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F-2018-113

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Brenda Marie Huff v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2018-113

Filed: Feb. 6, 2020

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Brenda Marie Huff appealed her conviction for Child Neglect and Enabling Child Sexual Abuse. Her conviction and sentence were 25 years for each count, but the sentences were to be served at the same time. Judge Kuehn disagreed with some of the decisions made in the court.

Decision

The JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Huff committed the crime of enabling child sexual abuse?
  • Was there sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Huff committed the crime of child neglect as alleged in Count II?
  • Was there sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Huff committed the crime of child neglect as alleged in Counts I, III, and IV?
  • Did the trial court fail to properly instruct the jury, in violation of Mrs. Huff's due process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. II, § 7, of the Oklahoma Constitution?
  • Were Mrs. Huff's concurrent sentences of twenty-five years on each count excessively shocking to the conscience of the court?
  • Did cumulative errors deprive Mrs. Huff of a fair proceeding and a reliable outcome?

Findings

  • evidence was sufficient for the conviction of enabling child sexual abuse
  • evidence was sufficient for the conviction of child neglect as alleged in Count II
  • evidence was sufficient for the conviction of child neglect as alleged in Counts I, III, and IV
  • no error occurred in the jury instructions regarding the elements of child neglect
  • the sentences imposed were not excessive and did not shock the conscience
  • cumulative error claim was denied, as there were no individual errors to sustain

F-2018-113

Feb. 6, 2020

Brenda Marie Huff

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

JOHN D. HADDEN LUMPKIN, JUDGE:

Appellant, Brenda Marie Huff, was tried by jury and convicted of four counts of Child Neglect, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(C) (Counts 1-4), and one count of Enabling Child Sexual Abuse, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(G) (Count 5), in the District Court of Lincoln County, Case Number CF-2016-172A. The jury recommended as punishment twenty-five years imprisonment on each count. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly and ordered the sentences to run concurrently to one another. It is from this judgment and sentence that Appellant appeals.

Appellant raises the following propositions of error in this appeal:

I. The State’s evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Huff committed the crime of enabling child sexual abuse and the conviction must be overturned with instructions to dismiss.

II. The State’s evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Huff committed the crime of child neglect as alleged in Count II, and the conviction must be overturned with instructions to dismiss.

III. The State’s evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Huff committed the crime of child neglect as alleged in Counts I, III, IV and the convictions must be overturned with instructions to dismiss.

IV. Plain error occurred when the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury, in violation of Mrs. Huff’s due process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. II, § 7, of the Oklahoma Constitution.

V. Based on all of the facts and circumstances of this case, Mrs. Huff received an excessive sentence that should shock the conscience of this court and should be modified.

VI. Cumulative errors deprived Mrs. Huff of a fair proceeding and a reliable outcome.

After thorough consideration of these propositions and the entire record before us on appeal including the original record, transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we have determined that under the law and the evidence no relief is warranted.

In Propositions One (Count 5), Two (Count 2) and Three (Counts 1, 3 and 4), Appellant claims that her convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence. We address these claims utilizing the same standard of review and find all three must be denied. This Court follows the standard for the determination of the sufficiency of the evidence which the United States Supreme Court set forth in Jackson U. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Easlick U. State, 2004 OK CR 21, I 15, 90 P.3d 556, 559; Spuehler U. State, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-204. Under this test, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Easlick, 2004 OK CR 21, T 5, 90 P.3d at 558-59; Spuehler, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d at 203-204. Pieces of evidence must be viewed not in isolation but in conjunction, and we must affirm the conviction so long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn from the record as a whole, the jury might fairly have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Matthews U. State, 2002 OK CR 16, IT 35, 45 P.3d 907, 919-20. A reviewing court must accept all reasons, inferences, and credibility choices that tend to support the verdict. Taylor v. State, 2011 OK CR 8, 9 13, 248 P.3d 362, 368. [T]he law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence and either, or any combination of the two, may be sufficient to support a conviction. Mitchell U. State, 2018 OK CR 24, I 11, 424 P.3d 677, 682.

The State initially argues Appellant has waived these claims from appellate review pursuant to Rule 3.5(A)(5), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), because she failed to cite any binding authority, other than the correct standard of review, in support of these propositions. We find Appellant has complied with the rule, albeit her compliance is minimal.

