Blog

F-2017-1104

  • Post author:
  • Post category:F

Joseph Johnson v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2017-1104

Filed: Apr. 11, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Joseph Johnson appealed his conviction for first degree murder. His conviction and sentence was life imprisonment without parole. Judge Hudson dissented. In this case, Joseph Johnson shot and killed Quavis "Trae" Cato during an argument about a stolen car. Witnesses at the scene testified that Cato was unarmed when Johnson shot him multiple times. Johnson claimed the shooting happened during a heated exchange, and he argued that he acted in self-defense or in the heat of passion. The court reviewed Johnson's claims and decided the trial court was correct to deny instructions on lesser charges like manslaughter. They concluded there was no sufficient evidence that Johnson was provoked into acting in self-defense or that he was justified in using deadly force. The court found that Johnson intentionally killed Cato and fled the scene afterward, which supported his conviction for murder. Overall, the court ruled that Johnson's arguments did not provide enough grounds for overturning the conviction, and they affirmed the sentence.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there an error in the trial court's refusal to provide instructions on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter in the heat of passion?
  • Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser crime of first degree manslaughter while resisting a criminal attempt?
  • Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to request the aforementioned instructions on lesser offenses?
  • Did prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments deprive Appellant of a fair trial?
  • Did trial counsel provide ineffective assistance by failing to present certain evidence and arguments related to self-defense?

Findings

  • the trial court properly denied Appellant's requested instructions on heat of passion manslaughter.
  • no plain or obvious error occurred regarding lack of jury instructions on the lesser crime of manslaughter while resisting criminal attempt.
  • Proposition Two is denied; no prosecutorial misconduct deprived Appellant of a fair trial.
  • Proposition Three is denied; Appellant has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel.
  • The Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED.

F-2017-1104

Apr. 11, 2019

Joseph Johnson

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

OPINION

LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE: Appellant, Joseph Johnson, was tried by jury and convicted of first degree murder, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2012, § 701.7(A), in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2016-5475. The jury set punishment at life imprisonment without parole. The Honorable Doug Drummond, District Judge, pronounced judgment and sentence according to the verdict. Mr. Johnson appeals.

FACTS

On October 10, 2016, around 1:45 p.m., Appellant shot and killed Quavis Trae Cato during an argument over possession of a car. Cato, who according to witnesses was unarmed, suffered ten gunshot wounds to the right side of his face, one wound to his neck, and three more wounds to his left shoulder. Trae Cato’s fiance, Ashley Porter, Porter’s friend Sarah Farris, and Appellant’s friend, Shannon Cage, were present at the shooting and testified at Appellant’s trial. Ashley Porter testified that Cato had bought the Mercedes from a third party more than a month earlier. The car had no title and was subject to a lien. They eventually realized the seller was not the owner and the car was stolen. By then, Cato had traded the car to Nathaniel Washington, Appellant’s cousin, for a Chevy Avalanche. Porter testified that she and Cato later realized this vehicle was also stolen and could not be titled. Porter testified that in early September 2016, Nathaniel Washington had texted her and asked her to remove the Mercedes from the grounds of his former duplex, as he had moved. On the afternoon of October 10, Ashley Porter and her friend, Sarah Farris, went to Washington’s duplex, where the car was parked. Cato came to the duplex in a separate car. Because the Mercedes had no working key, they broke in through a window to unlock it. They planned to remove the vehicle’s rims and have it hauled off for salvage.

Appellant, who sometimes stayed in the duplex unit next door, arrived on the scene and told Porter and Cato they could not remove the car until he consulted with Washington. Porter, Cato, and Appellant argued about their right to take immediate possession of the car. Porter testified that she tried to show Appellant the text messages allowing her to remove the car, but he refused to look at them. Porter testified that during this argument, Appellant got in his car and left. When he returned, he got out of the car carrying two handguns, one tucked under each of his folded arms. Appellant, Porter, and Cato then resumed arguing about the car. Porter testified that she initially tried to talk [Appellant] down, but Cato told her to stay out of grown men’s business and shoved her to the side, saying she did not have anything to explain to the Appellant. Cato then moved toward the back of his car, waiting to see what Appellant was going to do. More words were exchanged, and Porter saw the Appellant extend his arms and point the guns toward Cato. She heard Cato say that Appellant keeps pointing them f’ing guns like he’s gonna use them. Porter heard Appellant say, I’m ready to catch a body. As Cato appeared to be turning away, Appellant fired on him several times, first emptying the smaller pistol that looked like a chrome .38, then firing more shots from what looked like a 9 millimeter. Porter testified that after the shooting, she went to Cato and screamed for Sarah Farris to call 911. Porter remained at Cato’s side until he died. Appellant got in his car and left the scene.

