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F-2018-308

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Deondrea Deshawn Thompson v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2018-308

Filed: Feb. 13, 2020

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State of Oklahoma

Summary

Deondrea Deshawn Thompson appealed his conviction for robbery with a firearm, attempted robbery, felon in possession of a firearm, and other charges. His conviction and sentence were for a total of thirty-five years for serious robbery charges and seven years for lesser charges, with all sentences running one after the other. Judge Timothy R. Henderson oversaw the trial. Thompson argued that he did not receive a fair trial for several reasons: he believed important evidence was withheld, racial bias affected jury selection, and errors were made during the trial process. The court examined each of these claims. The court ultimately found that the trial was conducted fairly, that any errors were not significant enough to change the outcome of the trial, and that the evidence against Thompson was sufficient. Therefore, the court affirmed Thompson's conviction and sentence. Judges Kuehn, Lumpkin, Hudson, and Rowland all agreed with the decision, with no one dissenting.

Decision

The judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2020), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there a violation of Mr. Thompson's right to confront witnesses when the trial court ruled that the confidential informant's name did not have to be disclosed to defense counsel?
  • Did the State exercise peremptory challenges based on race, violating the constitutional guarantees of equal protection?
  • Did the trial court's examples and questions during voir dire improperly influence the jury, violating Mr. Thompson's right to a fair trial?
  • Did the trial court commit reversible error in allowing hearsay testimony to serve as the foundation for the cell phone ping evidence, violating Mr. Thompson's right to confront witnesses?
  • Did the admission of evidence relating to historic cell tower records obtained without a warrant violate Mr. Thompson's Fourth Amendment rights?
  • Was Mr. Thompson denied a fair trial due to an evidentiary harpoon that unnecessarily informed the jury of other bad acts by the defendant?
  • Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on eyewitness identification, violating Mr. Thompson's due process right to present a defense?
  • Did the trial court err by not allowing defense counsel to impeach a witness's testimony with prior inconsistent statements?
  • Did trying all seven cases together before the same jury constitute prejudicial joinder and deny Mr. Thompson a fundamentally fair trial?
  • Did Mr. Thompson's convictions for robbery with a firearm, attempted robbery with a firearm, and felon in possession of a firearm violate Section 11?
  • Do cumulative trial errors warrant a new trial for Mr. Thompson?

Findings

  • the trial court did not err in withholding the informant's identity
  • the State did not violate Batson by exercising peremptory challenges based on race
  • the trial court's voir dire did not improperly influence the jury
  • the trial court did not err in allowing hearsay testimony related to cell phone ping evidence
  • the admission of historic cell tower records obtained without a warrant was permissible under the good faith exception
  • the evidentiary harpoon did not result in reversible error
  • the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to instruct the jury on eyewitness identification
  • the trial court did not err by not allowing impeachment of Ms. Lacount's testimony with prior inconsistent statements
  • trying all seven cases together did not constitute prejudicial joinder
  • Appellant's convictions do not violate double jeopardy principles
  • trial errors do not warrant a new trial when considered cumulatively

F-2018-308

Feb. 13, 2020

Deondrea Deshawn Thompson

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE: Deondrea Deshawn Thompson, Appellant, was tried by jury and found guilty of Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 9, robbery with a firearm, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 801; Counts 3 and 10, attempted robbery with a firearm, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 801; Count 6, felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 1283; and Count 7, engaging in a pattern of criminal offenses in two or more counties, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 425, all after former conviction of a felony, in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CF-2016-6831. The jury sentenced him to thirty-five (35) years imprisonment on each of Counts 1 through 5 and 8 through 10, and seven (7) years imprisonment on each of Counts 6 and 7. The Honorable Timothy R. Henderson, District Judge, pronounced judgment and sentence according to the jury verdict and ordered the sentences to run consecutively.

