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F-2017-1306

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Rebecca Faith Clark v State Of Oklahoma

F-2017-1306

Filed: Oct. 24, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: Rebecca Faith Clark

Summary

Rebecca Faith Clark appealed her conviction for four counts of Child Abuse by Injury and one count of First Degree Child Abuse Murder. The court upheld her conviction and sentence, which included life imprisonment for the child abuse charges and life without the possibility of parole for the murder charge. In her appeal, Clark argued that her lawyer had a conflict of interest because he represented both her and her husband, who was also charged. However, the court found that both Clark and her husband knowingly chose to have the same lawyer and that this decision did not harm her case. The appeals court concluded that her lawyer did not fail to protect her rights during the trial. In the dissenting opinion, one judge agreed with the majority on the conviction but raised concerns about some legal procedures regarding joint representation and the handling of supplementary evidence. Overall, the court affirmed Clark's conviction and emphasized the importance of the evidence presented during the trial.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED. The Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Grounds is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to a conflict of interest arising from the joint representation of the Appellant and her co-defendant?
  • Did the admission of the co-defendant's out-of-court statements violate the Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against her?
  • Was there prejudice from the admission of State's Exhibit 6, which purportedly contained inadmissible evidence?
  • Was the Appellant denied effective assistance of counsel due to failure to adequately cross-examine key witnesses and utilize evidence?
  • Did cumulative error warrant a new trial or modification of the Appellant's sentence?

Findings

  • the court did not err in the joint representation of appellant and her co-defendant
  • the admission of co-defendant's statements did not violate appellant's confrontation rights
  • any error in admitting certain statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
  • appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel
  • appellant's cumulative error claim is without merit
  • the judgment and sentence is affirmed
  • the application for evidentiary hearing on Sixth Amendment grounds is denied

F-2017-1306

Oct. 24, 2019

Rebecca Faith Clark

Appellant

v

State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

LUMPKIN, JUDGE:

Appellant Rebecca Faith Clark was tried by jury and convicted of four counts of Child Abuse by Injury (Counts I-IV) (21 O.S.Supp.2002, § 843.5(A)) and one count of First Degree Child Abuse Murder (Count V) (21 O.S.2001, § 701.7(C), Case No. CF-2017-460 in the District Court of Pontotoc County. The jury recommended as punishment life imprisonment in each of Counts I-IV and a five thousand dollar ($5,000.00) fine, and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in Count V. The trial court sentenced Appellant according to the jury’s recommendations on imprisonment but rejected the recommendation for a fine. The sentences in Counts I-IV were ordered to be served concurrent to each other but consecutive to the sentence in Count V. It is from this judgment and sentence that Appellant appeals.

Colton Clark and his older brother T.J.S. lived with Appellant and her husband/co-defendant James Rex Clark in rural Seminole County. The boys had been removed from the custody of their alcohol and drug-addicted biological parents and placed with Appellant and the co-defendant, who was the boys’ biological uncle, in the fall of 2003. T.J.S. was nine (9) years old and Colton was seven (7) years old. Approximately one year later, Appellant and the co-defendant (also referred to as Appellants) adopted the boys.

In April 2006, the Appellants reported Colton missing. An extensive search for Colton was conducted. Local law enforcement responded as well as representatives from the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hundreds of people searched the area on foot, horseback, and in vehicles. Bloodhounds, search and rescue dogs, and cadaver dogs were brought in. Helicopter, penetrating radar, and drones searched the area around the Appellants’ home. No sign of Colton was ever found. The search was called off and the case went cold.

When the search for Colton died down, the Appellants took T.J.S. to previously scheduled counseling sessions. During one visit, the therapist noticed that T.J.S. had black and swollen eyes and appeared fearful of the co-defendant. The co-defendant was overheard to tell T.J.S. it was his fault that Colton had disappeared and that he was the only person willing to take care of T.J.S. He told T.J.S. he was to tell the therapist that he blackened his own eyes by pressing his thumbs into them. The co-defendant denied harming T.J.S. The comments and conduct of T.J.S. and the co-defendant caused the therapist great concern, and she recommended in-patient treatment for T.J.S. because of his unsupportive home environment.

