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F 2017-1055

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William Singleton Wall, III v The State Of Oklahoma

F 2017-1055

Filed: Oct. 10, 2019

Not for publication

Prevailing Party: The State Of Oklahoma

Summary

William Singleton Wall, III, appealed his conviction for Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance (Oxycodone), Second and Subsequent. His conviction and sentence were ten years in prison. Judge Kuehn dissented. In this case, William Wall entered a drug court program after being charged with drug possession. If he completed the program successfully, his case would be dismissed, but if he failed, he could face a ten-year prison sentence. The state decided to remove him from the drug court after he tested positive for THC (marijuana). He argued that he should not have been removed because he had not received enough notice about the rules, and that the state’s request to terminate him came too late. The court found that William Wall's termination from the drug court was proper. They said the judge had the right to decide whether to remove him based on the evidence presented, which included his positive drug test and his own admission of using drugs. They stated that he was aware of his options when he joined the program and that there was no legal issue with the timing of the state's request. In the end, the court decided to uphold his termination from the drug court and the ten-year prison sentence. Judge Kuehn disagreed, believing that Wall's termination happened after the time limit allowed by law, which should not have happened.

Decision

The termination of Appellant from the Pontotoc County Drug Court Program in Pontotoc County District Court Case No. CF-2014-61 is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the filing of this decision.

Issues

  • Was there sufficient evidence to justify the termination of Appellant from Drug Court?
  • Did Appellant receive proper notice of the terms and conditions of his Drug Court participation?
  • Did the trial court have jurisdiction to terminate Appellant from Drug Court after the statutory time period for participation had expired?

Findings

  • the court did not err in terminating Appellant from Drug Court
  • the court did not abuse its discretion regarding the performance contract and treatment plan
  • the court had jurisdiction to terminate Appellant from Drug Court despite the timing of the State's application

F 2017-1055

Oct. 10, 2019

William Singleton Wall, III

Appellant

v

The State Of Oklahoma

Appellee

SUMMARY OPINION

JOHN D. HADDEN LUMPKIN, JUDGE:

Appellant, William Singleton Wall, III, was charged on February 18, 2014, with Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance (Oxycodone), Second and Subsequent, in Pontotoc County District Court Case No. CF-2014-61. Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere on March 24, 2014, and was admitted into the Pontotoc County Drug Court Program. If successful, the case would be dismissed and expunged; if not, Appellant would be sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

The State filed an application to terminate Appellant from the Pontotoc County Drug Court Program on April 19, 2017, alleging Appellant tested positive for THC. Following a hearing on the State’s application on October 11, 2017, the Honorable Thomas S. Landrith, District Judge, sustained the State’s application and terminated Appellant from the Pontotoc County Drug Court Program. Appellant was sentenced to ten years with credit for time served. Appellant appeals from his termination from Drug Court. On appeal Appellant argues the following propositions of error:

1. The court abused its discretion by terminating Appellant from Drug Court. There was insufficient evidence of an unsanctioned violation.
2. The record contains no performance contract, treatment plan, or otherwise describes the terms of Appellant’s Drug Court participation; Appellant should not have been terminated for violating provisions of which he had no notice.
3. The State filed the application after the period allotted for Drug Court participation expired. The court lacked authority to terminate and sentence Appellant.

We affirm the trial court’s order to terminate Appellant from the Pontotoc County Drug Court Program.

1. Appellant failed to object to the introduction of the violation report at the termination hearing which reflected that Appellant admitted to drug use and had a positive drug test on April 11, 2017. The decision to revoke or terminate from Drug Court lies within the discretion of the Drug Court judge (Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, ¶ 11, 990 P.2d 894, 898). Appellant has not shown that his termination from the Drug Court program was an abuse of discretion.

2. Appellant argues that the record does not include a performance contract, a treatment plan, an eligibility form, or any other document explaining the terms and conditions of Drug Court participation and that he should not be terminated for violating provisions of which he had no notice. In a Supplemental Designation of Record filed in this District Court on October 24, 2017, appellate counsel designated the entire Pontotoc County Drug Court file. On January 31, 2018, appellate counsel filed an objection to the record in this Court stating he had not received the designated Drug Court file. In an Order issued on February 6, 2018, the matter was remanded to the District Court for findings of fact regarding Appellant’s objection to the record on appeal. Findings of Fact were filed in this Court on March 19, 2018, concluding Appellant never had a separate Drug Court file and that the record as previously submitted was complete. No further objection to the record was made by either party.

The transcript of the Drug Court plea reflects that the trial judge asked Appellant’s counsel whether he had gone over the Drug Court contract with Appellant and counsel answered yes. The trial judge asked counsel whether he believed Appellant understands the nature, purpose and consequences of his Drug Court contract and counsel answered that he did. The trial judge then asked Appellant whether he went over this with his counsel and whether he had any questions about it and Appellant answered no. The trial judge also asked Appellant whether he understood that if he messed up and violated the terms of his Drug Court contract that he would get ten years and Appellant answered that he understood.