Mr. Thompson appeals in the following propositions of error:

1. The trial court deprived Mr. Thompson of a fair trial when it ruled that the confidential informant’s name did not have to be turned over to defense counsel violating Mr. Thompson’s right to confront witnesses and compulsory process under the federal and state constitutions;
2. The State exercised peremptory challenges based on race, violating Batson v. Kentucky and constitutional guarantees of equal protection;
3. The trial court’s examples and questions given during voir dire improperly influenced the jury violating Mr. Thompson’s right to a fair trial;
4. The trial court committed reversible error in allowing hearsay testimony to serve as the foundation basis of the cell phone ping evidence violating Mr. Thompson’s right to confront witnesses;
5. The admission of evidence relating to historic cell tower records obtained without a warrant violated Mr. Thompson’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States;
6. Mr. Thompson was denied a fair trial due to an evidentiary harpoon that unfairly and unnecessarily informed the jury of other bad acts by the defendant;
7. The trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on eyewitness identification violating Mr. Thompson’s due process right to present a defense and in violation of the federal and state constitutions;
8. The trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to impeach Ms. Lacount’s testimony with prior inconsistent statements, in violation of the federal and state constitutions;
9. Trying all seven cases together before the same jury, where the counts did not meet the joinder criteria set forth in Glass v. State, constituted prejudicial joinder and denied Mr. Thompson a fundamentally fair trial;
10. Mr. Thompson’s convictions for robbery with a firearm, attempted robbery with a firearm, and felon in possession of a firearm violates Section 11;
11. Trial errors, when considered in a cumulative fashion, warrant a new trial.

In Proposition One, Appellant challenges the trial court’s decision allowing the State to withhold from defense counsel the name of their confidential informant. We review this decision for an abuse of discretion. Hill v. State, 1979 OK CR 2, ¶ 16, 589 P.2d 1073, 1077. Appellant claims he was denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. See Hanson v. State, 2009 OK CR 3, ¶ 8, 206 P.3d 1020, 1025; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Okla. Const. art. II, § 20. It is the general rule in this jurisdiction that the government is privileged to withhold from an accused the identity of an informer unless the identity of the informer is necessary and relevant to the defense. Corbett v. State, Okl.Cr., 527 P.2d 200 (1974). The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Hill, 1979 OK CR 2, ¶ 16, 589 P.2d at 1077. Here, the confidential informant’s only connection to the case was to provide information leading to identification and probable cause for a warrant. The disclosure is, therefore, not required. See Morgan v. State, 1987 OK CR 139, ¶ 6, 738 P.2d 1373, 1374.

Appellant alleges a Batson violation in Proposition Two. Appellant is an African-American. He claims the State violated the Equal Protection Clause when the prosecutor exercised four of its five peremptory challenges to remove African-Americans from the jury panel. The Equal Protection Clause forbids challenging potential jurors solely on the basis of their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). No matter the race or gender of a defendant, either party may contest the opposing party’s use of peremptory challenges, if those challenges result in deliberate exclusion of potential jurors by gender or race, denying the parties a jury composed of a cross-section of the community and violating his right to equal protection. Day v. State, 2013 OK CR 8, ¶ 15, 303 P.3d 291, 299. To properly preserve a Batson claim, objection to the removal of a potential juror must be made immediately and before the challenged juror is finally excused. McElmurry v. State, 2002 OK CR 40, ¶¶ 35-36, 60 P.3d 4, 18. The prosecution proffered race neutral reasons for the challenges of the last three African-American jurors, but not the first one removed, as Appellant failed to object to the first challenged African-American juror. The prosecutor’s race neutral reasons included past negative interactions with police officers, family members who had felony convictions, and a general negative opinion of the police. These are sufficient. The reasons given will be deemed race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation. Harris v. State, 2004 OK CR 1, ¶ 19, 84 P.3d 731, 742-43; see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-69 (1995). Among the race neutral reasons given was that the prospective jurors or their family members had a criminal history. Appellant argues that this reason has a disparate impact on black jurors. Appellant has not shown, however, a clear discriminatory intent. Appellant argues that other jurors had similar opinions of police officers, yet they were not challenged. Although other members of the jury pool also gave similar responses, there is no record of the race of these members. Moreover, similar responses from different races of members do not necessarily prove racially-motivated discrimination. Grant v. State, 2009 OK CR 11, ¶ 28, 205 P.3d 1, 15. See also Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S.Ct. 2228, 2248-49 (2019). Here, the peremptory challenges were based on race neutral reasons, and no discriminatory intent is shown. This proposition is denied.

