Davis v The State Of Oklahoma
F-2017-1259
Filed: Apr. 4, 2019
Not for publication
Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma
Summary
#Davis appealed his conviction for multiple offenses, including drug possession and driving with a suspended license. Conviction and sentence: ten years for drug possession, one year for drug paraphernalia, and a $200 fine for driving with a suspended license, all served concurrently. #None dissented.
Decision
The order of the District Court of Lincoln County terminating Appellant from Drug Court in Case No. CF-2016-222 is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.
Issues
- Was there an abuse of discretion when the trial court terminated Mr. Davis from the Drug Court program based on a violation that was not willful?
- Did the trial court fail to make the statutorily mandated findings required for terminating Mr. Davis from the Drug Court program?
- Was the termination of Mr. Davis from the Drug Court program an abuse of discretion under the facts of this case?
Findings
- The trial court did not err in terminating Mr. Davis from the Drug Court program based on violations of his contract.
- The trial court did not fail to make statutorily mandated findings regarding Mr. Davis's termination from the Drug Court program.
- The trial court's consideration of sanctions prior to terminating Mr. Davis from the Drug Court program was appropriate and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
F-2017-1259
Apr. 4, 2019
Davis
Appellantv
The State Of Oklahoma
Appellee
v
The State Of Oklahoma
Appellee
SUMMARY OPINION
ROWLAND, JUDGE: On March 13, 2017, Appellant Davis, represented by counsel, entered guilty pleas to Count 1, Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (after former conviction of two or more felonies); Count 2, Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and Count 3, Driving with a Suspended License in Lincoln County Case No. CF-2016-222. Sentencing was deferred pending Davis’s completion of the Pottawatomie County Drug Court Program.
Upon successful completion of Drug Court, Davis’s charges were to be dismissed. If terminated from the program, Davis was to be sentenced as follows: On August 9, 2017, the State filed an Application to Terminate Davis from Drug Court. On November 21, 2017, at the conclusion of the hearing on the State’s application, the Honorable Cynthia Ferrell Ashwood, District Judge, terminated Davis’s Drug Court participation and sentenced him as specified in his plea agreement.
From this judgment and sentence, Davis appeals, raising the following propositions of error:
1. The trial court abused its discretion when it terminated Mr. Davis from the Drug Court program on the basis of a violation that was not willful;
2. The trial court abused its discretion when it terminated Mr. Davis from the Drug Court program in the absence of statutorily mandated findings; and
3. The termination of Mr. Davis from the Drug Court program was an abuse of discretion under the facts of this case and should be reversed.
Davis’s termination from Drug Court participation is AFFIRMED. Count 1 – Ten years Count 2 – One year Count 3 – $200 fine. The sentences were to be served concurrently.
Prior to terminating a defendant from Drug Court, the District Court must find that the offender violated the terms and conditions of the plea agreement or performance contract, and that disciplinary sanctions have been insufficient to gain compliance. See 22 O.S.2011 § 471.7(E); Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, ¶ 11, 990 P.2d 894, 898. The judge is to consider relapses and order increasing sanctions, except when the offender’s conduct requires revocation from the program. Id.; 22 O.S. § 471.7(E). Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court will not reverse a ruling of the District Court terminating a defendant from Drug Court. Hagar, id.
Davis does not dispute that he violated the terms of his Drug Court contract, and admits that the State met its burden in proving those violations by a preponderance of the evidence. Instead, at proposition one he claims that his contract violations were the result of his mental illness. He argues that because his violations were not willful, the trial court’s termination of his participation in Drug Court was an abuse of discretion. Davis concedes that this argument was not presented to the trial court and is subject only to plain error analysis. See Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, ¶ 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923; Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, ¶ 23, 876 P.2d 690, 698.
Testimony at the termination hearing established that during his three month tenure as a Drug Court participant, Davis was sanctioned 23 times, most often for relapses (failed drug tests), and missed calls and appointments. Davis admitted at the hearing that he continued to use drugs and live in a drug environment. However, he claimed that during this time he was unable to secure medication for his mental illness which was the root cause of his failure to comply with his Drug Court terms and for his absconding from the program. Nowhere in the appeal record submitted to this Court does Davis explain or testify to the nature of his mental illness; the basis for the diagnosis or any specifics thereof; what type of medication has been or was prescribed to treat this unspecified illness; how his continued drug use impacts the illness; or any other specifics supporting his mental illness claim. It is incumbent upon Davis to establish with the presentation of credible evidence a causal connection between his mental illness and his failure to comply with his Drug Court contract sufficient to show the court that he should not be terminated from the program. A general claim of mental illness, which is the only evidence presented in this record, is insufficient to establish either that Davis is mentally ill or that it was the cause of his non-compliant behavior.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order terminating Davis’s Drug Court participation. At proposition two, Davis argues that the trial court failed to make statutorily mandated findings as required by this Court’s holding in Hagar. In particular, he claims the trial court did not make a specific finding that intermediate sanctions were insufficient to gain Davis’s compliance so as to warrant his termination from Drug Court. We disagree. Judge Ashwood’s pronouncement from the bench terminating Davis’s Drug Court participation referenced his 23 sanctions, his failure to participate in the program and his absconding from the program as the reasons for his termination. We find no error here.
In his third proposition, Davis argues that Judge Ashwood should have considered further sanctions before terminating Davis from Drug Court. As noted above, the trial court’s actions in terminating a participant from Drug Court are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 22 O.S.2011 § 471.7(E); Hagar, 1999 OK CR 35, ¶ 11, 990 P.2d at 898. There is no evidence, and Davis presents none, that the court failed to consider his relapses, progressive sanctions, and the insufficiency of those sanctions. Based upon the record presented for review, we find no evidence that Judge Ashwood did not properly consider the imposition of additional sanctions prior to terminating Davis’s Drug Court participation.
DECISION
The order of the District Court of Lincoln County terminating Appellant from Drug Court in Case No. CF-2016-222 is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.
Footnotes:
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.7(E)
- Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, 990 P.2d 894
- Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, 139 P.3d 907
- Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 P.2d 690
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.7(E)
- Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, 990 P.2d 894
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.7(E)
Oklahoma Statutes citations:
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.7 (2011) - Drug Court participation and termination
- Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.7 (2011) - Drug Court participation and termination
Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:
No Oklahoma administrative rules found.
U.S. Code citations:
No US Code citations found.
Other citations:
No other rule citations found.
Case citations:
- Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, I 11, 990 P.2d 894, 898
- Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
- Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, I 23, 876 P.2d 690, 698