Christopher Lantz Wildman v The State of Oklahoma
F-2017-639
Filed: Apr. 25, 2019
Not for publication
Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma
Summary
Christopher Lantz Wildman appealed his conviction for First Degree Manslaughter. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the court, meaning he will serve twelve years in prison, with 85% of that time required before he can be considered for parole. Judge Kuehn dissented in part, expressing concerns about the evidence used against Wildman during his trial.
Decision
The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.
Issues
- Was the State's evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wildman was not acting in self-defense?
- Did Mr. Wildman's rights to due process and a fair trial get violated by the improper admission of bad character evidence and the failure to give a limiting instruction on such evidence?
- Did prosecutorial misconduct deprive Mr. Wildman of a fair trial?
- Was Mr. Wildman deprived of effective assistance of counsel?
- Did the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence infect the proceedings with unfairness?
- Did the accumulation of errors deprive Mr. Wildman of due process of law?
Findings
- Evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wildman was not acting in self-defense.
- The trial court did not err in admitting bad character evidence nor in failing to give a limiting instruction.
- There was no prosecutorial misconduct that deprived Mr. Wildman of a fair trial.
- Mr. Wildman was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel.
- The trial court did not err in allowing the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.
- The accumulation of errors did not deprive Mr. Wildman of a fair trial.
F-2017-639
Apr. 25, 2019
Christopher Lantz Wildman
Appellantv
The State of Oklahoma
Appellee
v
The State of Oklahoma
Appellee
SUMMARY OPINION
LUMPKIN, JUDGE:
Appellant, Christopher Lantz Wildman, was tried by jury and convicted of First Degree Manslaughter (21 O.S.2011, § 711), in District Court of McCurtain County Case Number CF-2016-271. The jury recommended as punishment imprisonment for twelve (12) years. The trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the jury’s recommendation and directed that Appellant receive credit for the time he had served awaiting trial. It is from this judgment and sentence that Appellant appeals.1
1 Appellant is required to serve 85% of his sentence prior to becoming eligible for consideration for parole. 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1.
Appellant raises the following propositions of error in this appeal:
I. The State’s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wildman was not acting in self-defense. Therefore, Mr. Wildman was convicted and sentenced in violation of his rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, §§ 7 and 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
II. Mr. Wildman’s rights to due process and a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States’ Constitution and Article II, §§ 7 and 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution were violated by the improper admission of bad character evidence and the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction on such evidence.
III. Prosecutorial misconduct deprived Mr. Wildman of a fair trial in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, §§ 7 and 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
IV. Mr. Wildman was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, §§ 7 and 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
V. Irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of Mr. Gibson’s alleged habits admitted at Appellant’s trial infected the proceedings with unfairness, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
VI. The accumulation of error in this case deprived Mr. Wildman of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
After thorough consideration of these propositions and the entire record before us on appeal including the original record, transcripts and briefs of the parties, we have determined that neither reversal nor modification of sentence is warranted under the law and the evidence.
In Proposition One, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. This Court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Easlick U. State, 2004 OK CR 21, I 5, 90 P.3d 556, 559; Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-204. Self-defense is an affirmative defense which admits the elements of the charge, but offers a legal justification for conduct which would otherwise be criminal. McHam U. State, 2005 OK CR 28, I 10, 126 P.3d 662, 667. Once the defense of self-defense has been raised, the State has the burden of proof to show that the defendant did not act in self-defense. Perez v. State, 1990 OK CR 67, I 8, 798 P.2d 639, 641. Taking the evidence in the present case in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant did not act in self-defense. Jones U. State, 2009 OK CR 1, I 64, 201 P.3d 869, 886; 21 O.S.2011, § 643(3); Instruction Number 8-48, OUJI-CR(2d). Proposition One is denied.
In Proposition Two, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted prejudicial evidence of another crime. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to either admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Willis U. State, 2017 OK CR 23, I 20, 406 P. 3d 30, 35; Marshall U. State, 2010 OK CR 8, I 24, 232 P.3d 467, 474. An abuse of discretion has been defined as a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented or, stated otherwise, any unreasonable or arbitrary action taken without proper consideration of the facts and law pertaining to the matter at issue. Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170. Reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the challenged evidence. Appellant’s statement expressing fear that his claim of self-defense would be doubted in light of his prior act of self-defense which resulted in a declined homicide charge did not constitute evidence of other crimes or bad acts. Since Appellant was cleared of any wrongdoing in the prior incident, there was neither a specific reference to another crime nor any stigma attached to the incident that could unduly prejudice Appellant in the eyes of the jury. Eizember U. State, 2007 OK CR 29, I 75, 164 P.3d 208, 230 (An act that is not a violation of the criminal law is nonetheless governed by § 2404(B) where it carries a stigma that could unduly prejudice an accused in the eyes of the jury.); Bear v. State, 1988 OK CR 181, I 22, 762 P.2d 950, 956 ([The mere suggestion of another crime, without more, will not trigger the general rules regarding the admission of other crimes evidence.); Nuckols v. State, 1984 OK CR 92, I 39, 690 P.2d 463, 471 (holding there must be a specific reference to other offense to constitute evidence of another crime). Giving the challenged testimony its maximum reasonable probative force and minimum reasonable prejudicial value in the present case, we find that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Stewart U. State, 2016 OK CR 9, I 19, 372 P.3d 508, 512; 12 O.S.2011, § 2403. The evidence was part of Appellant’s spontaneous admissions to stabbing Gibson and his declaration that he acted in self-defense. Appellant’s reference to the prior uncharged incident tended to establish his state-of-mind and placed his claim of self-defense in context. Based upon this record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Appellant’s statement. Appellant asserts within this same proposition of error that the prosecutor misused this evidence during opening and closing argument. To the extent that Appellant’s assertion could be construed as a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we find that his failure to separately set out this claim as a proposition of error waives review of the claim. Rule 3.5(A)(5), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019) (requiring each proposition of error to be set out separately in the brief); Cuesta-Rodriguez v. State, 2011 OK CR 4, I 12, 247 P.3d 1192, 1197 (holding appellant waived review of claim when he failed to set it out as a separate proposition of error). Proposition Two is denied.
