Jose Jonathan Rivera-Chavez v The State Of Oklahoma

F-2017-1103

Filed: Apr. 4, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

Jose Jonathan Rivera-Chavez appealed his conviction for first degree murder. Conviction and sentence: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Judge Kuehn, Judge Lumpkin, Judge Hudson, and Judge Rowland concurred, while Judge Lewis dissented. In this case, Rivera-Chavez was found guilty of murdering Wanda Cooper at a hotel in Tulsa. After the incident, Cooper was found with severe injuries and later died in the hospital. Evidence showed that Rivera-Chavez had tried to hide and was behaving strangely after the attack. He claimed that he was in a drug-induced state and did not intend to kill Cooper. During the trial, his defense argued that he was too intoxicated to form the intent to kill, but the court allowed evidence of his behavior after being arrested, which contradicted his claims. The court ruled that this evidence was permissible for assessing his state of mind. Ultimately, the court affirmed his conviction, stating there was no reasonable doubt about his guilt.

Decision

The Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

Issues

• Was the admission of a recording showing the administration of Miranda warnings and Appellant's invocation of his rights a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights under Doyle v. Ohio and Wainwright v. Greenfield?
• Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence pertaining to Appellant's demeanor and behavior during the administration of Miranda warnings?
• Was the use of post-Miranda silence by the State for impeachment purposes fundamentally unfair under the Due Process Clause?
• Was any potential error in the admission of the recording harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the evidence presented?

Findings

• the court did not err in admitting the recording of Appellant's Miranda warnings and subsequent invocation of rights
• the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of first degree murder
• no reversible error occurred regarding the admission of evidence pertaining to Appellant's demeanor
• any potential error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
• the judgment and sentence is affirmed

F-2017-1103

Apr. 4, 2019

Jose Jonathan Rivera-Chavez

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

OPINION

LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE:

Appellant, Jose Jonathan Rivera-Chavez, was tried by jury and convicted of first degree murder, in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2012, 701.7(A), in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2017-59. After a second-stage sentencing where the State introduced three (3) prior felony convictions, the jury sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Honorable William Musseman, District Judge, pronounced judgment and sentence according to the verdict. Mr. Rivera-Chavez appeals.

FACTS

Appellant and Wanda Cooper were staying together at a Tulsa extended stay hotel in late December, 2016. Around 3:00 p.m., on December 27, 2016, Cooper appeared in the doorway of the hotel office and said, Help me to a staff member at the front desk. Cooper gestured in the direction of a man, who was walking quickly away from the hotel down East 41st Street. The staff member recognized this person as the man who had paid the rent on Cooper’s room a few days before, and identified the man at trial as the Appellant. Ms. Cooper, who was covered in blood, walked only a few feet from the hotel’s front door and fell to the ground. The hotel staff member called 911. She and other bystanders then tried to help Ms. Cooper, who later died from her wounds at the hospital. Down 41st Street, meanwhile, other witnesses at a local business saw a man, whom they also identified at trial as the Appellant, approach the driver’s side doors of several parked cars and attempt to open them. Police later recovered a hoodie worn by the Appellant in this lot. The murder weapon was never recovered.

One of the hotel patrons had passed Appellant while driving to the lobby to renew his room key. Appellant had stepped in front of his car and caused him to stop. He then saw Appellant attempt to open the rear door of his car. This man had watched Appellant’s getaway, and pursued him. When Appellant looked back and saw him, the man told Appellant he knew what he had done. As the man approached, Appellant took a swing at him and they began to fight. The man would not let Appellant go, saying at some point that Appellant could either come back and face police or continue to get beaten. Appellant relented and they began walking back toward the hotel. When the man asked Appellant why he did it, Appellant gave several reasons, stating he had paperwork on Ms. Cooper (a possible reference to her prior work as a police informant); that someone else had made him do it; and that he had no choice. Police soon reached Appellant’s location on 41st Street and told him to stop. Appellant ignored these commands, briefly taunted the officer and kind of danced in the street, then began to run away. Police released a K-9, which caught and subdued the Appellant. Police arrested the Appellant, seized his bloody clothing, and continued their investigation. The hotel patron who had pursued and fought with the Appellant, as well as police officers who came in contact with Appellant that afternoon, later testified at trial that from their observation and interactions with Appellant that day, he did not appear severely intoxicated or under the influence of drugs.

Ms. Cooper had suffered twenty-six sharp force injuries (cuts and stab wounds) from Appellant’s knife: nine to her head and neck; four to her chest area; four to her back, and several apparent defensive wounds and blunt force injuries besides. Two of the wounds to her chest went three or four inches deep. One penetrated her heart and directly contributed to her death.

