Milton Andre Shelton v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2018-120

Filed: May 23, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Milton Andre Shelton appealed his conviction for Human Trafficking for Commercial Sex. Conviction and sentence of thirty years in prison. Kuehn dissented.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• Was there an error in the trial court's failure to provide a specific instruction defining "human trafficking"?
• Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Shelton's conviction for human trafficking for commercial sex?
• Did the trial court's non-uniform instruction create an impermissible presumption, violating Mr. Shelton's rights to due process and a fair trial?
• Was Mr. Shelton denied his fundamental right to present a complete defense due to the exclusion of evidence regarding the victim's prior acts of prostitution?

Findings

• the trial court did not err in failing to give a specific instruction on "human trafficking."
• the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for human trafficking for commercial sex.
• the instruction given was an accurate statement of the law and did not violate due process or result in a Sandstrom error.
• the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence regarding the victim's prior acts of prostitution.

F-2018-120

May 23, 2019

Milton Andre Shelton

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE: Appellant, Milton Andre Shelton, was convicted by a jury in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CF-2016-6494, of Human Trafficking for Commercial Sex (21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 748(A)(6)), After Conviction of Two or More Felonies. On January 30, 2018, the Honorable Timothy R. Henderson, District Judge, sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment in accordance with the jury’s recommendation. Appellant must serve at least 85% of his sentence before parole consideration. 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1(22).

Appellant raises four propositions of error in support of his appeal:

PROPOSITION I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GIVING AN INSTRUCTION DEFINING HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN VIOLATION OF MR. SHELTON’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.

PROPOSITION II. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT MR. SHELTON’S CONVICTION FOR HUMAN TRAFFICKING FOR COMMERCIAL SEX, DUE PROCESS REQUIRES HIS CASE TO BE REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS.

PROPOSITION III. THE TRIAL COURT GAVE AN IMPROPER NON-OUJI INSTRUCTION THAT CREATED AN IMPERMISSIBLE PRESUMPTION THEREBY VIOLATING MR. SHELTON’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND IN VIOLATION OF SANDSTROM V. MONTANA.

PROPOSITION IV. MR. SHELTON WAS DENIED HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE BY THE TRIAL COURT’S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE THAT THE VICTIM PERFORMED ACTS OF PROSTITUTION PRIOR TO MEETING MR. SHELTON.

After thorough consideration of these propositions, the record on appeal, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm. Appellant was charged with coercing eighteen-year-old A.H. to engage in prostitution under his direction. As to Proposition I, Appellant did not request a different instruction on the definition of human trafficking than the one given by the trial court, so we review this claim for plain error only. Appellant must show a plain or obvious deviation from a legal rule which affected his substantial rights; we will only grant relief if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice. Hogan U. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923.

The statute in question, and the Uniform Jury Instructions, contain a specific definition for Human Trafficking by Commercial Sex, which the trial court gave. The language Appellant complains about here (from 21 O.S. § 748(A)(4)) would only have confused the jury, as it embraced other scenarios not applicable to the facts in this case. Compare 21 O.S. § 748(A)(4), (5), and (6). This is why the drafters of the Uniform Jury Instructions did not create an instruction based on subsection (A)(4). OUJI-CR (2nd) No. 4-113B, Committee Comments. This general statutory definition would not have assisted the trier of fact, nor would it have materially aided the defense.¹ The trial court did not err in failing to give it. See Dennis U. State, 1976 OK CR 266, I 17, 556 P.2d 617, 621. Proposition I is denied.

As to Proposition II, the complaining witness, A.H., testified that Appellant recruited her as a prostitute, drove her from Tulsa to Oklahoma City, bought her clothing and other personal items, supplied her with methamphetamine, helped her set up an online personals ad to attract customers, provided her with motel rooms in which to conduct business, and confiscated the money she made from performing sex acts with strangers. She testified that at the time she agreed to work for Appellant, she was homeless, jobless, and penniless, and felt she had no other option. The jury was well aware that A.H. was not physically forced to work for Appellant; its verdict that Appellant’s actions nevertheless amounted to coercion as defined in 21 O.S. § 748 is supported by competent evidence. Jessie U. State, 1982 OK CR 99, II 2-3, 648 P.2d 46, 46-47. Proposition II is denied.

As to Proposition III, the trial court’s non-uniform instruction, explaining that consent by the person prostituting herself is not a defense to a charge of Human Trafficking, was an accurate statement of the law. 21 O.S. § 748(E). The instruction was appropriate, as it responded to evidence and argument that A.H. was not physically forced to work for Appellant. Patton U. State, 1998 OK CR 66, I 49, 973 P.2d 270, 288. The instruction did not absolve the State of proving every element of the charge, nor did it shift the burden to Appellant to disprove any particular element. Sandstrom U. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 525, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2460, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); Littlejohn v. State, 2008 OK CR 12, I 10, 181 P.3d 736, 740. The State remained obligated to prove coercion by any of the means set out in § 748(A)(1) that were applicable to the evidence. Proposition III is denied.

As to Proposition IV, the trial court prevented defense counsel from asking A.H. if she had engaged in prostitution before meeting Appellant. We see no relevance to this line of inquiry; it did not tend to establish any motive for A.H. to falsely accuse Appellant. Insofar as defense counsel was attempting to impeach A.H.’s credibility generally, we note (1) she admitted engaging in prostitution after leaving Appellant; (2) she admitted being a regular user of methamphetamine before Appellant met her and supplied her with the drug; and (3) she admitted knowing how to place a personals ad on a web site notorious for escort services. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining an objection to defense counsel’s question, and Appellant cannot demonstrate any unfair prejudice. Pavatt U. State, 2007 OK CR 19, I 42, 159 P.3d 272, 286. Proposition IV is denied.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

1. 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 748(A)(6)
2. 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1(22)
3. Hogan U. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
4. 21 O.S. § 748(A)(4)
5. 21 O.S. § 748(A)(5)
6. OUJI-CR (2nd) No. 4-113B, Committee Comments
7. Dennis U. State, 1976 OK CR 266, I 17, 556 P.2d 617, 621
8. Jessie U. State, 1982 OK CR 99, II 2-3, 648 P.2d 46, 46-47
9. 21 O.S. § 748(E)
10. Patton U. State, 1998 OK CR 66, I 49, 973 P.2d 270, 288
11. Sandstrom U. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 525, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2460, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)
12. Littlejohn v. State, 2008 OK CR 12, I 10, 181 P.3d 736, 740
13. Pavatt U. State, 2007 OK CR 19, I 42, 159 P.3d 272, 286
14. 21 O.S.2011, § 1081

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 748(A)(6) - Human Trafficking for Commercial Sex
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1(22) - Sentencing
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 748(A)(4) - Human Trafficking Definition
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 748(A)(5) - Human Trafficking Definition
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 748(E) - Consent Not a Defense
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1081 - Pandering

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Hogan U. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923.
• Dennis U. State, 1976 OK CR 266, I 17, 556 P.2d 617, 621.
• Jessie U. State, 1982 OK CR 99, II 2-3, 648 P.2d 46, 46-47.
• Patton U. State, 1998 OK CR 66, I 49, 973 P.2d 270, 288.
• Sandstrom U. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 525, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2460, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979).
• Littlejohn v. State, 2008 OK CR 12, I 10, 181 P.3d 736, 740.
• Pavatt U. State, 2007 OK CR 19, I 42, 159 P.3d 272, 286.