William Hunter Magness v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2017-171

Filed: Nov. 21, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

William Hunter Magness appealed his conviction for First Degree Child-Abuse Murder. His conviction and sentence was life imprisonment. Judge Hudson dissented. Magness was found guilty of hurting his 22-month-old son, T.G. He watched the child while the boy's mother had custody. On November 11, 2013, after returning T.G. from a babysitter, Magness called for help because T.G. was in serious distress and was later pronounced dead at the hospital. Medical experts determined that T.G. died from a severe brain injury caused by blunt force trauma, and the evidence suggested these injuries were not accidental. Magness argued that the evidence did not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and claimed he didn’t get a fair trial because the court didn’t allow certain evidence and failed to assist in providing adequate defense tools. The court reviewed all the evidence and claims made by Magness but ultimately found no abuse of discretion and upheld the conviction, stating that reasonable jurors could conclude he was guilty. Thus, his appeal was denied and the original ruling was affirmed.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Okfuskee County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• Was the evidence sufficient to prove all the elements of First Degree Child Abuse Murder beyond a reasonable doubt?
• Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to provide the appellant with the necessary tools to mount an adequate defense?
• Did the trial court commit reversible error by precluding the admission of the appellant's statement to the OSBI agent?
• Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing an investigator from the Department of Human Services to give improper opinion testimony?
• Was the appellant deprived of a fair trial due to pervasive prosecutorial misconduct?
• Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting prejudicial other crimes evidence and failing to instruct the jury on its limited use?
• Did multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel deprive the appellant of his constitutional rights?

Findings

• the court did not err, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for First Degree Child Abuse Murder
• the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the requests for a continuance and for a finding of indigency
• the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit Appellant’s statement to OSBI Agent Kurt Titsworth
• the trial court did not commit reversible error by allowing improper opinion testimony from Michelle Scott
• the prosecutor's conduct did not deprive Appellant of a fair trial due to purported misconduct
• the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission of evidence of other crimes
• Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were denied

F-2017-171

Nov. 21, 2019

William Hunter Magness

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

JOHN D. HADDEN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE: Appellant, William Hunter Magness, was convicted by a jury in Okfuskee County District Court, Case No. CF-2015-10, of First Degree Child-Abuse Murder. On February 22, 2017, the Honorable Lawrence W. Parish, District Judge, sentenced him to life imprisonment, in accordance with the jury’s recommendation. This appeal followed. Appellant raises seven propositions of error:

PROPOSITION I. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF FIRST DEGREE CHILD ABUSE MURDER BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, RESULTING IN A VIOLATION OF MR. MAGNESS’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE II, §§ 7 AND 20 OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION.

PROPOSITION II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO ENSURE MR. MAGNESS WAS PROVIDED WITH THE NECESSARY TOOLS TO MOUNT AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE II §§ 7 AND 20 OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION.

PROPOSITION III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY PRECLUDING THE ADMISSION OF APPELLANT’S STATEMENT TO OSBI AGENT KURT TITSWORTH IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE II, §§ 7 AND 20 OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION.

PROPOSITION IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY PERMITTING MICHELLE SCOTT, AN INVESTIGATOR FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, TO GIVE IRRELEVANT AND IMPROPER OPINION TESTIMONY IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE II, §§ 7 AND 20 OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION.

PROPOSITION V. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL BY PERVASIVE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE II, §§ 7 AND 20 OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION.

PROPOSITION VI. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE ADMISSION OF PREJUDICIAL OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE AND EXACERBATED THE ERROR BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LIMITED USE OF THIS EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF MR. MAGNESS’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE II, §§ 7 AND 20 OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION.

PROPOSITION VII. MULTIPLE INSTANCES OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE DEPRIVED MR. MAGNESS OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE II, §§ 7 AND 20 OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION.

After thorough consideration of the propositions, and the entire record before us on appeal, including the original record, transcripts, and briefs of the parties, we deny Appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing, and affirm his conviction and sentence.