Appellant was charged in Count 5 with enabling child sexual abuse. This charge stemmed from sexually suggestive text and other messages Appellant’s husband, Andrew Huff, sent to M.H. In order to convict Appellant of Count 5, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant willfully or maliciously permitted lewd or indecent acts and proposals to occur or be made by Huff to M.H. The evidence presented by the State showed that neither Appellant nor Huff was employed and that the children were home-schooled. Thus, the family was together virtually all of the time. Appellant, Huff and their children followed a nudist or naturalist lifestyle where clothing was optional. Appellant admitted she was aware of the sexual messages Huff sent to M.H. because she saw them on his phone. She also knew of the allegations against Huff with regard to M.H., but informed investigators she did not believe them. Since Appellant was aware of the sexual abuse allegations against Huff, the jury could find Appellant did nothing to prevent Huff’s further abuse of M.H. Cf. Johnson v. State, 1988 OK CR 54, I 8, 751 P.2d 1094, 1096 (where evidence showed that after receiving information about her husband’s abuse of her child, the appellant defended her husband and took no action to protect her child, sufficient evidence of permitting child abuse was shown). Appellant engaged in behavior designed to impede the investigation into the allegations against her and Huff by refusing to allow investigators access to the children and by exhorting the children to say nothing to authorities. The jury could find Appellant’s actions showed her consciousness of guilt. See Dodd U. State, 2004 OK CR 31, I 34, 100 P.3d 1017, 1031 (a defendant’s post-offense attempt to influence proceedings against him may be relevant to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offense). Viewing the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find ample proof from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that between May 1, 2016, and June 15, 2016, Appellant enabled Huff to sexually abuse M.H. Proposition One is denied.

Appellant was charged in Count 2 with child neglect of L.H. In order to convict Appellant on Count 2, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant willfully or maliciously failed to provide adequate shelter, sanitation, hygiene, appropriate education for L.H. or failed to protect L.H. from exposure to sexual materials that were not age-appropriate. Appellant contends no evidence was presented that L.H. was exposed to sexual materials, or to unsanitary living conditions since she went away to visit relatives on May 20, 2016.

The evidence showed that the living conditions were unspeakable. Investigators found animal feces, urine, a dead cat, dirty clothes, mountains of trash, filthy dishes, a trash bag filled with used feminine hygiene products and used toilet paper, sex devices and sexual reading material inside the trailer home. Although the children were allegedly home-schooled, no education-related materials were discovered when authorities searched the trailer. Additionally, the trailer had no running water and the water had been off for several weeks at the time of the Appellant’s arrest. Sex devices and sexual reading material were in plain sight throughout the trailer. Thus, the jury could reasonably infer that these materials were similarly displayed while L.H. was present at the trailer. The evidence also established that although the trailer was clean and in good condition in February 2016 when the Huffs moved in, it was virtually uninhabitable by June 15, 2016. The deplorable conditions of the trailer on June 15, 2016 did not simply appear during the three weeks L.H. was away visiting relatives, but were in existence long before that time. Even if the water was still on at the time L.H. left for her visit, there can be no dispute that the trailer was filthy and not fit for habitation for children at the time she left. In any event, even if the evidence was in conflict on this point, this Court presumes jurors resolve conflicts [in the evidence] in favor of the prosecution. Mack U. State, 2018 OK CR 30, I 3, 428 P.3d 326, 328. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense of child neglect of L.H. beyond a reasonable doubt. Proposition Two is denied.

Appellant was charged in Count 3 with child neglect of M.H., K.H. and J.W. In order to convict Appellant on Count 3, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant willfully or maliciously failed to provide adequate shelter, sanitation, hygiene, or appropriate education for M.H., K.H. and J.W or failed to protect M.H., K.H. and J.W from exposure to sexual materials that were not age-appropriate. The evidence adduced by the State in support of the neglect convictions is fully set out above. Suffice it to say that the evidence of Appellant’s neglect of the children was overwhelming. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense of child neglect of M.H., K.H. and J.W. beyond a reasonable doubt. Proposition Three is denied.

In Proposition Four, Appellant contends the trial court improperly instructed the jury with the elements of child neglect. She argues the State failed to elect which theory of child neglect it sought to prove, either neglect by failure to provide adequate shelter, sanitation, hygiene, or appropriate education or neglect by failure to protect from exposure to sexual materials that are not age-appropriate. The jury instructions gave both child neglect elements in the alternative. As a result, Appellant continues, the jury chose which of the theories it believed and its verdict may not have been unanimous. We review this claim for plain error as Appellant made no objection to the jury instructions at trial. Barnard U. State, 2017 OK CR 26, I 22, 408 P.3d 209, 217. Under the plain error test set forth in Simpson V. State, 1994 OK CR 40, II 3, 11, 23 30, 876 P.2d 690, 694-95, 698, we determine whether Appellant has shown an actual error, which is plain or obvious, and which affects his or her substantial rights. This Court will only correct plain error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice. Id., 1994 OK CR 40, 91 30, 876 P.2d at 701. See also Jackson U. State, 2016 OK CR 5, II 4, 371 P.3d 1120, 1121; Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923. Jury instructions are sufficient where they accurately state the applicable law. Runnels U. State, 2018 OK CR 27, I 19, 426 P.3d 614, 619. Reviewing the record, we find there was no error in the jury instructions.