Sarah Farris testified that her friend, Ashley Porter, was rowdy during the initial argument between Appellant, Cato, and Porter. Cato was backing up his fiance, but not as hostile as Porter toward the Appellant. Appellant told them repeatedly that he would not let them remove the car. Farris also confirmed that Appellant left the scene briefly and returned armed with two guns. Farris testified that Appellant’s friend, Shannon Cage, separated Appellant and Cato at one point and kind of calmed them down. Appellant still didn’t pull the guns. After Shannon Cage moved, Farris saw Appellant point the guns at Cato and calmly say they could not remove the car from the property. Cato replied that they were taking the car and continued his preparations to remove it. Farris said that as Cato turned a little bit to go back to his car, Appellant fired several shots at Cato. Farris also said that Cato was unarmed when he was shot.

Shannon Cage testified that Appellant drove up that afternoon to find Cato and Porter preparing to remove the Mercedes that afternoon and questioned what they were doing. Cage described Ashley Porter as being wound up in the quarrel with Appellant and drawing Cato into the argument as well. Cage said the Appellant had told them he wanted to ask his cousin if they could take the car. Cage also described the Appellant as armed with pistols folded up behind his arm. Cage testified that Appellant pulled at least one hand down and showed a firearm, saying he was going to call his cousin before the car went anywhere. Cato and Porter responded that they didn’t have to tell you nothing. [We] ain’t got to tell you nothing. Cage described the rest as Women hollering. Men arguing. Cage also recalled Cato pushing Porter aside from the argument and disrespecting the Appellant. Cage got concerned as Cato moved toward the back of his car, assuming he was going for a weapon. Cage said he briefly looked away, heard the shooting, and took cover. He never saw a weapon in Cato’s hands.

Tulsa Police Officer Cole Butler was flagged down by a black male just after the shooting. He found Cato on the ground, his blood already trailing down the driveway. A witness told him the shooter’s name was Joe and described the vehicle he had driven from the scene. After Appellant fled, he called Shannon Cage, who told Appellant that he believed Cato was dead. Appellant left his vehicle at his house in Tulsa and hitched a ride back to his mother’s house in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where he was arrested without incident by Louisiana police two days later. He later told the arresting officer that he used a 9 millimeter pistol in the shooting. He never mentioned the other person being armed, or claimed that he had shot in self-defense. Appellant did not testify at trial.

ANALYSIS

In Proposition One, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing his request for instructions on the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter in the heat of passion. In a second sub-proposition, he argues the trial court, sua sponte, should have instructed the jury on the lesser crime of first degree manslaughter while resisting a criminal attempt, based on a theory of imperfect self-defense. We review the trial court’s rulings on requested instructions for abuse of discretion. Eizember v. State, 2007 OK CR 29, ¶ 111, 164 P.3d 208, 236. An abuse of discretion is a clearly erroneous conclusion, contrary to the logic and effect of the facts presented. Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, ¶ 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170. Where an instructional error is raised for the first time on appeal, our review is for plain error. McHam v. State, 2005 OK CR 28, ¶ 21, 126 P.3d 662, 670. Trial court error not preserved by timely objection is waived, and therefore, not subject to correction on appeal, unless the error is plain or obvious under established law and affected the outcome of the trial. Barnard v. State, 2012 OK CR 15, ¶ 13, 290 P.3d 759, 764. The Court will exercise its discretion to remedy such a plain or obvious error only when the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Lamar v. State, 2018 OK CR 8, ¶ 40, 419 P.3d 283, 294.