In Proposition Three, Appellant claims that the trial court’s voir dire improperly influenced the jury and violated his right to a fair trial. There were no objections to the trial court’s questions during voir dire, thus we review for plain error only. To prevail under plain error review, Appellant must show: (1) the existence of an actual error (i.e., deviation from a legal rule); (2) that the error is plain or obvious; and (3) that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, ¶ 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923. See also Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, ¶ 3, 11, 23, 876 P.2d 690, 694, 695, 698. This Court will only correct plain error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice. Hogan, 2006 OK CR 19, ¶ 38, 139 P.3d at 923. The purpose of voir dire examination is to ascertain whether there are grounds to challenge prospective jurors for cause and to facilitate the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. Mitchell v. State, 2010 OK CR 14, ¶ 11, 235 P.3d 640, 646; Sanchez v. State, 2009 OK CR 31, ¶ 44, 223 P.3d 980, 997. Appellant argues that the trial court improperly deviated from the Uniform Jury Instructions on voir dire. In this case, however, the trial court was trying to gauge how potential jurors would judge the witnesses’ credibility and whether they could be fair in their assessment of credibility. The voir dire did not deprive Appellant of a fair and impartial jury. He cannot show that the trial court’s voir dire amounted to plain error.

Appellant claims in Proposition Four that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony as the foundation basis of the cell phone ping evidence, thereby violating Appellant’s right to confront witnesses. Appellant objected to Oklahoma City Police Detective Jeffrey Padgett testifying about anything witness Jessica Nelson told him about Appellant’s phone number. Padgett took a picture of Nelson’s phone that showed a picture of Appellant and a phone number. The trial court ruled that the showing of the phone with the number was not hearsay. We review this ruling under an abuse of discretion standard. Marshall v. State, 2010 OK CR 24, 232 P.3d 467, 474 (Admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court). The testimony of Padgett was that the number was Appellant’s phone number. The picture of the phone is depicted in State’s exhibit 34. It shows Appellant and Nelson embracing with a caption of My King and the cell phone number. Either Padgett was making an uneducated assumption or Nelson told him the number was Appellant’s—the latter clearly being hearsay, the former an opinion of a lay witness.

Opinion testimony of a lay witness is permissible under 12 O.S.2011, § 2701, when it is rationally based on the perception of the witness, is helpful to the determination of a fact in issue, and does not require any specialized or scientific knowledge. Andrew v. State, 2007 OK CR 23, ¶ 73, 164 P.3d 176, 195. Padgett’s testimony is marginally permissible lay witness opinion because part of the opinion may have been based on Nelson’s assertion that the number belonged to Appellant. Clearly, the photograph alone was admissible without any of the testimony as it was relevant to show that the number was associated with Appellant. The photo alone is circumstantial evidence that the number is Appellant’s. Moreover, the photograph showed the jury why a cell tower search was conducted using this number. Nevertheless, the information was not testimonial hearsay, thus the alleged error is not of constitutional magnitude and this Court may dispose of the error under a simple harmless error analysis. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (the admission of non-testimonial hearsay does not implicate the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution). Any error in the testimony of Padgett was harmless because the photograph provided independent circumstantial evidence that the number belonged to Appellant. Furthermore, there was other evidence tying Appellant to these robberies, such as eye-witness identification, and surveillance camera footage. This proposition is denied.