The Court has consistently held that the election rule does not apply to child abuse and child sex abuse crimes committed under the domination of parents or older authority figures. Gilson U. State, 2000 OK CR 14, II 22-23, 8 P.3d 883, 889-890 (applying election rule exception to acts of child abuse by treating separate acts as one transaction); Jones v. State, 1989 OK CR 66, IT 17, 781 P.2d 326, 329 (finding that multiple acts of sexual abuse over three year period were part of same transaction as act constituting charged offense); Huddleston U. State, 1985 OK CR 12, I 16, 695 P.2d 8, 10-11 ([W]hen a child of tender years is under the exclusive domination of one parent for a definite and certain period of time and submits to sexual acts at that parent’s demand, the separate acts of abuse become one transaction under exception to the election rule set forth in Cody U. State, 1961 OK CR 43, 361 P.2d 307). As the Court noted in Gilson, the general rule requiring the State to elect which offense it will prosecute is not in force when separate acts are treated as one transaction and that separate acts of abuse are one transaction for purposes of election of offenses. Id., 2000 OK CR 14, I 21, 8 P.3d at 899. The record demonstrates that the State charged Appellant with child neglect against the children in Counts 1-4 with the acts comprising the neglect occurring between May 1, 2016 and June 15, 2016. As this Court held in Gilson: Therefore, under the principles enunciated in Huddleston, the abuse suffered by the children was a continuous act and the State was not required to elect one specific act upon which to prosecute, nor was the jury required to agree on one specific incident of abuse to support a finding of child abuse. While the State could have elected to charge and prove separate acts of child abuse, it did not. Instead, the State elected to charge the acts of abuse as one continuous act during the period of time set out in the felony information. The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that they must agree on the specific act supporting the verdict of guilt as to child abuse did not deny Appellant his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. Id., 2000 OK CR 14, I 23, 8 P.3d at 900.

As in Gilson and Huddleston, the State alleged a forty-six day time span during which neglect was ongoing based upon Appellant’s failure to provide the children adequate shelter, sanitation, hygiene, or appropriate education and to protect the children from exposure to sexual materials that were not age-appropriate. Therefore, the neglect the children suffered was a continuous transaction that required no election by the State or more specific jury instruction. Nor was Appellant deprived of a unanimous verdict because the State proceeded under the above separate theories of child neglect. As stated above, child neglect was the crime charged. Similarly to Gilson, failure to provide adequate shelter, etc., or failure to protect from exposure to inappropriate sexual materials were the alternative means of committing the charged crime of child neglect. Where the Information contains alternative means of committing the crime charged, [t]he constitutional requirement of a unanimous jury verdict applies only to the ultimate issue of the appellant’s guilt or innocence of the crime charged, not the alternative means by which the crime was committed. Gilson, 2000 OK CR 14, I 34, 8 P.3d at 902, quoting Rounds U. State, 1984 OK CR 49, 26, 679 P.2d 283, 287. The jury returned verdicts of guilt on each count of child neglect. Thus, the verdicts were unanimous and satisfied due process. Id., 2000 OK CR 14, II 35-41, 8 P.3d at 902-03.

Because there was no error in the jury instructions, there was no plain error. Sonnier U. State, 2014 OK CR 13, q14, 334 P.3d 948, 952-53.

In Proposition Five, Appellant argues her concurrent sentences of twenty-five years on each count are shockingly excessive. She contends that even in light of the evidence presented, there was no evidence that the children were not loved and cared for and she asserts that the child sexual abuse she permitted was minimal. This Court will not disturb a sentence within statutory limits unless, under the facts and circumstances of the case, it is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the Court. Baird U. State, 2017 OK CR 16, IF 40, 400 P.3d 875, 886. The record demonstrates and the jury found that Appellant allowed her three children and a young relative to live in abject squalor and exposed them to sexual materials far too mature for their ages. She failed to protect M.H. from sexual abuse by Huff. The jury found Appellant to be deserving of significant punishment. Nothing about Appellant’s sentence shocks the conscience of this Court. Proposition Five is denied.