In September 2006, T.J.S. ran away from the Appellants’ home. Approximately one week later, T.J.S. was found by the sheriff at a local trailer park. The sheriff had received a report that T.J.S. may have broken into a neighbor’s home. The Appellants had not reported T.J.S. as missing. T.J.S. told the sheriff he did not want to go back to the Appellants’ home because he did not know what had happened to his brother and feared something bad was going to happen to him. When Appellant was notified that T.J.S. was in the sheriff’s custody, she told the sheriff to just keep him. T.J.S. was eventually placed in a foster home and ultimately adopted. His new family moved to Spain and then to Tennessee where T.J.S. graduated from high school and went to college on a baseball scholarship. He graduated from college and started his own business.

In 2015, he read an article on the internet about his brother’s case and decided it was time to call the Seminole County authorities and tell them about his life with the Appellants and what he thought had happened to his brother. As a result of T.J.S.’s information and further investigation, Colton’s case was reopened. In 2017, a search warrant was executed for the Appellants’ home and property. Investigators thought it odd that the Appellants referred to Colton in the past tense. The co-defendant spontaneously stated to one of the investigators, you didn’t find anything out at my place, did you? When the investigator responded that they had not found Colton but had found other things, the co-defendant smirked and said, [y]ou’re never going to find him.

The Appellants were eventually charged and tried on four (4) counts of child abuse by injury (two (2) counts for each boy) and the first degree murder of Colton. The description T.J.S. gave at trial of the life he and his brother shared while living with the Appellants was grim. T.J.S. testified that when he and his brother first went to the Appellants’ home in 2003 as foster children, they were treated well and he and his brother were happy to live on the Appellants’ farm where there were ponds, fishing, animals, and space to run around. Both boys were enrolled in and attended the local school. While they were behind academically, there were no reports of any serious disciplinary or behavior problems. In December 2004, after the Appellants had adopted them, the boys were withdrawn from school. The Appellants indicated they wanted to home school the boys. The boys were provided a desk, a math book, and reading plans. However, any schoolwork they were to do soon fell to the side as they were directed by the Appellants to give their primary attention to chores around the house and farm.

T.J.S. testified that at some point during 2005, the Appellants’ attitudes toward him and his brother changed. The Appellants routinely accused the boys of stealing things from around the house. When they denied the accusations, the boys were beaten with belts. The boys were accused of having deviant sexual thoughts regarding each other and the Appellants. They were accused of sexually molesting each other and animals on the property. They were ordered to write these thoughts down in a journal. When the boys denied having any inappropriate sexual thoughts or conduct, and refused to write so in their journals, they were beaten. The beatings, which usually took place in the Appellants’ bedroom, became more violent over time and included slapping, kicking, and punching, and progressed to the use of a broom, bamboo sticks, cattle prod, pocketknife, and other implements around the house and farm. T.J.S. described Appellant as an open-handed hitter while the co-defendant usually punched the boys in the face and stomach or hit them with objects. T.J.S. said the Appellants routinely cursed at them and called them perverts.

T.J.S. testified the Appellants isolated them from other family members and neighbors. T.J.S. recalled that one evening in March 2006, they were eating dinner when Colton was accused of stealing a ring from Appellant. Colton denied taking the ring and argued with the co-defendant for a minute or two before he was snatched up and taken to the Appellants’ bedroom. As he finished his dinner, T.J.S. could hear the Appellants yelling and cursing at Colton and Colton screaming as he was hit. When T.J.S. had cleaned up the dishes, he went to the Appellants’ bedroom, as he did every night, to ask if they needed him to do anything else before he went to bed. Standing at the bedroom door, he saw Appellant slap Colton and observed that Colton’s face was already discolored and bruised and Colton was crying hysterically. Knowing he could do nothing for Colton, T.J.S. went to bed.

At approximately 2:30 a.m., T.J.S. woke up to go to the bathroom. When he walked by the living room, he saw Colton lying on the sofa, covered in a green sleeping bag. Colton’s eyes were closed, his face was bruised, and there was blood around his ears and nose. The cartoon SpongeBob SquarePants was on the television. Thinking Colton had fallen asleep, T.J.S. walked past him and went back to bed. T.J.S. woke up again at approximately 5:15 a.m. for his morning chores. When he walked through the living room, Colton was no longer on the sofa. The co-defendant was standing in the kitchen, dressed, with his boots and coat on. This was odd as he was usually not dressed for the day at that early hour. T.J.S. asked the co-defendant where Colton was and was told he did not know and he should go look outside or ask Appellant. T.J.S. went to the Appellant’s bedroom, found her awake and dressed, which again was unusual for her at that early hour. Appellant said she did not know where Colton was and that T.J.S. should ask the co-defendant. Thinking that Colton had gone outside to start their morning chores, T.J.S. dressed to go outside and look for him. As he left the house, he noticed that Colton’s coat and boots were by the door, items Colton would have needed if he had gone outside.