Appellant testified at trial, admitting that he and Ms. Cooper had been staying together and doing drugs in the hotel for five days. Appellant testified that he had gotten too high on methamphetamine, grown paranoid, and hallucinated. He said Ms. Cooper had become upset when he asked her to get money for more drugs. Thinking she had glanced toward a pair of scissors lying on the counter, Appellant stabbed her with his hunting knife. He claimed he only remembered stabbing the victim four times. Appellant denied intending to kill Cooper, and admitted his three prior felony convictions. Additional facts will be related in the discussion of Appellant’s proposition of error.

ANALYSIS

In Proposition One, Appellant argues that the admission of a one-minute, seventeen second (1:17) recording showing a detective’s administration of the Miranda warnings and Appellant’s subsequent invocation of Miranda rights, offered to rebut his defense of voluntary intoxication, abridged his Fourteenth Amendment rights under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976) and Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 286-87, 295, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (holding State’s use of post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes violated Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). Defense counsel preserved this claim with a timely objection to the proposed evidence at trial. The trial court admitted this evidence on the State’s cross-examination after the defense called the investigating detective in its case-in-chief. The court found the recording’s depiction of Appellant’s demeanor, close in time to the crime, had tremendous probative value on the issue of voluntary intoxication.

Recognizing the danger of admitting evidence involving the right to remain silent, the trial court first instructed the jury that a defendant is not compelled to talk to the police and the fact that a defendant does not talk to police cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way. The trial court then told jurors the recording was a snippet of a discussion giving them: an opportunity for you to review his responses and demeanor. It is not to be considered as proof of guilt or innocence. It’s not the answers that are given that is [sic] to be evaluated. It is his demeanor and evidence that you can evaluate for the intoxication element. That is all it will be used for (emphasis added).

The admission of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and, when properly preserved for appellate review, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. In Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986), the defendant asserted the defense of insanity at trial on a charge of sexual battery. After the conclusion of the evidence, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the defendant’s silence after receiving Miranda warnings was evidence of his sanity. Relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court held that this argument imposed an unfair penalty for the exercise of Miranda rights after an implied promise (in the Miranda warning) that silence carried no penalty. The Court found this use of post-Miranda silence fundamentally unfair under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Whether a prosecutor’s use of post-Miranda silence to impeach or rebut defense testimony is reversible error under Doyle depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Here, we find that the admission of this brief recording of Appellant, showing the administration of Miranda warnings and his invocation of the right to remain silent, was not an unfair use for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, as prohibited by Doyle and Greenfield.

We conclude from the relevant facts and circumstances that the recording showing Appellant’s invocation of his Miranda rights was not unfairly used against him in violation of due process. Even assuming that error occurred, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Properly admissible aspects of the recording were clearly probative of voluntary intoxication. The evidence came in only on rebuttal, after Appellant had offered evidence of voluntary intoxication. The contemporaneous limiting instruction likely prevented any prejudicial use of this evidence by the jury. The State’s arguments focused on the purposes for which the evidence was admitted, and avoided the excesses associated with past Doyle violations. The remaining evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant killed with malice aforethought, and was not so intoxicated as to obviate the mens rea of the crime. We find no reasonable doubt that error unfairly prejudiced the verdict or resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

Proposition One is therefore denied.

DECISION

The Judgment and Sentence is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon delivery and filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

1. 1 Police recovered blood from Appellant's pants and shoes that matched a known profile of Ms. Cooper's DNA.
2. 2 Miranda U. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
3. 3 The trial court instructed the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication and the lesser crime of second degree depraved mind murder.
4. 4 To save trial time, the State was allowed to open its case in rebuttal during cross-examination of this defense witness and offer the recording in rebuttal.
5. 5 Appellant's demeanor, close in time to the crime, had tremendous probative value on the issue of voluntary intoxication.
6. 6 In Wainwright U. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986), the defendant asserted the defense of insanity at trial on a charge of sexual battery.
7. 7 had repeatedly asked to talk to a Charlie Milor.
8. 8 Whether a prosecutor's use of post-Miranda silence to impeach or rebut defense testimony is reversible error under Doyle depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
9. 9 cases in which this Court has found Doyle violations.
10. 10 invocation of his Miranda rights was not unfairly used against him in violation of due process.
11. 20 O.S.2011, § 3001.1.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

• Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7 (2012) - First degree murder
• Okla. Stat. tit. 20 § 3001.1 (2011) - Evidence relating to intoxication

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

• Bramlett v. State, 2018 OK CR 19, I 36, 422 P.3d 788, 799-800
• Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)
• Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 286-87, 295, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986)
• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)
• Pavatt v. State, 2007 OK CR 19, I 42, 159 P.3d 272, 286
• Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, "I 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170
• Royal v. State, 1988 OK CR 203, 761 P. 2d 497
• Dungan v. State, 1982 OK CR 152, I 6, 651 P.2d 1064, 1065
• Parks v. State, 1988 OK CR 275, 19 8-12, 765 P. 2d 790, 792-93
• Wood v. State, 1987 OK CR 281, I 16, 748 P.2d 523, 525
• Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001)