Appellant argues in Proposition Three that counsel’s failure to request these instructions denied him the effective assistance of counsel. All lesser crimes of homicide (second degree murder, first and second degree manslaughter) are necessarily included in a charge of premeditated first degree murder, and instructions on lesser degrees of homicide should be given if supported by the evidence. Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41, ¶ 10, 991 P.2d 1032, 1036. Sufficient evidence to warrant instructions on a lesser offense is evidence that would allow a rational jury to acquit the defendant of the greater crime of murder and find him guilty of the lesser homicide. McHam v. State, 2005 OK CR 28, ¶ 20-21, 126 P.3d 662, 669-70. As pertinent here, homicide is first degree manslaughter when perpetrated without a design to effect death, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon; unless committed under circumstances of excusable or justifiable homicide. 21 O.S.2011, § 711(2). Homicide is also first degree manslaughter when the defendant kills the deceased unnecessarily while resisting an attempt by the deceased to commit a crime, or after an attempt by the deceased to commit a crime had failed. 21 O.S.2011, § 711(3).

The heat of passion required to reduce a killing from murder to heat of passion manslaughter includes (1) adequate provocation of the defendant by the victim; (2) a resulting passion or emotion, such as fear, terror, anger, rage or resentment; (3) the passion existed at the time of the killing and before a reasonable opportunity for the passion to cool; and (4) a causal connection between the provocation, the resulting passion, and the homicide. McHam, 2005 OK CR 28, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d at 667. When a defendant charged with premeditated first degree murder claims self-defense at trial, the evidence may warrant instructions on heat of passion manslaughter if the killer believed he was in great danger, even if this fear was unwarranted; or, though acting to defend himself, the killer was not free from blame. McHam, 2005 OK CR 28, ¶ 14, 126 P.3d 662, 668.

The question for the court is whether, in addition to evidence of an intent to kill, there was sufficient evidence that the killing occurred after adequate provocation, while in a resulting heat of passion, and thus, without a premeditated design to effect death. Tryon v. State, 2018 OK CR 20, ¶¶ 70-71, 423 P. 3d 617, 638. Appellant argues that the victim here was guilty of adequate provocation to give rise to homicidal passion at the time of the killing. He points to Cato and Porter’s uninvited entry on the former driveway of Appellant’s cousin; their breaking and entering of the car through the window; the heated argument about the right to take possession of the car; Cato’s recent use of methamphetamine that could have affected his behavior; Cato’s refusal to listen to Appellant or heed his requests; the fact that Cato owned and was sometimes known to carry a gun; and the chaotic ringing of the Mercedes’s car alarm during the argument. Appellant argues that Cato’s movement toward the trunk, as testified to by Shannon Cage, would have naturally or reasonably caused fear sufficient to provoke a heat of passion in the defendant, from which he killed before he had time to cool down.

On the contrary, we find that the evidence at trial was insufficient to show either an adequate provocation by the victim, or any resulting passion causally related to this killing. Appellant recklessly escalated this quarrel over another person’s property by arming himself with two loaded pistols. He firmly and, according to his own friend, Cage, rather calmly told Cato and Porter that no one would take the car without his cousin’s approval. Appellant then fired numerous shots at short range, striking the unarmed Cato fourteen times. Appellant then immediately fled the scene and left the state. He later admitted the shooting, but never claimed he was threatened with a weapon or in imminent fear of great bodily harm. Mere words, threats, menaces, or gestures, standing alone, however offensive or insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation to reduce intentional murder to heat of passion manslaughter. Washington v. State, 1999 OK CR 22, ¶ 13 n.4, 989 P.2d 960, 968 n.4. Conversely, personal violence by the deceased toward the accused likely to cause pain, bloodshed, or bodily harm can be adequate provocation. Jones v. State, 2006 OK CR 17, ¶ 7 n.4, 134 P.3d 150, 154 n.4; OUJI-CR (2d) 4-98 (defining adequate provocation). This record is insufficient to warrant instructions on heat of passion manslaughter. Davis v. State, 2011 OK CR 29, ¶ 113, 268 P.3d 86, 118 (finding armed defendant’s quarrel with unarmed decedent involved insufficient provocation to warrant heat of passion manslaughter instructions). Cato and Porter’s actions here never warranted Appellant doing more than calling police to investigate their claims to possession of the car. Appellant’s unprovoked violence in a dispute over property led to an unjustified and deliberate killing. The trial court properly denied Appellant’s requested instructions on heat of passion manslaughter. Reviewing for plain error, we reach the same conclusion regarding Appellant’s argument that the evidence warranted instructions on the crime of first degree manslaughter by resisting criminal attempt. While this killing was obviously perpetrated unnecessarily, establishing one element of this lesser crime, the evidence is insufficient to show that Appellant killed while resisting any actual crime or attempted crime by Cato, against either Appellant’s own person or property or the person or property of another. Counsel for the Appellant theorizes that Appellant opened fire on Cato to resist, at minimum, an assault and battery because he believed Cato was about to retrieve a gun. The law that reduces murder to manslaughter for resisting a criminal attempt does not go so far. Even if Cato was going to retrieve a weapon—which is mere speculation—Appellant intentionally gunned down Cato before he could either arm himself or withdraw from the difficulty. This was not manslaughter, but deliberate murder. Therefore, we find no plain or obvious error in the lack of jury instructions on the lesser crime of manslaughter while resisting criminal attempt. Proposition One is denied.