T.J.S. checked all over the property for Colton and could not find him. He implored the Appellants to call the police. They refused and told T.J.S. not to tell anyone that Colton was gone or they would kill him. When T.J.S. insisted on calling the police, the co-defendant knocked him down and kicked him in the ribs. He told T.J.S. to stay inside the house unless he was doing chores so none of the neighbors would notice there was only one boy at the house. Appellants also told T.J.S. that if anyone asked about Colton he was to say that Colton had either run away or been kidnapped by his biological father. Fearful of the Appellants, T.J.S. did as he was told.

What seemed to T.J.S. to be three to four weeks later, a child welfare investigator from the Department of Human Services, Ms. Harge, came to the Appellants’ home inquiring about the welfare of the boys. The Appellants told T.J.S. to say that Colton was at his grandmother’s house helping to fix a goat pen. T.J.S. did as he was told and in the presence of the Appellants, told Ms. Harge that he and his brother were fine. Ms. Harge scheduled a return visit and told the Appellants that Colton needed to be there for her to talk with him. During the next few days, the Appellants rehearsed a story for T.J.S. to tell Ms. Harge upon her return. He was to say that Colton either ran away as they were getting ready for a counseling appointment or their biological father kidnapped him. On the date of the return visit by Ms. Harge, Colton was not there. T.J.S. told Ms. Harge that Colton had run away. When Ms. Harge asked Appellant about Colton, she said they were looking for him. When Appellant asked Ms. Harge what they should do, she replied that they should call the police if he did not return home within a few hours. The police were called later that night and Colton was reported missing.

A possible clue as to what happened to Colton came in 2013 when the Appellants had a storm shelter installed on their property. Mr. Lehman recalled that while installing the shelter, he overheard the co-defendant cursing at Appellant, and saying that if anyone came on his property he would shoot them. As Mr. Lehman’s employee would need to make a return visit to the property to finish the install, he told the co-defendant not to shoot him. The co-defendant replied that if he shot him he would know what to do with the body. The co-defendant said he would put the body in a barrel, cook it, and feed it to his dogs. Whatever was left, he would throw in the river. The co-defendant commented that he had done worse.

The Appellant testified at trial; her co-defendant did not. Appellant claimed the boys were extremely troubled when she and the co-defendant adopted them. She denied that they ever beat the boys and denied seeing any scars on them. She claimed that any injuries or scars the boys may have had were caused by the boys themselves. She claimed that they acted out in sexually inappropriate ways, including wanting to have sex with her and with animals, and that they were afraid of people of color. She explained that the co-defendant’s derogatory references to the boys were him just venting.

Further facts will be set forth as necessary. In Proposition I, Appellant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise her that his joint representation of her and the co-defendant would cause an unwaivable conflict of interest. Joint representation of co-defendants is not a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantee. Williams U. State, 1987 OK CR 77 II, 5, 736 P.2d 536, 537 (citing Holloway U. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)). In some cases, certain advantages might accrue from joint representation because a common defense often gives strength against a common attack. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-483 (internal quotations omitted).

Prejudice is presumed only where the trial court fails to conduct an inquiry after a timely conflict objection has been made. Williams, 1987 OK CR 77 II, 5, 736 P.2d at 537. Where no objection was raised, the appellant must demonstrate an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance. Id., (citing Cuyler U. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). See also Ross U. State, 1992 OK CR 18, II 6, 829 P.2d 58, 61. Counsel cannot be effective if conflicts of interest, no matter how subtle, dull the zeal of undivided loyalty. However, the mere appearance or possibility of a conflict of interest is not sufficient to cause reversal. Rutan U. State, 2009 OK CR 3, I 67, 202 P.3d 839, 852-3 (quoting Banks U. State, 1991 OK CR 51, II 34, 810 P.2d 1286, 1296). An actual conflict of interest means a conflict that affected counsel’s performance – as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. Mickens U. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002).