FACTS

Appellant was convicted of using unlawful and fatal force on his 22-month-old son, T.G., on the evening of November 11, 2013. Appellant and the child’s mother, Danielle Grice, were not in a relationship at the time; she had custody of T.G. Appellant lived alone in Wetumka. Appellant agreed to watch T.G. for several days beginning Friday, November 8. Because Appellant had to travel out of town for his job on Monday, November 11, he arranged for a friend, Lakin Shannon, to watch T.G. that day. T.G. accompanied Shannon and her family on several outings during that day. Several witnesses noticed a bruise across T.G.’s nose at the time. Appellant told witnesses he accidentally injured the child the preceding Friday, causing a doorknob to hit the child in the face. T.G. was also suffering from some congestion. Other than the nose bruise and congestion, no one noticed anything particularly unusual about T.G.’s behavior; they described him playing and eating normally.

On Monday evening, Lakin Shannon and her husband returned T.G. to Appellant’s home. About two hours later, Appellant called his father and said T.G. was in distress; Appellant’s stepmother called 911. Two local ambulances responded to Appellant’s home. Many injuries were immediately apparent on the child, including a dilated pupil, bruises on the face and body, and a bruise on the tip of the child’s penis. Paramedic Lonnie Ramirez documented these injuries in a contemporaneous report and photographed some of them. A second paramedic also noticed bruises to T.G.’s face and penis before he began medical intervention at the scene. T.G. was transported to a local hospital, and later transferred to a Tulsa facility for more specialized treatment. Sadly, T.G.’s condition did not improve, and he was removed from life support a few days later. The cause of death was a large subdural hematoma on the back of the head, which caused severe brain swelling. T.G.’s mother testified that when she arrived at the hospital to see her son, the first thing Appellant did was hug her and apologize for hurting the boy. Later, she asked Appellant how the child received so many injuries. According to Grice, Appellant offered various theories: One theory was that [T.G.] was kicked by a horse. He told me that [T.G.] was playing roughly with an 8-year-old boy, he told me that [T.G.] was hit by the door, he told me that [T.G.] had been hit in the – or fell into the windowsill. And then, he also told me that [T.G.] was at the babysitter and that the babysitter could have possibly [done] it.

Given the nature of T.G.’s injuries, medical personnel suspected child abuse. Appellant was interviewed by an agent from the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, as well as an investigator from the Department of Human Services. The account Appellant gave to these investigators was largely consistent with his testimony at trial. Appellant maintained that T.G. woke from his sleep on Monday night in an agitated state and had a seizure of some sort as Appellant escorted him into the kitchen to get a drink. Appellant said that, other than the accidental nose bruise from the preceding Friday, he saw no bruises on T.G. after the Shannons returned the child to him. Both parties presented extensive medical expert testimony. All experts agreed that T.G. suffered blunt force trauma to the head, which was the proximate cause of his death. The State’s theory was that T.G.’s bruises and fatal head injury were not accidental, but were inflicted intentionally by Appellant on the evening of Monday, November 11, after the Shannons returned the child to him. The State’s experts concluded it was extremely unlikely that a child suffering from a subdural hematoma the size of T.G.’s would not have shown symptoms almost immediately. In other words, they believed it was highly unlikely that T.G. could have sustained the head injury a few days, or even more than a couple of hours, before 911 was called around 10:00 p.m. on November 11. The defense experts disagreed, contending it was entirely possible for a child to sustain a head injury hours, if not days, before symptoms surfaced and life-threatening consequences manifested themselves. The defense also theorized that T.G. was not, in fact, acting normally, as evidenced by the fact that, according to Appellant’s father, the child vomited up phlegm and food during a visit on November 9, two days before his collapse. Much testimony was given about T.G.’s retinal hemorrhages, elevated liver-enzyme levels, white-blood-cell count, and other test results, and whether those indices were necessarily influenced by head trauma, or could simply have been caused by the child’s ear infection and mild pneumonia.