In Proposition Two, Appellant argues that prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument deprived him of a fair trial. Because trial counsel failed to object to all but one of the challenged statements, we review only for plain error, as defined above. Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, ¶¶ 3, 11, 23, 876 P.2d 690, 694, 695, 698. Appellant specifically claims the prosecutor’s arguments stated facts not in evidence, misled the jury on the law of self-defense, and compared Appellant’s execution of a death sentence on the victim in arguing for the sentence of life without parole.

This Court will not grant relief based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct unless the State’s argument or tactics rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. We view alleged misconduct within the context of the trial, considering the prosecutor’s actions, the strength of the evidence, and the corresponding arguments and tactics of defense counsel. Nicholson, 2018 OK CR 10, ¶ 18, 421 P.3d 890, 896-97. Counsel have a wide latitude to discuss the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom. Harmon v. State, 2011 OK CR 6, ¶ 81, 248 P.3d 918, 943.

Appellant first says the prosecutor misstated the evidence by saying that most of the fourteen shots fired by the Appellant were after Cato fell to the ground, an argument he correctly perceives as damaging to his claim of self-defense. We find this comment a reasonable inference from evidence that the initial shots fired by the Appellant struck Cato in the head. The State presented further evidence that several of the bullets struck the victim and the ground at a downward angle. Defense counsel’s objections to these statements as arguing facts not in evidence were properly overruled.

Appellant argues that the prosecutor also repeatedly misstated the law of self-defense. We review these challenged comments to determine whether a plain or obvious error in the prosecutor’s comment affected the outcome of the trial. In one quoted passage challenged by Appellant, the prosecutor is responding to defense counsel’s claim that Appellant had no intent to kill. The prosecutor asked rhetorically which of the fourteen shots fired was an intent to wound? Which one of these was an intent to just make him stop, stop lying on the ground bleeding out?, and so forth. In another challenged comment, the prosecutor argued, You don’t get to draw guns and shoot people just because you don’t like what’s happening. He could have left and because what did he do right after he shot him? Well, I don’t know. He left. The prosecutor also distinguished between wanting to and having to save your life, and argued that we don’t live in the wild west. In another passage, the prosecutor urged the jury not to get so confused and so tripped up by this back story that it somehow unravels into it’s okay to shoot him ten times in the head. No, that’s not how it works. Thankfully. We find these and similar arguments were fair comments on evidence that Appellant killed without justification and with malice aforethought, rather than in self-defense. No plain or obvious error occurred.

We also find no plain or obvious error in the prosecutor calling this crime an execution or a death sentence while arguing for a sentence of life without parole. Ashton v. State, 2017 OK CR 15, ¶ 49, 400 P.3d 887, 899 (citing Pickens v. State, 1993 OK CR 15, ¶ 59, 850 P.2d 328, 342) (finding no error in prosecutors’ use of term execution, where defendants shot unarmed victims in the head at fairly close range). The prosecutor was arguing that Appellant didn’t deserve to be back in our society; or deserve that 38 years and 3 months consideration, urging jurors to deny him the opportunity to plead for his freedom, an opportunity that he had denied the victim. These are powerful comments on comparative justice of the sentencing options for the jury, but viewed in the context of the facts of Appellant’s crime, the comments are not fundamentally unfair. Likewise, we find no improper appeal to sympathy or prejudice in the prosecutor’s use of the verb annihilate in comparing this case to murders involving a single shot or fatal blow, and thus possibly warranting the minimum sentence of life imprisonment. The prosecutor argued that Appellant deserved greater punishment because he tried to annihilate somebody as they’re laying on the ground languishing, probably hanging by a thread when you try to annihilate them and make sure they’re wiped clean off the face of this earth. These and similar characterizations of the facts of the crime are fair comments on the evidence and proper argument on the just penalty for this crime. We conclude that no plain or obvious error occurred in the prosecutor’s arguments to the jury.