The record in the present case shows that trial counsel represented both Appellant and her co-defendant from the inception of the case to sentencing. No objections to counsel’s joint representation were raised. Approximately one month before the start of trial, the court inquired about the joint representation, concerned about any potential inconsistent or antagonistic defenses. Defense counsel informed the court that based upon his investigation and conversation with both defendants, the defenses were not antagonistic toward each defendant but were identical. Counsel further informed the court that he told the Appellants that this was their opportunity to let him and the court know if they wanted separate counsel. Counsel said that both defendants had informed him they were satisfied with his joint representation and wanted him to continue to represent them.

The trial court then inquired of both defendants whether counsel’s statements were correct that there were no statements by one defendant incriminating the other and whether they believed their defenses were incompatible or in conflict with each other. Appellant indicated she understood what the court was saying, that their defenses were not inconsistent, and they wanted the same attorney. The co-defendant also indicated he had no objection to counsel’s joint representation. When asked specifically whether they had any problems with counsel representing the both of them, both Appellant and the co-defendant replied in the negative. Appellant added that they were staying with the agreement that we made to represent both of us. In the face of this record, Appellant submits a signed affidavit as part of her Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Grounds stating that she never discussed the potential pitfalls of joint representation with counsel (Exhibit A).

Appellant also includes an affidavit from Laura Giblin, Investigator with the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, stating she requested any waivers for joint representation that trial counsel had in his possession, but none were ever provided. (Exhibit B). These ex parte affidavits, merely by reason of their filing, are not properly a part of the appellate record for our consideration. Dewberry U. State, 1998 OK CR 10, II, 9, 954 P.2d 774, 776. Under our court rules, supplementation of the record with extra record ex parte material is strictly limited and is not allowable at this juncture of the case, except to be considered in determining whether a sufficient showing has been made to remand for an evidentiary hearing. See Rules 3.11(A) and/or Rule 3.11(B), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019). See also Coddington U. State, 2011 OK CR 17, II 20, 254 P.3d 684, 698.

As evident from the record, Appellant raised no objection to counsel’s joint representation. In fact, she made it very clear that she and her husband would have the same attorney as they were responding as one to the charges against them. Appellant’s after the fact apparent change of heart is not sufficient for us to presume prejudice. Appellant must therefore demonstrate an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance.

That actual conflict, according to Appellant, arises from the admission of out-of-court statements made by the co-defendant without any objection from counsel, without counsel being able to cross-examine the co-defendant, and without any limiting instruction given to the jury. This Bruton violation, argues Appellant, created a conflict of interest that denied her the effective assistance of counsel.

In Bruton U. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the Supreme Court held that an accused’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right to confront the witnesses against him is violated when the out-of-court statements of a non-testifying co-defendant which implicate the defendant are introduced at trial. The Supreme Court subsequently decided Crawford U. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). In Crawford, the Court drew a distinction between out-of-court hearsay statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial. The Supreme Court discussed at least three types of testimonial hearsay statements subject to confrontation and concluded that [w]hatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. The Court found the Sixth Amendment precluded the admission of out-of-court statements that are testimonial, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

Under Crawford and its progeny, the test for determining whether the admission of an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted violates the Confrontation Clause focuses on whether the statement was testimonial or non-testimonial. The narrow Bruton rule, like the Confrontation Clause upon which it is premised, does not apply to non-testimonial hearsay statements.

The specific statements which Appellant relies upon to support her claim of an actual conflict of interest are discussed in a plain error review in Proposition II. It is sufficient at this point for us to say that except for the statements contained in Defense Exhibit B, statements made by the co-defendant as part of the 2005 sexual abuse allegations, none of the challenged statements were testimonial in nature. Therefore, Bruton has no application to Appellant’s case and her claim of actual conflict based on a Bruton violation affords her no relief.

The error in admitting the statements in Defense Exhibit B is discussed in Proposition II. However, as this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not support Appellant’s claim that counsel acted under a conflict of interest which adversely affected his performance. Having thoroughly reviewed Appellant’s argument, we find she has failed to show that defense counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel by trial counsel’s joint representation of both Appellant and her co-defendant. This proposition is denied.