Appellant’s Proposition Five claims the admission of evidence relating to historic cell tower records that was obtained without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures. Appellant argues that the cell phone data recovered in this case without a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights as interpreted by Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2019). The State acknowledges that Carpenter requires the State obtain a search warrant before such data is collected. However, because the information was obtained prior to the decision in Carpenter and in accord with a statute in effect at the time, the good faith exception to the warrant requirement should apply. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment need not be suppressed if the police obtained the evidence in good faith reliance upon a statute which is later determined to be unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347-55 (1987). The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct and where, as here, there is no demonstrable police misconduct there is nothing to deter by suppressing evidence. The detective’s reliance on 13 O.S.2011, § 176.9 as the basis for obtaining the cell tower records was objectively reasonable and unquestionably done in good faith. See State v. Sittingdown, 2010 OK CR 22, ¶¶ 17-18, 240 P.3d 714, 718. Had the record been further developed, it is highly likely it would have shown the existence of probable cause sufficient to obtain a warrant. This proposition is, therefore, denied.

In Proposition Six, Appellant claims he was subjected to an evidentiary harpoon when the State unfairly and unnecessarily informed the jury of other bad acts. Appellant objected and moved for a mistrial; we review for an abuse of discretion. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to allow introduction of evidence of other crimes for an abuse of discretion. Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, ¶ 12, 274 P.3d 161, 164. An abuse of discretion has been defined as a conclusion or judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented. Pullen v. State, 2016 OK CR 18, ¶ 4, 387 P.3d 922, 925. Appellant claims that Detective Padgett’s testimony indicated that he had prior offenses. Padgett testified that during the investigation, another suspect was investigated. This suspect had a bad eye, similar to Appellant. It was determined, however, that the alternative suspect was in the county jail at the time of these robberies. The prosecutor asked him how he had the ability to determine the whereabouts of the alternative suspect at the time of the robbery. Padgett testified that he used the Oklahoma County system, which he uses every day to make line-ups and get pictures of people. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, as the testimony indicated that they obtained line-up pictures of Appellant through the county jail records. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial. This proposition is denied.

Proposition Seven challenges the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on eyewitness identification. Jury instructions are within the trial court’s discretion and we review for an abuse of discretion. Mitchell v. State, 2016 OK CR 21, ¶ 24, 387 P.3d 934, 943. Instructions are sufficient where they state the applicable law. Id. Appellant requested instructions on eyewitness identification, OUJI CR 2d 9-19. The trial court, however, refused the request. The trial court reasoned that the committee comments and notes indicated that the instruction was not warranted in the present case. The notes indicate that the instruction should be given if an eyewitness identification is a critical element of the prosecution’s case and there is a serious question concerning the reliability of the identification. Citing McDoulett v. State, 1984 OK CR 81, ¶ 9, 685 P.2d 978, 980. Jury instructions are within the trial court’s discretion and we review for an abuse of discretion. Mitchell v. State, 2016 OK CR 21, ¶ 24, 387 P.3d 934, 943. Instructions are sufficient where they state the applicable law. Id. Here, the instruction might have been given out of an abundance of caution. There is, however, no evidence that there were serious questions about the identification of Appellant as the perpetrator of these crimes. Victim Lacount was the only witness who picked someone other than Appellant from the lineup. Even so, she was absolutely positive about her in-court identification. It cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. Proposition Seven is denied.

Proposition Eight alleges the trial court erred by not allowing defense counsel to impeach Ms. Lacount’s testimony with prior inconsistent statements. Defense counsel attempted to impeach witness Lacount by showing that she had different testimony at preliminary hearing regarding her identification of Appellant. Although Appellant quotes the questioning, Appellant does not cite the page number of the transcript where the colloquy takes place. Lacount’s testimony covers about fifteen pages of transcript. Lacount testified that she did not remember her preliminary hearing testimony. The cross-examination is confusing regarding whether she remembered the preliminary hearing or initial identification of the robber through video or photographs. She testified that she picked out someone that looked like the robber. She was sure, however, that the man she identified at trial was the person that robbed her. Due to the confusing questioning, the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection to the method defense counsel used to impeach Lacount. Even with the ruling, it was extremely evident that Lacount identified someone else, other than Appellant, at an earlier time. There was, therefore, no prejudice here, even if we assume that the trial court’s ruling was incorrect. This proposition is denied.