Reviewing the argument as a whole, we further conclude that any minor irregularities in the argument are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the strong evidence of the deliberate nature of the killing. These errors did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings, and no relief is required. Proposition Two is denied.

In Proposition Three, Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) present expert testimony of the effects of PTSD, bipolar disorder, and autism on self-defense; (2) utilize evidence that Appellant was threatened by the victim; (3) utilize evidence of Appellant’s remorse; (4) marshal the evidence in closing argument; (5) request manslaughter instructions; and (6) object to prosecutorial misconduct.

This Court reviews ineffective assistance claims with the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), requiring that the appellant show both unreasonably deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice, in the form of an unreliable verdict or sentence. Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Prejudice in this sense means a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient representation, the outcome of the trial or sentencing would have been different. Head v. State, 2006 OK CR 44, ¶ 23, 146 P.3d 1141, 1148.

In connection with his claim regarding counsel’s failure to present expert psychological testimony, Appellant has filed an Application for Evidentiary Hearing on Sixth Amendment Claims pursuant to Rule 3.11(B)(3)(b), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 22 O.S.Supp.2018, Ch.18, App. We review an application for evidentiary hearing filed pursuant to Rule 3.11 (B) to determine whether Appellant’s materials show clear and convincing evidence of a strong possibility that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to utilize or identify the complained-of evidence.

This Rule 3.11 standard is less demanding than the Strickland test. Where a strong possibility of ineffective counsel is shown by clear and convincing evidence, Appellant should be afforded further opportunity to develop his claim, and remand is granted. Where review discloses no clear and convincing evidence of a strong possibility of ineffective assistance, we deny remand and, necessarily, conclude that Appellant cannot show that counsel was ineffective under the two-pronged Strickland standard. Simpson v. State, 2010 OK CR 6, ¶ 53, 230 P.3d 888, 905-06.

In his application for evidentiary hearing, Appellant submits an affidavit from a forensic psychologist who reviewed various medical records of the Appellant and selected transcripts from the trial. Based on these records, despite the lack of a personal evaluation, the psychologist states the opinion that Appellant likely suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), bipolar disorder, cognitive deficits, and autism. Appellant argues that trial counsel’s failure to identify and utilize such forensic testimony at trial, to explain Appellant’s perceptions of the situation and his reactions to the threat he perceived, is clear and convincing evidence of a strong possibility that trial counsel was ineffective. We disagree.

Homicide is justified only when a reasonable person would have used deadly force. Davis v. State, 2011 OK CR 29, ¶ 95, 268 P.3d 86, 114. Neither fear, nor threats or insults alone can justify homicide. McKee v. State, 1962 OK CR 57, 372 P.2d 243; Jamison v. State, 1956 OK CR 127; OUJI-Cr(2nd) 8-50. One who voluntarily enters into an altercation armed with a deadly weapon has no right to self-defense unless the aggressor then withdrew or attempted to withdraw from the altercation and communicated the desire to withdraw to the adversary. Ruth v. State, 1978 OK CR 79, ¶ 8, 581 P. 2d 919, 922; OUJI-Cr(2d) 8-51.

In Bechtel v. State, 1992 OK CR 55, 840 P. 2d 1, this Court held that the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) was reversible error in a murder case involving a domestic abuse victim’s claim of self-defense. Id., 840 P.2d at 9-10. The Court reasoned that specialized knowledge about the battered woman’s fear of imminent danger in an abusive environment, and the reasonableness of that fear, can be understood only within the framework of BWS. Id., 840 P.2d at 6. The Court found BWS was a substantially scientifically accepted theory that could assist the trier of fact in assessing the reasonableness of her belief that she was in imminent danger. Id., 840 P.2d at 6-8. The Court also found that expert testimony about how this syndrome affected [defendant’s] perceptions of danger, its imminence, what actions were necessary to protect herself, and the reasonableness of those perceptions are relevant and necessary to prove self-defense. Id. at 10.