In Proposition II, Appellant argues that admission of the co-defendant’s statements to Mr. Lehman, Chief Hanson, Mr. Timm, in Defense Exhibit B, and to Sheriff Craig were irrelevant, prejudicial, and a violation of her Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against her under Bruton U. United States. As no objections were made to the admission of the challenged statements, our review is for plain error.

Under the test set forth in Simpson U. State, 1994 OK CR 40, II 10, 26, 30, 876 P.2d 690, 694, 699, 701, this Court determines whether the appellant has shown an actual error, which is plain or obvious, and which affects his or her substantial rights. This Court will only correct plain error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice.

In Proposition I, we generally found the challenged statements, except for those in Defense Exhibit B, were not prohibited by the Confrontation Clause, and their admission did not support Appellant’s claim that counsel actively represented conflicting interests. We now address the challenged statements in detail.

The co-defendant’s statements to Mr. Lehman concerning shooting anyone who came on his property and disposing of the body were made spontaneously as Mr. Lehman installed a storm shelter on the Appellants’ property in 2013. Those statements, along with testimony that the co-defendant disagreed with Appellant about where to locate the storm shelter and cursed and shouted profanities at her, do not fall into the category of testimonial statements whose admission is prohibited by Crawford and Bruton.

The co-defendant’s statements to Chief Hanson, who at the time of the statements was an investigator with the Seminole County Sheriff’s office, were made during the execution of a search warrant for the Appellants’ property in 2017. Hansen testified that the co-defendant smirked at him and said, you didn’t find anything at my place did you? Hanson testified the co-defendant was not being interrogated at the time, and that he was even surprised that the co-defendant spoke to him. These statements do not fall into the category of testimonial statements whose admission is prohibited by Crawford and Bruton.

The testimony of Physician Assistant Roger Timme, admitted by stipulation, was that the witness had seen the co-defendant at a March 2006 appointment at the Veteran’s Administration Hospital. At that time, the co-defendant was very upset with his adopted sons and talked for 10-15 minutes about them in very derogatory and vulgar terms. The co-defendant accused the boys of stealing money and jewelry from him, said that he had to take the boys out of school because they were acting in sexually inappropriate ways, and that if he ever caught them in his bedroom he would kill them.

Additionally, the co-defendant said that if they were going to look for Colton, they should look on his grandparents’ property, and again said that he would kill the boys if they ever hurt him or his wife. None of these statements meet the requirement of testimonial statements.

Ms. Wellman was a therapist who worked with abused children. She began working with T.J.S. in June of 2006, after Colton’s murder/disappearance. Ms. Wellman testified she heard the co-defendant tell T.J.S. that Colton’s disappearance was his fault, that he and the Appellant hated him, that no one loved him, and no one was willing to take care of him. These statements were not testimonial in nature.

Sheriff Craig testified that the co-defendant ran him off his property after the investigation into Colton’s disappearance grew stale, that he cursed at him, and said he did not want to be accused of any wrongdoing any longer. Any statements by the co-defendant were not testimonial in nature.

Defense Exhibit B is a redacted copy of a video of the co-defendant’s interview with law enforcement in 2005 concerning allegations of sexual abuse made against him and others by T.J.S. An investigation was conducted by the Midwest City Police Department into the allegations but no findings of abuse were confirmed and no criminal charges were filed. As the co-defendant’s statements were made during a police interrogation, they meet the requirements of testimonial hearsay under Crawford and are subject to the demands of the Confrontation Clause.

The error in their admission does not require reversal of Appellant’s conviction if we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. None of the statements made by the co-defendant to the Midwest City Police incriminated Appellant in any of the sexual or physical abuse allegations made by T.J.S.

The 2005 investigation into the sexual abuse allegations made by T.J.S. is unrelated to the 2017 prosecutions for murder and physical abuse. T.J.S. provided extensive details of the abuse he and his brother suffered at the hands of the Appellants.

After thoroughly reviewing the record, and Appellant’s allegations of ineffectiveness, we have considered counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the case as viewed at the time and have asked if the conduct was professionally unreasonable and, if so, whether the error affected the jury’s judgment.

