F-2018-384

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Jimmy Dean Coke, Jr. v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2018-384

Filed: May 23, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Jimmy Dean Coke, Jr. appealed his conviction for Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property and Obstructing Officer. His conviction and sentence were 25 years in prison for concealing stolen property and 1 year in jail for obstructing an officer, with the sentences to be served one after the other. Judge Russell C. Vaclaw presided over the trial. There was a disagreement among the judges, with one judge dissenting on the case.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • was there sufficient evidence to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt of Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property?
  • was there sufficient evidence to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt of Obstructing Officer?
  • did the trial court err when it failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime of Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property?
  • was he denied his right to be present during portions of the trial?
  • did improper prosecutorial argument violate his right to a fair trial?
  • was he denied his right to a fair and impartial judge?
  • did the trial court err by imposing a sentence that varied from the jury's verdict?
  • was he denied effective assistance of counsel?
  • did cumulative errors deprive him of a fair trial and reliable outcome?

Findings

  • the evidence was sufficient to convict for Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property
  • the evidence was sufficient to convict for Obstructing Officer
  • the trial court's failure to instruct on the value of the concealed stolen property was not plain error and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
  • the trial court did not err in continuing the trial in the appellant's absence
  • the alleged prosecutorial misconduct did not affect the fairness of the trial, and any comments regarding the exercise of the right to a jury trial were ultimately deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
  • the claim of a biased or impartial judge was denied
  • the trial court's imposition of fines was not error
  • the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was denied
  • the cumulative error claim was denied as there were no individual errors to warrant reversal


F-2018-384

May 23, 2019

Jimmy Dean Coke, Jr.

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

JIMMY DEAN COKE, JR., Appellant,

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.

Appellant Jimmy Dean Coke, Jr. appeals his Judgment and Sentence from the District Court of Washington County, Case No. CF-2016-523, for Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property, After Former Conviction of Two or More Felonies (Count 1), in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2016, § 1713, and Obstructing Officer (Count 2), in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 540. The Honorable Russell C. Vaclaw, Associate District Judge, presided over Coke’s bifurcated jury trial and sentenced him, in accordance with the jury’s verdict, to twenty-five years imprisonment on Count 1 and one year incarceration on Count 2. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. The trial court also imposed a $1,000.00 fine on Count 1 and a $500.00 fine on Count 2. Coke appeals raising the following issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt of Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt of Obstructing Officer; (3) whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime of Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property; (4) whether he was denied his right to be present during portions of the trial; (5) whether improper prosecutorial argument violated his right to a fair trial; (6) whether he was denied his right to a fair and impartial judge; (7) whether the trial court erred by imposing a sentence that varied from the jury’s verdict; (8) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (9) whether cumulative errors deprived him of a fair trial and reliable outcome.

We find relief is not required and affirm the Judgment and Sentence of the district court.

1. Coke claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for knowingly concealing stolen property because the State did not prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and will not disturb the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. In evaluating the evidence presented at trial, we accept the fact-finder’s resolution of conflicting evidence as long as it is within the bounds of reason. This Court also accepts all reasonable inferences and credibility choices that tend to support the verdict. The State proved each element of the crime of knowingly concealing stolen property beyond a reasonable doubt. This proposition is without merit.

2. Coke also claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for obstructing officer because the State did not prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, this Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and will not disturb the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. The State proved each element of the crime of obstructing officer beyond a reasonable doubt. This proposition is without merit.

3. In order for a conviction for concealing stolen property to be a felony, the value of the concealed stolen property must be $1,000.00 or more. Coke argues the district court committed fundamental error when it did not instruct the jury that the State was required to prove the value of the stolen property beyond a reasonable doubt. It is settled law that trial courts have a duty to instruct the jury on the salient features of the law raised by the evidence with or without a request. Because the record does not show that trial counsel either objected to the trial court’s failure to give the omitted portion of the instructions or requested the same, review on appeal is for plain error. To be entitled to relief for plain error, an appellant must show: (1) the existence of an actual error (i.e., deviation from a legal rule); (2) that the error is plain or obvious; and (3) that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. This Court will only correct plain error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice.

4. A criminal defendant has a right, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, to have the charged offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution bears the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged and must persuade the factfinder ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements. The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that the error which occurs when an element of the crime charged is omitted from the jury instructions is subject to harmless error analysis. The harmless error test is whether it appears ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. The State presented uncontroverted evidence through the testimony of the owner of the stolen property that its value at the time it was stolen was $1,500.00. Thus, we find that the error in failing to instruct on this element was not plain error and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This claim is denied.

5. When the jury retired to deliberate at the end of the first stage of trial, Coke left the courthouse. Around two and a half hours later the jury notified the court that they had reached a verdict. Coke was not present at this time and, after significant effort, could not be located. The trial court continued with the proceedings; first stage verdict was announced and the sentencing stage, including the return of sentencing verdicts and recommendations, was held in Coke’s absence. Coke argues on appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to be present at these critical stages of the trial by the trial court’s decision to proceed in his absence. We review the trial court’s decision to continue with trial proceedings in Coke’s absence for an abuse of discretion. Oklahoma statutes require that a defendant be personally present at the trial if he is being prosecuted for a felony and when a verdict is returned. It is true that courts are to indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. However, in Taylor v. United States, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the right to be present at one’s trial may be waived by a defendant’s voluntary absence from the proceedings. We find on the record that the trial court made diligent attempts to locate Coke who had voluntarily absented himself from the proceedings. Coke waived his right to be present during the remainder of his trial and the trial court’s decision to continue the proceeding in his absence was not an abuse of discretion. There was no error here and this claim is denied.