As for the bruises to T.G.’s body, the State alleged that these, too, were intentionally inflicted shortly before the 911 call, and that their appearance in the same short time frame as the child’s collapse only reinforced the inference that these injuries were not accidental. Besides eyewitness testimony that no bruises (except the one across T.G.’s nose) were present before the child was returned to Appellant, the State’s medical experts explained that these bruises were generally to soft tissues, not knees and elbows where children sustain accidental bruises. Perhaps most peculiar was the bruise to T.G.’s penis. The State’s medical experts and child-abuse investigator testified that such an injury was rarely seen, and sometimes linked to attempts to potty-train a child. The defense raised the possibility that T.G. might have bruised easily (and accidentally) due to any number of blood disorders. However, no evidence was presented that T.G. actually suffered from such a disorder.

Additional facts will be related as relevant to the propositions of error.

DISCUSSION

In Proposition I, Appellant claims that given all of the evidence, no rational juror could have concluded that the only reasonable explanation for T.G.’s fatal injury was intentional, blunt-force trauma, caused by Appellant himself, in the two-hour period after the Shannons brought the child back to him. This Court reviews the totality of evidence to determine if a rational juror could find each element of the offense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). To be clear, the standard is whether a rational juror could make that determination – not whether an alternative result was theoretically possible. Appellate courts must be careful not to substitute their own assessment of the facts for sound choices made by competent and fair juries.

The evidence is detailed above. Both sides presented considerable medical testimony. All experts agreed that T.G.’s hematoma was large, serious, and caused by blunt force trauma. When that trauma was likely to have occurred, and whether it was likely to have been accidental, were the only issues in dispute. The experts agreed that no other conditions (ear infection, mild pneumonia) contributed to the child’s death.

Appellant’s conduct after the 911 call is also concerning. According to the child’s mother, Appellant told her he was sorry and suggested that the injuries were his fault. He later offered other explanations. Appellant left the hospital to be alone in the woods as the child was removed from life support. The jury could reasonably infer that this conduct was at least somewhat peculiar.

A rational juror could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was guilty as charged. Proposition I is denied.

In Proposition II, Appellant claims he was denied the basic tools of an adequate defense by the trial court’s refusal to either (1) grant a continuance, so that he could earn additional money for transcripts and experts, or (2) declare him indigent, and allocate court funds for those purposes. These decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

A defendant who can establish his indigency is entitled to public funds for the basic tools of a defense. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). A mistrial transcript may qualify as a basic tool.

We find no abuse of discretion here as the trial court was not presented with sufficient information about Appellant’s finances, and the decisions to not grant a continuance or declare him indigent were reasonable.

Proposition II is therefore denied.

In Proposition III, Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to introduce, into evidence, a videotape recording of his interview with OSBI Agent Kurt Titsworth. Less than an hour after T.G. died, OSBI Agent Kurt Titsworth interviewed Appellant in a non-custodial setting.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the video. Proposition III is denied.

In Proposition IV, Appellant complains that Michelle Scott, an investigator with the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, gave improper opinions of his guilt. We review admission of this opinion evidence for an abuse of discretion.

Considering the totality of the evidence, there is no reasonable probability that Scott’s opinion affected the outcome of the trial. Proposition IV is therefore denied.

In Proposition V, Appellant alleges various instances of misconduct by the prosecutor. Some of these instances were objected to, but most were not.

We conclude that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s questions and comments did not deprive Appellant of a fair trial. Proposition V is denied.

In Proposition VI, Appellant complains about the introduction of evidence concerning an ankle injury T.G. sustained about a year before his death.

We find no abuse of discretion here, as Appellant opened the door by highlighting the importance of sentinel injuries. Proposition VI is denied.

In Proposition VII, Appellant claims his trial attorneys provided ineffective assistance. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, Appellant must demonstrate not only that counsel’s performance was deficient, but also a reasonable probability that counsel’s performance caused prejudice.