In Proposition Three, Appellant contends that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. This Court’s review is well established. Prosecutorial comments, like jury instructions, are not reviewed in artificial isolation, but must be judged in the context of the entire record. Runnels U. State, 2018 OK CR 27, I 25, 426 P.3d 614, 621. Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct do not warrant reversal of a conviction unless the cumulative effect was such [as] to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Appellant argues that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the credibility of Detective Darryl Blakely when he stated that there’s no one I’d rather stand here with than Darryl Blakely. Reviewing the record, we find that the prosecutor’s comment was borderline. Although this portion of the prosecutor’s argument could be interpreted as vouching for the detective’s credibility, it is apparent from the record that the prosecutor was attempting to counter Appellant’s mischaracterization of the burden of proof, i.e. repeatedly suggesting that the jurors hold the State to the burden of bringing its A game. Mitchell U. State, 2018 OK CR 24, I 31, 424 P.3d 677, 686 (Vouching occurs when a prosecutor expresses a personal belief in a witness’s credibility.). Taking the prosecutor’s comment within the context of the entire trial, we find that the comment did not deprive Appellant of a fundamentally fair trial. Teafatiller v. State, 1987 OK CR 141, I 8, 739 P.2d 1009, 1010-1011 (Comments which are invited and do no more than respond substantially in order to right the scale, do not warrant reversing a conviction.). Appellant further argues that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when he repeatedly argued that Appellant had stabbed the victim in the heart. He concedes that he waived appellate review of this claim for all but plain error when he failed to object to the prosecutor’s comments at trial. Therefore, we review Appellant’s claim pursuant to the test for plain error set forth in Simpson U. State, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690. Malone U State, 2013 OK CR 1, I 41, 293 P.3d 198, 211-212. Under this test, an appellant must show an actual error, which is plain or obvious, and which affects his substantial rights. Id.; Simpson, 1994 OK CR 40, 10, 26, 30, 876 P.2d at 694, 699, 701. This Court will only correct plain error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice. Id. Applying this analysis to Appellant’s claim, we find that Appellant has not shown the existence of an actual error. The prosecutor’s argument was reasonably based upon the evidence at trial and did not constitute either arguing facts not in evidence or a misstatement of fact. Lamar v. State, 2018 OK CR 8, I 54, 419 P.3d 283, 297; Wood v. State, 1998 OK CR 19, I 54, 959 P.2d 1, 14; Langley U. State, 1991 OK CR 66, I 24, 813 P.2d 526, 531. Reviewing the entire record, the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s comments did not deprive Appellant of a fundamentally fair trial. The evidence strongly supported the jury’s determination of both guilt and recommendation as to sentence. Proposition Three is denied.
In Proposition Four, Appellant challenges the effectiveness of defense counsel. This Court reviews ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the two-part test mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland U. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Malone U. State, 2013 OK CR 1, I 14, 293 P.3d 198, 206. The Strickland test requires an appellant to show: (1) that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id., citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness to sponsor introduction of Gibson’s toxicology report. Since neither the document nor its contents are within the record, we are unable to determine whether the evidence was admissible. However, it was undisputed that Gibson was drinking prior to his encounter with Appellant. In light of the strong evidence suggesting that Appellant did not act in self-defense, we conclude that Appellant has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel introduced the toxicology report. Appellant further argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction concerning the evidence he challenged in Proposition Two. We determined in that proposition that Appellant’s statement concerning the previous homicide investigation did not constitute other crimes or bad acts evidence. Since there was no need for a limiting instruction concerning this evidence, we conclude that Appellant has not shown ineffective assistance under Strickland. See Instruction No. 9-9, OUJI-CR(2d) (2000 Supp.). Appellant further argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the misstatement of the facts challenge that he now raises in Proposition Three. We determined in that proposition that the prosecutor’s comments had not deprived Appellant of a fundamentally fair trial. Since the prosecutor’s comments did not affect the outcome of the case, there can be no ineffective assistance of counsel. Glossip U. State, 2007 OK CR 12, I 110-12, 157 P.3d 143, 161. Proposition Four is denied.