6. Coke complains that the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Only one comment at issue was met with objection at trial. Those comments not objected to below will be reviewed for plain error only. We review his claim under the analysis set forth in prior rulings. This Court will only correct plain error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice. Relief is only granted where the prosecutor’s flagrant misconduct so infected the defendant’s trial that it was rendered fundamentally unfair.

7. Coke asserts that even if no individual error in his case merits reversal, the cumulative effect of the errors committed warrants a new trial or sentence modification. The cumulative error doctrine applies when several errors occurred at the trial court level, but none alone warrants reversal. A cumulative error claim is baseless when this Court fails to sustain any of the alleged errors raised on appeal. There were no errors, either individually or when considered together, that deprived Coke of a fair trial. This claim is denied.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. 21 O.S.Supp.2016, § 1713.
  2. 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 540.
  3. 22 O.S.2011, § 583.
  4. 22 O.S.2011, § 912.
  5. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
  6. Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d at 923.
  7. Martinez v. State, 2016 OK CR 3, I 85, 371 P.3d 1100.
  8. Fite v. State, 1993 OK CR 58, 11, 873 P.2d 293.
  9. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993).
  10. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4 (1999).
  11. Barnes v. State, 2017 OK CR 26, 408 P.3d 209.
  12. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
  13. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
  14. Harmon v. State, 2011 OK CR 6, I 81, 248 P.3d 918.
  15. Jones v. State, 2011 OK CR 13, I 3, 253 P.3d 997.
  16. Delancy v. State, 1979 OK CR 56, "I 6, 596 P.2d 897.
  17. Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, I 16, 90 P.3d 556.
  18. Royal v. State, 1988 OK CR 203, I 6, 761 P.2d 203.
  19. Mehdipour v. State, 1998 OK CR 23, I 9, 956 P.2d 911.
  20. Frederick v. State, 2001 OK CR 34, I 175, 37 P.3d 908.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1713 (2016) - Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 540 (2015) - Obstructing Officer
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 583 (2011) - Presence of the Defendant
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 912 (2011) - Presence of the Defendant
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 991a(A)(2) (2011) - Imposition of Fines
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 (2011) - Sentencing for Felony Offenses
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 (2011) - Sentencing for Multiple Felonies

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

  • 508 U.S. § 275 - Sullivan v. Louisiana
  • 527 U.S. § 1 - Neder v. United States
  • 386 U.S. § 18 - Chapman v. California
  • 304 U.S. § 458 - Johnson v. Zerbst
  • 414 U.S. § 17 - Taylor v. United States
  • 380 U.S. § 609 - Griffin v. California
  • 466 U.S. § 668 - Strickland v. Washington

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Logsdon v. State, 2010 OK CR 7, I 5, 231 P.3d 1156, 1161
  • Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-04
  • Day v. State, 2013 OK CR 8, I 13, 303 P.3d 291, 298
  • Coddington v. State, 2006 OK CR 34, I 70, 142 P.3d 437, 456
  • Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 39, 139 P.3d 907, 923
  • Atterberry v. State, 1986 OK CR 186, I 8, 731 P.2d 420, 422
  • Soriano v. State, 2011 OK CR 9, I 36, 248 P.3d 381, 396
  • Rutan v. State, 2009 OK CR 3, I 78, 202 P.3d 839, 855
  • Stewart v. State, 2016 OK CR 9, I 25, 372 P.3d 508, 514
  • Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2080-81, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)
  • Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4, 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 1837, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)
  • Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705
  • Barnard v. State, 2012 OK CR 15, I 14, 290 P.3d 759, 764
  • Delancy v. State, 1979 OK CR 56, I 6, 596 P.2d 897, 899
  • Watson v. State, 2010 OK CR 9, I 6, 234 P.3d 111, 113
  • Jones v. State, 2006 OK CR 5, I 68, 128 P.3d 521, 543
  • Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)
  • Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20, 94 S.Ct. 194, 196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973)
  • Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, I 16, 90 P.3d 556, 559
  • Carpenter v. State, 1996 OK CR 56, I 19, 929 P.2d 988, 994
  • Royal v. State, 1988 OK CR 203, I 6, 761 P.2d 203, 498-99
  • Harney v. State, 2011 OK CR 10, I 23, 256 P.3d 1002, 1007
  • Hanson v. State, 2009 OK CR 13, I 18, 206 P.3d 1020, 1028
  • Harmon v. State, 2011 OK CR 6, I 81, 248 P.3d 918, 943
  • Pryor v. State, 2011 OK CR 18, I 4, 254 P.3d 721, 722
  • Barnes v. State, 2017 OK CR 26, 408 P.3d 209
  • Mitchell v. State, 2006 OK CR 20, I 87, 136 P.3d 671, 706
  • Frederick v. State, 2001 OK CR 34, I 175, 37 P.3d 908, 951
  • Mehdipour v. State, 1998 OK CR 23, I 9, 956 P.2d 911, 915
  • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)
  • Malone v. State, 2013 OK CR 1, I 14, 293 P.3d 198, 206
  • Head v. State, 2006 OK CR 44, I 23, 146 P.3d 1141, 1148
  • Martinez v. State, 2016 OK CR 3, I 85, 371 P.3d 1100, 1119
  • Baird v. State, 2017 OK CR 16, I 42, 400 P.3d.875, 886