Antonio Tiwan Taylor v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2017-1231

Filed: Apr. 18, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Antonio Tiwan Taylor appealed his conviction for two counts of Sexual Abuse of a Child. His conviction and sentence were life imprisonment on both counts, to be served one after the other. Judge Hudson dissented. In this case, Taylor was found guilty of sexually abusing his girlfriend's seven-year-old daughter. The girl testified about the abuse, and the State used letters from Taylor where he seemed to admit the acts. To show that Taylor had a pattern of sexual assaults, a woman named Witness M testified about a past incident in which Taylor raped her, which he had been acquitted of in another trial. Taylor's appeal included several arguments. First, he said that the trial court shouldn't have allowed Witness M's testimony because it was too damaging and not helpful. The court decided that M’s testimony was necessary, and the jury was warned to only use it for limited purposes. Taylor’s objection was dismissed. Secondly, since Witness M did not attend the trial, the court allowed her testimony from a previous hearing to be read instead. Taylor argued that the State didn’t try hard enough to bring her to court, but the court found that the State's efforts were sufficient. Taylor also claimed that because he was found not guilty in the previous case involving Witness M, that evidence should not be used against him in this trial. The court explained that a previous acquittal does not mean he is innocent; it just means there was some doubt about his guilt. Thus, they allowed the evidence. Finally, Taylor said that the combination of the errors made during the trial should lead to a new trial, but since the court found no errors, this claim was also denied. In the end, the court decided to uphold Taylor's convictions and sentences.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• Was there error in the trial court's admission of propensity evidence that was allegedly more prejudicial than probative?
• Did the trial court violate the appellant's right to confront witnesses by declaring the state's propensity evidence witness unavailable and allowing her pretrial testimony to be read before the jury?
• Was the State barred from using the appellant's acquitted conduct as substantive evidence of guilt due to the doctrine of collateral estoppel?
• Did the cumulative effect of trial errors warrant a new trial for the appellant?

Findings

• the court did not err in admitting propensity evidence that was found to be relevant and not prejudicial
• the court did not abuse its discretion in declaring the witness unavailable and allowing prior testimony to be read
• the court did not err in admitting propensity evidence based on principles of collateral estoppel
• there can be no cumulative error if no individual errors were found

F-2017-1231

Apr. 18, 2019

Antonio Tiwan Taylor

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

JOHN D. HADDEN KUEHN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:

Appellant, Antonio Tiwan Taylor, was convicted by a jury in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CF-2015-4412, of two counts of Sexual Abuse of a Child (21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 843.5), After Conviction of Four Felonies. On November 30, 2017, the Honorable Ray C. Elliott, District Judge, sentenced him in accordance with the jury’s verdict to life imprisonment on both counts, with the terms to be served consecutively. This appeal followed.

Appellant raises four propositions of error in support of his appeal:

PROPOSITION I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING PROPENSITY EVIDENCE THAT WAS MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE IN CONTRAVENTION OF HORN V. STATE AND APPELLANT’S FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.

PROPOSITION II. REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DECLARED THE STATE’S PROPENSITY EVIDENCE WITNESS UNAVAILABLE AND ALLOWED A TRANSCRIPT OF HER PROPENSITY HEARING TESTIMONY TO BE READ BEFORE THE JURY IN VIOLATION OF MR. TAYLOR’S RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

PROPOSITION III. THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL BARRED THE STATE FROM USING MR. TAYLOR’S ACQUITTED CONDUCT AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IN THIS CASE IN VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS.

PROPOSITION IV. TRIAL ERRORS, WHEN CONSIDERED IN A CUMULATIVE FASHION, WARRANT A NEW TRIAL.

After thorough consideration of these propositions, the briefs of the parties, and the record on appeal, we affirm. Appellant was convicted of sexually abusing his girlfriend’s seven-year-old daughter in December 2014. The child testified about these acts of abuse. The State also presented letters Appellant had written to the child’s mother, where he appeared to admit and apologize for these acts. Finally, to show Appellant’s propensity to commit sexual assaults, the State presented testimony from a young woman (Witness M) who said that Appellant raped her in December 2011. All claims on appeal involve the testimony of Witness M.

As to Proposition I, the trial court held a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of M’s testimony to show Appellant’s propensity to commit sexual assaults. Defense counsel vigorously cross-examined M about her claims. The trial court made specific findings on M’s credibility, the probative value of her account, and the absence of unfair prejudice to Appellant. Appellant did not renew this objection to these findings at trial, so our review is only for plain error. Appellant must show a plain or obvious deviation from a legal rule which affected his substantial rights. We will only grant relief if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, or otherwise represents a miscarriage of justice. Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, ¶ 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923. We find no error, plain or otherwise. The court’s record on why it found M’s testimony admissible was entirely sufficient. Further, the court repeatedly cautioned the jury on the limited use of this evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony at Appellant’s trial. 12 O.S.2011, §§ 2403, 2413; James v. State, 2009 OK CR 8, ¶ 7, 204 P.3d 793, 796; Horn v. State, 2009 OK CR 7, ¶ 40, 204 P.3d 777, 786. Proposition I is denied.