In Proposition Five, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce improper, irrelevant, and extremely prejudicial habit evidence. Appellant failed to raise this objection at trial. Therefore, we find that he has waived appellate review of this claim for all but plain error. Harmon U. State, 2011 OK CR 6, IT 36, 248 P.3d 918, 934 (when a specific objection is made at trial, this Court will not entertain a different objection on appeal). We review his claim pursuant to the test for plain error, set out above, and determine whether he has shown an actual error, which is plain or obvious, and which affects his or her substantial rights. Malone, 2013 OK CR 1, I 41, 293 P.3d at 211-212. Appellant asserts that the State introduced evidence of the victim’s habit of giving rides to other people. The record fails to support Appellant’s claim. Since the record fails to show that this evidence was actually introduced, we conclude that he has failed to show the existence of an actual error. We further note that Appellant had not shown that this alleged error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we find that Appellant has not shown that error, plain or otherwise, occurred. Proposition Five is denied.
In Proposition Six, Appellant claims the combined errors in his trial denied him the right to a constitutionally guaranteed fair trial. When there have been numerous irregularities during the course of a trial that tend to prejudice the rights of the defendant, reversal will be required if the cumulative effect of all the errors is to deny the defendant a fair trial. Bechtel v. State, 1987 OK CR 126, I 12, 738 P.2d 559, 561. We have not identified any error during the course of the trial in the present case. Therefore, no new trial or modification of sentence is warranted and this assignment of error is denied. Baird U. State, 2017 OK CR 16, I 42, 400 P.3d 875, 886
Proposition Six is denied.
DECISION
The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court is hereby AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.
Footnotes:
- 21 O.S.Supp.2015, § 13.1
- 21 O.S.2011, § 643(3)
- 12 O.S.2011, § 2403
- 21 O.S.2011, § 711
- 12 O.S.2011, § 2403
- 21 O.S.2011, § 711
- Eizember U. State, 2007 OK CR 29, II 75, 164 P.3d 208, 230.
- Malone U. State, 2013 OK CR 1, I 41, 293 P.3d 198, 211-212.
- Glossip U. State, 2007 OK CR 12, II 110-12, 157 P.3d 143, 161.
- Pullen U. State, 2016 OK CR 18, IT 13, 387 P.3d 922, 927.
Oklahoma Statutes citations:
- Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 711 - First Degree Manslaughter
- Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1 - Parole eligibility
- Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 643 - Self-defense
- Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2403 - Exclusion of relevant evidence
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 3.5(A)(5) - Propositions of error
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 18 - Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
- Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 2404 - Character evidence; admissibility
- Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 - Death penalty; guilty plea
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 40 - Ineffective assistance of counsel
- Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 1208 - Cumulative error
Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:
No Oklahoma administrative rules found.
U.S. Code citations:
No US Code citations found.
Other citations:
No other rule citations found.
Case citations:
- Easlick v. State, 2004 OK CR 21, I 5, 90 P.3d 556, 559
- Spuehler v. State, 1985 OK CR 132, I 7, 709 P.2d 202, 203-204
- McHam v. State, 2005 OK CR 28, I 10, 126 P.3d 662, 667
- Perez v. State, 1990 OK CR 67, I 8, 798 P.2d 639, 641
- Jones v. State, 2009 OK CR 1, I 64, 201 P.3d 869, 886
- Willis v. State, 2017 OK CR 23, I 20, 406 P.3d 30, 35
- Marshall v. State, 2010 OK CR 8, I 24, 232 P.3d 467, 474
- Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170
- Eizember v. State, 2007 OK CR 29, I 75, 164 P.3d 208, 230
- Bear v. State, 1988 OK CR 181, I 22, 762 P.2d 950, 956
- Nuckols v. State, 1984 OK CR 92, I 39, 690 P.2d 463, 471
- Stewart v. State, 2016 OK CR 9, I 19, 372 P.3d 508, 512
- Mitchell v. State, 2018 OK CR 24, I 31, 424 P.3d 677, 686
- Teafatiller v. State, 1987 OK CR 141, I 8, 739 P.2d 1009, 1010-1011
- Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690
- Malone v. State, 2013 OK CR 1, I 41, 293 P.3d 198, 211-212
- Lamar v. State, 2018 OK CR 8, I 54, 419 P.3d 283, 297
- Wood v. State, 1998 OK CR 19, I 54, 959 P.2d 1, 14
- Langley v. State, 1991 OK CR 66, I 24, 813 P.2d 526, 531
- Glossip v. State, 2007 OK CR 12, II 110-12, 157 P.3d 143, 161
- Harmon v. State, 2011 OK CR 6, I 36, 248 P.3d 918, 934
- Bechtel v. State, 1987 OK CR 126, I 12, 738 P.2d 559, 561
- Baird v. State, 2017 OK CR 16, I 42, 400 P.3d 875, 886
- Pullen v. State, 2016 OK CR 18, I 13, 387 P.3d 922, 927