Without deciding whether PTSD, bipolar disorder, and/or autism, and/or related perceptions and behaviors could be relevant to self-defense under the reasoning of Bechtel, we find no relief is warranted here. Appellant armed himself and voluntarily entered into the difficulty with Cato and Porter. Appellant then killed Cato, firing multiple shots from close range while Cato was yet unarmed. Appellant may have subjectively feared an assault, but we find no persuasive evidence that his fear or the resulting attack was reasonable, even viewing the facts from Appellant’s perspective at the time. We conclude that Appellant has not shown clear and convincing evidence of a strong possibility that counsel was ineffective for failing to identify or utilize expert testimony about the Appellant’s alleged PTSD, bipolar disorder, and/or autism in the way suggested by Appellant’s brief. Necessarily, we also conclude that this aspect of counsel’s performance was consistent with prevailing professional norms. Even if it was not, the degree of deficiency creates no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. We therefore deny the request to remand for evidentiary hearing on this claim and find no relief is required.

Regarding Appellant’s remaining claims, we find that trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance in failing to present evidence that Appellant was threatened; that he expressed remorse after the killing; that counsel failed to better marshal conflicting testimony about whether Appellant had one or two weapons; that counsel failed to request instructions on manslaughter, or object to certain prosecutorial arguments, neither show unreasonably deficient performance nor create any reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. Appellant has not shown that counsel’s representation violated the Sixth Amendment. Proposition Three is therefore denied.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Click Here To Download PDF

Footnotes:

  1. 21 O.S.Supp.2012, § 701.7(A)
  2. 21 O.S.2011, § 711(2)
  3. 21 O.S.2011, § 711(3)
  4. Washington v. State, 1999 OK CR 22, I 13 n.4, 989 P.2d 960, 968 n.4.
  5. Jones v. State, 2006 OK CR 17, I 7 n.4, 134 P.3d 150, 154 n.4;
  6. Davis v. State, 2011 OK CR 29, I 113, 268 P.3d 86, 118.
  7. McKee v. State, 1962 OK CR 57, 372 P.2d 243;
  8. Jamison v. State, 1956 OK CR 127;
  9. OUJI-Cr(2nd) 8-50.
  10. Ruth v. State, 1978 OK CR 79, I 8, 581 P. 2d 919, 922;
  11. OUJI-Cr(2d) 8-51.
  12. Bechtel v. State, 1992 OK CR 55, 840 P.2d 1.
  13. Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, II 3, 11, 23, 876 P.2d 690, 694, 695, 698.
  14. Mack v. State, 2018 OK CR 30, 9 5, 428 P.3d 326, 328-29.
  15. Head v. State, 2006 OK CR 44, I 23, 146 P.3d 1141, 1148.
  16. Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7(A) - First degree murder
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 711(2) - First degree manslaughter
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 711(3) - First degree manslaughter while resisting a criminal attempt
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 3.11 - Evidentiary hearing on Sixth Amendment claims
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 22 - MANDATE issued upon delivery and filing of decision
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 - Intentional murder
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 652 - Intoxication as a defense
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 682 - Homicide definitions

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Eizember v. State, 2007 OK CR 29, I 111, 164 P.3d 208, 236.
  • Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170.
  • McHam v. State, 2005 OK CR 28, I 21, 126 P.3d 662, 670.
  • Shrum v. State, 1999 OK CR 41, I 10, 991 P.2d 1032, 1036.
  • Davis v. State, 2011 OK CR 29, I 113, 268 P.3d 86, 118.
  • Washington v. State, 1999 OK CR 22, I 13 n.4, 989 P.2d 960, 968 n.4.
  • Jones v. State, 2006 OK CR 17, I 7 n.4, 134 P.3d 150, 154 n.4.
  • Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, II 3, 11, 23, 876 P.2d 690, 694, 695, 698.
  • Harmon v. State, 2011 OK CR 6, I 81, 248 P.3d 918, 943.
  • Ashton v. State, 2017 OK CR 15, I 49, 400 P.3d 887, 899.
  • Pickens v. State, 1993 OK CR 15, I 59, 850 P.2d 328, 342.
  • Davis v. State, 2011 OK CR 29, I 95, 268 P.3d 86, 114.
  • McKee v. State, 1962 OK CR 57, 372 P.2d 243.
  • Jamison v. State, 1956 OK CR 127.
  • Ruth v. State, 1978 OK CR 79, I 8, 581 P.2d 919, 922.
  • Bechtel v. State, 1992 OK CR 55, 840 P.2d 1.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,