In Proposition Nine, Appellant claims trying all seven of his cases together before the same jury constituted prejudicial joinder because the counts did not meet the joinder criteria set forth in Glass v. State. Several different robberies were joined into one trial. Appellant made no request to sever the counts. This Court, therefore, reviews the joint trial for plain error only. Collins v. State, 2009 OK CR 32, ¶ 12, 223 P.3d 1014, 1017. Joinder of offenses for trial are proper if the offenses are part of a series of criminal acts or transactions. Glass v. State, 1985 OK CR 65, ¶ 8, 701 P.2d 765, 768. Four factors are used to determine if joinder is proper: (1) whether the offenses are the same; (2) whether they occur over a short period of time; (3) whether they are within the same area or location; and (4) whether the proof of each overlaps so as to evidence a common scheme or plan. Id. Appellant claims that factors three and four are not present here. He argues that the crimes occurred at seven different locations spread out over a large area. He also argues that the similarities of the offenses alone are insufficient to indicate a common scheme or plan. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, all of the robberies are of convenience stores in the Oklahoma City area, mainly the west side. They all occurred during the month of July 2016. In each of the robberies, the defendant wore the same type of clothing. In the five robberies on July 25, the defendant asked for a black and mild cigar. The robberies are similar; the video shows the similarities of the offenses. The trial court did not abuse its discretion here. There is no plain error and this proposition is denied.

Appellant raises a claim pursuant to 21 O.S. 2011, § 11 in Proposition Ten. Appellant complains about count six, a felonious possession of a firearm count under 21 O.S.2011, § 1283, being charged along with his six robbery with a firearm counts and two attempted robbery with a firearm counts. Our analysis of a section 11 claim focuses on the relationship between the crimes. If the crimes truly arise out of one act, section 11 prohibits prosecution for more than one crime, absent specific legislative intent. Davis v. State, 1999 OK CR 48, ¶ 12-13, 993 P.2d 124, 126-127. Where the defendant commits a series of separate and distinct crimes, section 11 is not violated. Ziegler v. State, 1980 OK CR 23, 610 P.2d 251, 254. We apply the traditional test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932) to Appellant’s claims of double jeopardy, asking whether each offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Id., 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 180. Watts v. State, 2008 OK CR 27, ¶ 16, 194 P.3d 133, 139. Here, Appellant committed separate offenses; he possessed the firearm and then he used the firearm. This constitutes separate and distinct acts. See Thompson v. State, 2018 OK CR 32, ¶ 12, 429 P.3d 690, 693-94. Appellant was not subject to double punishment under Section 11; this proposition is denied.

Finally, in Proposition Eleven, Appellant claims the trial errors, when considered cumulatively, warrant granting him a new trial. There are no individual errors requiring relief. As we find no error that was harmful to Appellant, there is no accumulation of error to consider. Barnett v. State, 2011 OK CR 28, ¶ 34, 263 P.3d 959, 969.

DECISION

The judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2020), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HENDERSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES AT TRIAL
RICHARD HULL
HALLIE ELIZABETH BOVOS
NICHOLAS SOUTHERLAND
320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 611
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

APPEARANCES ON APPEAL
KELLY COLLINS
MIKE HUNTER
STEPHANIE POWERS
ATTORNEY GENERAL
ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
JAY SCHNIEDERJAN
320 ROBERT S. KERR, STE. 505
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 73102
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE

OPINION BY: LEWIS, P.J.
KUEHN, V.P.J.: Concur
LUMPKIN, J.: Concur
HUDSON, J.: Concur
ROWLAND, J.: Concur

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Footnotes:

  1. Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 13.1(8).
  2. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
  3. Corbett v. State, Okl.Cr., 527 P.2d 200 (1974).
  4. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
  5. Hanson v. State, 2009 OK CR 3, 206 P.3d 1020.
  6. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2019).
  7. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
  8. State v. Sittingdown, 2010 OK CR 22, 240 P.3d 714.
  9. McDoulett v. State, 1984 OK CR 81, 685 P.2d 978.
  10. Collins v. State, 2009 OK CR 32, 223 P.3d 1014.
  11. Davis v. State, 1999 OK CR 48, 993 P.2d 124.
  12. Ziegler v. State, 1980 OK CR 23, 610 P.2d 251.
  13. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
  14. Watts v. State, 2008 OK CR 27, 194 P.3d 133.
  15. Thompson v. State, 2018 OK CR 32, 429 P.3d 690.
  16. Barnett v. State, 2011 OK CR 28, 263 P.3d 959.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 801 (2011) - Robbery with a firearm
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283 (Supp. 2014) - Felon in possession of a firearm
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 425 (2011) - Engaging in a pattern of criminal offenses
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 13.1 (2011) - Parole eligibility
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2701 (2011) - Opinion testimony of lay witnesses
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 13 § 176.9 (2011) - Cell tower records
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 11 (2011) - Prohibition against multiple prosecutions
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283 (2011) - Possession of a firearm after former conviction of a felony
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 (2011) - Sentencing factors

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

  • U.S. Const. amend. VI - Confrontation Clause
  • U.S. Const. amend. IV - Search and Seizure
  • U.S. Const. amend. XIV - Equal Protection Clause
  • Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2019) - Search Warrant Requirement
  • Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) - Double Jeopardy
  • Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) - Hearsay and Confrontation Clause
  • Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) - Good Faith Exception
  • Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) - Jury Selection and Racial Discrimination
  • United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) - Materiality and Disclosure of Evidence

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
  • Hill v. State, 1979 OK CR 2, I 16, 589 P.2d 1073, 1077
  • Hanson v. State, 2009 OK CR 3, I 8, 206 P.3d 1020, 1025
  • Corbett v. State, Okl.Cr., 527 P.2d 200 (1974)
  • United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)
  • Morgan v. State, 1987 OK CR 139, I 6, 738 P.2d 1373, 1374
  • Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
  • Day v. State, 2013 OK CR 8, I 15, 303 P.3d 291, 299
  • McElmurry v. State, 2002 OK CR 40, II 35-36, 60 P.3d 4, 18
  • Harris v. State, 2004 OK CR 1, I 19, 84 P.3d 731, 742-43
  • Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-69 (1995)
  • Grant v. State, 2009 OK CR 11, I 28, 205 P.3d 1, 15
  • Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S.Ct. 2228, 2248-49 (2019)
  • Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
  • Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, II 3, 11, 23, 876 P.2d 690, 694, 695, 698
  • Mitchell v. State, 2010 OK CR 14, I 11, 235 P.3d 640, 646
  • Sanchez v. State, 2009 OK CR 31, I 44, 223 P.3d 980, 997
  • Marshall v. State, 2010 OK CR 24, 232 P.3d 467, 474
  • Andrew v. State, 2007 OK CR 23, I 73, 164 P.3d 176, 195
  • Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004)
  • Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2019)
  • Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347-55 (1987)
  • State v. Sittingdown, 2010 OK CR 22, II 17-18, 240 P.3d 714, 718
  • Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 12, 274 P.3d 161, 164
  • Pullen v. State, 2016 OK CR 18, I 4, 387 P.3d 922, 925
  • McDoulett v. State, 1984 OK CR 81, I 9, 685 P.2d 978, 980
  • Collins v. State, 2009 OK CR 32, I 12, 223 P.3d 1014, 1017
  • Glass v. State, 1985 OK CR 65, I 8, 701 P.2d 765, 768
  • Davis v. State, 1999 OK CR 48, 12-13, 993 P.2d 124, 126-127
  • Ziegler v. State, 1980 OK CR 23, 610 P.2d 251, 254
  • Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932)
  • Watts v. State, 2008 OK CR 27, I 16, 194 P.3d 133, 139
  • Thompson v. State, 2018 OK CR 32, I 12, 429 P.3d 690, 693-94
  • Barnett v. State, 2011 OK CR 28, I 34, 263 P.3d 959, 969

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