In an Order issued August 1, 2019, this Court issued a directive to Judge Kessinger directing him to transmit a certified, file-stamped copy of the Drug Court Performance Contract to this Court or advise why it is not available. A response by Judge Kessinger was filed on August 9, 2019, with a copy of the Performance Contract that is not certified or file stamped. While Judge Kessinger found the Performance Contract is a true and correct copy signed by Appellant, he also found the Performance Contract was not filed of record with the Pontotoc County Court Clerk. The original was maintained by the Pontotoc County Drug Court Program. The record does not support Appellant’s argument that he had no notice. Appellant has not shown an abuse of discretion. While we do not find error in this case, the Drug Court contract and records related to the Drug Court program must be filed of record. The Drug Court contract is a part of the record on the plea of guilty and the Drug Court file must be maintained of record to ensure any appeal by a defendant includes the entirety of the record to be considered on appeal. While certain confidentiality is required in the Drug Court program, records must be available for a defendant if an appeal is filed.

3. Appellant entered Drug Court on March 24, 2014, and the State’s application to terminate Appellant from Drug Court was filed on April 19, 2017. Citing Section 471.6(G) of Title 22, Appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to terminate him from Drug Court since the State filed its motion over three years after Appellant entered the program. To the extent that sentencing is delayed pending participation in Drug Court, these cases are comparable to situations where a defendant receives a deferred sentence (Looney v. State, 2002 OK CR 27, ¶ 9, 49 P.3d 761, 763). The termination of a defendant from Drug Court is analogous to an acceleration of a deferred sentence (Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, ¶ 9-11, 990 P.2d 894). Subsection G of Section 471.6 deals with timing issues related to the active treatment portion of the Drug Court program. The statutory language does not limit the timing of the filing of an application to terminate. We find no authority for Appellant’s interpretation of Section 471.6(G). While the statutory time allowed for the treatment portion of the Drug Court program may expire, Appellant remains subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court. Petitioner has been convicted but he has not been sentenced. Sentencing was delayed pending his successful completion or his termination from the Drug Court program. In this case Appellant was neither terminated nor otherwise released from the Drug Court program within the statutory time limits of Section 471.6(G). In effect, the time for the treatment portion of the program expired terminating Appellant’s Drug Court participation by operation of law. Authority reverted to the District Court for sentencing. Judge Landrith terminated Appellant from the Drug Court Program and sentenced him pursuant to the terms of the Drug Court contract. This proposition of error has no merit.

DECISION

The termination of Appellant from the Pontotoc County Drug Court Program in Pontotoc County District Court Case No. CF-2014-61 is AFFIRMED. Pursuant to Rule 3.15, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2019), the MANDATE is ORDERED issued upon the filing of this decision.

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Footnotes:

  1. Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, IT 11, 990 P.2d 894, 898.
  2. Looney U. State, 2002 OK CR 27, 9 9, 49 P.3d 761, 763.
  3. Hagar U. State, 1999 OK CR 35, II 9-11, 990 P.2d 894.
  4. Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.6(G).
  5. Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.1.
  6. Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.2(B)(5).
  7. Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.7(G).
  8. Willard U. State, 67 Okla. Crim. 192, 1939 OK CR 102, 94 P.2d 13, 17.
  9. Grant U. McLeod, 1958 OK CR 51, I 20, 325 P.2d 1083, 1089.
  10. Boykin U. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 175, 198, 190 P.2d 471, 482.
  11. Jones v. State, 1975 OK CR 189, I 9, 541 P.2d 219, 223.
  12. State U. Rodriquez, 1976 OK CR 68, I 4, 547 P.2d 974, 975.

Oklahoma Statutes citations:

  • Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.8 (2011) - Possession of Controlled Dangerous Substance
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.6(G) (2016) - Drug Court Program Participation
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.1 (2011) - Drug Court Purpose
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.2(B)(5) (2011) - Plea Agreements in Drug Court
  • Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 471.7(G) (2011) - Prohibition of Amending Plea Agreements

Oklahoma Administrative Rules citations:

No Oklahoma administrative rules found.

U.S. Code citations:

No US Code citations found.

Other citations:

No other rule citations found.

Case citations:

  • Hagar v. State, 1999 OK CR 35, I 11, 990 P.2d 894, 898
  • Looney v. State, 2002 OK CR 27, I 9, 49 P.3d 761, 763
  • Willard v. State, 67 Okla. Crim. 192, 1939 OK CR 102, 94 P.2d 13, 17
  • Grant v. McLeod, 1958 OK CR 51, I 20, 325 P.2d 1083, 1089
  • Boykin v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 175, 190 P.2d 471, 479
  • Jones v. State, 1975 OK CR 189, I 9, 541 P.2d 219, 223
  • State v. Rodriquez, 1976 OK CR 68, I 4, 547 P.2d 974, 975

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