed. 329 (1978). [A] detainer merely puts the officials of the institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated on notice that the prisoner is wanted in another jurisdiction for trial upon his release from prison. Id.
The issue in the present case is whether a facsimile sent by the Oklahoma County Sheriff’s office constitutes a proper detainer under the law. The trial court found that the fax was not a proper detainer; however, as a question of law, this Court reviews that finding de novo. The fax contained a request for a hold on Appellant and a copy of the arrest warrant on file with the Oklahoma County Court Clerk’s office. Under the United States Supreme Court’s definition of a detainer, the detainer in this case was valid. In Fex, the prosecuting attorney lodged the detainer against the appellant. Fex, 507 U.S. at 46, 113 S.Ct. at 1088. While not an issue, it can be safely assumed that a detainer by the prosecuting entity would be valid. In United States U. Washington, 596 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 2010), the ATF lodged the detainer; however, no issues were raised regarding the validity of the detainer.
5 We find that, under the facts of this case, a proper detainer was filed against Appellant. Having found so, we move to the second issue, whether Appellant delivered a proper request for final disposition. In order to invoke his rights under Article III, Appellant must have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition . . .. 22 O.S.2011, § 1347; Fex, 507 U.S. at 45, 113 S.Ct. at 1087-89.
As the trial court stated, the issue is: Either both the DA’s Office and the Court Clerk’s Office messed up, for a better term, and didn’t do anything with the paperwork, or it wasn’t sent to the DA’s Office and the Court Clerk’s Office. Appellant avers that he mailed separate requests for applications for final disposition, one each to the Oklahoma County District Attorney’s office and to the Oklahoma County Court Clerk. He received the certified mail return receipts from those mailings. The receipts show that the District Attorney’s office and Court Clerk’s office received something on May 30, 2017. However, neither the District Attorney’s office nor the Clerk’s office has documents showing anything was contained in the certified mail sent to them. Had the documents been received, the 180 days would have lapsed on November 26, 2017. Appellant was not brought before the Court until December 5, 2017, when he appeared for his initial appearance. The issue of the trial Court’s decision on whether Appellant sent the proper paperwork to the proper agencies pursuant to the IAD is a question of fact which this Court reviews for an abuse of discretion. For proper written notice and request to be valid under Article III, the request for final disposition shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decision of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 22 O.S.2011, § 1347, Art. III(d)
There is no explanation for the lack of documents being found at the Court Clerk’s office or the District Attorney’s office. It seems odd that both agencies would have lost the documents just as it seems odd that Appellant would have sent empty envelopes. This Court’s prior order denying mandamus in this case, explained the discretionary nature of this determination by stating that the trial court is in the best position to determine when Appellant made demand on Oklahoma County for a speedy disposition of this case. As that order noted, Appellant’s evidence, consisting of two green mail cards and return receipts, was insufficient to show that he made proper demand on the prosecution and the court. Appellant’s reliance on Gallimore U. State, 1997 OK CR 46, 944 P.2d 939, is misplaced. In Gallimore, Article IV of the Act was at issue where a defendant must be tried within 120 days of being returned to the jurisdiction. Id., 1997 OK CR 46 5, 944 P.2d at 940. Obviously, the State has the burden to show why the defendant was not tried within the mandated time period in such cases. This case is different as the burden is on Appellant to show that he mailed the correct documents – the State cannot know what he placed into the envelopes.
8 There is no credible evidence from which this Court can determine the contents of the certified mailings. We find, furthermore, that Appellant’s later pro se motion did not comply with the Act. This Court can find no evidence in which to find that the trial court abused its discretion in this matter. Proposition One is denied.
In Proposition Two, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Coddington U. State, 2006 OK CR 34, IT 70, 142 P.3d 437, 456; Spuehler U. State, 1985 OK CR 132, T 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04. This Court will not weigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury. See Day v. State, 2013 OK CR 8, I 12, 303 P.3d 291, 298.
Applying this standard in the instant case, we find that any rational trier of fact could find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of robbery with a dangerous weapon. See Logsdon U. State, 2010 OK 9 CR 7, I 5, 231 P.3d 1156, 1161; Spuehler, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d at 203-04. The facts presented show that the elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon were completed. Even though one of the supposed victims was actually an accomplice to the crime, a fearful victim was present. She had a knife thrust toward her face and she was in fear. The money was taken by the codefendant and handed to Appellant in the presence of the victim, thus fulfilling the elements of the crime. Appellant’s conviction on Count 1 may stand.
DECISION
The judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY
THE HON. TIMOTHY R. HENDERSON, DISTRICT JUDGE
APPEARANCES AT TRIAL
APPEARANCES ON APPEAL
NICK SOUTHERLAND ANDREA DIGILIO MILLER
MICAH SIELERT
320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 611
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
10 KELLY COLLINS MIKE HUNTER
LORI McCONNELL
ATTORNEY GENERAL ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
JENNIFER B. MILLER
320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 505
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73105
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
OPINION BY: LEWIS, P.J.
KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur in Results
LUMPKIN, J.: Concur
HUDSON, J.: Concur
ROWLAND, J.: Concur
Footnotes:
- 21 O.S.2011, § 801
- 21 O.S.2011, § 421
- 22 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1(8)
- 22 O.S.2011, § 1347
- 22 O.S.2011, § 1347, Art. III(d)
- Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3403, 87 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1985)
- New York U. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S. Ct. 659, 662, 145 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2000)
- Fulgam U. State, 2016 OK CR 30, "I 6, 400 P.3d 775, 778
- Fex U. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 45, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1087, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993)
- United States U. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 358, 8 S.Ct. 1834, 1838, 56 L. Ed. 329 (1978)
- United States U. Washington, 596 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 2010)
- Coddington U. State, 2006 OK CR 34, IT 70, 142 P.3d 437, 456
- Spuehler U. State, 1985 OK CR 132, T 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04
- Day v. State, 2013 OK CR 8, I 12, 303 P.3d 291, 298
- Logsdon U. State, 2010 OK 9 CR 7, I 5, 231 P.3d 1156, 1161
- Gallimore U. State, 1997 OK CR 46, 944 P.2d 939
Oklahoma Statutes citations:
- Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 801 - Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon
- Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 421 - Conspiracy to Commit a Felony
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 13.1 - Parole Eligibility
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 1347 - Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:
No Oklahoma administrative rules found.
U.S. Code citations:
No US Code citations found.
Other citations:
No other rule citations found.
Case citations:
- Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 3403, 87 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1985)
- New York U. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S. Ct. 659, 662, 145 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2000)
- Fulgam U. State, 2016 OK CR 30, 400 P.3d 775, 778
- Fex U. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 45, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 1087, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993)
- United States U. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 358, 8 S.Ct. 1834, 1838, 56 L. Ed. 329 (1978)
- United States U. Washington, 596 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 2010)
- Coddington U. State, 2006 OK CR 34, 142 P.3d 437, 456
- Spuehler U. State, 1985 OK CR 132, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04
- Day v. State, 2013 OK CR 8, 303 P.3d 291, 298
- Logsdon U. State, 2010 OK CR 7, 231 P.3d 1156, 1161
- Gallimore U. State, 1997 OK CR 46, 944 P.2d 939