In her last proposition, Appellant claims she is entitled to relief on a cumulative error basis. A cumulative error argument has no merit when this Court fails to sustain any of the other errors raised by Appellant. Baird, 2017 OK CR 16, I 42, 400 P.3d at 886. The record shows that no error occurred during the course of the trial in the present case. Therefore, no new trial or modification of sentence is warranted. Proposition VI is denied.

DECISION

The JUDGMENT and SENTENCE is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(C)
  2. 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5(G)
  3. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)
  4. Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, ¶ 15, 90 P.3d 556, 559
  5. Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, ¶ 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-204
  6. Matthews v. State, 2002 OK CR 16, ¶ 35, 45 P.3d 907, 919-20
  7. Taylor v. State, 2011 OK CR 8, ¶ 13, 248 P.3d 362, 368
  8. Mitchell v. State, 2018 OK CR 24, ¶ 11, 424 P.3d 677, 682
  9. Rule 3.5(A)(5), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019)
  10. Johnson v. State, 1988 OK CR 54, ¶ 8, 751 P.2d 1094, 1096
  11. Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31, ¶ 34, 100 P.3d 1017, 1031
  12. Mack v. State, 2018 OK CR 30, ¶ 3, 428 P.3d 326, 328
  13. Barnard v. State, 2017 OK CR 26, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d 209, 217
  14. Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, ¶¶ 3, 11, 23, 876 P.2d 690, 694-95, 698
  15. Jackson v. State, 2016 OK CR 5, ¶ 4, 371 P.3d 1120, 1121
  16. Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, ¶ 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
  17. Runnels v. State, 2018 OK CR 27, ¶ 19, 426 P.3d 614, 619
  18. Gilson v. State, 2000 OK CR 14, ¶¶ 22-23, 8 P.3d 883, 889-890
  19. Jones v. State, 1989 OK CR 66, ¶ 17, 781 P.2d 326, 329
  20. Huddleston v. State, 1985 OK CR 12, ¶ 16, 695 P.2d 8, 10-11
  21. Cody v. State, 1961 OK CR 43, 361 P.2d 307
  22. Rounds v. State, 1984 OK CR 49, ¶ 26, 679 P.2d 283, 287
  23. Baird v. State, 2017 OK CR 16, ¶ 40, 400 P.3d 875, 886
  24. Sonniers v. State, 2014 OK CR 13, ¶ 14, 334 P.3d 948, 952-53
  25. A.O. v. State, 2019 OK CR 18, ¶ 13, 447 P.3d 1179, 1187
  26. Huskey v. State, 1999 OK CR 3, 989 P.2d 1

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 843.5(C) - Child Neglect
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 843.5(G) - Enabling Child Sexual Abuse
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 27 - Jury Instructions
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 33 - Unanimous Verdicts
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 - Sentencing

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

  • 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution - Due Process

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, I 15, 90 P.3d 556, 559
  • Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-204
  • Matthews v. State, 2002 OK CR 16, I 35, 45 P.3d 907, 919-20
  • Taylor v. State, 2011 OK CR 8, I 13, 248 P.3d 362, 368
  • Mitchell v. State, 2018 OK CR 24, I 11, 424 P.3d 677, 682
  • Johnson v. State, 1988 OK CR 54, I 8, 751 P.2d 1094, 1096
  • Dodd v. State, 2004 OK CR 31, I 34, 100 P.3d 1017, 1031
  • Mack v. State, 2018 OK CR 30, I 3, 428 P.3d 326, 328
  • Barnard v. State, 2017 OK CR 26, I 22, 408 P.3d 209, 217
  • Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, II 3, I 30, 876 P.2d 690, 694-95
  • Jackson v. State, 2016 OK CR 5, II 4, 371 P.3d 1120, 1121
  • Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
  • Runnels v. State, 2018 OK CR 27, I 19, 426 P.3d 614, 619
  • Baird v. State, 2017 OK CR 16, I 40, 400 P.3d 875, 886
  • Sonnier v. State, 2014 OK CR 13, q14, 334 P.3d 948, 952-53
  • Gilson v. State, 2000 OK CR 14, II 22-23, 8 P.3d 883, 889-890
  • Jones v. State, 1989 OK CR 66, IT 17, 781 P.2d 326, 329
  • Huddleston v. State, 1985 OK CR 12, I 16, 695 P.2d 8, 10-11
  • Cody v. State, 1961 OK CR 43, 361 P.2d 307
  • A.O. v. State, 2019 OK CR 18, IT 13, 447 P.3d 1179, 1187
  • Huskey v. State, 1999 OK CR 3, 989 P.2d 1

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