Having thoroughly reviewed Appellant’s argument, we find she has failed to show that defense counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Appellant has thus failed to meet her burden of showing a reasonable probability that, but for any unprofessional errors by counsel, the result of the trial would have been different as any errors or omissions by counsel did not influence the jury’s determination of guilt or sentencing recommendation. Accordingly, we find that Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and this proposition of error is denied.

In Proposition V, Appellant asserts that cumulative error warrants a new trial or a modification of her sentence. A cumulative error argument has no merit when this Court fails to sustain any of the other errors raised by Appellant. Having found no errors warranting reversal or modification, we find relief is not warranted upon a cumulative error argument. This proposition of error is denied.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED. The Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Grounds is DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. 21 O.S.Supp.2002, § 843.5(A)
  2. 21 O.S.2001, § 701.7(C)
  3. Williams U. State, 1987 OK CR 77 II, 5, 736 P.2d 536, 537 (citing Holloway U. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978))
  4. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-483
  5. Williams, 1987 OK CR 77 II, 5, 736 P.2d at 537
  6. Cuyler U. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)
  7. Ross U. State, 1992 OK CR 18, II 6, 829 P.2d 58, 61
  8. Rutan U. State, 2009 OK CR 3, I 67, 202 P.3d 839, 852-3
  9. Mickens U. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002)
  10. Bruton U. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)
  11. Crawford U. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)
  12. Davis U. Washington and Hammon U. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 165 L.Ed.: 2d 224 (2006)
  13. Frederick U. State, 2017 OK CR 12, II 43, 400 P.3d 786, 806
  14. Williamson U. State, 2018 OK CR 15, 422 P.3d 752
  15. Cuesta-Rodriquez U. State, 2010 OK CR 23, II 30, 241 P.3d 214, 227
  16. Marshall U. State, 2010 OK CR 8, II 31, 232 P.3d 467, 476
  17. Mitchell U. State, 2016 OK CR 21, I 29, 387 P.3d 934, 945
  18. Hogan U. State, 2006 OK CR 19, II 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
  19. Thornburg U. State, 1999 OK CR 32, II 10-11, 985 P.2d 1234, 1242
  20. Lott U. State, 2004 OK CR 27, I 166, 98 P.3d 318, 357
  21. Eizember U. State, 2007 OK CR 29, I 155, 164 P.3d 208, 244
  22. Lee U. State, 2018 OK CR 14, II 15, 422 P.3d 782, 786-787
  23. White v. State, 2019 OK CR 2, 437 P.3d 1061, 1073

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 843.5(A) - Child Abuse by Injury
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7(C) - First Degree Child Abuse Murder
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 2803(3) - Hearsay Exceptions
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22, Ch. 18 App. - Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
  • Williams v. State, 1987 OK CR 77 II, 5, 736 P.2d 536, 537
  • Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)
  • Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)
  • Ross v. State, 1992 OK CR 18, II 6, 829 P.2d 58, 61
  • Rutan v. State, 2009 OK CR 3, I 67, 202 P.3d 839, 852-3
  • Banks v. State, 1991 OK CR 51, II 34, 810 P.2d 1286, 1296
  • Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002)
  • Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)
  • Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)
  • Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 165 L.Ed. 2d 224 (2006)
  • U.S. v. Clark, 717 F.3d 790 (10th Cir. 2013)
  • Frederick v. State, 2017 OK CR 12, II 43, 400 P.3d 786, 806
  • Williamson v. State, 2018 OK CR 15, 422 P.3d 752
  • Cuesta-Rodriquez v. State, 2010 OK CR 23, II 30, 241 P.3d 214, 227
  • Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, II 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
  • Jackson v. State, 2016 OK CR 20 5, II 4, 371 P.3d 1120, 1121
  • Levering v. State, 2013 OK CR 19, II 6, 315 P.3d 392, 395
  • Mitchell v. State, 2016 OK CR 21, I 29, 387 P.3d 934, 945
  • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)
  • Lott v. State, 2004 OK CR 27, I 166, 98 P.3d 318, 357
  • Grissom v. State, 2011 OK CR 3, II 81, 253 P.3d 969, 995
  • Eizember v. State, 2007 OK CR 29, I 155, 164 P.3d 208, 244
  • Lee v. State, 2018 OK CR 14, II 15, 422 P.3d 782, 786-787

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