None of Appellant’s record-based claims of ineffective counsel have merit.

Proposition VII is therefore denied.

APPLICATION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Claims is DENIED.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Okfuskee County is AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

1. 1 Appellant must serve 85% of his sentence before parole eligibility. 21 O.S.2011, § 13.1(1).
2. 2 Appellant said that he was carrying bags of groceries into his home and, with his hands full, he kicked the front door open, unaware that T.G. was standing behind the door.
3. 3 The autopsy confirmed that T.G. had an inner-ear infection. He also had mild pneumonia, possibly caused by being on a hospital ventilator.
4. 4 To counter the notion that T.G. might have suffered from a condition that caused him to bruise easily, the State's experts pointed out that the child exhibited no bruising around his shin, where paramedics had inserted a large intraosseous needle. The State's rebuttal expert, Dr. Block, testified that "[blood disorders] may be factors in bruising, but they are not factors in a case where a child who's been perfectly well and perfectly normal and makes it to 22 months and then suddenly has got a trauma and collapse[s]."
5. 5 The defense speculated that the "doorknob incident" may have been an accidental cause of the hematoma. Besides the fact that there was no evidence that T.G. hit the back of his head (the location of the hematoma) in that incident, that scenario also does not explain the other bruises to the child's body. Defense expert Dr. Shuman did not believe the doorknob incident was likely to have caused the hematoma, or that a blood disorder caused the bruising. He also agreed that the penis bruise was troubling.
6. 6 The hearings on these matters do not reveal why trial counsel needed the entire transcript of the second trial, or why additional funds were needed for experts. A transcription of voir dire, and the testimony of most of the fact witnesses, would presumably have been unnecessary; the focus was on the experts' opinions. Defense counsel never specified if he needed funds to explore new angles of expert assistance, or simply to bring his original experts back to Oklahoma for another trial.
7. 7 During the first trial, the videotape was introduced by the State and played for the jury, but some jurors had difficulty with the audio quality. The State chose not to present the video at the second and third trials.
8. 8 The prosecutor did occasionally object to defense counsel's cross-examination, but these objections did not go to the content of what Titsworth or Appellant said in the interview.
9. 9 As Professor Wigmore observes: [The opinion rule] does not exclude any specific class of witnesses or all testimony on a specific subject. It simply endeavors to save time and avoid confusing testimony by telling the witness: "The tribunal is in possession of the same materials of information on this subject as yourself; thus, as you can add nothing to our materials for judgment, your further testimony is unnecessary, and merely cumbers the proceedings." VII Wigmore, Evidence § 1918 (Chabourn rev. 1978) at 11.
10. 10 In closing, defense counsel said: Now, what else did we talk about during opening and voir dire? I believe I told you that this was a quick decision as to child abuse and that it was Hunter Magness right off the bat. We heard from Dr. Wallace, she made that decision pretty quick. She gathered a little bit of information from Dani Grice, Tuff's mom, and her boyfriend, I think. She had a conversation with Agent Titsworth before Hunter ever made it to Agent Titsworth's interview.
11. 11 Also, Dr. Dehnel downplayed the issue; in his experience as a pediatrician and "as indicated in the literature," foot injuries are quite common in toddlers.
12. 12 Appellant's alternative request to file some of this material pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 3.11(A) is moot, since we find all of the material is properly submitted as part of his ineffective-counsel claim pursuant to Rule 3.11(B).
13. 13 Ramirez pled guilty to larceny of a controlled substance in 2016.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 13.1 (2011) - Parole eligibility
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2801 (2011) - Hearsay exceptions
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2107 (2011) - Rule of Completeness
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2701 (2011) - Admissibility of expert testimony
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2608 (2011) - Impeachment by evidence of misconduct
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2612 (2011) - Refreshing recollection of witnesses
• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 (2011) - Child abuse murder

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

No case citations found.