Witness M did not appear for Appellant’s trial. Over defense objection, the court declared her unavailable and allowed the State to use her testimony at the pretrial admissibility hearing as a substitute. In Proposition II, Appellant makes several complaints about this ruling. First he claims the State did not exercise due diligence in trying to secure M’s presence at trial. The State offered testimony on its efforts in this regard; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that those efforts were sufficient. LaFevers v. State, 1995 OK CR 26, ¶ 27, 897 P.2d 292, 304-05; Cleary v. State, 1997 OK CR 35, ¶ 18, 942 P.2d 736, 744. Next, Appellant claims that M’s testimony at the pretrial hearing was an inadequate substitute for live testimony at trial, because the scope and objectives of the pretrial hearing were different from those at trial. See Thompson v. State, 2007 OK CR 38, ¶¶ 20-26, 169 P.3d 1198, 1205-07. We disagree. The credibility of M’s account was central to both whether the trial court should admit her testimony in the first place under 12 O.S. § 2413, and whether the jury should believe that testimony, as it considered Appellant’s guilt on a different crime. Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined M at the pretrial hearing, trying to impeach her credibility with perceived inconsistencies in her account. Finally, Appellant complains that when he cross-examined M at the pretrial hearing, he did not have the benefit of her testimony in yet another setting, which might have offered additional opportunities for cross-examination. Yet he gives no specifics on the impeachment value of that additional testimony, or how it would have affected the outcome here. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring M unavailable and admitting her prior testimony at this trial. Willis v. State, 2017 OK CR 23, ¶¶ 18-19, 406 P.3d 30, 34-35. Proposition II is denied.

In Proposition III, Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting M’s testimony to show his propensity to commit sexual assault because he had previously been tried and found not guilty of raping M, hence the State was collaterally estopped from using that same evidence in this proceeding. Defense counsel objected to M’s testimony on these grounds at the propensity hearing and renewed his objection at trial, so the issue is preserved for full appellate review. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does include a collateral estoppel component. [W]hen an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). But an acquittal merely signifies the fact-finder’s reasonable doubt as to guilt; it is not a conclusive determination of innocence. The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar situation in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990). In Dowling’s trial for bank robbery, the government offered evidence that he had been involved in an armed home invasion about two weeks after the robbery. But Dowling had already been tried for that home invasion and acquitted. The government claimed the circumstances of the home invasion (particularly the identification of Dowling as one of the intruders) was other crimes evidence, making it more likely that Dowling participated in the bank robbery as well. The trial court admitted the evidence and instructed the jury on its limited evidentiary purpose. 493 U.S. at 344-46, 110 S.Ct. at 670-71. Dowling appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed. It rejected Dowling’s collateral estoppel argument because the ultimate fact to be proven in the bank-robbery trial – whether he took part in the bank robbery – was not decided in the home-invasion trial. The jury’s not-guilty verdict in the home-invasion trial was not even a conclusive determination of Dowling’s innocence in the home invasion; the acquittal simply showed that the jury had a reasonable doubt about his involvement. The jury in Dowling’s subsequent trial for bank robbery was not required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had also committed the home invasion; it was only permitted to use that evidence for a limited purpose, and that purpose did not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as it was not an element of the crime of bank robbery. 493 U.S. at 347-350, 110 S.Ct. at 671-673. In summary, the fact that one jury had a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed Crime A does not bar the State from having a different jury consider the underlying facts supporting Crime A for some other purpose with a standard of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not err in admitting Witness M’s testimony to show Appellant’s propensity to commit sexual assault. Proposition III is denied.

Finally, in Proposition IV, Appellant claims the cumulative effect of the preceding errors warrants relief. Having found no error in the preceding claims, there can be no error by accumulation. Sanders v. State, 2002 OK CR 42, ¶ 17, 60 P.3d 1048, 1051. Proposition IV is therefore denied.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence of the District Court of Oklahoma County is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

1. Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 843.5
2. 12 O.S.2011, §§ 2403, 2413
3. Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923.
4. James v. State, 2009 OK CR 8, I 7, 204 P.3d 793, 796.
5. Horn v. State, 2009 OK CR 7, I 40, 204 P.3d 777, 786.
6. LaFevers v. State, 1995 OK CR 26, I 27, 897 P.2d 292, 304-05.
7. Cleary v. State, 1997 OK CR 35, IT 18, 942 P.2d 736, 744.
8. Thompson v. State, 2007 OK CR 38, §§ 20-26, 169 P.3d 1198, 1205-07.
9. Willis v. State, 2017 OK CR 23, II 18-19, 406 P.3d 30, 34-35.
10. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).
11. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990).
12. Sanders v. State, 2002 OK CR 42, I 17, 60 P.3d 1048, 1051.
13. Smith v. State, 2002 OK CR 2, I 9, 46 P.3d 136, 138.
14. Woodruff v. State, 1993 OK CR 7, 846 P.2d 1124.
15. Ryder v. State, 2004 OK CR 2, I 67, 83 P.3d 856, 872.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 843.5 - Sexual abuse of a child
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2403 - Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time
• Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2413 - Testimony of unavailable witnesses
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 20 - Double Jeopardy; prohibition against twice being put in jeopardy
• Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 41 - Provisions regarding collateral estoppel

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

• Fifth Amendment - Collateral Estoppel

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
• Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19, I 38, 139 P.3d 907, 923
• James v. State, 2009 OK CR 8, I 7, 204 P.3d 793, 796
• Horn v. State, 2009 OK CR 7, I 40, 204 P.3d 777, 786
• LaFevers v. State, 1995 OK CR 26, I 27, 897 P.2d 292, 304-05
• Cleary v. State, 1997 OK CR 35, I T 18, 942 P.2d 736, 744
• Thompson v. State, 2007 OK CR 38, 99 20-26, 169 P.3d 1198, 1205-07
• Willis v. State, 2017 OK CR 23, II 18-19, 406 P.3d 30, 34-35
• Sanders v. State, 2002 OK CR 42, I 17, 60 P.3d 1048, 1051
• Smith v. State, 2002 OK CR 2, I 9, 46 P.3d 136, 138
• Woodruff v. State, 1993 OK CR 7, 846 P.2d 1124
• Ryder v. State, 2004 OK CR 2, I 67, 83 P.3d 856, 872
• Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)
• Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)